Igor Aleksander | Imperial College London (original) (raw)

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Papers by Igor Aleksander

Proceedings of The Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, Jan 22, 2000

An existing hypothesis states that visual consciousness is made up of`microconsciousnesses' occur... more An existing hypothesis states that visual consciousness is made up of`microconsciousnesses' occurring asynchronously in several sites of the visual system of the brain with no need for direct means of binding. We extend this hypothesis to de¢ne what quali¢es a neural activity for generating an element of consciousness to distinguish it from one that does not. We argue that, for these separate neural activities to represent elements of a compound sense of consciousness, they each need the support of sites that unconsciously process an important attentional referent and that it is the commonality of such referents in di¡ering sites which bring the microconsciousnesses together. We consider the broader implications of this extended hypothesis for other sensory modalities and mental imagery.

Philosophies, May 29, 2022

This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative... more This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY

Blackwell Publishing eBooks, Dec 13, 2007

Neurocomputing, Jul 1, 1996

The topic of artificial consciousness asks the following question. Were a manufactured object app... more The topic of artificial consciousness asks the following question. Were a manufactured object appear to be conscious what mechanisms could be responsible for such a state of affairs? First the paper defines the foundation of the theory as a postulate which requires the manufactured object to be neural, specifying that the firing of some neurons is responsible for conscious states. This leads to the title ‘neuroconsciousness’. It follows this up by a series of 12 corollaries which is open-ended in the belief that a definition of consciousness is an open-ended series of properties. The method of theoretical expression is that of a neural state machine for which the state structure is the product of learning and generalisation. Central to this scheme is a novel concept of ‘iconic’ learning which creates states that are sampled versions of sensory experience. The paper ends with both a technical critique that is directed towards the construction of this type of machinery and a philosophical critique which asks how helpful is the concept of artificial consciousness in elucidating the real thing.

International Journal of Machine Consciousness, Jun 1, 2009

ABSTRACT This paper critically tracks the impact of the development of the machine consciousness ... more ABSTRACT This paper critically tracks the impact of the development of the machine consciousness paradigm from the incredulity of the 1990s to the structuring of the turn of this century, and the consolidation of the present time which forms the basis for guessing what might happen in the future. The underlying question is how this development may have changed our understanding of consciousness and whether an artificial version of the concept contributes to the improvement of computational machinery and robots. The paper includes some suggestions for research that might be profitable and others that may not be.

International Journal of Machine Consciousness, Jun 1, 2013

ABSTRACT The stated aim of adherents to the paradigm called biologically inspired cognitive archi... more ABSTRACT The stated aim of adherents to the paradigm called biologically inspired cognitive architectures (BICA) is to build machines that address "the challenge of creating a real-life computational equivalent of the human mind".(From the mission statement of the new BICA journal.) In contrast, practitioners of machine consciousness (MC) are driven by the observation that these human minds for which one is trying to find equivalents are generally thought to be conscious. (Of course, this is controversial because there is no evidence of consciousness in behavior. But as the hypothesis of the consciousness of others is commonly used, a rejection of it has to be considered just as much as its acceptance.) In this paper, it is asked whether those who would like to build computational equivalents of the human mind can do so while ignoring the role of consciousness in what is called the mind. This is not ignored in the MC paradigm and the consequences, particularly on phenomenological treatments of the mind, are briefly explored. A measure based on a subjective feel for how well a model matches personal experience is introduced. An example is given which illustrates how MC can clarify the double-cognition tenet of Strawson's cognitive phenomenology.

There has been a recent renewal of interest in the debate as to whether an explanation of conscio... more There has been a recent renewal of interest in the debate as to whether an explanation of consciousness can (Dennett, 1991) or cannot (penrose, 1989) be captured by some formal theory. The aim of this paper is to side with the former and to present a theory testable through the concept of a neural state machine. This is a development of a theme first announced in Aleksander (1992). The theory is developed from the point of view of the conditions necessary to synthesize “consciousness” in a manufactured artefact. This is given the name “artificial consciousness” so as to create grounds for a discussion of the difference between the synthetic product and that which is normally thought to be possessed by human beings. During the last 40 years, under the heading of “artificial intelligence”, there has been an effort to program computers so as to make them perform functions which, if done by humans, would be said to require intelligence. This endeavour consists of programs that endow the machine with the ability to follow logical rules developed by a programmer. It is not uncommon to point to the poverty of this approach as logical rules do not capture a sense of intentional subjectivity (Searle, 1992) or a sense of “being” (Winograd & Flores, 1986). In this paper it is argued that as a result of novel neural approaches to computation, such properties are not outside the scope of formal theory. A system of postulates is shown to contain the concept of “self awareness” and to support corollaries regarding that special part of human consciousness: natural language.

Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1995

The concept of a theory of artificial neural consciousness based on neural machines was introduce... more The concept of a theory of artificial neural consciousness based on neural machines was introduced at ICANN94 (Aleksander, 1994). Here the theory is developed by defining that which would have to be synthesized were consciousness to be found in an engineered artefact. This is given the name artificial consciousness to indicate that the theory is objective and while it applies to manufactured devices it also stimulates a discussion of the relevance of such a theory to the consciousness of living organisms. The theory consists of a fundamental postulate and a series of corollaries. In this paper the series of corollaries is extended and illustrated by means of characteristic state structures. Studies of artificial neuroconsciousness aim at two results: first to provide a single perspective on many mechanisms which perform cognitive tasks; and second, it provides an explanation of consciousness which stands alongside the many discussions found in the literature of the day.

Aleksander, Ie.; And Others Artificial Intelligence and Its Potential as an Aid to Vocational Tra... more Aleksander, Ie.; And Others Artificial Intelligence and Its Potential as an Aid to Vocational Training and Education. European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, Berlin (West Germany). ISBN-92-825-8303-1 88 99p.

Electronics and Power, 1973

ABSTRACT

Impossible Minds: My Neurons, My Consciousness has been written to satisfy the curiosity each and... more Impossible Minds: My Neurons, My Consciousness has been written to satisfy the curiosity each and every one of us has about our own consciousness. It takes the view that the neurons in our heads are the source of consciousness and attempts to explain how this happens. Although it talks of neural networks, it explains what they are and what they do in such a way that anyone may understand. While the topic is partly philosophical, the text makes no assumptions of prior knowledge of philosophy; and so contains easy excursions into the important ideas of philosophy that may be missing in the education of a computer scientist. The approach is pragmatic throughout; there are many references to material on experiments that were done in our laboratories.The first edition of the book was written to introduce curious readers to the way that the consciousness we all enjoy might depend on the networks of neurons that make up the brain. In this second edition, it is recognized that these arguments still stand, but that they have been taken much further by an increasing number of researchers. A post-script has now been written for each chapter to inform the reader of these developments and provide an up-to-date bibliography. A new epilogue has been written to summarize the state-of-the art of the search for consciousness in neural automata, for researchers in computation, students of philosophy, and anyone who is fascinated by what is one of the most engaging scientific endeavours of the day.This book also tells a story. A story of a land where people think that they are automata without much in the way of consciousness, a story of cormorants and cliffs by the sea, a story of what it might be like to be a conscious machine …

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2003

... The details of the axiom-atic approach are discussed next: we first set out the axioms withou... more ... The details of the axiom-atic approach are discussed next: we first set out the axioms without ... N(I). It is suggested that if both are j-indexed they will automati-cally overlap in consciousness. ... x where N(I)' is the next internal state to N(I) and 'x' indicates a Cartesian product, that ...

Cognitive Processing, Mar 1, 2004

ABSTRACT The way in which artificial intelligence has developed over the last 50 years has had a ... more ABSTRACT The way in which artificial intelligence has developed over the last 50 years has had a major role in shaping cognitive science as it is today. This has generated computational models of behaviour. The connectionist revival of the 1980s added a tinge of neurodynamics to this. Here I suggest that some post-connectionist work in artificial intelligence is turning towards an understanding and formalisation of the mechanisms of brain architectures which contribute to an emergence of cognition providing a closer link between brain mechanisms and experienced brain states. This even addresses the neurological basis of consciousness.

Cognitive Computation, Jan 23, 2009

This paper reviews computational work that is currently developing under the heading of 'Machine ... more This paper reviews computational work that is currently developing under the heading of 'Machine Consciousness' and sets out to provide a guide for those who wish to contribute to this field. First, questions of philosophical concern as to the appropriateness of this activity are raised and discussed. Then some classical designs and computational attitudes are described before arguing that fine-grain neural approaches are needed to provide truly phenomenal representations that stand in relation to the behaviour of a computational organism as subjective mental states stand in relation to the existence of a conscious organism. The paper concludes with an evaluation of the validity and benefits of designing conscious systems.

The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness