Alexis Belianin | National Research University Higher School of Economics (original) (raw)
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Papers by Alexis Belianin
This paper reports a novel cross-cultural public goods game experiment played in real time throug... more This paper reports a novel cross-cultural public goods game experiment played in real time through Internet. Web-based software was used to compare the contributions to public good of different groups of participants: mixed, consisting of both Italians (students in law and economics) ...
This paper reports a novel cross-cultural public goods game experiment played in real time throug... more This paper reports a novel cross-cultural public goods game experiment played in real time through Internet. Web-based software was used to compare the contributions to public good of different groups of participants: mixed, consisting of both Italians (students in law and economics) and Russians (students in economics), as well as all-Italian and all-Russian groups. This setup allows for testing for a number of effects, including participants' awareness of the group composition in terms of nationality and gender of group members; possibility of coordination of one's strategy during a cheap talk session organized before some of the games was used as an additional control. Our results show that the degree of cooperation is rather high, but does not vary significantly with nationalities of the group members, while communication tends to enhance contributions to public goods. A notable difference between the subjects representing the two nations is an overly strong and increasing cooperativeness of the Russian female participants in contrast to that of the Russian men, as well as the Italians.
An experimental approach to study the distribution of power in a voting body is described. Labora... more An experimental approach to study the distribution of power in a voting body is described. Laboratory experiments in collective decisionmaking provide a relatively new way of measuring voting power that 1) is based on empirical data, 2) is analytically tractable and 3) allows to control voters' preferences in a theoretically unambiguous environment. Taking the experiment by Montero, Sefton and Zhang (2008) (MSZ) as starting point, we confirm their basic findings, and explain some of their empirical paradoxes. In particular, we show that the asymmetry between the resulting shares of some otherwise identical players is a feature of the experimental design of MSZ, and develop an experimental way to correct for this. The main contribution of our research deals with the question of how voters' preferences to coalesce influence their behaviour and the resulting allocation of shares (as measured by the average payoffs of the players). To tackle the issue experimentally we extend the basic design to allow for asymmetric voters' preferences depending on the coalitions they take part in. The results of the experiments show that even small modifications of preferences lead to statistically significant differences in players' shares. This result supports preference-based power indices as proposed in , rather than the classical Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices.
This paper reports a novel cross-cultural public goods game experiment played in real time throug... more This paper reports a novel cross-cultural public goods game experiment played in real time through Internet. Web-based software was used to compare the contributions to public good of different groups of participants: mixed, consisting of both Italians (students in law and economics) ...
This paper reports a novel cross-cultural public goods game experiment played in real time throug... more This paper reports a novel cross-cultural public goods game experiment played in real time through Internet. Web-based software was used to compare the contributions to public good of different groups of participants: mixed, consisting of both Italians (students in law and economics) and Russians (students in economics), as well as all-Italian and all-Russian groups. This setup allows for testing for a number of effects, including participants' awareness of the group composition in terms of nationality and gender of group members; possibility of coordination of one's strategy during a cheap talk session organized before some of the games was used as an additional control. Our results show that the degree of cooperation is rather high, but does not vary significantly with nationalities of the group members, while communication tends to enhance contributions to public goods. A notable difference between the subjects representing the two nations is an overly strong and increasing cooperativeness of the Russian female participants in contrast to that of the Russian men, as well as the Italians.
An experimental approach to study the distribution of power in a voting body is described. Labora... more An experimental approach to study the distribution of power in a voting body is described. Laboratory experiments in collective decisionmaking provide a relatively new way of measuring voting power that 1) is based on empirical data, 2) is analytically tractable and 3) allows to control voters' preferences in a theoretically unambiguous environment. Taking the experiment by Montero, Sefton and Zhang (2008) (MSZ) as starting point, we confirm their basic findings, and explain some of their empirical paradoxes. In particular, we show that the asymmetry between the resulting shares of some otherwise identical players is a feature of the experimental design of MSZ, and develop an experimental way to correct for this. The main contribution of our research deals with the question of how voters' preferences to coalesce influence their behaviour and the resulting allocation of shares (as measured by the average payoffs of the players). To tackle the issue experimentally we extend the basic design to allow for asymmetric voters' preferences depending on the coalitions they take part in. The results of the experiments show that even small modifications of preferences lead to statistically significant differences in players' shares. This result supports preference-based power indices as proposed in , rather than the classical Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices.