Ben Sheredos - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Published Papers by Ben Sheredos
Synthese, 2018
I argue (1) that what (ontic) New Mechanistic philosophers of science call mechanisms would be ma... more I argue (1) that what (ontic) New Mechanistic philosophers of science call mechanisms would be material Gestalten, and (2) that Merleau-Ponty’s engagement with Gestalt theory can help us frame a standing challenge against ontic conceptions of mechanisms. In short, until the (ontic) New Mechanist can provide us with a plausible account of the organization of mechanisms as an objective feature of mind-independent ontic structures in the world which we might discover – and no ontic Mechanist has done so – it is more conservative to claim that mechanistic organization is instead a mind-dependent aspect of our epistemic strategies of mechanistic explanation.
TopiCS in Cognitive Science, 2017
In many fields of biology, both the phenomena to be explained and the mechanisms proposed to expl... more In many fields of biology, both the phenomena to be explained and the mechanisms proposed to explain them are commonly presented in diagrams. Our interest is in how scientists construct such diagrams. Researchers begin with evidence, typically developed experimentally and presented in data graphs. To arrive at a robust diagram of the phenomenon or the mechanism, they must integrate a variety of data to construct a single, coherent representation. This process often begins as the researchers create a first sketch, and it continues over an extended period as they revise the sketch until they arrive at a diagram they find acceptable. We illustrate this process by examining the sketches developed in the course of two research projects directed at understanding the generation of circadian rhythms in cyanobacteria. One identified a new aspect of the phenomenon itself, whereas the other aimed to develop a new mechanistic account. In both cases, the research resulted in a paper in which the conclusion was presented in a diagram that the authors deemed adequate to convey it. These diagrams violate some of the normative “cognitive design principles” advanced by cognitive scientists as constraints on successful visual communication. We suggest that scientists’ sketching is instead governed by norms of success that are broadly explanatory: conveying the phenomenon or mechanism.
Husserl Studies, 2017
Husserl famously retracted his early portrayal, in Logische Untersuchungen, of phenomenology as e... more Husserl famously retracted his early portrayal, in Logische Untersuchungen, of phenomenology as empirical psychology. Previous scholarship has typically understood this transcendental turn in light of the Ideen's revised conception of the ἐποχή, and its distinction between noesa and noemata. This essay thematizes the evolution of the concept of mental acts in Husserl's work as a way of understanding the shift. I show how the recognition of the pure ego in Ideen I & II enabled Husserl to radically alter his conception of mental acts, coming to understand them all in terms of genuine *acts* (doings or performances) in a way that had been essentially precluded for descriptive psychologists (Brentano, Natorp, and the early Husserl) so long as the pure ego was denied. This reading challenges a widespread assumption in the secondary literature that "mental act" is a merely technical term or misnomer.
Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in the History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 2017
Scientists' graphical practices have recently become a target of inquiry in the philosophy of sci... more Scientists' graphical practices have recently become a target of inquiry in the philosophy of science, and in the cognitive sciences. Here I supplement our understanding of graphical practices via a case study of how researchers crafted the graphics for scientific publication in the field of circadian biology. The case highlights social aspects of graph-ical production which have gone understudied – especially concerning the negotiation of publication. I argue that it also supports a challenge to the claim that empirically-informed " cognitive design principles " offer an apt understanding of the norms of success which govern good scientific graphic design to communicate data and hypotheses to other experts. In this respect, the case-study also illustrates how " descriptive " studies of scientific practice can connect with normative issues in philosophy of science, thereby addressing a central concern in recent discussions of practice-oriented philosophy of science.
Human Studies, 2017
Merleau-Ponty's appropriation of Gestalt theory in The Structure of Behavior is central to his en... more Merleau-Ponty's appropriation of Gestalt theory in The Structure of Behavior is central to his entire corpus. Yet commentators exhibit little agreement about what lesson is to be learned from his critique, and provide little ex-egesis of how his argument proceeds. I fill this exegetical gap. I show that the Gestaltist’s fundamental error is to reify forms as transcendent realities, rather than treating them as phenomena of perceptual consciousness. From this, reductivist errors follow. The essay serves not only as a helpful guide through parts of /The Structure of Behavior/ for newcomers, but also offers a corrective to recent trends in philosophy of mind. Such influential commentators as Hubert Dreyfus, Taylor Carmen, and Evan Thompson have, I argue, risked serious misunderstanding of Merleau-Ponty’s view, by mistakenly treating “circular causality” as central to Merleau-Ponty’s own acausal (dialectical) view of forms.
The Scientific Imagination: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives
Some proponents of mechanistic explanation downplay the significance of how-possibly explanations... more Some proponents of mechanistic explanation downplay the significance of how-possibly explanations. We argue that developing accounts of mechanisms that could explain a phenomenon is an important aspect of scientific reasoning, one that involves imagination. Although appeals to imagination may seem to obscure the process of reasoning, we illustrate how, by examining diagrams (including drafts researchers construct in the course of research) we can gain insights into the construction of mechanistic explanations.
