Eyal Berelovich | The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (original) (raw)
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![Research paper thumbnail of 210 Division in the Yom Kippur War [in Hebrew]](https://attachments.academia-assets.com/104887383/thumbnails/1.jpg)
](Yesodot, 2023
On October 6th the Yom Kippur war started and the commander of newly established 210 reserve arm... more On October 6th the Yom Kippur war started and the commander of newly established 210 reserve armor division, Major General (res') Dan Lener assigned to lifeguard duty in his Kibbutz. On the first day of the war the 36 armor division was the only division holding the defensive line in the Golan Hight's. Lener division was not a functioning military unit. It didn't have armor and mechanized brigades assigned to her and the logistic and artillery regiments weren't established yet. Although the difficult start the division fought on October 7 defensives battles, took part on October 8 counteroffensive and in October 10 breakthrough the Syrian army defensive lines. Furthermore, by October 16 the division and it's assigned brigades fought against the expedition forces from Iraq and Royal Jordanian Army units that came to assist the Syrian army. This paper will examine how the Division was erected while simultaneously engaging the Syrian army and how did the newly established division become the main effort for the IDF operations inside Syria.
Israel Affairs , 2023
Though forming having taken an active part in the Sinai and Palestine campaigns of the World War ... more Though forming having taken an active part in the Sinai and Palestine campaigns
of the World War I, the Bedouin tribes are rarely mentioned. This is due in
part to the scarcity of documentation, especially having none from the
Bedouins themselves. This article seeks to fill in some of the gaps in the research
on the war in the Sinai Peninsula and southern Palestine, and to examine the
contribution of the Bedouin tribes in that area to the Ottoman military campaign.
It argues that the Ottoman perception of the Bedouins as a fighting force
changed during the war from being seen as force multiplier to being employed
only in scout and reconnaissance roles.
Die Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2023
Notwithstanding certain immutable features of war, some of its concrete techniques do change, not... more Notwithstanding certain immutable features of war, some
of its concrete techniques do change, notably following new
technological developments. Advanced electronic weapon
systems, including armed drones, are a case in point. We
shall examine how countries handle the opportunities and
challenges involved by means of a comparative analysis of
Israel and Germany
JOURNAL OF THE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF ISRAEL, 2022
The Ottoman general staff (Erkân-ı Harbiye) was established in 1860 as part of a comprehensive re... more The Ottoman general staff (Erkân-ı Harbiye) was established in 1860 as part of a comprehensive reform in the Ottoman civil and military establishments, known as the Tanzimat (1839–1876). After its formation and until the outbreak of the first Balkan War in 1912, the Ottoman general staff went through several structural, functional reforms aimed at making the Ottoman general staff more compatible with the Prussian-German model of the general staff (Generalstab). These reforms were carried by the Ottoman general staff officers and German officers who served in the Ottoman Empire as part of the Military Assistance mission to the Ottoman army. This article examines this process focusing on how the Prussian-German model was adapted to the unique political system and conditions of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman general staff case study allows us a wider discussion about knowledge transfer between states and armies and the importance of mitigating the differences and gaps between them for the success of these reforms.
Military Strategy Magazine, 2021
During the years of the Syrian civil war (2011-) the Syrian army changed its modus operandi in t... more During the years of the Syrian civil war (2011-) the Syrian army
changed its modus operandi in the Strategical, operational, and
tactical level. The change accord because the previous operational
concept failed, and the army forces were unable to carry major
offensive operations. This paper will examine the reasons for the
changes, how they were implemented and how they affect the
rebuilding of the Syrian army in the near future.
![Research paper thumbnail of A tactical surprise does not always guarantee a victory [in Hebrew].pdf](https://attachments.academia-assets.com/57355558/thumbnails/1.jpg)
](Maarachot, 2015
From March 21st the German Army launched a two offensive campaigns in the western front. those ca... more From March 21st the German Army launched a two offensive campaigns in the western front. those campaigns aim to create a gap between the British Expeditionary Force and the French Army. The attacking forces used a new tactics and techniques that achieved some results in the beginning of each campaign. However, the attackers failed to achieve the operational goals because the British Expeditionary Force didn't act as expected of them.
A century after the outbreak of the First World War, the authors reevaluate the infrastructure an... more A century after the outbreak of the First World War, the authors reevaluate
the infrastructure and military logistics of the Ottoman
Army in Palestine before and during the war as it affected its ability
to successfully wage the military campaign in the Sinai and Palestine.
Using primary sources in Ottoman Turkish, Turkish, Arabic, English,
German and Hebrew, as well as official war literature, memoirs
of commanders and soldiers, general military historical scholarly
literature, and material specific to Palestine, coming from both
adversaries, the authors show how infrastructure and logistics shaped
and limited the Ottoman Army’s operational plans and their execution.
![Research paper thumbnail of The Role of the Bedouin in Southern Palestine's Negev and Sinai during World War I [in Hebrew]](https://attachments.academia-assets.com/45339948/thumbnails/1.jpg)
](
Like many states, Turkey is still adapting to the post-Cold War era in many respects. As Turkey t... more Like many states, Turkey is still adapting to the post-Cold War era in many respects. As Turkey tries to
assess the changing strategic environment, it also responds to developments concerning Iran's nuclear
ambitions. Iranian nuclear advances are currently causing tensions in the Middle East and in the Gulf, which
are likely to intensify even further into the future. If Iran continues down the nuclear path and other states
in the region like Saudi Arabia follow, Turkey may have to face a decision: will it continue with its Cold War
and post-Cold War policies of emphasizing its membership in NATO and the alliance's nuclear guarantees?
Or will Turkey move toward a much more independent stance? At some point, Turkey may even consider
leaving the alliance and developing its own nuclear capabilities.
In this paper, we present two scenarios. In the first scenario, Turkey maintains its relations with the West
and continues to rely on its own strong conventional capabilities and on US-NATO's nuclear guarantee. In
the second scenario, Turkey's internal dynamics, a change in the Turkish threat perception, and the
weakening of the US-NATO alliance's assurances causes Turkey to choose to develop independent nuclear
capabilities. Both scenarios reflect the doctrine of deterrence by punishment; while in the first scenario
Turkey extended deterrence forms a major basis of its strategy, in the second scenario it builds its own
nuclear capabilities.
Turkish-Israeli security relations fluctuated greatly between 1993 and their nadir in 2010, when ... more Turkish-Israeli security relations fluctuated greatly between 1993 and their nadir in 2010, when Israeli commandos raided the Mavi Marmara aid ship. The foundations for upgrading relations were laid in the early 1990s, and were based on the mutual understanding that closer bilateral relations would enhance both countries’ security, improve their military capabilities and help stabilize the region
Nevertheless, in the first decade of the 21st century, cooperation between the countries’ defense industries and military relations diminished. This essay will argue that the strategic partnership deteriorated due to changes in Turkey’s foreign policy paradigm and continuing Israeli action against Palestinians. However, the Turkish government’s wish to become self-sufficient probably made the end of defense-industry cooperation inevitable. This desire has been declared by every Turkish government since the tacit strategic alliance between Turkey and Israel began in 1993.
![Research paper thumbnail of The Ottoman Army in Palestine: Infrastructure and Campaigns [in Hebrew]](https://attachments.academia-assets.com/34440801/thumbnails/1.jpg)
](Yesodot, 2023
On October 6th the Yom Kippur war started and the commander of newly established 210 reserve arm... more On October 6th the Yom Kippur war started and the commander of newly established 210 reserve armor division, Major General (res') Dan Lener assigned to lifeguard duty in his Kibbutz. On the first day of the war the 36 armor division was the only division holding the defensive line in the Golan Hight's. Lener division was not a functioning military unit. It didn't have armor and mechanized brigades assigned to her and the logistic and artillery regiments weren't established yet. Although the difficult start the division fought on October 7 defensives battles, took part on October 8 counteroffensive and in October 10 breakthrough the Syrian army defensive lines. Furthermore, by October 16 the division and it's assigned brigades fought against the expedition forces from Iraq and Royal Jordanian Army units that came to assist the Syrian army. This paper will examine how the Division was erected while simultaneously engaging the Syrian army and how did the newly established division become the main effort for the IDF operations inside Syria.
Israel Affairs , 2023
Though forming having taken an active part in the Sinai and Palestine campaigns of the World War ... more Though forming having taken an active part in the Sinai and Palestine campaigns
of the World War I, the Bedouin tribes are rarely mentioned. This is due in
part to the scarcity of documentation, especially having none from the
Bedouins themselves. This article seeks to fill in some of the gaps in the research
on the war in the Sinai Peninsula and southern Palestine, and to examine the
contribution of the Bedouin tribes in that area to the Ottoman military campaign.
It argues that the Ottoman perception of the Bedouins as a fighting force
changed during the war from being seen as force multiplier to being employed
only in scout and reconnaissance roles.
