Latifundia Economics (original) (raw)

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Abstract

This paper proposes a simple general equilibrium theory of agrarian production organization to explain the emergence and persistence of latifundia - minifundia type patterns of agrarian production organization such as have prevailed historically in many parts of Latin America. When land ownership is concentrated, the exercise of market power over land can facilitate the exercise of control over labor, as labor supply to landlord estates is affected by peasant access to land. Equilibria may emerge where landlords, behaving as multi-market Cournot oligopolists, inefficiently hoard land to drive up land rentals and corral cheaper labor into their expanding estates. Labor-service tenancy arrangements, similar to those used in practice, emerge as landlords try to price discriminate. These contracts help to restore allocative inefficiency but lead to lower equilibrium peasant wages and welfare. Population growth, differential technical progress on landlord and peasant farms, and other changes in the physical and economic environment are shown to transform equilibrium patterns of agrarian production organization in ways that are consistent with agrarian trajectories observed in late nineteenth century Chile and several other regions and periods. The model also clarifies how agents' incentives to challenge property rights change along with equilibrium agrarian structures (See my more recent closely related paper "On The Causes of Slavery or Serfdom and the Transition to Agrarian Capitalism: Domar Extended.")

Suggested Citation

Handle: RePEc:htr:hcecon:02/1

References listed on IDEAS

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Cited by:

  1. Assunção, Juliano Junqueira & Moreira, Humberto Ataíde, 2004. "Land taxes in a Latin American context,"FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE)526, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
  2. Hermans, Frans L. P. & Chaddad, Fabio R. & Gagalyuk, Taras & Senesi, Sebastian & Balmann, Alfons, 2017. "The emergence and proliferation of agroholdings and mega farms in a global context,"International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association, vol. 20(2), April.
  3. Jonathan H. Conning & James A. Robinson, 2001. "Land Reform and the Political Organization of Agriculture,"Department of Economics Working Papers2001-10, Department of Economics, Williams College.
  4. World Bank, 2004. "Colombia : Land Policy in Transition,"World Bank Publications - Reports14351, The World Bank Group.
  5. William F. Maloney, 2002. "Missed Opportunities: Innovation and Resource-Based Growth in Latin America,"Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Fall 2002), pages 111-168, August.
  6. Juliano Assunção, 2006. "Land Reform and Landholdings in Brazil,"WIDER Working Paper SeriesRP2006-137, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  7. Raffaella Castagnini & Klaus Deininger & Maria A. Gonzalez, 2004. "Comparing land reform and land markets in colombia: impacts on equity and efficiency,"Policy Research Working Paper Series3258, The World Bank.
  8. Banco Mundial, 2004. "Colombia: Una Política De Tierras En Transición,"Documentos CEDE2146, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
  9. Conning, Jonathan H. & Robinson, James A., 2007. "Property rights and the political organization of agriculture,"Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 416-447, March.
  10. Gollin, Douglas & Kirchberger, Martina & Lagakos, David, 2021. "Do urban wage premia reflect lower amenities? Evidence from Africa,"Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).

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Keywords

Monoposony; agrarian organization; inequality; tenancy; slavery; serfdom.;
[All these keywords](/cgi-bin/htsearch2?q=%22Monoposony%22 %22agrarian+organization%22 %22inequality%22 %22tenancy%22 %22slavery%22 %22serfdom.%22 ).

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This item is featured on the following reading lists, Wikipedia, or ReplicationWiki pages:

  1. Латифундија in Wikipedia Macedonian
  2. Latifundium in Wikipedia Latin
  3. Latifundium in Wikipedia Indonesian

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