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Books by Angel Dzhonev

МИНИМУМ ЧОВЕЩИНА. КЮСТЕНДИЛСКАТА АКЦИЯ ЗА СПАСЯВАНЕТО НА БЪЛГАРСКИТЕ ЕВРЕИ, 2023

ANGEL DZHONEV MINIMUM HUMANITY THE KYUSTENDIL ACTION FOR THE RESCUE OF THE BULGARIAN JEWS The pr... more ANGEL DZHONEV
MINIMUM HUMANITY
THE KYUSTENDIL ACTION FOR THE RESCUE OF THE BULGARIAN JEWS

The present study doesn’t have the ambition to wholly revise the theses established so far, but has more modest tasks. Its aim is to summarize the numerous
known documents and available researches including little known or unknown
so far historical records. It strives for achieving an objective reconstruction of
the events and the direct participants so that to underline their beneft and thus
to estimate the achieved results. The Kyustendil action for the rescue of the
Bulgarian Jews has already been a known fact but the importance of the place
it takes in the events, and therefore in the national and the world history, should
be specifed. To confrm the put forward tasks, numerous documents and memories connected with the topic are published as a separate part to the study and
photos and facsimiles are provided to illustrate the specifc events and persons.
The Kyustendil action for the rescue of the Bulgarian Jews started on the frst
days of March 1943. Information about the prepared deportation of the whole
local community was disseminated in the town trough diﬀerent channels. A
delegation, in which Asen Suychmezov, Vladimir Kurtev and Ivan Momchilov took part, was formed on the 8th of March. They and the deputy member
Petar Mihalev set out for the capital by train in the same evening. They met
the vice-chairperson of the Bulgarian National Assembly Dimitar Peshev at
Mihalev’s house before noon on the 9th of March 1943 informing him about
the preparation processes in Kyustendil. They decided to meet each other at
the National Assembly at about 3 p.m. and to request a meeting with the Prime
Minister Bogdan Filov. Meantime, Ivan Momchilov visited his godfather General
Nikola Zhekov, who had serious connections with the German representatives
in Bulgaria. Vladimir Kurtev asked for help Prof. Alexander Stanishev and tried
to activate the lobby of the Macedonian Bulgarians. Asen Suychmezov and
Petar Mihalev met Jews from the capital. Asen Suychmezov, Ivan Momchilov,
Petar Mihalev gathered at the National Assembly at the appointed time. Dimitar
Peshev informed them about the Prime Minister’s refusal for a meeting. Then
the eﬀorts were directed to the Minister of Interior Petar Gabrovski. After a
tense meeting, which was attended by several deputies with Dimitar Peshev
on the head, the Minister ordered the planned deportation of the Jews from the
pre-war territories of Bulgaria to be stopped.

Discussions in the contemporary Bulgarian historiography are continuing.
One of the accents is put on the signifcance of the Statement Letter signed by
the 43 deputies and sent to the Prime Minister. But somehow the members of
the National Assembly participating on the fateful day of the 9th of March are
neglected. Those who opposed the Minister of Interior and insisted the planned
measures for deportation of the Jews from the pre-war territories of Bulgaria to
be ceased. By the distance of time, the key moment is to be considered precisely
then. Numerous documents have proven this. The only time the executive power was caused to hesitate and made a step backwards was on the 9th of March
namely. Otherwise, it controlled the situation and eliminated every attempt
for contradiction – as in the legislation’s adoption, as in the deportation of the
Jews from the new lands, as in the emigration of the Jews from the capital to
the countryside. Every opposition then was crushed.
On the 9th of March 1943 at Petar Gabrovski’s ofce together with Dimitar
Peshev and Petar Mihalev were Dimiter Ikonomov, d-r Bozhko Kovachevski,
Sotir Yanev, Ivan Petrov and Tsvyatko Petkov. These seven deputies forced
the Minister of Interior to countermand the deportation of the Jews from the
Kingdom of Bulgaria’s pre-war territories. If not fve, then four of them have
been left in complete oblivion. Eﬀorts to make Dimitar Peshev’s activity popular
have been undertaken, but moreover based on the facts related to informing
the vice-chairperson and his involvement in collecting the signatures under
the Statement Letter addressed to the Prime Minister. These are signifcant
moments but not as much as his involvement in the fateful confrontation with
the Minister of Interior. The rest four men have been left in the section others
without disserving similar attitude. Ivan Petrov, d-r Bozhko Kovachevski, Sotir
Yanev and Tsvyatko Petkov have proven to be in the group and their contribution
shouldn’t be underestimated.

