Intisar Rabb | Harvard University (original) (raw)
Papers by Intisar Rabb
Law and Tradition in Classical Islamic Thought, 2013
International Journal of Middle East Studies
“Information wants to be free.” Although this sentiment dominates the current digital landscape, ... more “Information wants to be free.” Although this sentiment dominates the current digital landscape, information about Islamic law and history often remains bound to its physical form and to the price of acquiring it. One should not have to travel to several countries or be associated with the handful of institutions with large collections in these fields to gain access to these sources (which can still be onerous once there). But this is precisely the case for those who aim to do serious, comparative, or otherwise broad-ranging work in Islamic law. For Islamic law, there is a persistent problem of access and ease of use.
Journal of Qur Ānic Studies, 2006
Law and Tradition in Classical Islamic Thought, 2013
Accusations of Unbelief in Islam, 2015
A History of Legal Maxims, Interpretation, and Islamic Criminal Law, 2015
A History of Legal Maxims, Interpretation, and Islamic Criminal Law, 2015
What is the role of Islamic law in literature and, reflexively, the role of literature in Islamic... more What is the role of Islamic law in literature and, reflexively, the role of literature in Islamic law? We set about to answer this intriguing question, often asked in other interpretive communities of law and literature, with reference to one of the most acclaimed storytellers in early Islamic history. Abū ʿAlī al-Muḥassin al-Tanūkhī (d. 384/994) was a scholar of Arabic-Islamic literature who doubled as a judge, and had something to say about both law and literature, though not necessarily in ways one might expect.
الفقه الإسلامي في الأدب: أهمّية الإجراءات القضائية في كتاب الفرج بعد الشدّة للتنوخي انتصار راب و... more الفقه الإسلامي في الأدب:
أهمّية الإجراءات القضائية في كتاب الفرج بعد الشدّة للتنوخي
انتصار راب و بلال الأرفه لي
المقدّمة
ما هو دور الفقه الإسلامي في الأدب؟ وبطريقة عكسية، ما هو دور الأدب في الفقه الإسلامي؟ ينطلق هذا البحث للإجابة عن هذين السؤالين البالغي الأهمّية_واللذين عادةً ما يظهران في الأوساط التأويلية للفقه والأدب_من خلال الإحالة لأحد أهمّ القصّاص في التاريخ الإسلامي المبكّر. كان أبو عليّ المُحَسِّن التنوخي (ت 384ه/994م) أديبًا وقاضيًا في الوقت نفسه، وقد أدلى بدلوه في مجالَي الأدب والفقه، ولكن بأساليب وطرق غير متوقَّعة. إذ لم تتناول قصصه مثلًا الموضوعات الأدبية في الفقه، ولم تكن قصصًا تمثيلية لوقائع متخيّلة، كما كان الحال مع هاربر لي (Harper Lee) في روايته أن تقتل طائرًا بريئًا (Lee, 1960)، وهي رواية صارت علامةً في الأدب الأميركي الحديث عرضت لشخصيتها البطولية التي تمثّلت (مع تحوّلها إلى موضع شكّ فيما بعد) ببطلها المحامي آتيكوس فيتش (Atticus Fitch) ومعالجته لموضوعات جوهرية من قبيل العدالة العرقية والجنائية (Lee, 2015). ولكنّ قصص التنوخي اهتمّت بعرض موضوعات دنيويّة ذات جذور قانونية بصيغة أدبية، من قبيل التجّار المشاكسين والمتقاضين الجشعين والغيرة في المحاكم الشرعية والسلطانية. وقدّمت هذه القصص آنذاك دروسًا أخلاقية من زمانها ومحيطها، تمامًا كما يُتوقّع من الأدب الخيالي. وكان الشكل الأدبي الذي استُخدم لنقل الدروس الأخلاقية في العصر الوسيط في بغداد هو السرد، وقد تفوّق التنوخي بعرضه لتلك الدروس في مختاراته الأدبية. ونقلت هذه القصص في الوقت نفسه دروسًا هامّة عن الفقه، أو التصوّر الشائع له آنذاك من خلال نُقول عَرَضية للإجراءات القضائية. ولأنّ استحضاره للإجراءات في المحاكم كان عَرَضيًّا في سياق السرد، تشكّل هذه القصص والتمثيلات مادّة للمؤرّخين يستطيعون توظيفها في استكمال القصص والتقارير المختصرة والتعليمية حول الإجراءات القضائية الواردة في المصادر التقليدية للفقه الإسلامي المبكّر.
In the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings dubbed the "Arab Spring," Egypt's new constitution expands... more In the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings dubbed the "Arab Spring," Egypt's new constitution expands the constitutionally recognized role of Islamic law in state legislation and judicial review.
This Article explores an area of close parallel between legal doctrines in the contexts of Islami... more This Article explores an area of close parallel between legal doctrines in the contexts of Islamic law and American legal theory. In criminal law, both traditions espouse a type of "rule of lenity"-that curious common law rule that instructs judges not to impose criminal sanctions in cases of doubt. The rule is curious because criminal law is a peremptory expression of legislative will. However, the rule of lenity would seem to encourage courts to disregard one of the most fundamental principles of Islamic and American legislation and adjudication: judicial deference to legislative supremacy. In the Islamic context, such a rule would be even more curious, allowing Muslim judges to disregard a deference rule even more entrenched than the American one: a divine legislative supremacy to which judicial deference should be absolute. Yet, there is an "Islamic rule of lenity" that pervades Islamic criminal law. This Article examines the operation of and justifications for the lenity rule in the American and Islamic contexts against the backdrop of theories of law and legislative supremacy that underlie both. In both contexts, the lenity rule acts serves to expand the operation of judicial discretion. But whereas the use of American lenity is fraught and limited, Islamic lenity is relatively uncontroversial and expansive. With the Islamic rule of lenity, we see both stronger legislative supremacy doctrines and more assertions (albeit hidden) of
Legal maxims reflect settled principles of law to which jurists appeal when confronting new legal... more Legal maxims reflect settled principles of law to which jurists appeal when confronting new legal cases. One such maxim of Islamic criminal law stipulates that judges are to avoid imposing ḥudūd and other sanctions when beset by doubts as to the scope of the law or the sufficiency of the evidence (idra'ū ʾl-ḥudūd biʾl-shubahāt): the "ḥudūd maxim." Jurists of all periods reference this maxim widely. But whereas developed juristic works attribute it to Muḥammad in the form of a prophetic report (ḥadīth), early jurists do not. Instead, they cite the maxim as an anonymous saying of nonspecific Correspondence: Intisar A. Rabb,
Law and Tradition in Classical Islamic Thought, 2013
International Journal of Middle East Studies
“Information wants to be free.” Although this sentiment dominates the current digital landscape, ... more “Information wants to be free.” Although this sentiment dominates the current digital landscape, information about Islamic law and history often remains bound to its physical form and to the price of acquiring it. One should not have to travel to several countries or be associated with the handful of institutions with large collections in these fields to gain access to these sources (which can still be onerous once there). But this is precisely the case for those who aim to do serious, comparative, or otherwise broad-ranging work in Islamic law. For Islamic law, there is a persistent problem of access and ease of use.
Journal of Qur Ānic Studies, 2006
Law and Tradition in Classical Islamic Thought, 2013
Accusations of Unbelief in Islam, 2015
A History of Legal Maxims, Interpretation, and Islamic Criminal Law, 2015
A History of Legal Maxims, Interpretation, and Islamic Criminal Law, 2015
What is the role of Islamic law in literature and, reflexively, the role of literature in Islamic... more What is the role of Islamic law in literature and, reflexively, the role of literature in Islamic law? We set about to answer this intriguing question, often asked in other interpretive communities of law and literature, with reference to one of the most acclaimed storytellers in early Islamic history. Abū ʿAlī al-Muḥassin al-Tanūkhī (d. 384/994) was a scholar of Arabic-Islamic literature who doubled as a judge, and had something to say about both law and literature, though not necessarily in ways one might expect.
