Brice Magdalou - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
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Institut de Chimie de la Matière Condensée de Bordeaux
London School of Economics and Political Science
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Papers by Brice Magdalou
We provide a characterization of the generalised satisfaction -- in our terminology non-deprivati... more We provide a characterization of the generalised satisfaction -- in our terminology non-deprivation -- quasi-ordering introduced by S.R. Chakravarty (Keio Economic Studies 34 (1997), 17--32) for making welfare comparisons based on the absence of deprivation. We show that the non-deprivation quasi-ordering obeys a weaker version of the principle of transfers: welfare improves only for specific combinations of progressive transfers which
We experimentally investigate cooperative behavior in a social dilemma situation, where the socia... more We experimentally investigate cooperative behavior in a social dilemma situation, where the socially efficient outcome may be encouraged by risk aversion and/or inequality aversion.The first part of our experiment is devoted to the elicitation of subjects' aversion profile, taking care to not confuse the two dimensions. Subjects are then grouped by three according to their aversion profiles, and interact in a repeated social dilemma game. In this game, agents are characterised by a social status so that higher the agent's status, higher will be her earnings. Cooperation is costly for a majority of agents at each period, but statuses can be reversed in future periods. We show that cooperation is strongly influenced by the group's aversion profile. Groups averse in both dimensions cooperate more than groups averse in only one dimension. Moreover cooperation seems to be more affected by risk aversion, whereas one might interpret cooperative behavior as an inequality aver...
Social Choice and Welfare, 2009
We introduce a new criterion for making welfare comparisons based on the absence of deprivation. ... more We introduce a new criterion for making welfare comparisons based on the absence of deprivation. This method constitutes a natural alternative to the standard approach in normative economics, which consists in comparing the generalised Lorenz curves of the distributions. The generalised Lorenz criterion is consistent with the principle of transfers, which requires that welfare increases as the result of an arbitrary progressive transfer. The criterion we propose obeys a weaker version of the principle of transfers: welfare improves only for some specific combinations of progressive transfers, where the positions of the donors and beneficiaries of the transfers play a crucial role. We extend the approach to the measurement of inequality by considering the corresponding relative and absolute ethical inequality indices.
This paper establishes an equivalence between three incomplete rank-ings of distributions of an o... more This paper establishes an equivalence between three incomplete rank-ings of distributions of an ordinally measurable attribute. The first rank-ing is that associated with the possibility of going from distribution to the other by a finite sequence of two elementary operations: increments of the attribute and the so-called Hammond transfer. The later transfer is like the Pigou-Dalton transfer, but without the requirement -that would be senseless in an ordinal setting -that the "amount" transferred from the "rich" to the "poor" is fixed. The second ranking is an easy-to-use statistical criterion associated to a specifically weighted recursion on the cumulative density of the distribution function. The third ranking is that resulting from the comparison of numerical values assigned to distribu-tions by a large class of additively separable social evaluation functions. Illustrations of the criteria are also provided.
We provide a characterization of the generalised satisfaction -- in our terminology non-deprivati... more We provide a characterization of the generalised satisfaction -- in our terminology non-deprivation -- quasi-ordering introduced by S.R. Chakravarty (Keio Economic Studies 34 (1997), 17--32) for making welfare comparisons based on the absence of deprivation. We show that the non-deprivation quasi-ordering obeys a weaker version of the principle of transfers: welfare improves only for specific combinations of progressive transfers which
We experimentally investigate cooperative behavior in a social dilemma situation, where the socia... more We experimentally investigate cooperative behavior in a social dilemma situation, where the socially efficient outcome may be encouraged by risk aversion and/or inequality aversion.The first part of our experiment is devoted to the elicitation of subjects' aversion profile, taking care to not confuse the two dimensions. Subjects are then grouped by three according to their aversion profiles, and interact in a repeated social dilemma game. In this game, agents are characterised by a social status so that higher the agent's status, higher will be her earnings. Cooperation is costly for a majority of agents at each period, but statuses can be reversed in future periods. We show that cooperation is strongly influenced by the group's aversion profile. Groups averse in both dimensions cooperate more than groups averse in only one dimension. Moreover cooperation seems to be more affected by risk aversion, whereas one might interpret cooperative behavior as an inequality aver...
Social Choice and Welfare, 2009
We introduce a new criterion for making welfare comparisons based on the absence of deprivation. ... more We introduce a new criterion for making welfare comparisons based on the absence of deprivation. This method constitutes a natural alternative to the standard approach in normative economics, which consists in comparing the generalised Lorenz curves of the distributions. The generalised Lorenz criterion is consistent with the principle of transfers, which requires that welfare increases as the result of an arbitrary progressive transfer. The criterion we propose obeys a weaker version of the principle of transfers: welfare improves only for some specific combinations of progressive transfers, where the positions of the donors and beneficiaries of the transfers play a crucial role. We extend the approach to the measurement of inequality by considering the corresponding relative and absolute ethical inequality indices.
This paper establishes an equivalence between three incomplete rank-ings of distributions of an o... more This paper establishes an equivalence between three incomplete rank-ings of distributions of an ordinally measurable attribute. The first rank-ing is that associated with the possibility of going from distribution to the other by a finite sequence of two elementary operations: increments of the attribute and the so-called Hammond transfer. The later transfer is like the Pigou-Dalton transfer, but without the requirement -that would be senseless in an ordinal setting -that the "amount" transferred from the "rich" to the "poor" is fixed. The second ranking is an easy-to-use statistical criterion associated to a specifically weighted recursion on the cumulative density of the distribution function. The third ranking is that resulting from the comparison of numerical values assigned to distribu-tions by a large class of additively separable social evaluation functions. Illustrations of the criteria are also provided.