Al Merlo - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Al Merlo
Springer-Lehrbuch, 2010
Durch einen kurzen, aber dennoch systematischen Untersuchungsablauf ist es dem Arzt möglich, beim... more Durch einen kurzen, aber dennoch systematischen Untersuchungsablauf ist es dem Arzt möglich, beim neurochirurgischen Notfall rasch die klinische Situation zu klären und die Art der Zusatzuntersuchung festzulegen. Es handelt sich dabei häufig um die Beurteilung von Schädel-Hirn-Verletzungen.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
known as pattern bargaining-a union determines a sequence for negotiations with …rms within an in... more known as pattern bargaining-a union determines a sequence for negotiations with …rms within an industry where the agreement with the …rst …rm becomes the take-it-or-leave-it o¤er by the union for all subsequent negotiations. In this paper, we show that pattern bargaining is preferred by a union to both simultaneous industrywide negotiations and sequential negotiations without a pattern.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
We study the recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model ... more We study the recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by two political parties competing in an election. We show that political parties may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that they could select better individuals. Furthermore, we show that this phenomenon is more likely to occur in proportional than in majoritarian electoral systems.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
In this paper, I discuss recent developments in political economy. By focusing on the microeconom... more In this paper, I discuss recent developments in political economy. By focusing on the microeconomic side of the discipline, I present an overview of current research on four of the fundamental institutions of a political economy: voters, politicians, parties and governments. For each of these topics, I identify and discuss some of the salient questions that have been posed and addressed in the literature, present some stylized models and examples, and summarize the main theoretical findings. Furthermore, I describe the available data, review the relevant empirical evidence, and discuss some of the challenges for empirical research in political economy.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
Two main career paths are prevalent among politicians in modern democracies:
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
We study the initial recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibriu... more We study the initial recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by two political parties competing in an election. We show that political parties may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that they could afford to recruit better individuals. Furthermore, we show that this phenomenon is more likely to occur in proportional electoral systems than in majoritarian electoral systems.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
In this paper we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lo... more In this paper we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying biases the outcome of the political process toward the centre of the policy space, and extreme policies cannot emerge in equilibrium. Moreover, in equilibrium, not all lobbies participate in the policy-making process.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
Stochastic sequential bargaining games Wilson (1995, 1998)) have found wide applications in vario... more Stochastic sequential bargaining games Wilson (1995, 1998)) have found wide applications in various …elds including political economy and macroeconomics due to their ‡exibility in explaining delays in reaching agreement. In this paper, we present new results in nonparametric identi…cation of such models under di¤erent scenarios of data availability. First, with complete data on players'decisions, the sizes of the surplus to be shared (cakes) and the agreed allocations, both the mapping from states to the total surplus (i.e. the "cake function") and the players'common discount rate are identi…ed, if the unobservable state variable (USV) is independent of observable ones (OSV), and the total surplus is strictly increasing in the USV conditional on the OSV. Second, when the cake size is only observed under agreements and is additively separable in OSV and USV, the contribution by OSV is identi…ed provided the USV distribution satis…es some distributional exclusion restrictions. Third, if data only report when an agreement is reached but never report the cake sizes, we propose a simple algorithm that exploits exogenously given shape restrictions on the cake function and the independence of USV from OSV to recover all rationalizable probabilities for reaching an agreement under counterfactual state transitions. Numerical examples show the set of rationalizable counterfactual outcomes so recovered can be informative.
Springer-Lehrbuch, 2010
Durch einen kurzen, aber dennoch systematischen Untersuchungsablauf ist es dem Arzt möglich, beim... more Durch einen kurzen, aber dennoch systematischen Untersuchungsablauf ist es dem Arzt möglich, beim neurochirurgischen Notfall rasch die klinische Situation zu klären und die Art der Zusatzuntersuchung festzulegen. Es handelt sich dabei häufig um die Beurteilung von Schädel-Hirn-Verletzungen.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
known as pattern bargaining-a union determines a sequence for negotiations with …rms within an in... more known as pattern bargaining-a union determines a sequence for negotiations with …rms within an industry where the agreement with the …rst …rm becomes the take-it-or-leave-it o¤er by the union for all subsequent negotiations. In this paper, we show that pattern bargaining is preferred by a union to both simultaneous industrywide negotiations and sequential negotiations without a pattern.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
We study the recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model ... more We study the recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by two political parties competing in an election. We show that political parties may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that they could select better individuals. Furthermore, we show that this phenomenon is more likely to occur in proportional than in majoritarian electoral systems.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
In this paper, I discuss recent developments in political economy. By focusing on the microeconom... more In this paper, I discuss recent developments in political economy. By focusing on the microeconomic side of the discipline, I present an overview of current research on four of the fundamental institutions of a political economy: voters, politicians, parties and governments. For each of these topics, I identify and discuss some of the salient questions that have been posed and addressed in the literature, present some stylized models and examples, and summarize the main theoretical findings. Furthermore, I describe the available data, review the relevant empirical evidence, and discuss some of the challenges for empirical research in political economy.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
Two main career paths are prevalent among politicians in modern democracies:
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
We study the initial recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibriu... more We study the initial recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by two political parties competing in an election. We show that political parties may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that they could afford to recruit better individuals. Furthermore, we show that this phenomenon is more likely to occur in proportional electoral systems than in majoritarian electoral systems.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
In this paper we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lo... more In this paper we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying biases the outcome of the political process toward the centre of the policy space, and extreme policies cannot emerge in equilibrium. Moreover, in equilibrium, not all lobbies participate in the policy-making process.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
Stochastic sequential bargaining games Wilson (1995, 1998)) have found wide applications in vario... more Stochastic sequential bargaining games Wilson (1995, 1998)) have found wide applications in various …elds including political economy and macroeconomics due to their ‡exibility in explaining delays in reaching agreement. In this paper, we present new results in nonparametric identi…cation of such models under di¤erent scenarios of data availability. First, with complete data on players'decisions, the sizes of the surplus to be shared (cakes) and the agreed allocations, both the mapping from states to the total surplus (i.e. the "cake function") and the players'common discount rate are identi…ed, if the unobservable state variable (USV) is independent of observable ones (OSV), and the total surplus is strictly increasing in the USV conditional on the OSV. Second, when the cake size is only observed under agreements and is additively separable in OSV and USV, the contribution by OSV is identi…ed provided the USV distribution satis…es some distributional exclusion restrictions. Third, if data only report when an agreement is reached but never report the cake sizes, we propose a simple algorithm that exploits exogenously given shape restrictions on the cake function and the independence of USV from OSV to recover all rationalizable probabilities for reaching an agreement under counterfactual state transitions. Numerical examples show the set of rationalizable counterfactual outcomes so recovered can be informative.