Titli Basu | Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (original) (raw)

Papers by Titli Basu

Research paper thumbnail of India-Japan Vision 2025: Deciphering the Indo- Pacific Strategy

Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, 2018

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s strategic pursuit of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, anchored in his co... more Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s strategic pursuit of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, anchored in his conceptualisation of ‘Confluence of the Two Seas’ and founded on the principle of concert of democracies, has created space for India in Japan’s Grand Strategy. India has been identified as a key variable in the geopolitical churning that is shaping the Indo-Pacific discourse both in Japan and the US. However, as policy positions are articulated by respective leaders, ambiguities around the Indo-Pacific puzzle demands more clarity. While President Trump and Prime Minister Abe are aligned in terms of pursuing the Indo-Pacific strategy with the objective of managing the US-led strategic order amidst Chinese attempts in claiming equity in international affairs with alternative ideas and institutions, Prime Minister Modi has articulated India’s Indo-Pacific vision as a free, open and ‘inclusive’ construct. India’s approach toward geopolitical realities is guided by a balance between engagement and autonomy. While there is alignment of interests which has led India to develop an ‘action oriented partnership’ for its Indo-Pacific Vision 2025 with Japan and pursue robust security and economic engagement with the US but containment of China has not been the objective of India’s foreign policy approach. Meanwhile, Japan’s strategy is shaped by the complex interplay of security and economic interests within the Japan-US-China triangle. Although there are certain gaps in each country’s nuanced interpretation of the Indo-Pacific construct, a few common elements define India-Japan ‘winning combination’ in the Indo-Pacific such as upholding ASEAN centrality; the objective of securing strategic stability and economic prosperity based on the pillars of shared universal values; facilitating infrastructure and connectivity between the sub-regions including Bay of Bengal, Mekong region and the Indian Ocean for better economic integration and leveraging regional production networks and value chains; and securing maritime global commons by strengthening security cooperation with like-minded partners. India-Japan Vision 2025 is rooted on ‘action oriented partnership’ advancing universal values and furthering rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific. As regional fluidity both in terms of geopolitics and geo-economics are unfolding greater uncertainty, India and Japan as two major Asian powers and economies have coordinated in forward thinking while steering the challenges and realising the opportunities that this maritime super-region has to offer.

Research paper thumbnail of Decoding Japan’s Security Discourse: Diverse Perspectives

India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs

Research paper thumbnail of Post Covid 19 Strategic Priorities The India Japan Action Agenda

Asian Perspectives, Asia Global Online , 2021

Beijing’s ascent in the global order and the ensuing disequilibrium in the power balance between ... more Beijing’s ascent in the global order and the ensuing disequilibrium in the power balance between the US and China at the global level, and the India-China and Japan-China relationships in Asia, are making New Delhi and Tokyo weigh their strategic choices. Japan, as a beneficiary of the US-led system, does not favor the idea of a Sino-centric order. India’s Indo-Pacific vision aims at empowering it as a leading power, instead of a balancer, in a multipolar world. India and Japan, writes Titli Basu of the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, are well positioned to shape strategic solutions and to deliver on the shared responsibility of providing global public goods.

Research paper thumbnail of Sino-US Disorder: Power and Policy in Post-COVID Indo- Pacific

Journal of Asian Economic Integration 2(2) 159–179, 2020, 2020

Great powers have invested in order-building projects with competing vision of political values a... more Great powers have invested in order-building projects with competing vision of political values and ideologies. How the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic shapes the balance of power and order are debated. The pandemic arrived in the midst of Sino-US strategic contestation, a crumbling European project, de-globalisation and contested economic governance architecture. While the pandemic exacerbated Washington abdicating leadership role, Beijing also has alienated itself from the followers of rules based order. It has sharpened the clash of rhetoric, narratives, and perceptions. The pandemic will reorganise the international system and power structures. Situating the Indo-Pacific project in this backdrop, this article critically analyses the debates, discourses and nuanced divergences that are shaping the Indo-Pacific puzzle in the power corridors of Washington, Tokyo and Delhi, in addition to mapping Beijing's approach to Indo-Pacific. The article evaluates the contrast in their respective visions of order, China strategy, ASEAN centrality and multilateral free-trade regimes. But these subtle departures have not restricted major Indo-Pacific powers to weave a strategic web of democracies and pursue a win-win issue-based multi-alignment on matters of mutual strategic interests. With new realities in play, the India-US-Japan triangle will feature as one of the key building blocks of Indo-Pacific to deliver on the shared responsibility of providing global public goods.

