Carlotta Mariotto - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by Carlotta Mariotto

Over the recent years, the development of Internet banking and mobile banking has had a considera... more Over the recent years, the development of Internet banking and mobile banking has had a considerable impact on competition in the retail banking industry. In some countries, the regulatory framework has been adapted to allow non-banks to operate in retail payments and compete with banks for deposits. Several platforms or large retailers have started to offer innovative financial products to their customers. In this paper, we survey the issues related to innovation and competition in Internet banking and mobile banking and discuss some perspectives for future research.

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2014

Social Science Research Network, 2016

Peer-to-peer lending marketplaces are a phenomenon in great expansion in the USA and Europe. Thes... more Peer-to-peer lending marketplaces are a phenomenon in great expansion in the USA and Europe. These Online platforms build an example of two-sided market as they try to attract and match lenders and borrowers, while facing the trade-off between increasing the volume of intermediated transactions and minimizing the risks. In this article, we provide a descriptive analysis on the competitive strategies used by these platforms, in a two-sided market environment, and we try to find whether these two platforms differentiate from each other or from banks. To provide evidence on this comparison, we exploit data obtained by Prosper and LendingClub websites, the two leading peer-to-peer lending platforms in the USA, for the years 2006-2013 in the case of Prosper, while for LendingClub they are for the years 2007 until 2014. We deduce that these platforms are substitutes with one another and that they are frontally competing.

L’industrie de la finance a connu une multiplication d’innovations qui peuvent bouleverser les se... more L’industrie de la finance a connu une multiplication d’innovations qui peuvent bouleverser les services financiers traditionnels. Elles brouillent les frontieres entre banques et start-ups, accelererent les transactions, democratisent l'acces au credit, tout en imposant aux regulateurs le defi de construire un cadre reglementaire qui reequilibre le compromis entre stabilite financiere, concurrence innovation.Dans cette these, d'abord je reponds a cette question : comment les innovations influencent-elles la concurrence dans la banque de detail ? Un premier enjeu consiste a comprendre pourquoi certains de ces services innovants sont offerts par les plateformes non-bancaires, et comment les banques peuvent rivaliser avec des participants qui appliquent un modele d'affaire different. Apres, je regarde quels sont les facteurs d’adoption de l'innovation par les consommateurs. Pour repondre a cette question, j'etudie a l'aide d'outils d'analyse empirique l&...

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014

Competition law journal, 2022

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, Nov 25, 2015

Over the recent years, the development of Internet banking and mobile banking has had a considera... more Over the recent years, the development of Internet banking and mobile banking has had a considerable impact on competition in the retail banking industry. In some countries, the regulatory framework has been adapted to allow non-banks to operate in retail payments and compete with banks for deposits. Several platforms or large retailers have started to offer innovative financial products to their customers. In this paper, we survey the issues related to innovation and competition in Internet banking and mobile banking and discuss some perspectives for future research.

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Research Series, 2015

Payment platforms o¤er intermediation services to consumers and merchants that interact on a prod... more Payment platforms o¤er intermediation services to consumers and merchants that interact on a product market. The merchant’s bank (the acquirer) usually pays an interchange fee to the consumer’s bank (the issuer) that impacts the allocation of the total transaction fee between consumers and merchants. This paper studies whether a monopolistic payment platform chooses an interchange fee that exceeds the socially optimal one when there is "double internalization". We refer to "double internalization" as a situation in which both consumers and merchants internalize a fraction of the other side’s net costs of transacting on the platform. We show that double internalization may occur when the interchange fee is no longer neutral on the product market and compare the pro…t-maximizing interchange fee to the welfare-maximizing one.

Review of Network Economics, 2020

We use data from the two leading US platforms, Prosper and Lending Club, to explore the drivers o... more We use data from the two leading US platforms, Prosper and Lending Club, to explore the drivers of the growing consumer demand for peer-to-peer (P2P) credit. Despite the online nature of new entrants, we rely on the spatial autoregressive model because spatial effects play an important role. Our findings suggest that the initial growth of P2P lending was spurred by the global financial crisis, but its growth after 2011 occurred in counties that were underserved by bank branches. The growth of P2P lending is slower in counties with high bank concentration and this factor is the most robust, stable over time and economically important in our study. Counties with lower population density, lower share of educated and young people experience lower growth of P2P lending, consistent with the hypothesis that learning costs deter the entry of new entrants.

Review of Network Economics, 2017

When a consumer pays by card, the merchant’s bank pays to the consumer’s bank an interchange fee.... more When a consumer pays by card, the merchant’s bank pays to the consumer’s bank an interchange fee. In this article, we construct a general model of a card platform that unifies the literature on interchange fees. We enrich the existing frameworks by analyzing the choice of the interchange fee when consumer demand is elastic to retail prices. We show that the difference between the privately set structure of payment card fees and the socially optimal one depends both on banks’ and merchants’ pass-through of their costs to consumers. We argue that the maturity of the payment card market impacts the redistributive effects of interchange fees (i.e. between consumers and merchants, card and cash users) and therefore, their optimal regulation.

