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Papers by Jose Antonio Cheibub

Cambridge Books, Jan 1, 2000

Is economic development conducive to political democracy? Does democracy foster or hinder materia... more Is economic development conducive to political democracy? Does democracy foster or hinder material welfare? These two questions are examined by looking at the experience of 135 countries between 1950 and 1990. Descriptive information, statistical analyses, and historical ...

Studies in Comparative …, Jan 1, 1996

Page 1. PARLIAMENTARISM, AND DEMOCRACY JOSE ANTONIO CHEIBUB Page 2. Page 3. Presidentialism, Parl... more Page 1. PARLIAMENTARISM, AND DEMOCRACY JOSE ANTONIO CHEIBUB Page 2. Page 3. Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy Are newly established presidential democracies doomed to fail? In support of ...

World Politics, Jan 1, 1998

Page 1. POLITICAL REGIMES AND THE EXTRACTIVE CAPACITY OF GOVERNMENTS Taxation in Democracies and ... more Page 1. POLITICAL REGIMES AND THE EXTRACTIVE CAPACITY OF GOVERNMENTS Taxation in Democracies and Dictatorships By JOS? ANTONIO CHEIBUB* I. Introduction THE simultaneous political and economic transformations occur ...

Democracy, accountability, and …, Jan 1, 1999

Page 234. Jose Antonio Cheibub and Adam Przeworski Chapter Seven Democracy, Elections, and Accoun... more Page 234. Jose Antonio Cheibub and Adam Przeworski Chapter Seven Democracy, Elections, and Accountability for Economic Outcomes Our purpose is to examine the empirical validity of two propositions: that democracy ...

Comparative Political Studies, Jan 1, 2002

What are the conditions that generate minority presidents and deadlock in presidential regimes? W... more What are the conditions that generate minority presidents and deadlock in presidential regimes? What is the impact of minority presidents and deadlock on the survival of these regimes? Based on data for all presidential and mixed democracies that existed between 1946 and 1996, I show (1) that characteristics of the electoral and party systems do affect the level of support for the president in congress and hence the probability of minority presidents; (2) that these characteristics, and the minority presidents they generate, do not make deadlock more likely; (3) that minority presidents do not necessarily induce deadlock; and (4) that minority presidents and deadlock do not affect the survival of presidential systems. Together these findings suggest that we must abandon the view that explains the instability of presidential democracies in terms of the type of executive-legislative relations these regimes are likely to induce. I then offer two reasons, institutional in nature, that may account for the instability of presidential regimes.

Annual Review of Political Science, Jan 1, 2002

We review arguments and empirical evidence found in the comparative literature that bear on the d... more We review arguments and empirical evidence found in the comparative literature that bear on the differences in the survival rates of parliamentary and presidential democracies. Most of these arguments focus on the fact that presidential democracies are based on the separation of executive and legislative powers, while parliamentary democracies are based on the fusion of these powers. From this basic distinction several implications are derived which would lead to radically different behavior and outcomes under each regime. We argue that this perspective is misguided and that we cannot deduce the functioning of the political system from the way governments are formed. There are other provisions, constitutional or otherwise, that also affect the way parliamentary and presidential democracies operate and that may counteract some of the tendencies that we would expect to observe if we were to derive the regime's performance from its basic constitutional principle.

Public Choice, Jan 1, 2010

We address the strengths and weaknesses of the main available measures of political regime and ex... more We address the strengths and weaknesses of the main available measures of political regime and extend the dichotomous regime classification first introduced in Alvarez et al. (Stud. Comp. Int. Dev. 31 : 1996). We argue that differences across regime measures must be taken seriously and that they should be evaluated in terms of whether they (1) serve to address important research questions, (2) can be interpreted meaningfully, and (3) are reproducible. We argue that existing measures of democracy are not interchangeable and that the choice of measure should be guided by its theoretical and empirical underpinnings. We show that the choice of regime measure matters by replicating studies published in leading journals.

annual meeting of the American Political Science …, Jan 1, 2004

Cambridge Books, Jan 1, 2000

Is economic development conducive to political democracy? Does democracy foster or hinder materia... more Is economic development conducive to political democracy? Does democracy foster or hinder material welfare? These two questions are examined by looking at the experience of 135 countries between 1950 and 1990. Descriptive information, statistical analyses, and historical ...

Studies in Comparative …, Jan 1, 1996

Page 1. PARLIAMENTARISM, AND DEMOCRACY JOSE ANTONIO CHEIBUB Page 2. Page 3. Presidentialism, Parl... more Page 1. PARLIAMENTARISM, AND DEMOCRACY JOSE ANTONIO CHEIBUB Page 2. Page 3. Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy Are newly established presidential democracies doomed to fail? In support of ...

World Politics, Jan 1, 1998

Page 1. POLITICAL REGIMES AND THE EXTRACTIVE CAPACITY OF GOVERNMENTS Taxation in Democracies and ... more Page 1. POLITICAL REGIMES AND THE EXTRACTIVE CAPACITY OF GOVERNMENTS Taxation in Democracies and Dictatorships By JOS? ANTONIO CHEIBUB* I. Introduction THE simultaneous political and economic transformations occur ...

Democracy, accountability, and …, Jan 1, 1999

Page 234. Jose Antonio Cheibub and Adam Przeworski Chapter Seven Democracy, Elections, and Accoun... more Page 234. Jose Antonio Cheibub and Adam Przeworski Chapter Seven Democracy, Elections, and Accountability for Economic Outcomes Our purpose is to examine the empirical validity of two propositions: that democracy ...

Comparative Political Studies, Jan 1, 2002

What are the conditions that generate minority presidents and deadlock in presidential regimes? W... more What are the conditions that generate minority presidents and deadlock in presidential regimes? What is the impact of minority presidents and deadlock on the survival of these regimes? Based on data for all presidential and mixed democracies that existed between 1946 and 1996, I show (1) that characteristics of the electoral and party systems do affect the level of support for the president in congress and hence the probability of minority presidents; (2) that these characteristics, and the minority presidents they generate, do not make deadlock more likely; (3) that minority presidents do not necessarily induce deadlock; and (4) that minority presidents and deadlock do not affect the survival of presidential systems. Together these findings suggest that we must abandon the view that explains the instability of presidential democracies in terms of the type of executive-legislative relations these regimes are likely to induce. I then offer two reasons, institutional in nature, that may account for the instability of presidential regimes.

Annual Review of Political Science, Jan 1, 2002

We review arguments and empirical evidence found in the comparative literature that bear on the d... more We review arguments and empirical evidence found in the comparative literature that bear on the differences in the survival rates of parliamentary and presidential democracies. Most of these arguments focus on the fact that presidential democracies are based on the separation of executive and legislative powers, while parliamentary democracies are based on the fusion of these powers. From this basic distinction several implications are derived which would lead to radically different behavior and outcomes under each regime. We argue that this perspective is misguided and that we cannot deduce the functioning of the political system from the way governments are formed. There are other provisions, constitutional or otherwise, that also affect the way parliamentary and presidential democracies operate and that may counteract some of the tendencies that we would expect to observe if we were to derive the regime's performance from its basic constitutional principle.

Public Choice, Jan 1, 2010

We address the strengths and weaknesses of the main available measures of political regime and ex... more We address the strengths and weaknesses of the main available measures of political regime and extend the dichotomous regime classification first introduced in Alvarez et al. (Stud. Comp. Int. Dev. 31 : 1996). We argue that differences across regime measures must be taken seriously and that they should be evaluated in terms of whether they (1) serve to address important research questions, (2) can be interpreted meaningfully, and (3) are reproducible. We argue that existing measures of democracy are not interchangeable and that the choice of measure should be guided by its theoretical and empirical underpinnings. We show that the choice of regime measure matters by replicating studies published in leading journals.

annual meeting of the American Political Science …, Jan 1, 2004