Arnis Mazlovskis - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
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Papers by Arnis Mazlovskis
Reliģiski-filozofiski raksti, 2018
Religious Philosophical Articles, 2015
On Free Will and Determinism When beliefs based on direct experience are replaced with a scientif... more On Free Will and Determinism When beliefs based on direct experience are replaced with a scientific outlook, some former views require revision, notwithstanding the fact that practical implications of this experience may be viable. Thus, the heliocentric planetary system being substituted for the geocentric one, the sophisticated constructs of epicycles and deferents became superfluous though sun's perceptible course in the sky preserved its common meaning. In the long and penetrating discussion on free will and determinism, admonitions are continuously evoked that our moral and legal system would collapse if natural causality is extended to human volition. 1 This opinion may be impugned even if the radical form of determinism is accepted. However, an according transformation of attitude to agents' behaviour, shift of accents and update of relevant terms and concepts are on the agenda.
In this paper I present a simple argument that demonstrates that free will, in the sense that a p... more In this paper I present a simple argument that demonstrates that free will, in the sense that a person is able to control his/her choices and actions, is consistent with determinism.1 That this is the case has been noted in the past (see below) but, for reasons that I do not understand, people continue to dispute the issue.
The evolutionary, timeless and current ethos, 2020
Morality as both a value system and social property has been considered. The neo-Darwinian vi... more Morality as both a value system and social property has been considered.
The neo-Darwinian view on the origin of morality is outlined. For weak organisms looking for scanty resources, conflicts were disastrous. In rivalry, an approximate Nash equilibrium was established, which means influence and dominance partition acceptable to all competitors. As a relation paradigm it is analogous to other examples of equilibrium in inanimate and animate nature and displays the objective, unconventional character of social regulation. In the hard struggle for survival, individuals and groups cooperating had the best chance to persist and propagate. A tribe having many members ready for mutual aid and self-sacrifice succeeded in fulfilling joint ventures and could leave more offspring. In this way, protomorality functioned as an instrument of natural selection. The development of morality should not be deemed a result of methodological induction. At the stage of undeveloped mind, this process means an instinctive, non-linguistic mechanism. Indirect reciprocity is a serious step toward moral behaviour. To form moral judgments, both general intellectual capacity (mind, memory, speech) and specific feelings (love, guilt, shame) are necessary. The acquisition of the capacity for normative guidance was the turning-point in moral development. Viable habits were maintained in the collective memory as social norms.
Our moral intuitions about the goodness of survival and reproduction have genetic heritage. Moral judgments are cognitive statements, which at least implicitly are universal.
The metaethical nature of moral values continues being discussed. Moral realists stress the objective, irreducible character and a priori cognition of moral norms. Their opponents point out that an unexplained gap remains between the ideal, causally inert values and real events. Evolutionists treat morality as biological adaptation and admit subjective creation of moral judgments. The synthesis of moral realism and evolutionary interpretation of moral sense is not impossible. The phylogenetic comprehension of values at a certain time does not degrade them as independent eternal patterns. Historical beliefs may rather be treated as instantiation of moral paragons. A parallel is drawn with general theoretical principles, which being unchangeable in themselves are discovered during investigation. Scrutinizing similar situations, human mind ponders idealized models subject to definite laws. Ethical a priori cognition is vindicated to the extent to which general theoretical knowledge is justified. Only a few inadequate beliefs provided by natural selection are known: parents’ conviction about the exclusive properties of their children and predisposed recollection of unfortunate experience in risky situations. Stable social order may be diverse, however not arbitrary. Axiological representations motivate human will, and correlated neurophysiological processes occur in the organism. There is no particular system for moral sense in the brain. The scope of available reactions considerably increases with the development of the prefrontal cortex. Brain areas responsible for reliance have bearing to host cooperation. The dextral prefrontal cortex controls voluntary impulses. In psychopaths, disposition to risk and irresponsibility coexist with deficient empathy.
Throughout times, morality has promoted peace. The social unit obeying the same basic moral norms and laws has expanded during history. Today aims are being set comprising the global community and affecting future generations. Critical revision of punitive motives suggests the inconsistency of the retributive function of punishment. Retribution relies on the prereflexive view that the offender has had free choice at the moment of transgression. Determinists stress that in any given situation, person’s decision is necessarily formed by a set of different causes. The neurophysiological correlate of volition is governed by the laws of Nature and admits no alternatives. If no choice is available, it is inadequate to impose legal responsibility on agents. Discarding retributivism may lead to the exclusion of punitive excesses. However, no reassessment of values is claimed, and the justified motives of punishment, viz. prevention (deterrence), isolation (incapacitation), and above all rehabilitation remain applicable.
Reliģiski-filozofiski raksti, 2018
Religious Philosophical Articles, 2015
On Free Will and Determinism When beliefs based on direct experience are replaced with a scientif... more On Free Will and Determinism When beliefs based on direct experience are replaced with a scientific outlook, some former views require revision, notwithstanding the fact that practical implications of this experience may be viable. Thus, the heliocentric planetary system being substituted for the geocentric one, the sophisticated constructs of epicycles and deferents became superfluous though sun's perceptible course in the sky preserved its common meaning. In the long and penetrating discussion on free will and determinism, admonitions are continuously evoked that our moral and legal system would collapse if natural causality is extended to human volition. 1 This opinion may be impugned even if the radical form of determinism is accepted. However, an according transformation of attitude to agents' behaviour, shift of accents and update of relevant terms and concepts are on the agenda.
In this paper I present a simple argument that demonstrates that free will, in the sense that a p... more In this paper I present a simple argument that demonstrates that free will, in the sense that a person is able to control his/her choices and actions, is consistent with determinism.1 That this is the case has been noted in the past (see below) but, for reasons that I do not understand, people continue to dispute the issue.
The evolutionary, timeless and current ethos, 2020
Morality as both a value system and social property has been considered. The neo-Darwinian vi... more Morality as both a value system and social property has been considered.
The neo-Darwinian view on the origin of morality is outlined. For weak organisms looking for scanty resources, conflicts were disastrous. In rivalry, an approximate Nash equilibrium was established, which means influence and dominance partition acceptable to all competitors. As a relation paradigm it is analogous to other examples of equilibrium in inanimate and animate nature and displays the objective, unconventional character of social regulation. In the hard struggle for survival, individuals and groups cooperating had the best chance to persist and propagate. A tribe having many members ready for mutual aid and self-sacrifice succeeded in fulfilling joint ventures and could leave more offspring. In this way, protomorality functioned as an instrument of natural selection. The development of morality should not be deemed a result of methodological induction. At the stage of undeveloped mind, this process means an instinctive, non-linguistic mechanism. Indirect reciprocity is a serious step toward moral behaviour. To form moral judgments, both general intellectual capacity (mind, memory, speech) and specific feelings (love, guilt, shame) are necessary. The acquisition of the capacity for normative guidance was the turning-point in moral development. Viable habits were maintained in the collective memory as social norms.
Our moral intuitions about the goodness of survival and reproduction have genetic heritage. Moral judgments are cognitive statements, which at least implicitly are universal.
The metaethical nature of moral values continues being discussed. Moral realists stress the objective, irreducible character and a priori cognition of moral norms. Their opponents point out that an unexplained gap remains between the ideal, causally inert values and real events. Evolutionists treat morality as biological adaptation and admit subjective creation of moral judgments. The synthesis of moral realism and evolutionary interpretation of moral sense is not impossible. The phylogenetic comprehension of values at a certain time does not degrade them as independent eternal patterns. Historical beliefs may rather be treated as instantiation of moral paragons. A parallel is drawn with general theoretical principles, which being unchangeable in themselves are discovered during investigation. Scrutinizing similar situations, human mind ponders idealized models subject to definite laws. Ethical a priori cognition is vindicated to the extent to which general theoretical knowledge is justified. Only a few inadequate beliefs provided by natural selection are known: parents’ conviction about the exclusive properties of their children and predisposed recollection of unfortunate experience in risky situations. Stable social order may be diverse, however not arbitrary. Axiological representations motivate human will, and correlated neurophysiological processes occur in the organism. There is no particular system for moral sense in the brain. The scope of available reactions considerably increases with the development of the prefrontal cortex. Brain areas responsible for reliance have bearing to host cooperation. The dextral prefrontal cortex controls voluntary impulses. In psychopaths, disposition to risk and irresponsibility coexist with deficient empathy.
Throughout times, morality has promoted peace. The social unit obeying the same basic moral norms and laws has expanded during history. Today aims are being set comprising the global community and affecting future generations. Critical revision of punitive motives suggests the inconsistency of the retributive function of punishment. Retribution relies on the prereflexive view that the offender has had free choice at the moment of transgression. Determinists stress that in any given situation, person’s decision is necessarily formed by a set of different causes. The neurophysiological correlate of volition is governed by the laws of Nature and admits no alternatives. If no choice is available, it is inadequate to impose legal responsibility on agents. Discarding retributivism may lead to the exclusion of punitive excesses. However, no reassessment of values is claimed, and the justified motives of punishment, viz. prevention (deterrence), isolation (incapacitation), and above all rehabilitation remain applicable.