Sam Weiss Evans | Harvard University (original) (raw)
Papers by Sam Weiss Evans
Nature Biotechnology, Dec 15, 2022
Malaria Journal
Building on an exercise that identified potential harms from simulated investigational releases o... more Building on an exercise that identified potential harms from simulated investigational releases of a population suppression gene drive for malaria vector control, a series of online workshops identified nine recommendations to advance future environmental risk assessment of gene drive applications.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2021
Social Studies of Science, 2020
Science and technology play a central role in the contemporary governance of security, both as to... more Science and technology play a central role in the contemporary governance of security, both as tools for the production of security and as objects of security concern. Scholars are increasingly seeking to not only critically reflect on the interplays between science, technology and security, but also engage with the practices of security communities that shape and are shaped by science and technology. To further help this growth of interest in security topics within science and technology studies (STS), we explore possible modes of socio-technical collaboration with security communities of practice. Bringing together literatures from STS and critical security studies, we identify several key challenges to critical social engagement of STS scholars in security-related issues. We then demonstrate how these challenges played out over the course of three case studies from our own experience in engaging security communities of practice. We use these vignettes to show that there is a rich...
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 2019
Mice Against Ticks is a community-guided ecological engineering project that aims to prevent tick... more Mice Against Ticks is a community-guided ecological engineering project that aims to prevent tick-borne disease by using CRISPR-based genome editing to heritably immunize the white-footed mice ( Peromyscus leucopus ) responsible for infecting many ticks in eastern North America. Introducing antibody-encoding resistance alleles into the local mouse population is anticipated to disrupt the disease transmission cycle for decades. Technology development is shaped by engagement with community members and visitors to the islands of Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard, including decisions at project inception about which types of disease resistance to pursue. This engagement process has prompted the researchers to use only white-footed mouse DNA if possible, meaning the current project will not involve gene drive. Instead, engineered mice would be released in the spring when the natural population is low, a plan unlikely to increase total numbers above the normal maximum in autumn. Communi...
Journal of Responsible Innovation, 2015
Main Point: We need to promote a dialogue between multiple conceptions of security and then build... more Main Point: We need to promote a dialogue between multiple conceptions of security and then build governance mechanisms that are flexible enough to maintain that dialogue through power sharing. Doing this entails connecting work in STS and Responsible Research and Innovation with the biological and security communities, and those communities with others (policy, publics, industry…) as equals, not dominant or subordinate. "If you don't have security, you don't have society," might be a good way to describe the general thinking about the role that a perception of security plays in ensuring we can do all the other things that constitute society. Such a simple statement, however, misses two basic points about security: it is multiply constituted, and those that have the power to define the objects, subjects, and governance mechanisms of security are also fundamentally shaping the type of society in which we live. The biosecurity community is well-versed in the need for security to be a central topic of discourse for states, and biosecurity professionals have argued for broadening the conception of national security beyond traditional state concerns to include things like health, agriculture, and building design. But in doing so, the argument is usually for those other communities to take on a security discourse, rather than for the security community to promote its goals by taking on the discourses of health etc (e.g. Bernard, 2013). In the US, such arguments are based on the assumption that security is the language that Washington listens to, and that it is where to find the money. That these assumptions are often borne out speaks to the power the security discourse has in shaping [at least American] society. But what type of security are these arguments talking about? Rabinow and Bennett (2012) argue strongly that the pervasive understanding of security is one based on a framing of the 'dual-use' problem: that there are bad actors out there who must be prevented from using our knowledge and technology against us. While there are likely many cases where we can know the enemy, know the technology that might harm, and be able to prevent the two coming together with destructive results, there are just as many cases where the subjects, objects, and actions of security concern are not known. Focusing only on the former is tantamount to the old adage of looking for your keys under the streetlamp because that's where the light is. Export controls, Institutional Biosafety Committees, even the newly minted Dual-Use Research of Concern US Government policies fall into this camp. So what would it mean to govern security concerns that are not yet known? This question should be a central strand of research and action in the coming decade. Answering it means finding meaningful ways past the traditional framing of security as a dual-use concern, where this framing is found to be lacking. It means fully appreciating that potential security concerns may also be health concerns, or concerns about the environment, economy, or morality.
Synthetic Biology
Recent calls for engaging communities in biotechnology development do not draw enough attention t... more Recent calls for engaging communities in biotechnology development do not draw enough attention to the hurdles that must be overcome for engagement strategies to effectively feed back into research design and conduct. These hurdles call into question many standard ways of operating and assessing in traditional scientific disciplines. The first steps in addressing these hurdles can be the most difficult. In reflecting on our own experiences in the early-stage development of environmental biotechnologies, we provide a set of techniques to help scientists and their collaborators learn to become more responsive to the needs and attitudes of communities with which they are engaging. Graphical Abstract
Science
We must rethink and test assumptions about relationships among biological research, security, and... more We must rethink and test assumptions about relationships among biological research, security, and society
Health Security
Gene drives have already challenged governance systems. In this case study, we explore the Intern... more Gene drives have already challenged governance systems. In this case study, we explore the International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) competition's experiences in gene drive-related research and lessons in developing, revising, and implementing a governance system. iGEM's experiences and lessons are distilled into 6 key insights for future gene drive policy development in the United States: (1) gene drives deserve special attention because of their potential for widescale impact and remaining uncertainty about how to evaluate intergenerational and transboundary risks; (2) an adaptive risk management approach is logical for gene drives because of the rapidly changing technical environment; (3) review by individual technical experts is limited and may fail to incorporate other forms of expertise and, therefore, must be complemented with a range of alternative governance methods; (4) current laboratory biosafety and biosecurity review processes may not capture gene drive research or its components in practice even if they are covered theoretically; (5) risk management for research and development must incorporate discussions of values and broader implications of the work; and (6) a regular technology horizon scanning capacity is needed for the early identification of advances that could pose governance system challenges.
PLOS ONE
Multiple national and international trends and drivers are radically changing what biological sec... more Multiple national and international trends and drivers are radically changing what biological security means for the United Kingdom (UK). New technologies present novel opportunities and challenges, and globalisation has created new pathways and increased the speed, volume and routes by which organisms can spread. The UK Biological Security Strategy (2018) acknowledges the importance of research on biological security in the UK. Given the breadth of potential research, a targeted agenda identifying the questions most critical to effective and coordinated progress in different disciplines of biological security is required. We used expert elicitation to generate 80 policy-relevant research questions considered by participants to have the greatest impact on UK biological security. Drawing on a collaboratively-developed set of 450 questions, proposed by 41 experts from academia, industry and the UK government (consulting 168 additional experts) we subdivided the final 80 questions into...
Science
We must ensure that trials are scientifically, politically, and socially robust, publicly account... more We must ensure that trials are scientifically, politically, and socially robust, publicly accountable, and widely transparent
Applied Biosafety
Introduction: The international synthetic biology competition iGEM (formally known as the interna... more Introduction: The international synthetic biology competition iGEM (formally known as the international Genetically Engineered Machines competition) has a dedicated biosafety and biosecurity program. Method: A review of specific elements of the program and a series of concrete examples illustrate how experiences in implementing the program have helped improved policy, including an increasing diversity of sources for genetic parts and organisms, keeping pace with technical developments, considering pathways toward future environmental release, addressing antimicrobial resistance, and testing the efficacy of current biosecurity arrangements. Results: iGEM’s program is forward-leaning, in that it addresses both traditional (pathogen-based) and emerging risks both in terms of new technologies and new risks. It is integrated into the technical work of the competition—with clearly described roles and responsibilities for all members of the community. It operates throughout the life cycle ...
The Wassenaar Arrangement is an international body that maintains a list of technologies to be co... more The Wassenaar Arrangement is an international body that maintains a list of technologies to be controlled in international trade because of their perceived military signicance. Rather than view this body as just another international organisation, thereby subjecting it to a range of international relations analysis, I instead choose to see the Arrangement as a classication system, where political, economic, and social debates are codied in the Lists of controlled items. In this talk, I will provide an overview of the Arrangement and a few examples on why this new conceptualisation of it may be useful to both researchers and practitioners.
Absence in Science, Security and Policy, 2015
Science and Public Policy, 2015
Journal of Responsible Innovation
Nature Biotechnology, Dec 15, 2022
Malaria Journal
Building on an exercise that identified potential harms from simulated investigational releases o... more Building on an exercise that identified potential harms from simulated investigational releases of a population suppression gene drive for malaria vector control, a series of online workshops identified nine recommendations to advance future environmental risk assessment of gene drive applications.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2021
Social Studies of Science, 2020
Science and technology play a central role in the contemporary governance of security, both as to... more Science and technology play a central role in the contemporary governance of security, both as tools for the production of security and as objects of security concern. Scholars are increasingly seeking to not only critically reflect on the interplays between science, technology and security, but also engage with the practices of security communities that shape and are shaped by science and technology. To further help this growth of interest in security topics within science and technology studies (STS), we explore possible modes of socio-technical collaboration with security communities of practice. Bringing together literatures from STS and critical security studies, we identify several key challenges to critical social engagement of STS scholars in security-related issues. We then demonstrate how these challenges played out over the course of three case studies from our own experience in engaging security communities of practice. We use these vignettes to show that there is a rich...
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 2019
Mice Against Ticks is a community-guided ecological engineering project that aims to prevent tick... more Mice Against Ticks is a community-guided ecological engineering project that aims to prevent tick-borne disease by using CRISPR-based genome editing to heritably immunize the white-footed mice ( Peromyscus leucopus ) responsible for infecting many ticks in eastern North America. Introducing antibody-encoding resistance alleles into the local mouse population is anticipated to disrupt the disease transmission cycle for decades. Technology development is shaped by engagement with community members and visitors to the islands of Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard, including decisions at project inception about which types of disease resistance to pursue. This engagement process has prompted the researchers to use only white-footed mouse DNA if possible, meaning the current project will not involve gene drive. Instead, engineered mice would be released in the spring when the natural population is low, a plan unlikely to increase total numbers above the normal maximum in autumn. Communi...
Journal of Responsible Innovation, 2015
Main Point: We need to promote a dialogue between multiple conceptions of security and then build... more Main Point: We need to promote a dialogue between multiple conceptions of security and then build governance mechanisms that are flexible enough to maintain that dialogue through power sharing. Doing this entails connecting work in STS and Responsible Research and Innovation with the biological and security communities, and those communities with others (policy, publics, industry…) as equals, not dominant or subordinate. "If you don't have security, you don't have society," might be a good way to describe the general thinking about the role that a perception of security plays in ensuring we can do all the other things that constitute society. Such a simple statement, however, misses two basic points about security: it is multiply constituted, and those that have the power to define the objects, subjects, and governance mechanisms of security are also fundamentally shaping the type of society in which we live. The biosecurity community is well-versed in the need for security to be a central topic of discourse for states, and biosecurity professionals have argued for broadening the conception of national security beyond traditional state concerns to include things like health, agriculture, and building design. But in doing so, the argument is usually for those other communities to take on a security discourse, rather than for the security community to promote its goals by taking on the discourses of health etc (e.g. Bernard, 2013). In the US, such arguments are based on the assumption that security is the language that Washington listens to, and that it is where to find the money. That these assumptions are often borne out speaks to the power the security discourse has in shaping [at least American] society. But what type of security are these arguments talking about? Rabinow and Bennett (2012) argue strongly that the pervasive understanding of security is one based on a framing of the 'dual-use' problem: that there are bad actors out there who must be prevented from using our knowledge and technology against us. While there are likely many cases where we can know the enemy, know the technology that might harm, and be able to prevent the two coming together with destructive results, there are just as many cases where the subjects, objects, and actions of security concern are not known. Focusing only on the former is tantamount to the old adage of looking for your keys under the streetlamp because that's where the light is. Export controls, Institutional Biosafety Committees, even the newly minted Dual-Use Research of Concern US Government policies fall into this camp. So what would it mean to govern security concerns that are not yet known? This question should be a central strand of research and action in the coming decade. Answering it means finding meaningful ways past the traditional framing of security as a dual-use concern, where this framing is found to be lacking. It means fully appreciating that potential security concerns may also be health concerns, or concerns about the environment, economy, or morality.