Research paper thumbnail of Geoeconomic Contest in Southeast Asia

The Sage Handbook of Asian Foreign Policy, 2019

Research paper thumbnail of Infrastructure Financing and Institutional Statecraft: Japan’s Role in India’s Modernisation

The chapter situates the theme of infrastructure financing and institutional statecraft in the In... more The chapter situates the theme of infrastructure financing and
institutional statecraft in the India-Japan context. It argues that Japan,
as a key developmental partner, should increasingly align its influence
in the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), especially leverage its
leading position in the Asian Development Bank (ADB) with Tokyo’s
own infrastructure export strategy pursued within the framework of
Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (EPQI), through the
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Japan Bank
for International Cooperation (JBIC), to achieve the twin objectives
of mutually beneficial economic development and for expanding its
geopolitical influence. The existing literature on India-Japan relations
has primarily focused on evaluating the impact of Japanese Official
Development Assistance (ODA) in India’s mega infrastructure projects.
While Japan’s development assistance performs an instrumental
role in facilitating the ‘Make in India’ initiative, Japan’s position in
the ADB can also be leveraged, in addition to bilateral ODA while
financing infrastructure projects of strategic importance in India and
coordinating economic and strategic interests in pursuit of Japan’s
Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision.

Research paper thumbnail of Rethinking Japan’s North Korea Strategy: In Cross-Currents between Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump

Research paper thumbnail of Realising 'Make in India': Port-led Development in the Indian Ocean

Research paper thumbnail of QUAD AND INDIA'S MULTI-ALIGNMENT

EAST ASIA MILITARY MONITOR, VOLUME 2 ISSUE 3, 2019

As the US-China strategic competition intensifies, structural changes are unfolding in the intern... more As the US-China strategic competition intensifies, structural changes are unfolding in the international system. In pursuit of preserving the liberal international order and keeping the Indo-Pacific free from coercion with open sea-lanes and infrastructure, key policy papers of the Trump administration have argued for a 'networked security architecture'. 1 The quadrilateral framework is considered 'vital to address pressing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific'. 2 Even though the Quad framework has its limits, since India has reservations in projecting it as a military alliance aimed at containment of a 'revisionist' China, there is a school of thought which argues that in case of escalating competition with Beijing, the US would increasingly consider employing Quad, especially the military dimension to uphold a favourable international order. 3 China's maritime assertiveness is a key variable in the revival of the Quad framework. 4

Research paper thumbnail of India-Japan Vision 2025: Deciphering the Indo-Pacific Strategy

Indian Foreign Affairs Journal , 2018

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s strategic pursuit of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, anchored in his co... more Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s strategic pursuit of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, anchored in his conceptualisation of ‘Confluence of the Two Seas’ and founded on the principle of concert of democracies, has created space for India in Japan’s Grand Strategy. India has been identified as a key variable in the geopolitical churning that is shaping the Indo-Pacific discourse both in Japan and the US. However, as policy positions are articulated by respective leaders, ambiguities around the Indo-Pacific puzzle demands more clarity. While President Trump and Prime Minister Abe are aligned in terms of pursuing the Indo-Pacific strategy with the objective of managing the US-led strategic order amidst Chinese attempts in claiming equity in international affairs with alternative ideas and institutions, Prime Minister Modi has articulated India’s Indo-Pacific vision as a free, open and ‘inclusive’ construct. India’s approach toward geopolitical realities is guided by a balance between engagement and autonomy. While there is alignment of interests which has led India to develop an ‘action oriented partnership’ for its Indo-Pacific Vision 2025 with Japan and pursue robust security and economic engagement with the US but containment of China has not been the objective of India’s foreign policy approach. Meanwhile, Japan’s strategy is shaped by the complex interplay of security and economic interests within the Japan-US-China triangle. Although there are certain gaps in each country’s nuanced interpretation of the Indo-Pacific construct, a few common elements define India-Japan ‘winning combination’ in the Indo-Pacific such as upholding ASEAN centrality; the objective of securing strategic stability and economic prosperity based on the pillars of shared universal values; facilitating infrastructure and connectivity between the sub-regions including Bay of Bengal, Mekong region and the Indian Ocean for better economic integration and leveraging regional production networks and value chains; and securing maritime global commons by strengthening security cooperation with like-minded partners. India-Japan Vision 2025 is rooted on ‘action oriented partnership’ advancing universal values and furthering rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific. As regional fluidity both in terms of geopolitics and geo-economics are unfolding greater uncertainty, India and Japan as two major Asian powers and economies have coordinated in forward thinking while steering the challenges and realising the opportunities that this maritime super-region has to offer.