Brentano Studien, 2016
Brentano's Psychology constantly refers to mental phenomena as "mental acts," yet there has been ... more Brentano's Psychology constantly refers to mental phenomena as "mental acts," yet there has been surprisingly little effort devoted to discerning the significance of the term "act" in this context. A widespread implicit view is (1) that it is merely a technical term, and does not literally invoke any connotations of action at all. But since many regard the Psychology as riddled with Aristotelian assumptions, some also suggest (2) that Brentano's talk of "mental acts" is a significant holdover from his Aristotelian pedigree. Here I argue, negatively, that both claims are deeply problematic. First, traditional readings of Brentano (by, e.g., Oskar Kraus) in terms of (1) are incapable of supporting some of Brentano's most central commitments regarding inner perception and the method of psychology. Second, Brentano's own conception of Aristotelianism is such that if (2) were true, (1) would be false. Finally, if (2) were true in any significant sense, then Brentano would simply fail to do what he sets out to do in his empirical psychology. I thus call for renewed attention to Brentano's conception of "mental acts."
Erkenntnis, 2016
Recent attempts to reconcile the ontic and epistemic approaches to explanation propose that our b... more Recent attempts to reconcile the ontic and epistemic approaches to explanation propose that our best explanations simply fulfill epistemic and ontic norms simultaneously. I aim to upset this armistice. Epistemic norms of attaining general and systematic explanations are, I argue, autonomous of ontic norms: they cannot be fulfilled simultaneously or in simple conjunction with ontic norms, and plausibly have priority over them. One result is that central arguments put forth by ontic theorists against epistemic theorists are revealed as not only question-begging, but ultimately self-defeating. Another result is that a more nuanced reconciliation of the epistemic and ontic views is required: we should regard good explanatory practice as a dynamic process with distinct phases of epistemic and ontic success.
We explore the crucial role of diagrams in scientific reasoning, especially reasoning directed at... more We explore the crucial role of diagrams in scientific reasoning, especially reasoning directed at developing mechanistic explanations of biological phenomena. We offer a case study focusing on one research project that resulted in a published paper advancing a new understanding of the mechanism by which the central circadian oscillator in Synechococcus elongatus controls gene expression. By examining how the diagrams prepared for the paper developed over the course of multiple drafts, we show how the process of generating a new explanation vitally involved the development and integration of multiple versions of different types of diagrams, and how reasoning about the mechanism proceeded in tandem with the development of the diagrams used to represent it.
Diagrams have distinctive characteristics that make them an effective medium for commu... more Diagrams
have
distinctive
characteristics
that
make
them
an
effective
medium
for
communicating
research
findings,
but
they
are
even
more
impressive
as
tools
for
scientific
reasoning.
Focusing
on
circadian
rhythm
research
in
biology
to
explore
these
roles,
we
examine
diagrammatic
formats
that
have
been
devised
(a)
to
identify
and
illuminate
circadian
phenomena
and
(b)
to
develop
and
modify
mechanistic
explanations
of
these
phenomena.
Cognitive scientists have shown increased interest in diagrams in recent years, but most of the f... more Cognitive scientists have shown increased interest in diagrams in recent years, but most of the focus has been on spatial representation, not conventions for representing time. We explore a variety of ways in which time is represented in diagrams by one research community: scientists investigating circadian rhythms at the behavioral and molecular levels. Diagrams that relate other variables to time or indicate a mechanism's states across time use one or two spatial dimensions or circles to represent time and sometimes include explicit time markers (e.g., the hours on a clockface).
(2013). Proceedings of the 35th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.
Recent research has begun to explore the role of diagrams as cognitive tools. Here I develop new ... more Recent research has begun to explore the role of diagrams as cognitive tools. Here I develop new conceptual and methodological resources for exploring the sociality of cognition involving diagrams. First, I distinguish two varieties of group-dependent cognition. Second, extending Nersessian's method of cognitive-historical analysis, I show how a suitably-informed "literature review" of diagrams published in scientific articles offers a window into the group-dependent cognition of scientists. I end by sketching future avenues of inquiry, and how this approach may inform science education.
Frontiers in Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology
Psychological Inquiry
Traditionally, identity and supervenience have been proposed in philosophy of mind as metaphysica... more Traditionally, identity and supervenience have been proposed in philosophy of mind as metaphysical accounts of how mental activities (fully understood, as they might be at the end of science) relate to brain processes. Kievet et al. (this issue) suggest that to be relevant to cognitive neuroscience, these philosophical positions must make empirically testable claims and be evaluated accordingly—they cannot sit on the sidelines, awaiting the hypothetical completion of cognitive neuroscience. We agree with the authors on the importance of rendering these positions relevant to ongoing science. We disagree, however, with their proposal that a metaphysical relationship (identity or supervenience) should “serve as a means to conceptually organize and guide the analysis of neurological and behavioral data” (p. 69). Instead, we advance a different view of the goals of cognitive neuroscience and of the proper means of relating metaphysics and explanation.
Other by Ben Sheredos
unpublished, 2019
This is a (likely incomplete) transcendental phenomenology of professional failure. You can read ... more This is a (likely incomplete) transcendental phenomenology of professional failure. You can read it, if you like. Or don't.
unpublished, 2019
In a recent article published in Ergo and entitled "Ontic explanation is either ontic or explanat... more In a recent article published in Ergo and entitled "Ontic explanation is either ontic or explanatory, but not both," Cory Wright and Dingmar van Eck have sought to undermine any ontic approach to explanation, providing three arguments to show that an epistemic approach is "the only game in town." I show that each of their arguments is straightforwardly question-begging. For brevity, I make my counter-arguments by showing how the claims of Sheredos (2016)- whom Wright & van Eck cite as an ally - undermine each of their own arguments. The consumer update is: there is no new decisive argument against an ontic view, the epistemic view is not the only game in town, and reconciliation between the ontic and epistemic views remains possible.