Synthetic Biology
Recent calls for engaging communities in biotechnology development do not draw enough attention t... more Recent calls for engaging communities in biotechnology development do not draw enough attention to the hurdles that must be overcome for engagement strategies to effectively feed back into research design and conduct. These hurdles call into question many standard ways of operating and assessing in traditional scientific disciplines. The first steps in addressing these hurdles can be the most difficult. In reflecting on our own experiences in the early-stage development of environmental biotechnologies, we provide a set of techniques to help scientists and their collaborators learn to become more responsive to the needs and attitudes of communities with which they are engaging. Graphical Abstract
Science
We must rethink and test assumptions about relationships among biological research, security, and... more We must rethink and test assumptions about relationships among biological research, security, and society
Health Security
Gene drives have already challenged governance systems. In this case study, we explore the Intern... more Gene drives have already challenged governance systems. In this case study, we explore the International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) competition's experiences in gene drive-related research and lessons in developing, revising, and implementing a governance system. iGEM's experiences and lessons are distilled into 6 key insights for future gene drive policy development in the United States: (1) gene drives deserve special attention because of their potential for widescale impact and remaining uncertainty about how to evaluate intergenerational and transboundary risks; (2) an adaptive risk management approach is logical for gene drives because of the rapidly changing technical environment; (3) review by individual technical experts is limited and may fail to incorporate other forms of expertise and, therefore, must be complemented with a range of alternative governance methods; (4) current laboratory biosafety and biosecurity review processes may not capture gene drive research or its components in practice even if they are covered theoretically; (5) risk management for research and development must incorporate discussions of values and broader implications of the work; and (6) a regular technology horizon scanning capacity is needed for the early identification of advances that could pose governance system challenges.
PLOS ONE
Multiple national and international trends and drivers are radically changing what biological sec... more Multiple national and international trends and drivers are radically changing what biological security means for the United Kingdom (UK). New technologies present novel opportunities and challenges, and globalisation has created new pathways and increased the speed, volume and routes by which organisms can spread. The UK Biological Security Strategy (2018) acknowledges the importance of research on biological security in the UK. Given the breadth of potential research, a targeted agenda identifying the questions most critical to effective and coordinated progress in different disciplines of biological security is required. We used expert elicitation to generate 80 policy-relevant research questions considered by participants to have the greatest impact on UK biological security. Drawing on a collaboratively-developed set of 450 questions, proposed by 41 experts from academia, industry and the UK government (consulting 168 additional experts) we subdivided the final 80 questions into...
Science
We must ensure that trials are scientifically, politically, and socially robust, publicly account... more We must ensure that trials are scientifically, politically, and socially robust, publicly accountable, and widely transparent
Applied Biosafety
Introduction: The international synthetic biology competition iGEM (formally known as the interna... more Introduction: The international synthetic biology competition iGEM (formally known as the international Genetically Engineered Machines competition) has a dedicated biosafety and biosecurity program. Method: A review of specific elements of the program and a series of concrete examples illustrate how experiences in implementing the program have helped improved policy, including an increasing diversity of sources for genetic parts and organisms, keeping pace with technical developments, considering pathways toward future environmental release, addressing antimicrobial resistance, and testing the efficacy of current biosecurity arrangements. Results: iGEM’s program is forward-leaning, in that it addresses both traditional (pathogen-based) and emerging risks both in terms of new technologies and new risks. It is integrated into the technical work of the competition—with clearly described roles and responsibilities for all members of the community. It operates throughout the life cycle ...
The Wassenaar Arrangement is an international body that maintains a list of technologies to be co... more The Wassenaar Arrangement is an international body that maintains a list of technologies to be controlled in international trade because of their perceived military signicance. Rather than view this body as just another international organisation, thereby subjecting it to a range of international relations analysis, I instead choose to see the Arrangement as a classication system, where political, economic, and social debates are codied in the Lists of controlled items. In this talk, I will provide an overview of the Arrangement and a few examples on why this new conceptualisation of it may be useful to both researchers and practitioners.
Absence in Science, Security and Policy, 2015
Science and Public Policy, 2015
Journal of Responsible Innovation
Presented at the James Martin Institute for Science and Civilization Work in Progress series in M... more Presented at the James Martin Institute for Science and Civilization Work in Progress series in Michaelmas 2006, on 31 October, this presentation argues for the value of assessing unknown knowns as a viable and important knowledge category for governing converging technologies.
The Wassenaar Arrangement is an international body that maintains a list of technologies to be co... more The Wassenaar Arrangement is an international body that maintains a list of technologies to be controlled in international trade because of their perceived military significance. Rather than view this body as just another international organisation, thereby subjecting it to a range of international relations analysis, I instead choose to see the Arrangement as a classification system, where political, economic, and social debates are codified in the Lists of controlled items. In this talk, I will provide an overview of the Arrangement and a few examples on why this new conceptualisation of it may be useful to both researchers and practitioners.
This is a draft of my comment for the Department of Commerce Advanced Notice if Proposed Rule Mak... more This is a draft of my comment for the Department of Commerce Advanced Notice if Proposed Rule Making (ANPRM) on “Review of Controls on Certain Emerging Technologies”. If you have any corrections or additions you think I should make please comment below or email me before January 7. More information about the ANPRM is in the link.