Research paper thumbnail of Japan's Strategic Calculations.pdf

IDSA Issue Brief, 2019

Japan's grand strategy has successively evolved from the Rich Nation, Strong Army (Fukoku Kyohei)... more Japan's grand strategy has successively evolved from the Rich Nation, Strong Army (Fukoku Kyohei) model of the Meiji era to Prince Konoye's New Order in Greater East Asia (Dai Tôa shin chitsujo) between the two world wars, and then to the pragmatic Yoshida Doctrine of security pacifism and mercantile realism during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, when the international system is moving away from the unipolar moment of US hegemony, how is Prime Minister Shinzo Abe managing Tokyo's strategic calculations within the US-Japan-China relations? While managing Japan's strategic puzzles amidst US-China competition, Japan will continue to invest in strengthening its alliance with the United States, buttress national strength, and further knit universal value based strategic partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, on the one hand, and engage with China in the hope of shaping it as a responsible power that respects international norms, on the other. Recent developments in Japan's China policy are shaped by tactical calculations and do not suggest dilution of Abe's primary objective of supporting the US-led regional order that has served Japan's national interests well since the post-war era.

Research paper thumbnail of Thinking Africa_ India, Japan, and the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor.pdf

Research paper thumbnail of Japan in Prime Minister Modi’s Vision for India.pdf

Asia Pacific Bulletin, East-West Centre, 2016

Research paper thumbnail of India-Japan and the Confluence of the Two Seas.pdf

IDSA Issue Brief , 2017

As Prime Minister Narendra Modi welcomes Shinzo Abe in India for the annual bilateral summit, bot... more As Prime Minister Narendra Modi welcomes Shinzo Abe in India for the annual bilateral summit, both leaders would be happy to showcase the report card of their 'action-oriented partnership' and the ever-expanding depth and scope of the bilateral relationship. Entry into force of the India-Japan civil nuclear agreement in July, launching of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, diversification of the defence cooperation, Japan's support towards India in the standoff in Doklam and terrorist attack in Pathankot, and coordination on the North Korean proliferation threat demonstrates the forward movement in India-Japan relations since the last summit meeting in November 2016.

Research paper thumbnail of India in Japan’s Geo-strategic Outlook.pdf

Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2016

Japan’s long-standing alliance with the US is the key feature of its defence and security policy.... more Japan’s long-standing alliance with the US is the key feature of its defence and security policy. However, China’s rise and impact on shaping the regional security architecture, and the vigour of US commitment in the backdrop of a G2 formulation, is making Japan diversify her options. Thus, India now features in the Japanese idea of Asia while it struggles to cope with the fluidity of the regional security landscape. This article critically analyses the increasing space accorded to India and the variables behind Japan’s courtship of it. It probes whether Japan’s India policy is Abe centric, or more enduring in nature, and examines India’s position in Japan’s defence outlook as Tokyo redesigns its security policy. India’s advent in the Japanese geo-strategic frame will endure since the variables that pushed Japan to incorporate India in its strategic design will mature and complicate the regional security environment in the coming years

