Barbora Jedlickova - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Journal Articles by Barbora Jedlickova

Jurisprudence, 2020

The dominant theoretical approach to the prohibition of exclusionary conduct in competition law d... more The dominant theoretical approach to the prohibition of
exclusionary conduct in competition law distinguishes exclusionary conduct from normal competitive conduct based on their economic outcomes. However, this approach fails to provide a uniform and consistent test for distinguishing the two categories. This article outlines a new account of the wrongness of exclusionary conduct that integrates consequentialist factors within
the deontological framework of the moral duty to promote the common good. Exclusionary conduct is wrong because it undermines the role of markets as a salient response to an important social coordination problem in a way that harms the competitive process and social welfare. The prohibition arises from the moral duty to promote the common good in combination with
evolved social and economic norms. This approach helps make sense of the distinction between exclusionary conduct and normal competitive behaviour. The article explores and applies this account to the European Union approach to the prohibition of exclusionary conduct under the legal framework provided by art 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

European Competition Law Review, 2015

World Competition, 2019

The digital economy has significantly changed many aspects of our lives, including the way firms ... more The digital economy has significantly changed many aspects of our lives, including the way firms do business and compete with each other. In addition to the benefits the digital world has introduced, it has also brought challenges for competition law, including new ways to restrict competition, with computing algorithms representing one of the most prominent examples. Algorithms can lead to, facilitate and maintain anticompetitive collusion, and one of the most pressing tests for competition law and its enforcement in the digital world is algorithmic parallel conduct. The terminology introduced for this conduct in this article is 'digital polyopoly'. Digital polyopolies encompass conditions similar to oligopolies, in particular, interdependency and transparency. However, unlike parallel conduct arising from oligopolies, digital polyopolies are not limited by their number of competitors. This new phenomenon requires fitted interpretation and rethinking of existing competition-law and economic concepts. What digital polyopolies are, how they differ from pre-digital era concepts and how competition law should tackle them (with a particular emphasis on the European Union competition law's concept of 'concerted practice'), are questions explored in this article.

European Competition Law Review, 2012

European Competition Law Review, 2008

Vertical restraints, which are illegal under Art.81(1) of the EC Treaty, must take the accepted f... more Vertical restraints, which are illegal under Art.81(1) of the EC Treaty, must take the accepted form of multilateral
conducts; particularly agreements, concerted practices or decisions of associations. In contrast to horizontal multilateral
conducts, vertical co-operation is, to some extent, necessary. For example, if a manufacturer has no capacity to distribute their
products or services then they have to identify distributors for this purpose. They will offer undertakings the opportunity to
become the manufacturer's distributors. Once a suitable undertaking accepts the manufacturer's offer, an agreement is concluded.
Hence, the relationship between the manufacturer and their distributors is based on an agreement.
The difficulty is in trying to differentiate whether a particular vertical restriction has the form of multilateral or unilateral conduct.
The distinction between multilateral actions, in the form of vertical agreements or vertical concerted practices, or decisions of
associations and unilateral conducts on a vertical level, can appear to be less clearly defined. When trying to prove the existence
of the agreement, the question is whether the vertical agreement does not miss an essential element--reciprocity.
This article aims to illustrate, using several EC cases, the difficulty in distinguishing between unilateral and multilateral conducts
in vertical restraints. The problem with the definition of the term "agreement" has arisen mainly in cases concerning restrictions
of parallel imports by undertakings. The Commission and the EC Courts base the existence of an agreement on circumstantial
evidence or discuss vertical restraints as part of the main distribution agreement.

University of Queensland Law Journal, 2018

Federal Law Review, 2016

Cartels have a significantly negative impact on economic welfare. Anti-cartel competition law-suc... more Cartels have a significantly negative impact on economic welfare. Anti-cartel competition law-such as the provisions of pt IV div 1 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)-tries to tackle this negative impact through civil and criminal remedies. The prohibition of cartels is most commonly justified on economic grounds. However, reference is also often made to broader moral grounds for proscribing cartels-for example, it is commonly stated that cartels are deceptive, unfair or engaged in a form of cheating. This article advances a unified account of the moral status of cartels that integrates both economic and moral factors. It does so by emphasising the relationship of cartel behaviour to the moral duty to promote the common good. Cartels are wrong because they undermine the role of open and competitive markets as a salient response to an important social coordination problem in a way that leads to seriously harmful economic outcomes. This combination of factors supplies a robust justification for both civil and criminal sanctions in appropriate cases, thereby affording a principled foundation for the current framework of cartel regulation in Australia.