A free system built on Google Drive & Google Sheets that standardizes job applicants' records and... more A free system built on Google Drive & Google Sheets that standardizes job applicants' records and makes it very easy for a placement director to compile a "Joint Report" (with 2 clicks) that integrates job application data from multiple applicants. The Joint Report can then be shared with faculty in the department at large to keep them informed about applicants' activities. The system runs on scripts that are embedded in google sheets, but is very user-friendly. (Nobody ever needs to see the scripts).
Book Reviews by Ben Sheredos
Philosophical Psychology, Mar 25, 2014
Open-Access Educational Resources by Ben Sheredos
Sheredos, Ben, and Harrison, Liz. "3 - Phase response curves." YouTube video, 7:31. Posted by "Th... more Sheredos, Ben, and Harrison, Liz. "3 - Phase response curves." YouTube video, 7:31. Posted by "The BioClock Studio," March 7, 2016. https://youtu.be/gib7_ppLpXI.
Synthese, 2018
I argue (1) that what (ontic) New Mechanistic philosophers of science call mechanisms would be ma... more I argue (1) that what (ontic) New Mechanistic philosophers of science call mechanisms would be material Gestalten, and (2) that Merleau-Ponty’s engagement with Gestalt theory can help us frame a standing challenge against ontic conceptions of mechanisms. In short, until the (ontic) New Mechanist can provide us with a plausible account of the organization of mechanisms as an objective feature of mind-independent ontic structures in the world which we might discover – and no ontic Mechanist has done so – it is more conservative to claim that mechanistic organization is instead a mind-dependent aspect of our epistemic strategies of mechanistic explanation.
TopiCS in Cognitive Science, 2017
In many fields of biology, both the phenomena to be explained and the mechanisms proposed to expl... more In many fields of biology, both the phenomena to be explained and the mechanisms proposed to explain them are commonly presented in diagrams. Our interest is in how scientists construct such diagrams. Researchers begin with evidence, typically developed experimentally and presented in data graphs. To arrive at a robust diagram of the phenomenon or the mechanism, they must integrate a variety of data to construct a single, coherent representation. This process often begins as the researchers create a first sketch, and it continues over an extended period as they revise the sketch until they arrive at a diagram they find acceptable. We illustrate this process by examining the sketches developed in the course of two research projects directed at understanding the generation of circadian rhythms in cyanobacteria. One identified a new aspect of the phenomenon itself, whereas the other aimed to develop a new mechanistic account. In both cases, the research resulted in a paper in which the conclusion was presented in a diagram that the authors deemed adequate to convey it. These diagrams violate some of the normative “cognitive design principles” advanced by cognitive scientists as constraints on successful visual communication. We suggest that scientists’ sketching is instead governed by norms of success that are broadly explanatory: conveying the phenomenon or mechanism.
Husserl Studies, 2017
Husserl famously retracted his early portrayal, in Logische Untersuchungen, of phenomenology as e... more Husserl famously retracted his early portrayal, in Logische Untersuchungen, of phenomenology as empirical psychology. Previous scholarship has typically understood this transcendental turn in light of the Ideen's revised conception of the ἐποχή, and its distinction between noesa and noemata. This essay thematizes the evolution of the concept of mental acts in Husserl's work as a way of understanding the shift. I show how the recognition of the pure ego in Ideen I & II enabled Husserl to radically alter his conception of mental acts, coming to understand them all in terms of genuine *acts* (doings or performances) in a way that had been essentially precluded for descriptive psychologists (Brentano, Natorp, and the early Husserl) so long as the pure ego was denied. This reading challenges a widespread assumption in the secondary literature that "mental act" is a merely technical term or misnomer.
Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in the History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 2017
Scientists' graphical practices have recently become a target of inquiry in the philosophy of sci... more Scientists' graphical practices have recently become a target of inquiry in the philosophy of science, and in the cognitive sciences. Here I supplement our understanding of graphical practices via a case study of how researchers crafted the graphics for scientific publication in the field of circadian biology. The case highlights social aspects of graph-ical production which have gone understudied – especially concerning the negotiation of publication. I argue that it also supports a challenge to the claim that empirically-informed " cognitive design principles " offer an apt understanding of the norms of success which govern good scientific graphic design to communicate data and hypotheses to other experts. In this respect, the case-study also illustrates how " descriptive " studies of scientific practice can connect with normative issues in philosophy of science, thereby addressing a central concern in recent discussions of practice-oriented philosophy of science.
Human Studies, 2017
Merleau-Ponty's appropriation of Gestalt theory in The Structure of Behavior is central to his en... more Merleau-Ponty's appropriation of Gestalt theory in The Structure of Behavior is central to his entire corpus. Yet commentators exhibit little agreement about what lesson is to be learned from his critique, and provide little ex-egesis of how his argument proceeds. I fill this exegetical gap. I show that the Gestaltist’s fundamental error is to reify forms as transcendent realities, rather than treating them as phenomena of perceptual consciousness. From this, reductivist errors follow. The essay serves not only as a helpful guide through parts of /The Structure of Behavior/ for newcomers, but also offers a corrective to recent trends in philosophy of mind. Such influential commentators as Hubert Dreyfus, Taylor Carmen, and Evan Thompson have, I argue, risked serious misunderstanding of Merleau-Ponty’s view, by mistakenly treating “circular causality” as central to Merleau-Ponty’s own acausal (dialectical) view of forms.
The Scientific Imagination: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives
Some proponents of mechanistic explanation downplay the significance of how-possibly explanations... more Some proponents of mechanistic explanation downplay the significance of how-possibly explanations. We argue that developing accounts of mechanisms that could explain a phenomenon is an important aspect of scientific reasoning, one that involves imagination. Although appeals to imagination may seem to obscure the process of reasoning, we illustrate how, by examining diagrams (including drafts researchers construct in the course of research) we can gain insights into the construction of mechanistic explanations.
Brentano Studien, 2016
Brentano's Psychology constantly refers to mental phenomena as "mental acts," yet there has been ... more Brentano's Psychology constantly refers to mental phenomena as "mental acts," yet there has been surprisingly little effort devoted to discerning the significance of the term "act" in this context. A widespread implicit view is (1) that it is merely a technical term, and does not literally invoke any connotations of action at all. But since many regard the Psychology as riddled with Aristotelian assumptions, some also suggest (2) that Brentano's talk of "mental acts" is a significant holdover from his Aristotelian pedigree. Here I argue, negatively, that both claims are deeply problematic. First, traditional readings of Brentano (by, e.g., Oskar Kraus) in terms of (1) are incapable of supporting some of Brentano's most central commitments regarding inner perception and the method of psychology. Second, Brentano's own conception of Aristotelianism is such that if (2) were true, (1) would be false. Finally, if (2) were true in any significant sense, then Brentano would simply fail to do what he sets out to do in his empirical psychology. I thus call for renewed attention to Brentano's conception of "mental acts."
Erkenntnis, 2016
Recent attempts to reconcile the ontic and epistemic approaches to explanation propose that our b... more Recent attempts to reconcile the ontic and epistemic approaches to explanation propose that our best explanations simply fulfill epistemic and ontic norms simultaneously. I aim to upset this armistice. Epistemic norms of attaining general and systematic explanations are, I argue, autonomous of ontic norms: they cannot be fulfilled simultaneously or in simple conjunction with ontic norms, and plausibly have priority over them. One result is that central arguments put forth by ontic theorists against epistemic theorists are revealed as not only question-begging, but ultimately self-defeating. Another result is that a more nuanced reconciliation of the epistemic and ontic views is required: we should regard good explanatory practice as a dynamic process with distinct phases of epistemic and ontic success.
We explore the crucial role of diagrams in scientific reasoning, especially reasoning directed at... more We explore the crucial role of diagrams in scientific reasoning, especially reasoning directed at developing mechanistic explanations of biological phenomena. We offer a case study focusing on one research project that resulted in a published paper advancing a new understanding of the mechanism by which the central circadian oscillator in Synechococcus elongatus controls gene expression. By examining how the diagrams prepared for the paper developed over the course of multiple drafts, we show how the process of generating a new explanation vitally involved the development and integration of multiple versions of different types of diagrams, and how reasoning about the mechanism proceeded in tandem with the development of the diagrams used to represent it.
Diagrams have distinctive characteristics that make them an effective medium for commu... more Diagrams
have
distinctive
characteristics
that
make
them
an
effective
medium
for
communicating
research
findings,
but
they
are
even
more
impressive
as
tools
for
scientific
reasoning.
Focusing
on
circadian
rhythm
research
in
biology
to
explore
these
roles,
we
examine
diagrammatic
formats
that
have
been
devised
(a)
to
identify
and
illuminate
circadian
phenomena
and
(b)
to
develop
and
modify
mechanistic
explanations
of
these
phenomena.
Cognitive scientists have shown increased interest in diagrams in recent years, but most of the f... more Cognitive scientists have shown increased interest in diagrams in recent years, but most of the focus has been on spatial representation, not conventions for representing time. We explore a variety of ways in which time is represented in diagrams by one research community: scientists investigating circadian rhythms at the behavioral and molecular levels. Diagrams that relate other variables to time or indicate a mechanism's states across time use one or two spatial dimensions or circles to represent time and sometimes include explicit time markers (e.g., the hours on a clockface).
(2013). Proceedings of the 35th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.
Recent research has begun to explore the role of diagrams as cognitive tools. Here I develop new ... more Recent research has begun to explore the role of diagrams as cognitive tools. Here I develop new conceptual and methodological resources for exploring the sociality of cognition involving diagrams. First, I distinguish two varieties of group-dependent cognition. Second, extending Nersessian's method of cognitive-historical analysis, I show how a suitably-informed "literature review" of diagrams published in scientific articles offers a window into the group-dependent cognition of scientists. I end by sketching future avenues of inquiry, and how this approach may inform science education.
Frontiers in Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology
Psychological Inquiry
Traditionally, identity and supervenience have been proposed in philosophy of mind as metaphysica... more Traditionally, identity and supervenience have been proposed in philosophy of mind as metaphysical accounts of how mental activities (fully understood, as they might be at the end of science) relate to brain processes. Kievet et al. (this issue) suggest that to be relevant to cognitive neuroscience, these philosophical positions must make empirically testable claims and be evaluated accordingly—they cannot sit on the sidelines, awaiting the hypothetical completion of cognitive neuroscience. We agree with the authors on the importance of rendering these positions relevant to ongoing science. We disagree, however, with their proposal that a metaphysical relationship (identity or supervenience) should “serve as a means to conceptually organize and guide the analysis of neurological and behavioral data” (p. 69). Instead, we advance a different view of the goals of cognitive neuroscience and of the proper means of relating metaphysics and explanation.