Numerous documents underline the participation and behavior of the District
Governor and the Mayor of Kyustendil. Lyuben Miltenov and Georgi Efremov
were not open opponents of the ongoing measures and of the preparation for
deportation of the Jews’ community from the town. Their ofcial positions
didn’t allow such a freedom. However, their behavior supported neither the
measures nor the preparation. They were sabotaging, as far as they were able
to, the eﬀorts of the Commissariat for the Jewish Aﬀairs’ (KEV) representatives. They both made the assigned task harder accomplishable by repeatedly
revealing the secret about the impending deportation, by hesitatingly behaving
during the implementation of the specifc steps, by taking their direct duties

without particular enthusiasm. Doubts about the intentional sabotage of the
planned deportation materialized in their removal from the posts they had taken.
Pointing them out as one of the main reasons for the failure of the initiative
was a result of the resistance.

Belittled or neglected, the Kyustendil action for the rescue of the Bulgarian
Jews has become more and more acknowledged by the historical records.
Although the long delay, the participants in the delegation have received the
necessary recognition. As Petar Mihalev has bequeathed with his last words to
the People’s Court, it is proper “to give everyone what is deserved according
to his dignity”. It also is relevant to the deputies who forced the Minister of
Interior to countermand the deportation that had begun, is relevant to the District
Governor and to the Mayor of Kyustendil. Giving everyone what is deserved
according to his dignity.

За историята на Кюстендил и района през античността и средновековието по-подробно вж.: Вандова, В... more За историята на Кюстендил и района през античността и средновековието по-подробно вж.: Вандова, В. Нови проучвания на неолитни обекти в долината на Струма.-В: Професор д-р Борис Борисов-ученици и приятели. В. Търново, 2016, с. 123; Вандова, В. Основни резултати от проучванията на обекти от неолита и халколита в Кюстендил и Кюстендилската котловина през последните 10 години.-Известия на Исторически музей-Кюстендил.