Research paper thumbnail of Decoding Japan’s Security Discourse.pdf

India Quarterly 72(1) 30–49, 2016

East Asian theatre is fast evolving. China’s arrival as a major power in international politics i... more East Asian theatre is fast evolving. China’s arrival as a major power in international politics is altering the existing regional balance of power and intensifying Japan’s quest for securing a rightful place in the international system. Japan is reacting to the asymmetrical power politics and Shinzo Abe is increasingly becoming restless in attempting to redefine Japan’s secondary power identity. This requires undoing
the limitations that were forced on Japan in the post-war period, including the constitutional restrictions, especially the pacifist clause. Amid fiercely contested domestic debate, reinterpreting the pacifist
constitution is certainly a bold step towards infusing clarity in Japan’s future security role. The key objective is to convey to Japan’s allies concerning the manner the SDF will cooperate with the US and other regional powers, such as Australia, India, Philippines, etc. How this limited’ right to collective self-defence will translate into operation will remain to be seen. To understand the rapidly unfolding policy shift, it is imperative to understand the different waves of the debate on collective self-defence and deconstruct the recent cabinet decision; explore the arguments of the competing schools of thought in Japan; examine the nuances and drivers that propelled Japan to redefine its passive constitution; and understand how regional and extra-regional powers evaluate this policy reorientation. Few regional stakeholders raised an alarm over the approach adopted by Abe to achieve the policy objective
underscoring his militarist ambitions. While the aggressive historical baggage has caused considerable unease, it is premature to be alarmed over Japan’s shifting security posture as possible re-militarisation
is unlikely to represent the traits of Imperial Japan.

Books by Titli Basu

Research paper thumbnail of Major Powers and the Korean Peninsula: Politics, Policies and Perspectives

The Korean Peninsula, which constitutes one of the strategic pivots of Northeast Asian security, ... more The Korean Peninsula, which constitutes one of the strategic pivots of Northeast Asian security, has remained a contested theatre for major powers. Denuclearisation of the Peninsula is unfolding as one of the most defining challenges in shaping regional security. The end state in the Peninsula and how it is to be realised is debated amongst the stakeholders. This book aims to situate some of the critical issues in the Korean theatre within the competing geopolitical interests, strategic choices and policy debates among the major powers. This volume is an endeavour to bring together leading Indian experts including former Indian ambassadors to the Republic of Korea, and senior members from the defence and strategic community to analyse the developing situation in the Korean Peninsula.

Research paper thumbnail of India-Japan Vision 2025: Deciphering the Indo- Pacific Strategy

Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, 2018

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s strategic pursuit of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, anchored in his co... more Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s strategic pursuit of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, anchored in his conceptualisation of ‘Confluence of the Two Seas’ and founded on the principle of concert of democracies, has created space for India in Japan’s Grand Strategy. India has been identified as a key variable in the geopolitical churning that is shaping the Indo-Pacific discourse both in Japan and the US. However, as policy positions are articulated by respective leaders, ambiguities around the Indo-Pacific puzzle demands more clarity. While President Trump and Prime Minister Abe are aligned in terms of pursuing the Indo-Pacific strategy with the objective of managing the US-led strategic order amidst Chinese attempts in claiming equity in international affairs with alternative ideas and institutions, Prime Minister Modi has articulated India’s Indo-Pacific vision as a free, open and ‘inclusive’ construct. India’s approach toward geopolitical realities is guided by a balance between engagement and autonomy. While there is alignment of interests which has led India to develop an ‘action oriented partnership’ for its Indo-Pacific Vision 2025 with Japan and pursue robust security and economic engagement with the US but containment of China has not been the objective of India’s foreign policy approach. Meanwhile, Japan’s strategy is shaped by the complex interplay of security and economic interests within the Japan-US-China triangle. Although there are certain gaps in each country’s nuanced interpretation of the Indo-Pacific construct, a few common elements define India-Japan ‘winning combination’ in the Indo-Pacific such as upholding ASEAN centrality; the objective of securing strategic stability and economic prosperity based on the pillars of shared universal values; facilitating infrastructure and connectivity between the sub-regions including Bay of Bengal, Mekong region and the Indian Ocean for better economic integration and leveraging regional production networks and value chains; and securing maritime global commons by strengthening security cooperation with like-minded partners. India-Japan Vision 2025 is rooted on ‘action oriented partnership’ advancing universal values and furthering rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific. As regional fluidity both in terms of geopolitics and geo-economics are unfolding greater uncertainty, India and Japan as two major Asian powers and economies have coordinated in forward thinking while steering the challenges and realising the opportunities that this maritime super-region has to offer.