unpublished, 2019
This is a (likely incomplete) transcendental phenomenology of professional failure. You can read ... more This is a (likely incomplete) transcendental phenomenology of professional failure. You can read it, if you like. Or don't.
unpublished, 2019
In a recent article published in Ergo and entitled "Ontic explanation is either ontic or explanat... more In a recent article published in Ergo and entitled "Ontic explanation is either ontic or explanatory, but not both," Cory Wright and Dingmar van Eck have sought to undermine any ontic approach to explanation, providing three arguments to show that an epistemic approach is "the only game in town." I show that each of their arguments is straightforwardly question-begging. For brevity, I make my counter-arguments by showing how the claims of Sheredos (2016)- whom Wright & van Eck cite as an ally - undermine each of their own arguments. The consumer update is: there is no new decisive argument against an ontic view, the epistemic view is not the only game in town, and reconciliation between the ontic and epistemic views remains possible.
A free system built on Google Drive & Google Sheets that standardizes job applicants' records and... more A free system built on Google Drive & Google Sheets that standardizes job applicants' records and makes it very easy for a placement director to compile a "Joint Report" (with 2 clicks) that integrates job application data from multiple applicants. The Joint Report can then be shared with faculty in the department at large to keep them informed about applicants' activities. The system runs on scripts that are embedded in google sheets, but is very user-friendly. (Nobody ever needs to see the scripts).
Philosophical Psychology, Mar 25, 2014
Sheredos, Ben, and Harrison, Liz. "3 - Phase response curves." YouTube video, 7:31. Posted by "Th... more Sheredos, Ben, and Harrison, Liz. "3 - Phase response curves." YouTube video, 7:31. Posted by "The BioClock Studio," March 7, 2016. https://youtu.be/gib7_ppLpXI.
Rivera, Adreanne, Schloffman, Cheyenne, Villalon-Landeros, Maria, Sheredos, Ben, Tonsfeldt, Karen... more Rivera, Adreanne, Schloffman, Cheyenne, Villalon-Landeros, Maria, Sheredos, Ben, Tonsfeldt, Karen J., Noguchi, Takako, and Golden, Susan S. "Mammalian molecular entrainment to light and networks." YouTube video, 6:29. Posted by "The BioClock Studio," May 7, 2018. https://youtu.be/71jC0CXOcPI.
Nudell, Victoriah, Pongsawakul, Pagkapol Y., Sheredos, Ben, Noguchi, Takako, and Golden, Susan S.... more Nudell, Victoriah, Pongsawakul, Pagkapol Y., Sheredos, Ben, Noguchi, Takako, and Golden, Susan S. "The BioClock Studio documentary part 5: What is the impact of the bioclock studio?." YouTube video, 3:59. Posted by "The BioClock Studio," February 16, 2018. https://youtu.be/7PDP7H336wI.
Nudell, Victoriah, Pongsawakul, Pagkapol Y., Sheredos, Ben, Noguchi, Takako, and Golden, Susan S.... more Nudell, Victoriah, Pongsawakul, Pagkapol Y., Sheredos, Ben, Noguchi, Takako, and Golden, Susan S. "The BioClock Studio documentary part 4: Symposium." YouTube video, 6:20. Posted by "The BioClock Studio," February 16, 2018. https://youtu.be/I_FFXZAw9vI.
Nudell, Victoriah, Pongsawakul, Pagkapol Y., Sheredos, Ben, Noguchi, Takako, and Golden, Susan S.... more Nudell, Victoriah, Pongsawakul, Pagkapol Y., Sheredos, Ben, Noguchi, Takako, and Golden, Susan S. "The BioClock Studio documentary part 3: What does the bioclock studio produce?." YouTube video, 12:23. Posted by "The BioClock Studio," February 16, 2018. https://youtu.be/8rr_ne8R65w.
Nudell, Victoriah, Pongsawakul, Pagkapol Y., Sheredos, Ben, Noguchi, Takako, and Golden, Susan S.... more Nudell, Victoriah, Pongsawakul, Pagkapol Y., Sheredos, Ben, Noguchi, Takako, and Golden, Susan S. "The BioClock Studio documentary part 2: Workshops." YouTube video, 3:00. Posted by "The BioClock Studio," February 16, 2018. https://youtu.be/udMeHwTl0IM.
Nudell, Victoriah, Pongsawakul, Pagkapol Y., Sheredos, Ben, Noguchi, Takako, and Golden, Susan S.... more Nudell, Victoriah, Pongsawakul, Pagkapol Y., Sheredos, Ben, Noguchi, Takako, and Golden, Susan S. "The BioClock Studio documentary part 1: What is the bioclock studio." YouTube video, 3:48. Posted by "The BioClock Studio," February 16, 2018. https://youtu.be/KYUJOfGhnNM.
Oh, Clara, Sheredos, Ben, and Golden, Susan S. "Time-memory in bees: Demonstration that organisms... more Oh, Clara, Sheredos, Ben, and Golden, Susan S. "Time-memory in bees: Demonstration that organisms tell 24-hour time." YouTube video, 10:48. Posted by "The BioClock Studio," January 8, 2018. https://youtu.be/rVqYMenl9cc.