Cartels have a significantly negative impact on economic welfare. Anti-cartel competition law—suc... more Cartels have a significantly negative impact on economic welfare. Anti-cartel competition law—such as the provisions of pt IV div 1 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)—tries to tackle this negative impact through civil and criminal remedies. The prohibition of cartels is most commonly justified on economic grounds. However, reference is also often made to broader moral grounds for proscribing cartels—for example, it is commonly stated that cartels are deceptive, unfair or engaged in a form of cheating. This article advances a unified account of the moral status of cartels that integrates both economic and moral factors. It does so by emphasising the relationship of cartel behaviour to the moral duty to promote the common good. Cartels are wrong because they undermine the role of open and competitive markets as a salient response to an important social coordination problem in a way that leads to seriously harmful economic outcomes. This combination of factors supplies a robust justification for both civil and criminal sanctions in appropriate cases, thereby affording a principled foundation for the current framework of cartel regulation in Australia.

Books by Barbora Jedlickova

Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016

Theoretical discussions among competition lawyers and economists on the approach to Resale Price ... more Theoretical discussions among competition lawyers and economists on the approach to Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) and Vertical Territorial Restrictions (VTR) have often caused controversy. However, commentators agree that there is a lack of comprehensive study surrounding the topic. This book explores these two forms of anticompetitive conduct from legal, historical, economical, and theoretical points of view, focusing on the EU and US experiences.

Springer International Publishing AG, 2018

Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2015

The Australian grocery retail market is concentrated, with two major competitors, Coles and Woolw... more The Australian grocery retail market is concentrated, with two major competitors, Coles and Woolworths, holding a market share of approximately 80 %. In 2010, Coles had a market share of 37 % and Woolworths of 43 %. The third largest grocery stores in Australia, IGA and FoodWorks, unify independently owned supermarkets with a market share of 15 %. ALDI, the fourth largest grocery store, entered the Australian market in 2001 and currently has a market share of 3 %. The remaining 2 % of the market belongs to small local grocery stores and other supermarket chains, which have only entered the Australian market recently. 1 For instance, in 2008, Costco Wholesale Corporation entered the Australian market commencing sales in 2009 and targeting small food businesses and individuals.

Springer International Publishing Switzerland, 2016

Springer International Publishing AG, 2017

Thesis Chapters by Barbora Jedlickova

University of Glasgow, 2012

This PhD thesis critically surveys vertical territorial and price restraints in the EU and the US... more This PhD thesis critically surveys vertical territorial and price restraints in the EU and the USA not just from a legal angle, but also from comparative, economic, theoretical and historical perspectives. Different aspects of such comprehensive research assist with tackling the different issues that have occurred in the law of vertical territorial and price restraints while determining its correct approach. This thesis argues against some existing competition policies and principles, such as the objective of the law of vertical territorial and price restraints. It shows that law of vertical territorial and price restraints should protect effective and free competition. Nevertheless, it follows that the object of effective competition is efficiency which is difficult to determine in situations when RPM or VTR is used. Furthermore, the complexity of vertical competition and vertical chains, including relationships, power and market structures, is surveyed. This thesis advocates the existence of vertical competition and further explains that it is bargaining power which should be assessed in RPM and VTR cases and not horizontal market power, which serves the purpose of horizontal rather than vertical competition. The development of the laws of vertical territorial and price restraints including the analysis of relevant and significant cases both in the EU and the USA within a broader historical framework and relevant theories unveil some inconsistencies and uncertainties. This thesis criticises the formalistic approach within traditional anti-competitive theories and the demagogical approach within the majority of pro-competitive theories offering new suggestions and points of view. Although vertical restraints have been part of US antitrust law and EU competition law almost since the beginning of their existence, this thesis reveals that their approaches have been unsettled and continue to develop with contradictory arguments on this issue across the legal, economical, empirical and theoretical scholarly works, which show lack of understanding of vertical competition. Unfortunately, vertical competition has not been acknowledged as the basic framework for vertical restraints in both the EU and US policies and their legislations. Therefore, this thesis concludes with legislative suggestions which better reflect the nature of vertical restraints.

Papers by Barbora Jedlickova

European Law Review, 2013