Research paper thumbnail of Decoding Japan’s Security Discourse: Diverse Perspectives

India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs

Research paper thumbnail of Post Covid 19 Strategic Priorities The India Japan Action Agenda

Asian Perspectives, Asia Global Online , 2021

Beijing’s ascent in the global order and the ensuing disequilibrium in the power balance between ... more Beijing’s ascent in the global order and the ensuing disequilibrium in the power balance between the US and China at the global level, and the India-China and Japan-China relationships in Asia, are making New Delhi and Tokyo weigh their strategic choices. Japan, as a beneficiary of the US-led system, does not favor the idea of a Sino-centric order. India’s Indo-Pacific vision aims at empowering it as a leading power, instead of a balancer, in a multipolar world. India and Japan, writes Titli Basu of the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, are well positioned to shape strategic solutions and to deliver on the shared responsibility of providing global public goods.

Research paper thumbnail of Sino-US Disorder: Power and Policy in Post-COVID Indo- Pacific

Journal of Asian Economic Integration 2(2) 159–179, 2020, 2020

Great powers have invested in order-building projects with competing vision of political values a... more Great powers have invested in order-building projects with competing vision of political values and ideologies. How the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic shapes the balance of power and order are debated. The pandemic arrived in the midst of Sino-US strategic contestation, a crumbling European project, de-globalisation and contested economic governance architecture. While the pandemic exacerbated Washington abdicating leadership role, Beijing also has alienated itself from the followers of rules based order. It has sharpened the clash of rhetoric, narratives, and perceptions. The pandemic will reorganise the international system and power structures. Situating the Indo-Pacific project in this backdrop, this article critically analyses the debates, discourses and nuanced divergences that are shaping the Indo-Pacific puzzle in the power corridors of Washington, Tokyo and Delhi, in addition to mapping Beijing's approach to Indo-Pacific. The article evaluates the contrast in their respective visions of order, China strategy, ASEAN centrality and multilateral free-trade regimes. But these subtle departures have not restricted major Indo-Pacific powers to weave a strategic web of democracies and pursue a win-win issue-based multi-alignment on matters of mutual strategic interests. With new realities in play, the India-US-Japan triangle will feature as one of the key building blocks of Indo-Pacific to deliver on the shared responsibility of providing global public goods.

Research paper thumbnail of Geoeconomic Contest in Southeast Asia

The Sage Handbook of Asian Foreign Policy, 2019

Research paper thumbnail of Infrastructure Financing and Institutional Statecraft: Japan’s Role in India’s Modernisation

The chapter situates the theme of infrastructure financing and institutional statecraft in the In... more The chapter situates the theme of infrastructure financing and
institutional statecraft in the India-Japan context. It argues that Japan,
as a key developmental partner, should increasingly align its influence
in the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), especially leverage its
leading position in the Asian Development Bank (ADB) with Tokyo’s
own infrastructure export strategy pursued within the framework of
Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (EPQI), through the
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Japan Bank
for International Cooperation (JBIC), to achieve the twin objectives
of mutually beneficial economic development and for expanding its
geopolitical influence. The existing literature on India-Japan relations
has primarily focused on evaluating the impact of Japanese Official
Development Assistance (ODA) in India’s mega infrastructure projects.
While Japan’s development assistance performs an instrumental
role in facilitating the ‘Make in India’ initiative, Japan’s position in
the ADB can also be leveraged, in addition to bilateral ODA while
financing infrastructure projects of strategic importance in India and
coordinating economic and strategic interests in pursuit of Japan’s
Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision.

