Özgür Aktok - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Özgür Aktok
Felsefe Arkivi / Archives of Philosophy, 2021
As members of the most evolutionarily developed species on earth, most of us share the common-sen... more As members of the most evolutionarily developed species on earth, most of us share the common-sensical belief that our treatment of animals should be based more or less on moral grounds. However, it is also an undeniable fact that for more than two millennia, from the appearance of the first moral theories in Ancient Greece until almost the last quarter of the 20 th century, this traditional moral concern for animals has gone hand in hand with their systematic exclusion from the moral community of human beings, which deprives them of basic protective rights against moral abuse and mistreatment. A radical paradigm shift in ethics emerges, especially in the last quarter of the 20th century, when some philosophers begin to question this anthropocentric conception of ethics and the "otherness" of animals in terms of their traditional location outside the ethical discourse. Peter Singer, who is a utilitarian, and Tom Regan, who defends the "rights view" against Singer's utilitarianism, are two prominent representatives of this new ethical approach. After showing how Singer and Regan reject speciesism, this paper focuses on Regan's critique of Singer's account and adds new objections that show that utilitarianism has serious general defects even if it is restricted to human beings. Moreover, these defects give rise to more complicated problems when utilitarianism is applied to animals. After pointing to some weak aspects in Regan's theory, the paper spells out the sketch of an alternative account that points to the possibility of a synthesis of utility principle and right principle. Accordingly, Regan's worse-off principle deduced from the rights view is interpreted as a formal principle, while the utility principle as the material content of it is accepted: as long as there is no violation of the worse-off principle, one ought to deduce particular commands to maximize utility for specific cases out of the application of the utility principle. In this context, the worse-off principle has only a negative and formal function that prevents the utility principle from overriding individual rights by giving it its obligatory form..
Hegel-Jahrbuch, 2015
As is well-known, Heidegger translates the Ancient Greek concept of truth, aletheia, into German ... more As is well-known, Heidegger translates the Ancient Greek concept of truth, aletheia, into German as Unverborgenheit (unconcealedness)1. Heidegger’s interpretation of truth as Unverborgenheit has encountered serious criticisms from different authors. One example is Ernst Tugendhat, who criticizes Heidegger severely for expanding the phenomenological conception of truth such that the critical difference between truth and falsity is lost in this expanded version.2 Let’s call this problem „the normativity problem of truth“. Tugendhat’s critique implies that the classical conception of truth as correspondence offers a clear criterion3 for deciding whether a proposition is true, whereas Heidegger gives up such a criterion by equating truth with Unverborgenheit. Given Heidegger’s account, it seems that just in virtue of their „being there“, beings (das Seiende) satisfy the condition of „being true“. Heidegger seems to equate the „is“ with the „is unconcealed“. Beings are there because they are unconcealed, and because they are unconcealed, they are true. Given these considerations, is the normativity expected from truth completely lost here? The aim of this paper is to show that the normativity we are looking for is not given up by Heidegger at all. It lies rather in an intrinsic characteristic of aletheia, which is neglected by Tugendhat. This is its characteristic of concealing. Heidegger calls this characteristic the „Verbergung“ or „Verborgenheit“ of Sein.4 In order to show, how the normative dimension of truth lies in the concealing character of truth, I undertake to interpret aletheia in the light of a basic Hegelian principle that Hegel takes from Spinoza: Every determination is a negation. As is well-known, in his letter of June 2, 1674, to his friend Jarig Jelles, Spinoza writes that figures apply only to determinate bodies, which are finite, and finitude means negation. The determination of bodies is their limitation and it tells us simply about „what they are not“ in terms of their esse rather than „what they are“.5 Hegel refers to Spinoza as the discoverer of this fundamental insight while pointing to his failure to appreciate its importance when he announces his own principle of determinate negativity in the general form that every determination is a negation.6 In the rest of this paper, I will interpret aletheia in the light of this Hegelian principle and show that Heidegger’s conception of truth does not lack in normativity at all once we reinterpret it in this way. I will not get into a discussion of how we should interpret the Hegelian principle within Hegelian philosophy, although the principle
Felsefe Arkivi / Archives of Philosophy, 2021
As members of the most evolutionarily developed species on earth, most of us share the common-sen... more As members of the most evolutionarily developed species on earth, most of us share the common-sensical belief that our treatment of animals should be based more or less on moral grounds. However, it is also an undeniable fact that for more than two millennia, from the appearance of the first moral theories in Ancient Greece until almost the last quarter of the 20 th century, this traditional moral concern for animals has gone hand in hand with their systematic exclusion from the moral community of human beings, which deprives them of basic protective rights against moral abuse and mistreatment. A radical paradigm shift in ethics emerges, especially in the last quarter of the 20th century, when some philosophers begin to question this anthropocentric conception of ethics and the "otherness" of animals in terms of their traditional location outside the ethical discourse. Peter Singer, who is a utilitarian, and Tom Regan, who defends the "rights view" against Singer's utilitarianism, are two prominent representatives of this new ethical approach. After showing how Singer and Regan reject speciesism, this paper focuses on Regan's critique of Singer's account and adds new objections that show that utilitarianism has serious general defects even if it is restricted to human beings. Moreover, these defects give rise to more complicated problems when utilitarianism is applied to animals. After pointing to some weak aspects in Regan's theory, the paper spells out the sketch of an alternative account that points to the possibility of a synthesis of utility principle and right principle. Accordingly, Regan's worse-off principle deduced from the rights view is interpreted as a formal principle, while the utility principle as the material content of it is accepted: as long as there is no violation of the worse-off principle, one ought to deduce particular commands to maximize utility for specific cases out of the application of the utility principle. In this context, the worse-off principle has only a negative and formal function that prevents the utility principle from overriding individual rights by giving it its obligatory form..
Hegel-Jahrbuch, 2015
As is well-known, Heidegger translates the Ancient Greek concept of truth, aletheia, into German ... more As is well-known, Heidegger translates the Ancient Greek concept of truth, aletheia, into German as Unverborgenheit (unconcealedness)1. Heidegger’s interpretation of truth as Unverborgenheit has encountered serious criticisms from different authors. One example is Ernst Tugendhat, who criticizes Heidegger severely for expanding the phenomenological conception of truth such that the critical difference between truth and falsity is lost in this expanded version.2 Let’s call this problem „the normativity problem of truth“. Tugendhat’s critique implies that the classical conception of truth as correspondence offers a clear criterion3 for deciding whether a proposition is true, whereas Heidegger gives up such a criterion by equating truth with Unverborgenheit. Given Heidegger’s account, it seems that just in virtue of their „being there“, beings (das Seiende) satisfy the condition of „being true“. Heidegger seems to equate the „is“ with the „is unconcealed“. Beings are there because they are unconcealed, and because they are unconcealed, they are true. Given these considerations, is the normativity expected from truth completely lost here? The aim of this paper is to show that the normativity we are looking for is not given up by Heidegger at all. It lies rather in an intrinsic characteristic of aletheia, which is neglected by Tugendhat. This is its characteristic of concealing. Heidegger calls this characteristic the „Verbergung“ or „Verborgenheit“ of Sein.4 In order to show, how the normative dimension of truth lies in the concealing character of truth, I undertake to interpret aletheia in the light of a basic Hegelian principle that Hegel takes from Spinoza: Every determination is a negation. As is well-known, in his letter of June 2, 1674, to his friend Jarig Jelles, Spinoza writes that figures apply only to determinate bodies, which are finite, and finitude means negation. The determination of bodies is their limitation and it tells us simply about „what they are not“ in terms of their esse rather than „what they are“.5 Hegel refers to Spinoza as the discoverer of this fundamental insight while pointing to his failure to appreciate its importance when he announces his own principle of determinate negativity in the general form that every determination is a negation.6 In the rest of this paper, I will interpret aletheia in the light of this Hegelian principle and show that Heidegger’s conception of truth does not lack in normativity at all once we reinterpret it in this way. I will not get into a discussion of how we should interpret the Hegelian principle within Hegelian philosophy, although the principle