Die Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2023
Notwithstanding certain immutable features of war, some of its concrete techniques do change, not... more Notwithstanding certain immutable features of war, some
of its concrete techniques do change, notably following new
technological developments. Advanced electronic weapon
systems, including armed drones, are a case in point. We
shall examine how countries handle the opportunities and
challenges involved by means of a comparative analysis of
Israel and Germany
JOURNAL OF THE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF ISRAEL, 2022
The Ottoman general staff (Erkân-ı Harbiye) was established in 1860 as part of a comprehensive re... more The Ottoman general staff (Erkân-ı Harbiye) was established in 1860 as part of a comprehensive reform in the Ottoman civil and military establishments, known as the Tanzimat (1839–1876). After its formation and until the outbreak of the first Balkan War in 1912, the Ottoman general staff went through several structural, functional reforms aimed at making the Ottoman general staff more compatible with the Prussian-German model of the general staff (Generalstab). These reforms were carried by the Ottoman general staff officers and German officers who served in the Ottoman Empire as part of the Military Assistance mission to the Ottoman army. This article examines this process focusing on how the Prussian-German model was adapted to the unique political system and conditions of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman general staff case study allows us a wider discussion about knowledge transfer between states and armies and the importance of mitigating the differences and gaps between them for the success of these reforms.
Military Strategy Magazine, 2021
During the years of the Syrian civil war (2011-) the Syrian army changed its modus operandi in t... more During the years of the Syrian civil war (2011-) the Syrian army
changed its modus operandi in the Strategical, operational, and
tactical level. The change accord because the previous operational
concept failed, and the army forces were unable to carry major
offensive operations. This paper will examine the reasons for the
changes, how they were implemented and how they affect the
rebuilding of the Syrian army in the near future.
Maarachot, 2015
From March 21st the German Army launched a two offensive campaigns in the western front. those ca... more From March 21st the German Army launched a two offensive campaigns in the western front. those campaigns aim to create a gap between the British Expeditionary Force and the French Army. The attacking forces used a new tactics and techniques that achieved some results in the beginning of each campaign. However, the attackers failed to achieve the operational goals because the British Expeditionary Force didn't act as expected of them.
A century after the outbreak of the First World War, the authors reevaluate the infrastructure an... more A century after the outbreak of the First World War, the authors reevaluate
the infrastructure and military logistics of the Ottoman
Army in Palestine before and during the war as it affected its ability
to successfully wage the military campaign in the Sinai and Palestine.
Using primary sources in Ottoman Turkish, Turkish, Arabic, English,
German and Hebrew, as well as official war literature, memoirs
of commanders and soldiers, general military historical scholarly
literature, and material specific to Palestine, coming from both
adversaries, the authors show how infrastructure and logistics shaped
and limited the Ottoman Army’s operational plans and their execution.
Like many states, Turkey is still adapting to the post-Cold War era in many respects. As Turkey t... more Like many states, Turkey is still adapting to the post-Cold War era in many respects. As Turkey tries to
assess the changing strategic environment, it also responds to developments concerning Iran's nuclear
ambitions. Iranian nuclear advances are currently causing tensions in the Middle East and in the Gulf, which
are likely to intensify even further into the future. If Iran continues down the nuclear path and other states
in the region like Saudi Arabia follow, Turkey may have to face a decision: will it continue with its Cold War
and post-Cold War policies of emphasizing its membership in NATO and the alliance's nuclear guarantees?
Or will Turkey move toward a much more independent stance? At some point, Turkey may even consider
leaving the alliance and developing its own nuclear capabilities.
In this paper, we present two scenarios. In the first scenario, Turkey maintains its relations with the West
and continues to rely on its own strong conventional capabilities and on US-NATO's nuclear guarantee. In
the second scenario, Turkey's internal dynamics, a change in the Turkish threat perception, and the
weakening of the US-NATO alliance's assurances causes Turkey to choose to develop independent nuclear
capabilities. Both scenarios reflect the doctrine of deterrence by punishment; while in the first scenario
Turkey extended deterrence forms a major basis of its strategy, in the second scenario it builds its own
nuclear capabilities.
Turkish-Israeli security relations fluctuated greatly between 1993 and their nadir in 2010, when ... more Turkish-Israeli security relations fluctuated greatly between 1993 and their nadir in 2010, when Israeli commandos raided the Mavi Marmara aid ship. The foundations for upgrading relations were laid in the early 1990s, and were based on the mutual understanding that closer bilateral relations would enhance both countries’ security, improve their military capabilities and help stabilize the region
Nevertheless, in the first decade of the 21st century, cooperation between the countries’ defense industries and military relations diminished. This essay will argue that the strategic partnership deteriorated due to changes in Turkey’s foreign policy paradigm and continuing Israeli action against Palestinians. However, the Turkish government’s wish to become self-sufficient probably made the end of defense-industry cooperation inevitable. This desire has been declared by every Turkish government since the tacit strategic alliance between Turkey and Israel began in 1993.