Timothy Goodspeed | Hunter College (original) (raw)

Papers by Timothy Goodspeed

Research paper thumbnail of Absorbing Shocks: National Rainy-Day Funds and Cross-Country Transfers in a Fiscal Union

FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis

Research paper thumbnail of The Relationship Between State Income Taxes and Local Property Taxes: Education Finance in New Jersey

Research paper thumbnail of Bailouts and Soft Budget Constraints in Decentralized Government: A Synthesis and Survey of an Alternative View of Intergovernmental Grant Policy

Revista Hacienda Pública Española

This paper selectively surveys the theoretical literature to date on governmental soft budgets wh... more This paper selectively surveys the theoretical literature to date on governmental soft budgets where governments are bailing out other governments. The traditional view of intergovernmental grants is that grants can be used by the central government to correct for positive spillover externalities or fis cal equalization. We first we explain how the setup of the developing "soft budget constraint" view of grant policy differs from the traditional view in fundamental ways. We then use a simple workhorse model of intergovernmental soft budgets under perfect information to examine different motivations for central government bailouts and expand the usual textbook analysis of grants to illustrate the intertem poral distortions under the alternative view of grants. This type of model has been extended in various directions. We examine extensions that include capital taxation, tax competition, forms of equalizing grants, overlapping budget constraints, multiple grant instruments, and the case when public spending is an input to private production. We also briefly review certain papers that examine intergovernmental soft budgets and bailouts when public investment has uncertain returns, a feature of the original models relating to SOEs, and a closely related literature that deals with decentralized leadership and an analogy to Becker's Rotten Kid Theorem. We conclude with some thoughts on directions for future research.

Research paper thumbnail of Decentralization and intra-country transfers in the Great Recession: the case of the European Union

Research paper thumbnail of Some Simple Analytics of the Taxation of Banks as Corporations: Effects on Loans and Systemic Risk, Deposits, and Borrowing

Research paper thumbnail of Corruption, accountability, and decentralization: theory and evidence from Mexico

Documents De Treball Ieb, 2011

One of the fundamental tenets of fiscal federalism is that, absent various sorts of externalities... more One of the fundamental tenets of fiscal federalism is that, absent various sorts of externalities, decentralized governments that rely on own-source revenues should be more fiscally efficient than decentralized governments that rely on grant financing. The argument relies in part on the idea that sub-national governments, being closer to the people, are more accountable to its citizens. Accountability to citizens is also important in understanding the presence of corruption in government. This suggests that the financial structure and institutions of decentralized governments can potentially influence the degree and extent of corrupt activity. Financial structures that make governments more accountable should be associated with less corruption (other things equal), while financial structures with less accountability should be associated with more corrupt activities. We develop a simple model in which the use of grants rather than locally raised taxes increases corruption. We then use a panel data set of Mexican states to study the relationship between funding sources for Mexican states and the level of corruption in those states. We find that greater use of own tax revenues lowers corruption while greater use of grants increases corruption. This suggests that expenditure decentralization that is accompanied by revenue decentralization is likely to discourage corruption while expenditure decentralization that is funded by grants tends to encourage corruption. We also find that poverty, a measure of uninformed citizens, leads to greater corruption.

Research paper thumbnail of Factors that Affect Fiscal Externalities in an Economic Union

The literature on tax competition suggests that a country's public sector will be influe... more The literature on tax competition suggests that a country's public sector will be influenced by an economic union. For instance, the horizontal tax competition literature suggests that the expectation that a mobile factor will leave a jurisdiction in the face of a non-benefit tax will result in downward pressure on mobile tax bases within a jurisdiction, and hence lower than desired levels of non- benefit taxes and spending. Despite these important insights, little work has been done to assess the factors that affect fiscal externalities and the resulting impact of these externalities on public spending, taxation, and migration. This paper uses a simulation model to gauge the impact of the fiscal externalities in an economic union under alternative assumptions concerning expectations of tax base responsiveness, the time frame, the relative progressivity of member country tax systems, and the variance of incomes in the union.

Research paper thumbnail of The role of public services and taxes in attracting �foreign� direct investment

One of the fundamental tenets of fiscal federalism is that, absent various sorts of externalities... more One of the fundamental tenets of fiscal federalism is that, absent various sorts of externalities, decentralized governments that rely on own-source revenues should be more fiscally efficient than decentralized governments that rely on grant financing. The argument relies in part on the idea that sub-national governments, being closer to the people, are more accountable to its citizens. Accountability to citizens is also important in understanding the presence of corruption in government. This suggests that the financial structure and institutions of decentralized governments can potentially influence the degree and extent of corrupt activity. Financial structures that make governments more accountable should be associated with less corruption (other things equal), while financial structures with less accountability should be associated with more corrupt activities. We develop a simple model in which the use of grants rather than locally raised taxes increases corruption. We then use a panel data set of Mexican states to study the relationship between funding sources for Mexican states and the level of corruption in those states. We find that greater use of own tax revenues lowers corruption while greater use of grants increases corruption. This suggests that expenditure decentralization that is accompanied by revenue decentralization is likely to discourage corruption while expenditure decentralization that is funded by grants tends to encourage corruption. We also find that poverty, a measure of uninformed citizens, leads to greater corruption.

Research paper thumbnail of Public Economics and the Theory of Rationing

Research paper thumbnail of The role of public services and taxes in attracting ‘foreign’ direct investment

Routledge Studies in Global Competition, 2008

One of the fundamental tenets of fiscal federalism is that, absent various sorts of externalities... more One of the fundamental tenets of fiscal federalism is that, absent various sorts of externalities, decentralized governments that rely on own-source revenues should be more fiscally efficient than decentralized governments that rely on grant financing. The argument relies in part on the idea that sub-national governments, being closer to the people, are more accountable to its citizens. Accountability to citizens is also important in understanding the presence of corruption in government. This suggests that the financial structure and institutions of decentralized governments can potentially influence the degree and extent of corrupt activity. Financial structures that make governments more accountable should be associated with less corruption (other things equal), while financial structures with less accountability should be associated with more corrupt activities. We develop a simple model in which the use of grants rather than locally raised taxes increases corruption. We then use a panel data set of Mexican states to study the relationship between funding sources for Mexican states and the level of corruption in those states. We find that greater use of own tax revenues lowers corruption while greater use of grants increases corruption. This suggests that expenditure decentralization that is accompanied by revenue decentralization is likely to discourage corruption while expenditure decentralization that is funded by grants tends to encourage corruption. We also find that poverty, a measure of uninformed citizens, leads to greater corruption.

Research paper thumbnail of Taxation in a Global Economy by Andreas Haufler

National Tax Journal, 2004

Research paper thumbnail of The Incidence of Bank Regulations and Taxes on Wages: Evidence from US States

Taxation and Regulation of the Financial Sector, 2015

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch ge... more Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes. You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.

Research paper thumbnail of Decentralization and natural disasters

Handbook of Multilevel Finance, 2015

This paper surveys recent research on decentralization and natural disasters. The first part disc... more This paper surveys recent research on decentralization and natural disasters. The first part discusses results from theoretical models that have been used to study the issues that arise when natural disasters occur in a country with more than one level of government. The next section discusses the empirical results that have been found in the literature. A third section briefly touches upon practical problems that arise when decentralized governments are confronted with a natural disaster. The paper concludes by reflecting on what we know about whether policies to confront natural disasters should be centralized or decentralized.

Research paper thumbnail of Bailouts in a Federation

The recent move towards decentralization in countries such as Spain, Hungary, and South Africa an... more The recent move towards decentralization in countries such as Spain, Hungary, and South Africa and the difficulties that central governments have had in dealing with fiscal irresponsibility on the part of regional governments in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and India has made the study of transfer systems one of the most important areas of research in federalism today. A

Research paper thumbnail of Are Other Government Policies More Important than Taxation in Attracting FDI?

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000

ABSTRACT This paper attempts to broaden the existing empirical literature on foreign direct inves... more ABSTRACT This paper attempts to broaden the existing empirical literature on foreign direct investment by incorporating government expenditures (both investment in infrastructure and consumption) as well as tax, classical location factors, institutional factors that may hinder business investment (such as corruption), and agglomeration effects. We investigate the determinants of FDI inflows in two unbalanced panel data sets of 47 countries from 1995-2002 and 37 countries from 1996-2002. We use fixed country and year effects and examine different infrastructure measures. The evidence indicates that lower taxes, lower corruption, and better infrastructure attract FDI. Government consumption expenditures negatively impact FDI inflows. The magnitude of the response of FDI to our investment in infrastructure is similar to that of corruption and taxes in elasticity terms.

Research paper thumbnail of Taxation and Capital Flows in Offshore Financial Companies

The 1986 Tax Reform Act introduced changes that potentially alter capital flows into and out of t... more The 1986 Tax Reform Act introduced changes that potentially alter capital flows into and out of the United States, particularly for financial companies. This paper uses data from 1982 to 1997 to assess the evolution of net U.S. capital outflows (net repatriations) in banking and finance relative to other industries. The results of this paper indicate that net U.S. capital outflows in the banking and finance industry were much lower than in other industries after 1986, even after controlling for general finance company differences, a time trend, exchange rates, tax rates, and country fixed effects. Once controlling for the trend over time, net capital outflows were not different before and after 1986 for industries other than banking and finance, but are significantly lower for banking and finance companies after 1986. The results are interpreted to suggest that TRA86 did not influence net capital outflows for most industries, but that changes in Subpart F for financial companies lea...

Research paper thumbnail of Are Government Policies More Important Than Taxation in Attracting FDI

This paper attempts to broaden the existing empirical literature on foreign direct investment by ... more This paper attempts to broaden the existing empirical literature on foreign direct investment by incorporating government expenditures (both investment in infrastructure and consumption) as well as tax, classical location factors, institutional factors that may hinder business investment (such as corruption), and agglomeration effects. We investigate the determinants of FDI inflows in two unbalanced panel data sets of 47 countries from 1995-2002 and 37 countries from 1996-2002. We use fixed country and year effects and examine different infrastructure measures. The evidence indicates that lower taxes, lower corruption, and better infrastructure attract FDI. Government consumption expenditures negatively impact FDI inflows. The magnitude of the response of FDI to our investment in infrastructure is similar to that of corruption and taxes in elasticity terms.

Research paper thumbnail of International taxation

The term "international taxation" is something of a misnomer. Tax systems are almost in... more The term "international taxation" is something of a misnomer. Tax systems are almost invariably national. An exception is international tax treaties which set tax rules on a bilateral or multilateral basis. International taxation generally refers to the tax treatment of transactions that involve entities in more than a single nation.

Research paper thumbnail of Local income taxation: An externality, Pigouvian solution, and public policies

Regional Science and Urban Economics, 1995

Traditionally, public finance economists have suggested that the migration incentives created by ... more Traditionally, public finance economists have suggested that the migration incentives created by taxes on income make such taxes inferior to head taxes for local governments. This paper develops this argument in a model in which the choice of tax instrument is endogenously determined by majority rule in each jurisdiction. An asymmetric income distribution and majority rule can lead a local government to choose income taxes over head taxes. Although income is exogenous in the model, taxes on income are Pareto inefficient because of mobility. The inefficiency can be thought of as an externality created by local income taxes; the Pigouvian solution thus becomes a natural corrective mechanism to recommend. Public policies such as equalizing grants and the deductibility of local taxes are compared to the Pigouvian solution.

Research paper thumbnail of The Nonprofit Sector's Capital Constraint: Does It Provide a Rationale for the Tax Exemption Granted To Nonprofit Firms?

Public Finance Review, 1993

Page 1. http://pfr.sagepub.com/ Public Finance Review http://pfr.sagepub.com/content/ 21/4/415 Th... more Page 1. http://pfr.sagepub.com/ Public Finance Review http://pfr.sagepub.com/content/ 21/4/415 The online version of this article can be found at: DOI: 10.1177/ 109114219302100404 1993 21: 415 Public Finance Review Timothy ...