Dandekar, Jay, Villalon-Landeros, Maria, Oh, Clara, Hamza, Rahil, Leon, Stephanie, Lim, Mike, Phu... more Dandekar, Jay, Villalon-Landeros, Maria, Oh, Clara, Hamza, Rahil, Leon, Stephanie, Lim, Mike, Phung, Kristen, Rivera, Adreanne, Schloffman, Cheyenne, Tseng, Waverly, Tu, Christopher, To, Sarah, Johnson, Erin, Schoeller, Erica, Noguchi, Takako, Sheredos, Ben, and Golden, Susan S. "Spotlight interview: Messages for students." YouTube video, 6:20. Posted by "The BioClock Studio," November 6, 2017. https://youtu.be/bQY4du2vJjs.
Gorman, Michael R.. "Spotlight interview with Dr Michael R Gorman." YouTube video, 2:22. Posted b... more Gorman, Michael R.. "Spotlight interview with Dr Michael R Gorman." YouTube video, 2:22. Posted by "The BioClock Studio," October, 16, 2017. https://youtu.be/MC9AsnyCBrM.
Ancoli-Israel, S.. "Spotlight interview with Dr Sonia Ancoli-Israel." YouTube video, 2:12. Posted... more Ancoli-Israel, S.. "Spotlight interview with Dr Sonia Ancoli-Israel." YouTube video, 2:12. Posted by "The BioClock Studio," September, 14, 2017. https://youtu.be/1zGhJ3eK-50.
Leon, Stephanie, Sheredos, Ben, Tonsfeldt, Karen J., and Golden, Susan S. "Avian circadian photor... more Leon, Stephanie, Sheredos, Ben, Tonsfeldt, Karen J., and Golden, Susan S. "Avian circadian photoreception: "Ex-sparrow-ment" simulator." The BioClock Studio. http://ccb.ucsd.edu/_files/bioclock/projects-2017/exsparrowment.html (accessed September 1, 2018).
Golden, Susan S.. "Spotlight interview with Dr Susan S Golden." YouTube video, 2:20. Posted by "T... more Golden, Susan S.. "Spotlight interview with Dr Susan S Golden." YouTube video, 2:20. Posted by "The BioClock Studio," September, 7, 2017. https://youtu.be/qd856j_bX9Y.
Desplats, P.. "Spotlight interview with Dr Paula Desplats." YouTube video, 2:14. Posted by "The B... more Desplats, P.. "Spotlight interview with Dr Paula Desplats." YouTube video, 2:14. Posted by "The BioClock Studio," September, 7, 2017. https://youtu.be/vZuyWKQRCdE.
Joiner, William J.. "Spotlight interview with Dr William J Joiner." YouTube video, 2:10. Posted b... more Joiner, William J.. "Spotlight interview with Dr William J Joiner." YouTube video, 2:10. Posted by "The BioClock Studio," September, 7, 2017. https://youtu.be/__Vdd-MdxTU.
Kauffman, Alexander S.. "Spotlight interview with Dr Alexander S Kauffman." YouTube video, 2:19. ... more Kauffman, Alexander S.. "Spotlight interview with Dr Alexander S Kauffman." YouTube video, 2:19. Posted by "The BioClock Studio," September, 7, 2017. https://youtu.be/egIFHnvGz1o.
Hamza, Rahil, Phung, Kristen, Sheredos, Ben, Tonsfeldt, Karen J., and Golden, Susan S. "The supra... more Hamza, Rahil, Phung, Kristen, Sheredos, Ben, Tonsfeldt, Karen J., and Golden, Susan S. "The suprachiasmatic nucleus: Lesion & transplant experiments review." YouTube video, 12:34. Posted by "The BioClock Studio," August 31, 2017. https://youtu.be/GmXJYOlmKFA.
Lamia, Katja A.. "Spotlight interview with Dr Katja A Lamia." YouTube video, 2:16. Posted by "The... more Lamia, Katja A.. "Spotlight interview with Dr Katja A Lamia." YouTube video, 2:16. Posted by "The BioClock Studio," July, 24, 2017. https://youtu.be/8JwluDXIoZ0.
LiWang, A.. "Spotlight interview with Dr Andy LiWang." YouTube video, 2:13. Posted by "The BioClo... more LiWang, A.. "Spotlight interview with Dr Andy LiWang." YouTube video, 2:13. Posted by "The BioClock Studio," July, 18, 2017. https://youtu.be/wXClI2blSH8.
Partch, Carrie L.. "Spotlight interview with Dr Carrie L Partch." YouTube video, 2:10. Posted by ... more Partch, Carrie L.. "Spotlight interview with Dr Carrie L Partch." YouTube video, 2:10. Posted by "The BioClock Studio," July, 18, 2017. https://youtu.be/yDkkWiPPiqU.
Scientists’ graphical practices have recently become a target of inquiry in philosophy of science... more Scientists’ graphical practices have recently become a target of inquiry in philosophy of science, and in the cognitive sciences. However, our current methodologies leave much of graphical practice unexplored.
In cognitive science, the majority of relevant research examines how non-expert subjects (undergraduates) consume finished graphics. Some work has also examined how non-expert subjects produce their own graphics, though this is rare. In general, this research treats graphical practice as an individualistic affair. And there is little examination of how expert scientists, themselves, produce and consume graphics. Nonetheless, cognitive scientists have recently begun leveraging their empirical results to formulate prescriptive “cognitive design principles” for how one ought to construct effective graphics. (For review of all these points, see Tversky 2011 and Hegarty 2011). To provide a simplistic summary of these design principles, one basic recommendation is to “keep graphics simple” by removing any information which is not task-relevant, making intended meaning readily accessible, and keeping a basic visual style constant between graphics. Another recommendation is to use to use space in ways which are “natural,” or which are held to reflect everyday embodied experience – e.g., use vertical axes for valuations, with up meaning more/better and down less/worse, and use horizontal axes for neutral dimensions.