ПОГРОМЪТ В БОСИЛЕГРАДСКО 15 – 16 май 1917 г., 2016

Macedonia in the Railway Policy of Bulgaria (1878–1918), 2008

Since the Liberation up to the end of the First World War military operations the geographic regi... more Since the Liberation up to the end of the First World War military operations
the geographic region of Macedonia took an extremely important place in
the railway policy of Bulgaria. The railway connection between them and the development
of this transport communication were considered to be one of the main
components in solving the national question. In competitive conditions the young
country defended, up to the level it was able to, its priorities and developed a strategy
for transport network development. Aiming to preserve its sovereignty on the
railway transport it allowed some compromises in connecting with its neighbours
and in the establishing of the European network Vien – Belgrad – Sofia – Tsarigrad
but without giving a priority to it. What had been achieved during the Conference
of the four countries was a prerequisite for imposing a state monopoly over the
railways in Bulgaria. State institutions were managing all stages of building, exploitation
and control of the railway network.
Monopoly legalizing enabled the implementation of centralized railway policy
carried out by the government bodies in Bulgaria. National Assembly, Council
of Ministries and Monarch were the state authorities that had obtained the right to
manage it. These three factors were in constant collaboration although they had
contradictions on some issues. The National Assembly was the place for legalization
of firsthand assignments that formally concerned acceptance of concrete
railway project but in fact were a part of a global strategic plan. This statement is
hard to be revealed out of the available short legislative cases but it is quite evident
in plenary hall discussions. The Bulgarian railway policy regarding Macedonia obtained
enviable consensus and the contradictions between the government and the
opposition emerged mainly in taking unpopular negative decision. Uncertainties
in several details of the followed strategy were also items of conflict but often the
shown parliamentary harmony dominated over the cliquishness and the populism.
Mainly, this was a consequence of the fact that the party formations took the Bulgaria
railway policy to Macedonia as an important element of the strategy for the
national unification. On this ground an unique succession and continuity can be
ascertained in caring it out by the different governments which immediate priorities
and opportunities influenced upon them.
The Council of Ministers is an institution that both initiated and accomplished
the railway policy. Several basic ministries distinguished with their significance.
Home political issues were managed by a specialized body that had passed through
several alterations. After 1893 these functions were assigned to Minister of Public
Buildings, Roads and Communications and after 1911 to Minister of Railways,Posts and Telegraphs. Foreign political issues were assigned to the Minister of Foreign
Policy and Religion. Military Minister also had a decisive role especially in
determining strategic characteristics. The Prime Minister didn’t just coordinate the
railway policy but also sometimes managed country’s diplomatic activities or led
the railway department. Among those persons with great contribution to Bulgarian
railway policy towards Macedonia distinguish D. Tsankov, P. Karavelov, S. Stambolov,
D. Grekov, G. Nachovich, K. Stoilov, R. Petrov, D. Stanchov, A. Malinov,
St. Paprikov, I. Geshov, A. Lyapchev and others.
Monarchy body had also an important role. From the Liberation up to the end
of the military operations of the First World War there were only two monarchs
reigned over the Bulgarian country – King Aleksander I and King Ferdinand I.
Their involvement revealed mainly in caring the Foreign policy out. They took part
in diplomatic activities, led government delegations that accomplished the railway
strategy. The long reigning period enabled Ferdinand to outstand as one of the unchangeable
and most important factors. He had his own idea on the railway policy
that sometimes contradicted with the official position of the other state factors.
Political structures affected mainly the managing and controlling functions.
Operative activity was implemented by specialized bodies established in the three
main ministries and concerning the home and foreign policy aspects. Railway experts
have the decisive word mainly in determining the concrete parameters of each
of the projects. They were responsible for project’s examination, for the permanent
control on building works and for the railroad exploitation. Their opinion was taken
into consideration when implementing the foreign policy activities. The diplomatic
department and its structures abroad accomplished the international aspect. Their
task was more complicated significantly because it combined the satisfaction of
many contradictions. The biggest responsibility was assigned to Bulgarian deputy
in Tsarigrad who led the direct negotiations. Diplomatic abilities were shown by G.
Valkovich, P. Dimitrov, D. Markov, I. Geshov, M. Sarafov, A. Shopv, D. Rizov and
others. The Military were the other experts who had been assigned to manage the
railway policy. Up to the 1912–1918 wars they were responsible mainly for providing
expert statements on developing and following a particular strategy. Their
statements were one of the decisive ones in clearing out priority issues towards
Macedonia. Military subdivisions were also involved in constructing some of the
railway objects. This trend was kept and was given extremely important development
during the Balkan Wars and in particular during the First World War. The
most serious results were the ones achieved in building new narrow-gauge lines
that had more particular specifications but also were with longer-lasting than the
military ones objectives, mainly economic and political.
The foreign political factors also influenced a lot the Bulgarian railway policy.
First, it was the role of the Ottoman Empire, which up to the last months of 1912
ruled the geographic area of Macedonia. The Turkish rulers, especially Abdulhamid
II Sultan and the Military, put number of obstacles against the Bulgarian policy’s
goals. The main reason for this was connected with the established opinionthat along with any successful accomplishment the Bulgarian political influence
would increased.
Great Powers were the other factor which actions could be hardly assessed
synonymously neither in positive nor in negative point. What concretely distinguished
was the influence of Austria-Hungary, which following its interests in
Western Balkans, in particular in Macedonia, opposed most decisively the aspirations
directed to building the project towards Skopje. With some tactical derogations,
this policy stayed stable up to the wars. German interests to the East revealed
later and for them Macedonia was less important. Despite this statement, proved
by their project on the Bagdat railway, at first, they only assisted Vienna’s activities,
but gradually they were getting involved and began showing their expansion
intentions on the Balkans. While Austria-Hungary played pointedly negative role,
German had a significant contribution to accomplishing the Bulgaria policy, especially
through delivering a park and commissioning its representatives in building
the narrow-gauge lines in Macedonia.
The rest of the Great Powers didn’t act so categorically complying with their
direct interests. Russia, Italia, England and France followed their long-term political
objectives and in separate cases supported the Bulgarian activities. A very serious
problem for the governors in Sofia was their impossibility to gain a strategic
ally or to secure more sustainable international lobby.
In different periods building contractors connected with separate or several
Great Powers showed interest to Macedonia and formed themselves as another important
factor. Like a conductor of foreign economic and political expansion, these
foundations didn’t play a positive role on the Balkans at all and were observed with
mistrust by the government bodies in Bulgaria. They acted carefully even in cases
that had established opportunities for achieving mutual benefits.
Though small the Balkan countries should also be observed as an important
factor. Among them Serbia acted as a paranoiac adversary against Bulgarian policy,
including the railway one, towards Macedonia. Greece opposed too but not so hysterically
and stayed a bit calmly. Monte Negro and Romania influenced directly
through their trans-Balkan projects mainly. In such unfavourable situation Bulgaria
carried out its railway policy concerning Macedonia. Foreign political aspect
gained absolutely priority and dominated over the home political one especially up
to the Balkan War.
Within the forty-year period – from 1878 to 1918 – in Bulgaria numerous
projects and draft versions were prepared for connecting and for railway development
in Macedonia. They were many especially along the bordering area because
a lot of compromises were made in chasing the goal. Several general projects were
developed on Bulgarian territory with main center the capital Sofia. The direction to
Skopje was prior, followed by that to Struma River and to Bregalnitsa River gaining
popularity recently. The main trace followed the upper Struma River flow and
the alternatives that were discussed the most were those along the River.

МИНИМУМ ЧОВЕЩИНА. КЮСТЕНДИЛСКАТА АКЦИЯ ЗА СПАСЯВАНЕТО НА БЪЛГАРСКИТЕ ЕВРЕИ, 2023

ANGEL DZHONEV MINIMUM HUMANITY THE KYUSTENDIL ACTION FOR THE RESCUE OF THE BULGARIAN JEWS The pr... more ANGEL DZHONEV
MINIMUM HUMANITY
THE KYUSTENDIL ACTION FOR THE RESCUE OF THE BULGARIAN JEWS

ПОГРОМЪТ В БОСИЛЕГРАДСКО 15 – 16 май 1917 г., 2016

Macedonia in the Railway Policy of Bulgaria (1878–1918), 2008