Research paper thumbnail of Absorbing Shocks: National Rainy-Day Funds and Cross-Country Transfers in a Fiscal Union

FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis

Research paper thumbnail of The Relationship Between State Income Taxes and Local Property Taxes: Education Finance in New Jersey

Research paper thumbnail of Bailouts and Soft Budget Constraints in Decentralized Government: A Synthesis and Survey of an Alternative View of Intergovernmental Grant Policy

Revista Hacienda Pública Española

This paper selectively surveys the theoretical literature to date on governmental soft budgets wh... more This paper selectively surveys the theoretical literature to date on governmental soft budgets where governments are bailing out other governments. The traditional view of intergovernmental grants is that grants can be used by the central government to correct for positive spillover externalities or fis cal equalization. We first we explain how the setup of the developing "soft budget constraint" view of grant policy differs from the traditional view in fundamental ways. We then use a simple workhorse model of intergovernmental soft budgets under perfect information to examine different motivations for central government bailouts and expand the usual textbook analysis of grants to illustrate the intertem poral distortions under the alternative view of grants. This type of model has been extended in various directions. We examine extensions that include capital taxation, tax competition, forms of equalizing grants, overlapping budget constraints, multiple grant instruments, and the case when public spending is an input to private production. We also briefly review certain papers that examine intergovernmental soft budgets and bailouts when public investment has uncertain returns, a feature of the original models relating to SOEs, and a closely related literature that deals with decentralized leadership and an analogy to Becker's Rotten Kid Theorem. We conclude with some thoughts on directions for future research.

Research paper thumbnail of Decentralization and intra-country transfers in the Great Recession: the case of the European Union

Research paper thumbnail of Some Simple Analytics of the Taxation of Banks as Corporations: Effects on Loans and Systemic Risk, Deposits, and Borrowing

Research paper thumbnail of Corruption, accountability, and decentralization: theory and evidence from Mexico

Documents De Treball Ieb, 2011

One of the fundamental tenets of fiscal federalism is that, absent various sorts of externalities... more One of the fundamental tenets of fiscal federalism is that, absent various sorts of externalities, decentralized governments that rely on own-source revenues should be more fiscally efficient than decentralized governments that rely on grant financing. The argument relies in part on the idea that sub-national governments, being closer to the people, are more accountable to its citizens. Accountability to citizens is also important in understanding the presence of corruption in government. This suggests that the financial structure and institutions of decentralized governments can potentially influence the degree and extent of corrupt activity. Financial structures that make governments more accountable should be associated with less corruption (other things equal), while financial structures with less accountability should be associated with more corrupt activities. We develop a simple model in which the use of grants rather than locally raised taxes increases corruption. We then use a panel data set of Mexican states to study the relationship between funding sources for Mexican states and the level of corruption in those states. We find that greater use of own tax revenues lowers corruption while greater use of grants increases corruption. This suggests that expenditure decentralization that is accompanied by revenue decentralization is likely to discourage corruption while expenditure decentralization that is funded by grants tends to encourage corruption. We also find that poverty, a measure of uninformed citizens, leads to greater corruption.

Research paper thumbnail of Factors that Affect Fiscal Externalities in an Economic Union

The literature on tax competition suggests that a country's public sector will be influe... more The literature on tax competition suggests that a country's public sector will be influenced by an economic union. For instance, the horizontal tax competition literature suggests that the expectation that a mobile factor will leave a jurisdiction in the face of a non-benefit tax will result in downward pressure on mobile tax bases within a jurisdiction, and hence lower than desired levels of non- benefit taxes and spending. Despite these important insights, little work has been done to assess the factors that affect fiscal externalities and the resulting impact of these externalities on public spending, taxation, and migration. This paper uses a simulation model to gauge the impact of the fiscal externalities in an economic union under alternative assumptions concerning expectations of tax base responsiveness, the time frame, the relative progressivity of member country tax systems, and the variance of incomes in the union.

Research paper thumbnail of The role of public services and taxes in attracting �foreign� direct investment

One of the fundamental tenets of fiscal federalism is that, absent various sorts of externalities... more One of the fundamental tenets of fiscal federalism is that, absent various sorts of externalities, decentralized governments that rely on own-source revenues should be more fiscally efficient than decentralized governments that rely on grant financing. The argument relies in part on the idea that sub-national governments, being closer to the people, are more accountable to its citizens. Accountability to citizens is also important in understanding the presence of corruption in government. This suggests that the financial structure and institutions of decentralized governments can potentially influence the degree and extent of corrupt activity. Financial structures that make governments more accountable should be associated with less corruption (other things equal), while financial structures with less accountability should be associated with more corrupt activities. We develop a simple model in which the use of grants rather than locally raised taxes increases corruption. We then use a panel data set of Mexican states to study the relationship between funding sources for Mexican states and the level of corruption in those states. We find that greater use of own tax revenues lowers corruption while greater use of grants increases corruption. This suggests that expenditure decentralization that is accompanied by revenue decentralization is likely to discourage corruption while expenditure decentralization that is funded by grants tends to encourage corruption. We also find that poverty, a measure of uninformed citizens, leads to greater corruption.

Research paper thumbnail of Public Economics and the Theory of Rationing

Research paper thumbnail of The role of public services and taxes in attracting ‘foreign’ direct investment

Routledge Studies in Global Competition, 2008

One of the fundamental tenets of fiscal federalism is that, absent various sorts of externalities... more One of the fundamental tenets of fiscal federalism is that, absent various sorts of externalities, decentralized governments that rely on own-source revenues should be more fiscally efficient than decentralized governments that rely on grant financing. The argument relies in part on the idea that sub-national governments, being closer to the people, are more accountable to its citizens. Accountability to citizens is also important in understanding the presence of corruption in government. This suggests that the financial structure and institutions of decentralized governments can potentially influence the degree and extent of corrupt activity. Financial structures that make governments more accountable should be associated with less corruption (other things equal), while financial structures with less accountability should be associated with more corrupt activities. We develop a simple model in which the use of grants rather than locally raised taxes increases corruption. We then use a panel data set of Mexican states to study the relationship between funding sources for Mexican states and the level of corruption in those states. We find that greater use of own tax revenues lowers corruption while greater use of grants increases corruption. This suggests that expenditure decentralization that is accompanied by revenue decentralization is likely to discourage corruption while expenditure decentralization that is funded by grants tends to encourage corruption. We also find that poverty, a measure of uninformed citizens, leads to greater corruption.

Research paper thumbnail of Taxation in a Global Economy by Andreas Haufler

National Tax Journal, 2004

Research paper thumbnail of The Incidence of Bank Regulations and Taxes on Wages: Evidence from US States

Taxation and Regulation of the Financial Sector, 2015

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch ge... more Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes. You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.

Research paper thumbnail of Decentralization and natural disasters

Handbook of Multilevel Finance, 2015

This paper surveys recent research on decentralization and natural disasters. The first part disc... more This paper surveys recent research on decentralization and natural disasters. The first part discusses results from theoretical models that have been used to study the issues that arise when natural disasters occur in a country with more than one level of government. The next section discusses the empirical results that have been found in the literature. A third section briefly touches upon practical problems that arise when decentralized governments are confronted with a natural disaster. The paper concludes by reflecting on what we know about whether policies to confront natural disasters should be centralized or decentralized.

Research paper thumbnail of Bailouts in a Federation

The recent move towards decentralization in countries such as Spain, Hungary, and South Africa an... more The recent move towards decentralization in countries such as Spain, Hungary, and South Africa and the difficulties that central governments have had in dealing with fiscal irresponsibility on the part of regional governments in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and India has made the study of transfer systems one of the most important areas of research in federalism today. A

Research paper thumbnail of Are Other Government Policies More Important than Taxation in Attracting FDI?