Meanwhile, philosophical investigations of scientific graphics typically examine experts' finished products. (See, e.g., Nersessian 2008; Perini 2005, 2012; Griesemer 2012; Sheredos et
al., 2012). The practices which led to graphics' production are largely inferred and not observed. Moreover, there has been a tendency to focus on graphics produced by influential individuals (Maxwell, Darwin, etc.). As a result, we again have a set of methodologies which are ill-suited for uncovering the details of expert production, and we again have a tendency towards an individualistic conception of graphical practice.
In this talk I supplement our understanding of scientists' graphical practices via a novel case-study of how researchers crafted a peer-reviewed research publication in a top biology journal (what I shall call “the target article”). My data-set (provided by the authors of the target article) consists of 12 different drafts of the target article and its graphics, plus reviewer comments on the penultimate draft, as well as the authors' own revisions and rejoinders in response to reviewers. The target article is a publication in the biology of circadian rhythms, and thus this case-study finds robust context in, and was facilitated by, recent work in collaboration with William Bechtel. I show that the development of the target article involved social and communalized strategies of graphical production which previously methodologies have left understudied – especially concerning the negotiation of publication. I also argue the case supports a challenge to the claim that “cognitive design principles” offer an apt understanding of the norms of success which govern scientists’ graphical practices: scientists’ own practices of revision and drafting suggest that they work under a different conception of what good graphical practice aims to accomplish. I offer some clarification of the norms of good graphical practice, and call for renewed attention to this issue.
Husserl famously retracted his early portrayal, in Logische Untersuchungen, of phenomenology as e... more Husserl famously retracted his early portrayal, in Logische Untersuchungen, of phenomenology as empirical psychology. Previous scholarship has typically understood this transcendental turn in light of the Ideen’s revised conception of the ἐποχή, and its distinction between noesa and noemata. I thematize the evolution of the concept of "mental acts" in Husserl’s work as a way of understanding the shift. I show how the recognition of the pure ego in Ideen I & II enabled Husserl to radically alter his conception of mental acts, coming to understand them all in terms of genuine acts (doings or performances) in a way that had been essentially precluded for descriptive psychologists (Brentano, Natorp, and the early Husserl) so long as the pure ego was denied. This reading challenges a widespread assumption in the secondary literature that “mental act” is a merely technical term or misnomer.
Philosophy of action's traditional focus on such worthy concerns as personal freedom, agency, and... more Philosophy of action's traditional focus on such worthy concerns as personal freedom, agency, and responsibility must be modulated if we are to understand the nature of acts (doings) in general. While some species of acts have a clear relation to these traditional concerns, others (e.g., what O'Shaughnessy called “subintentional acts”) do not. An overriding focus on these traditional concerns prevents the philosophy of action from analyzing all species of acts, thereby precludes an adequate understanding the genus of acts, and consequently undermines even the traditional philosopher of action's aims.
I provide a case study of how a team of biologists (through 11 drafts, over 4 months) crafted an ... more I provide a case study of how a team of biologists (through 11 drafts, over 4 months) crafted an original research article. I aim to foster discussion regarding two features of scientists' graphical practices (“GPs”) revealed here, but which have previously gone understudied. First, while the article's data-graphics were settled early, and were largely produced by individuals working at the bench, in contrast the article's central mechanism diagram developed more gradually, arising through a collaborative decision-making process. Second, in response to reviewer comments (and to meet page-limits) the authors radically revised the penultimate draft, deleting large portions of prose in main text, and moving many graphics' panels out of the main text and into “supplementary information.” Both points highlight the importance of social influences (intralaboratory and extra-lab) on GPs, and set us the task of incorporating these influences into any adequate account of how scientists reason with diagrams.
24th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association
Recent attempts to unify the ontic and epistemic approaches to (mechanistic) explanation propose ... more Recent attempts to unify the ontic and epistemic approaches to (mechanistic) explanation propose that we simply pursue epistemic and ontic norms in tandem. I aim to upset this armistice. There are epistemic norms of attaining general/systematic explanations which we cannot fulfill if we are constrained always to fulfill ontic norms of explanation. Put another way, (some) epistemic norms are autonomous of and in tension with ontic norms. Put a third way, radically distinct forms of explanation are required to fulfill ontic and (some) epistemic norms. A result is that some central arguments put forth by ontic theorists against epistemic theorists are revealed as not only question-begging, but ultimately self-defeating.
I argue that pictorial representations (in Greenberg's (2013) sense) can be vague, by showing tha... more I argue that pictorial representations (in Greenberg's (2013) sense) can be vague, by showing that we regard some of them as if they possessed what Stewart Shapiro (2008) calls open texture. Graphical vagueness has not been previously recognized. The payoffs vary depending upon one's preferred view of vagueness. If one regards (graphical) vagueness as semantic in nature, one may impose an unappreciated desideratum upon accounts of pictorial semantics: they should accommodate and explain graphical vagueness. I show, for example, that Greenberg's analysis of pictorial semantics would need to be radically revised to meet this desideratum. There are, however, non-semantic (i.e., epistemic and metaphysical) conceptions of vagueness, and one could insulate an account of pictorial semantics from the issue of graphical vagueness by pursuing these options. Another potential payoff, then, is that recognizing graphical vagueness may provide new tools for delineating the scope of a proper account of pictorial semantics.