Research paper thumbnail of Rethinking Japan’s North Korea Strategy: In Cross-Currents between Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump

Research paper thumbnail of Realising 'Make in India': Port-led Development in the Indian Ocean

Research paper thumbnail of QUAD AND INDIA'S MULTI-ALIGNMENT

EAST ASIA MILITARY MONITOR, VOLUME 2 ISSUE 3, 2019

As the US-China strategic competition intensifies, structural changes are unfolding in the intern... more As the US-China strategic competition intensifies, structural changes are unfolding in the international system. In pursuit of preserving the liberal international order and keeping the Indo-Pacific free from coercion with open sea-lanes and infrastructure, key policy papers of the Trump administration have argued for a 'networked security architecture'. 1 The quadrilateral framework is considered 'vital to address pressing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific'. 2 Even though the Quad framework has its limits, since India has reservations in projecting it as a military alliance aimed at containment of a 'revisionist' China, there is a school of thought which argues that in case of escalating competition with Beijing, the US would increasingly consider employing Quad, especially the military dimension to uphold a favourable international order. 3 China's maritime assertiveness is a key variable in the revival of the Quad framework. 4

Research paper thumbnail of India-Japan Vision 2025: Deciphering the Indo-Pacific Strategy

Indian Foreign Affairs Journal , 2018

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s strategic pursuit of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, anchored in his co... more Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s strategic pursuit of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, anchored in his conceptualisation of ‘Confluence of the Two Seas’ and founded on the principle of concert of democracies, has created space for India in Japan’s Grand Strategy. India has been identified as a key variable in the geopolitical churning that is shaping the Indo-Pacific discourse both in Japan and the US. However, as policy positions are articulated by respective leaders, ambiguities around the Indo-Pacific puzzle demands more clarity. While President Trump and Prime Minister Abe are aligned in terms of pursuing the Indo-Pacific strategy with the objective of managing the US-led strategic order amidst Chinese attempts in claiming equity in international affairs with alternative ideas and institutions, Prime Minister Modi has articulated India’s Indo-Pacific vision as a free, open and ‘inclusive’ construct. India’s approach toward geopolitical realities is guided by a balance between engagement and autonomy. While there is alignment of interests which has led India to develop an ‘action oriented partnership’ for its Indo-Pacific Vision 2025 with Japan and pursue robust security and economic engagement with the US but containment of China has not been the objective of India’s foreign policy approach. Meanwhile, Japan’s strategy is shaped by the complex interplay of security and economic interests within the Japan-US-China triangle. Although there are certain gaps in each country’s nuanced interpretation of the Indo-Pacific construct, a few common elements define India-Japan ‘winning combination’ in the Indo-Pacific such as upholding ASEAN centrality; the objective of securing strategic stability and economic prosperity based on the pillars of shared universal values; facilitating infrastructure and connectivity between the sub-regions including Bay of Bengal, Mekong region and the Indian Ocean for better economic integration and leveraging regional production networks and value chains; and securing maritime global commons by strengthening security cooperation with like-minded partners. India-Japan Vision 2025 is rooted on ‘action oriented partnership’ advancing universal values and furthering rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific. As regional fluidity both in terms of geopolitics and geo-economics are unfolding greater uncertainty, India and Japan as two major Asian powers and economies have coordinated in forward thinking while steering the challenges and realising the opportunities that this maritime super-region has to offer.

Research paper thumbnail of Japan's Strategic Calculations.pdf

IDSA Issue Brief, 2019

Japan's grand strategy has successively evolved from the Rich Nation, Strong Army (Fukoku Kyohei)... more Japan's grand strategy has successively evolved from the Rich Nation, Strong Army (Fukoku Kyohei) model of the Meiji era to Prince Konoye's New Order in Greater East Asia (Dai Tôa shin chitsujo) between the two world wars, and then to the pragmatic Yoshida Doctrine of security pacifism and mercantile realism during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, when the international system is moving away from the unipolar moment of US hegemony, how is Prime Minister Shinzo Abe managing Tokyo's strategic calculations within the US-Japan-China relations? While managing Japan's strategic puzzles amidst US-China competition, Japan will continue to invest in strengthening its alliance with the United States, buttress national strength, and further knit universal value based strategic partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, on the one hand, and engage with China in the hope of shaping it as a responsible power that respects international norms, on the other. Recent developments in Japan's China policy are shaped by tactical calculations and do not suggest dilution of Abe's primary objective of supporting the US-led regional order that has served Japan's national interests well since the post-war era.