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000

ABSTRACT This paper attempts to broaden the existing empirical literature on foreign direct inves... more ABSTRACT This paper attempts to broaden the existing empirical literature on foreign direct investment by incorporating government expenditures (both investment in infrastructure and consumption) as well as tax, classical location factors, institutional factors that may hinder business investment (such as corruption), and agglomeration effects. We investigate the determinants of FDI inflows in two unbalanced panel data sets of 47 countries from 1995-2002 and 37 countries from 1996-2002. We use fixed country and year effects and examine different infrastructure measures. The evidence indicates that lower taxes, lower corruption, and better infrastructure attract FDI. Government consumption expenditures negatively impact FDI inflows. The magnitude of the response of FDI to our investment in infrastructure is similar to that of corruption and taxes in elasticity terms.

Research paper thumbnail of Taxation and Capital Flows in Offshore Financial Companies

The 1986 Tax Reform Act introduced changes that potentially alter capital flows into and out of t... more The 1986 Tax Reform Act introduced changes that potentially alter capital flows into and out of the United States, particularly for financial companies. This paper uses data from 1982 to 1997 to assess the evolution of net U.S. capital outflows (net repatriations) in banking and finance relative to other industries. The results of this paper indicate that net U.S. capital outflows in the banking and finance industry were much lower than in other industries after 1986, even after controlling for general finance company differences, a time trend, exchange rates, tax rates, and country fixed effects. Once controlling for the trend over time, net capital outflows were not different before and after 1986 for industries other than banking and finance, but are significantly lower for banking and finance companies after 1986. The results are interpreted to suggest that TRA86 did not influence net capital outflows for most industries, but that changes in Subpart F for financial companies lea...

Research paper thumbnail of Are Government Policies More Important Than Taxation in Attracting FDI

This paper attempts to broaden the existing empirical literature on foreign direct investment by ... more This paper attempts to broaden the existing empirical literature on foreign direct investment by incorporating government expenditures (both investment in infrastructure and consumption) as well as tax, classical location factors, institutional factors that may hinder business investment (such as corruption), and agglomeration effects. We investigate the determinants of FDI inflows in two unbalanced panel data sets of 47 countries from 1995-2002 and 37 countries from 1996-2002. We use fixed country and year effects and examine different infrastructure measures. The evidence indicates that lower taxes, lower corruption, and better infrastructure attract FDI. Government consumption expenditures negatively impact FDI inflows. The magnitude of the response of FDI to our investment in infrastructure is similar to that of corruption and taxes in elasticity terms.

Research paper thumbnail of International taxation

The term "international taxation" is something of a misnomer. Tax systems are almost in... more The term "international taxation" is something of a misnomer. Tax systems are almost invariably national. An exception is international tax treaties which set tax rules on a bilateral or multilateral basis. International taxation generally refers to the tax treatment of transactions that involve entities in more than a single nation.

Research paper thumbnail of Local income taxation: An externality, Pigouvian solution, and public policies

Regional Science and Urban Economics, 1995

Traditionally, public finance economists have suggested that the migration incentives created by ... more Traditionally, public finance economists have suggested that the migration incentives created by taxes on income make such taxes inferior to head taxes for local governments. This paper develops this argument in a model in which the choice of tax instrument is endogenously determined by majority rule in each jurisdiction. An asymmetric income distribution and majority rule can lead a local government to choose income taxes over head taxes. Although income is exogenous in the model, taxes on income are Pareto inefficient because of mobility. The inefficiency can be thought of as an externality created by local income taxes; the Pigouvian solution thus becomes a natural corrective mechanism to recommend. Public policies such as equalizing grants and the deductibility of local taxes are compared to the Pigouvian solution.

Research paper thumbnail of The Nonprofit Sector's Capital Constraint: Does It Provide a Rationale for the Tax Exemption Granted To Nonprofit Firms?

Public Finance Review, 1993

Page 1. http://pfr.sagepub.com/ Public Finance Review http://pfr.sagepub.com/content/ 21/4/415 Th... more Page 1. http://pfr.sagepub.com/ Public Finance Review http://pfr.sagepub.com/content/ 21/4/415 The online version of this article can be found at: DOI: 10.1177/ 109114219302100404 1993 21: 415 Public Finance Review Timothy ...