الفقه الإسلامي في الأدب: أهمّية الإجراءات القضائية في كتاب الفرج بعد الشدّة للتنوخي انتصار راب و... more الفقه الإسلامي في الأدب:
أهمّية الإجراءات القضائية في كتاب الفرج بعد الشدّة للتنوخي
انتصار راب و بلال الأرفه لي
المقدّمة
ما هو دور الفقه الإسلامي في الأدب؟ وبطريقة عكسية، ما هو دور الأدب في الفقه الإسلامي؟ ينطلق هذا البحث للإجابة عن هذين السؤالين البالغي الأهمّية_واللذين عادةً ما يظهران في الأوساط التأويلية للفقه والأدب_من خلال الإحالة لأحد أهمّ القصّاص في التاريخ الإسلامي المبكّر. كان أبو عليّ المُحَسِّن التنوخي (ت 384ه/994م) أديبًا وقاضيًا في الوقت نفسه، وقد أدلى بدلوه في مجالَي الأدب والفقه، ولكن بأساليب وطرق غير متوقَّعة. إذ لم تتناول قصصه مثلًا الموضوعات الأدبية في الفقه، ولم تكن قصصًا تمثيلية لوقائع متخيّلة، كما كان الحال مع هاربر لي (Harper Lee) في روايته أن تقتل طائرًا بريئًا (Lee, 1960)، وهي رواية صارت علامةً في الأدب الأميركي الحديث عرضت لشخصيتها البطولية التي تمثّلت (مع تحوّلها إلى موضع شكّ فيما بعد) ببطلها المحامي آتيكوس فيتش (Atticus Fitch) ومعالجته لموضوعات جوهرية من قبيل العدالة العرقية والجنائية (Lee, 2015). ولكنّ قصص التنوخي اهتمّت بعرض موضوعات دنيويّة ذات جذور قانونية بصيغة أدبية، من قبيل التجّار المشاكسين والمتقاضين الجشعين والغيرة في المحاكم الشرعية والسلطانية. وقدّمت هذه القصص آنذاك دروسًا أخلاقية من زمانها ومحيطها، تمامًا كما يُتوقّع من الأدب الخيالي. وكان الشكل الأدبي الذي استُخدم لنقل الدروس الأخلاقية في العصر الوسيط في بغداد هو السرد، وقد تفوّق التنوخي بعرضه لتلك الدروس في مختاراته الأدبية. ونقلت هذه القصص في الوقت نفسه دروسًا هامّة عن الفقه، أو التصوّر الشائع له آنذاك من خلال نُقول عَرَضية للإجراءات القضائية. ولأنّ استحضاره للإجراءات في المحاكم كان عَرَضيًّا في سياق السرد، تشكّل هذه القصص والتمثيلات مادّة للمؤرّخين يستطيعون توظيفها في استكمال القصص والتقارير المختصرة والتعليمية حول الإجراءات القضائية الواردة في المصادر التقليدية للفقه الإسلامي المبكّر.
In the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings dubbed the "Arab Spring," Egypt's new constitution expands... more In the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings dubbed the "Arab Spring," Egypt's new constitution expands the constitutionally recognized role of Islamic law in state legislation and judicial review.
This Article explores an area of close parallel between legal doctrines in the contexts of Islami... more This Article explores an area of close parallel between legal doctrines in the contexts of Islamic law and American legal theory. In criminal law, both traditions espouse a type of "rule of lenity"-that curious common law rule that instructs judges not to impose criminal sanctions in cases of doubt. The rule is curious because criminal law is a peremptory expression of legislative will. However, the rule of lenity would seem to encourage courts to disregard one of the most fundamental principles of Islamic and American legislation and adjudication: judicial deference to legislative supremacy. In the Islamic context, such a rule would be even more curious, allowing Muslim judges to disregard a deference rule even more entrenched than the American one: a divine legislative supremacy to which judicial deference should be absolute. Yet, there is an "Islamic rule of lenity" that pervades Islamic criminal law. This Article examines the operation of and justifications for the lenity rule in the American and Islamic contexts against the backdrop of theories of law and legislative supremacy that underlie both. In both contexts, the lenity rule acts serves to expand the operation of judicial discretion. But whereas the use of American lenity is fraught and limited, Islamic lenity is relatively uncontroversial and expansive. With the Islamic rule of lenity, we see both stronger legislative supremacy doctrines and more assertions (albeit hidden) of
Legal maxims reflect settled principles of law to which jurists appeal when confronting new legal... more Legal maxims reflect settled principles of law to which jurists appeal when confronting new legal cases. One such maxim of Islamic criminal law stipulates that judges are to avoid imposing ḥudūd and other sanctions when beset by doubts as to the scope of the law or the sufficiency of the evidence (idra'ū ʾl-ḥudūd biʾl-shubahāt): the "ḥudūd maxim." Jurists of all periods reference this maxim widely. But whereas developed juristic works attribute it to Muḥammad in the form of a prophetic report (ḥadīth), early jurists do not. Instead, they cite the maxim as an anonymous saying of nonspecific Correspondence: Intisar A. Rabb,