Research paper thumbnail of Thinking Africa_ India, Japan, and the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor.pdf

Research paper thumbnail of Japan in Prime Minister Modi’s Vision for India.pdf

Asia Pacific Bulletin, East-West Centre, 2016

Research paper thumbnail of India-Japan and the Confluence of the Two Seas.pdf

IDSA Issue Brief , 2017

As Prime Minister Narendra Modi welcomes Shinzo Abe in India for the annual bilateral summit, bot... more As Prime Minister Narendra Modi welcomes Shinzo Abe in India for the annual bilateral summit, both leaders would be happy to showcase the report card of their 'action-oriented partnership' and the ever-expanding depth and scope of the bilateral relationship. Entry into force of the India-Japan civil nuclear agreement in July, launching of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, diversification of the defence cooperation, Japan's support towards India in the standoff in Doklam and terrorist attack in Pathankot, and coordination on the North Korean proliferation threat demonstrates the forward movement in India-Japan relations since the last summit meeting in November 2016.

Research paper thumbnail of India in Japan’s Geo-strategic Outlook.pdf

Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2016

Japan’s long-standing alliance with the US is the key feature of its defence and security policy.... more Japan’s long-standing alliance with the US is the key feature of its defence and security policy. However, China’s rise and impact on shaping the regional security architecture, and the vigour of US commitment in the backdrop of a G2 formulation, is making Japan diversify her options. Thus, India now features in the Japanese idea of Asia while it struggles to cope with the fluidity of the regional security landscape. This article critically analyses the increasing space accorded to India and the variables behind Japan’s courtship of it. It probes whether Japan’s India policy is Abe centric, or more enduring in nature, and examines India’s position in Japan’s defence outlook as Tokyo redesigns its security policy. India’s advent in the Japanese geo-strategic frame will endure since the variables that pushed Japan to incorporate India in its strategic design will mature and complicate the regional security environment in the coming years

Research paper thumbnail of Decoding Japan’s Security Discourse.pdf

India Quarterly 72(1) 30–49, 2016

East Asian theatre is fast evolving. China’s arrival as a major power in international politics i... more East Asian theatre is fast evolving. China’s arrival as a major power in international politics is altering the existing regional balance of power and intensifying Japan’s quest for securing a rightful place in the international system. Japan is reacting to the asymmetrical power politics and Shinzo Abe is increasingly becoming restless in attempting to redefine Japan’s secondary power identity. This requires undoing
the limitations that were forced on Japan in the post-war period, including the constitutional restrictions, especially the pacifist clause. Amid fiercely contested domestic debate, reinterpreting the pacifist
constitution is certainly a bold step towards infusing clarity in Japan’s future security role. The key objective is to convey to Japan’s allies concerning the manner the SDF will cooperate with the US and other regional powers, such as Australia, India, Philippines, etc. How this limited’ right to collective self-defence will translate into operation will remain to be seen. To understand the rapidly unfolding policy shift, it is imperative to understand the different waves of the debate on collective self-defence and deconstruct the recent cabinet decision; explore the arguments of the competing schools of thought in Japan; examine the nuances and drivers that propelled Japan to redefine its passive constitution; and understand how regional and extra-regional powers evaluate this policy reorientation. Few regional stakeholders raised an alarm over the approach adopted by Abe to achieve the policy objective
underscoring his militarist ambitions. While the aggressive historical baggage has caused considerable unease, it is premature to be alarmed over Japan’s shifting security posture as possible re-militarisation
is unlikely to represent the traits of Imperial Japan.

Research paper thumbnail of Major Powers and the Korean Peninsula: Politics, Policies and Perspectives

The Korean Peninsula, which constitutes one of the strategic pivots of Northeast Asian security, ... more The Korean Peninsula, which constitutes one of the strategic pivots of Northeast Asian security, has remained a contested theatre for major powers. Denuclearisation of the Peninsula is unfolding as one of the most defining challenges in shaping regional security. The end state in the Peninsula and how it is to be realised is debated amongst the stakeholders. This book aims to situate some of the critical issues in the Korean theatre within the competing geopolitical interests, strategic choices and policy debates among the major powers. This volume is an endeavour to bring together leading Indian experts including former Indian ambassadors to the Republic of Korea, and senior members from the defence and strategic community to analyse the developing situation in the Korean Peninsula.