"Phenomena realism" is the thesis that there exist mental objects of experience. Quine raised a f... more "Phenomena realism" is the thesis that there exist mental objects of experience. Quine raised a fundamental challenge to phenomena realism: to say that phenomena exist is to commit to quantifying over them, and this requires an account of phenomena's individuation conditions. I articulate a novel, structural realist form of phenomena realism which provides such an account. While radical forms of structuralism are controversial, I pursue only a moderate structuralism according to which mental objects of experience are co individuated with the experiential structures in which they are embedded: phenomena exist, but are nothing beyond positions in the apparent structure of experience. My goal is not to argue in favor of adopting this view, but rather to re-center the debate over phenomena realism, bringing individuation to the fore. Objections against traditional variants of phenomena realism (sense-datum and subsistence theories) are either inapplicable to this structuralist version, or admit of an in-principle answer.
(ad hoc abstract): I argue that the idea of “mechanisms” as explicated in the new mechanistic phi... more (ad hoc abstract): I argue that the idea of “mechanisms” as explicated in the new mechanistic philosophy of science (focusing here on Craver's work) is convergent with the idea of “gestalten,” as explicated in the early 20th century by Koffka and Köhler. Bringing this convergence to light requires completing two tasks. First (the larger task) I offer a corrective to common (mis)conceptions of gestalten as only perceptual-phenomenal entities, re-introducing the under-appreciated notion of (what I call) material gestalten. Second,I argue that mechanisms are material gestalten. There are three payoffs. First, clarification of the gestalt program: I argue that while the gestaltists endorsed a form of holistic explanation (HE) in seeking to answer certain why-questions (why does this part exhibit φ? because the whole exhibits ψ), they did not invoke HE when seeking answers to how-questions. This renders HE far less absurd than it might at first seem. Mechanistic accounts tend not to address why-questions, focusing on how (against HE) we answer how-questions by decomposing a mechanism into its working parts and showing how they produce a phenomenon of interest. Yet I argue that both styles of explanation are well-grounded by recognizing mechanisms as gestalten. And so the second and third payoffs are: (i) clarification of the ontology of mechanisms (as gestalten), and (ii) bringing a range of why-questions under the mechanistic umbrella
Professional biologists are skilled graphic designers. In creating diagrams, they harness space-o... more Professional biologists are skilled graphic designers. In creating diagrams, they harness space-on-the-page to aid their own reasoning, and to communicate rich (but not error-free) theoretical conceptions of their domain of inquiry. I examine uses of diagrammatic space in portrayals of the mechanisms of circadian rhythmicity in various living systems to articulate aspects of what DiSessa labels the “meta-representational competence” that experts exhibit in their reasoning with these diagrams.
Meta-representational competence must be acquired. Novices can, as shown by cognitive scientists like Tversky and Hegarty, complete various tasks of diagram comprehension best if the distribution of ink on the page has a “natural mapping” to the semantic structure of a theoretical domain. It is thus often suggested that educators and working scientists alike would do well to design graphics so as to exploit any “natural mappings” which are available. I aim to add nuance to this view, by pointing out that in the course of coming to emulate expert practice, aspiring scientists must carefully learn to temper their reliance upon “natural mappings.” Distinct sub-regions of space-on-the-page within a single diagram often require distinct mappings to a variety of theoretical domains. A great source of diagrams' utility in biology consists in enabling researchers to coordinate these theoretical domains, but this requires a bifurcation of the total space-on-the-page into multiple spaces which each support an independent mapping. As I show by example, there is frequently no sensible way to perform a “global” mapping from total space-on-the-page to theoretical domains.
Diagrams have distinctive characteristics that make them an effective medium for communicating re... more Diagrams have distinctive characteristics that make them an effective medium for communicating research findings, but they are even more impressive as tools for scientific reasoning. Focusing on circadian rhythm research in biology to explore these roles, we examine diagrammatic formats that have been devised (a) to identify and illuminate circadian phenomena and (b) to develop and modify mechanistic explanations of these phenomena.
Cognition may play a role in discovery and understanding, but what of warranting inference and ju... more Cognition may play a role in discovery and understanding, but what of warranting inference and justifying proof? On the basis of empirical work in Cognitive Science and a cognitive-historical case-study of 19th century Analysis, we argue that embodied conceptual systems play a functional role in expert inferential practice — in particular, that these embodied conceptual systems constrain and elaborate the mathematician's warranted inferences.
For a system S, we can construe the “Core Question” of emergentism to be: “Are there any system-l... more For a system S, we can construe the “Core Question” of emergentism to be: “Are there any system-level properties of S which are not predictable from (some of) the properties of S’s parts?” Emergentists answer some variation of this question in the affirmative. I distinguish three kinds of emergentism based on how they interpret the Core Question, and why they answer in the affirmative. Epistemic and metaphysical variants of emergentism have previously been distinguished. I argue for recognizing a distinct form of semantic emergentism.
Derek Bolton has claimed that extant philosophical theories of mind imply accounts of mental diso... more Derek Bolton has claimed that extant philosophical theories of mind imply accounts of mental disorder, via their accounts of intentionality. The purpose of this paper is to extend Bolton’s claims, by exploring what an embodied/situated theory of mind might imply about mental disorder. I argue that, unlike the more traditional views Bolton considers, embodied/situated accounts can (in principle) provide an observer-independent criterion for distinguishing mental health from disorder in cases of Capgras and Cotard delusions.