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015

Over the recent years, the development of Internet banking and mobile banking has had a considera... more Over the recent years, the development of Internet banking and mobile banking has had a considerable impact on competition in the retail banking industry. In some countries, the regulatory framework has been adapted to allow non-banks to operate in retail payments and compete with banks for deposits. Several platforms or large retailers have started to offer innovative financial products to their customers. In this paper, we survey the issues related to innovation and competition in Internet banking and mobile banking and discuss some perspectives for future research.

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015

In several industries, merchants have the choice to offer add-on services to consumers either the... more In several industries, merchants have the choice to offer add-on services to consumers either themselves or through a platform. In this paper, we analyze whether a platform has an incentive to impose exclusive contracts to merchants when the latter can bundle an add-on service to a primary product and compete with the platform. We show that the platform never imposes exclusive contracts when the maximum value that consumers assign to the primary product is high. When the maximum value of the primary product decreases, the platform trades off between increasing consumer demand by offering exclusive contracts and increasing merchants' acceptance of its service by offering non exclusive contracts.

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014

Over the recent years, the development of mobile banking and Internet banking has had a considera... more Over the recent years, the development of mobile banking and Internet banking has had a considerable impact on competition in the retail banking industry. In some countries, the regulatory framework has been adapted to allow non-banks to operate in retail payments and compete with banks for deposits. Several Internet Service Providers or large retailers have started to offer innovative financial products to their customers. In this paper, we analyse how the industrial organization literature can be used to study recent innovations in retail banking and discuss some perspectives for future research.

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014

Payment platforms o¤er intermediation services to consumers and merchants that interact on a prod... more Payment platforms o¤er intermediation services to consumers and merchants that interact on a product market. The merchant's bank (the acquirer) usually pays an interchange fee to the consumer's bank (the issuer) that impacts the allocation of the total transaction fee between consumers and merchants. This paper studies whether a monopolistic payment platform chooses an interchange fee that exceeds the socially optimal one when there is "double internalization". We refer to "double internalization" as a situation in which both consumers and merchants internalize a fraction of the other side's net costs of transacting on the platform. We show that double internalization may occur when the interchange fee is no longer neutral on the product market and compare the pro…t-maximizing interchange fee to the welfare-maximizing one.

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016

Peer-to-peer lending platforms are online intermediaries that match lenders with borrowers. We us... more Peer-to-peer lending platforms are online intermediaries that match lenders with borrowers. We use data from the two leading P2P consumer lending platforms, Prosper and Lending Club, to explore main drivers of their expansion in the United States. We exploit the heterogeneity in local credit markets at the county level to analyze three hypotheses for the penetration of online lenders: 1) crisis-related; 2) competition-related; and 3) innovation-related. Our findings support the crisis-related and competition-related hypothesis, as lending platforms have expended more to counties with overleveraged banks and lower density of branch network. At the same time, lending platforms have difficulty penetrating countries with high bank concentration. We also document that spatial, socioeconomic and demographic characteristics determine the expansion of online lenders.

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2020

In several industries, merchants have the choice to offer add-on services to consumers either the... more In several industries, merchants have the choice to offer add-on services to consumers either themselves or through a platform. In this paper, we analyze whether a platform has an incentive to impose exclusive contracts to merchants when the latter can bundle an add-on service to a primary product and compete with the platform. We show that the platform never imposes exclusive contracts when the maximum value that consumers assign to the primary product is high. When the maximum value of the primary product decreases, the platform trades off between increasing consumer demand by offering exclusive contracts and increasing merchants' acceptance of its service by offering non exclusive contracts.

Over the recent years, the development of Internet banking and mobile banking has had a considera... more Over the recent years, the development of Internet banking and mobile banking has had a considerable impact on competition in the retail banking industry. In some countries, the regulatory framework has been adapted to allow non-banks to operate in retail payments and compete with banks for deposits. Several platforms or large retailers have started to offer innovative financial products to their customers. In this paper, we survey the issues related to innovation and competition in Internet banking and mobile banking and discuss some perspectives for future research.

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2014

Social Science Research Network, 2016

Peer-to-peer lending marketplaces are a phenomenon in great expansion in the USA and Europe. Thes... more Peer-to-peer lending marketplaces are a phenomenon in great expansion in the USA and Europe. These Online platforms build an example of two-sided market as they try to attract and match lenders and borrowers, while facing the trade-off between increasing the volume of intermediated transactions and minimizing the risks. In this article, we provide a descriptive analysis on the competitive strategies used by these platforms, in a two-sided market environment, and we try to find whether these two platforms differentiate from each other or from banks. To provide evidence on this comparison, we exploit data obtained by Prosper and LendingClub websites, the two leading peer-to-peer lending platforms in the USA, for the years 2006-2013 in the case of Prosper, while for LendingClub they are for the years 2007 until 2014. We deduce that these platforms are substitutes with one another and that they are frontally competing.

L’industrie de la finance a connu une multiplication d’innovations qui peuvent bouleverser les se... more L’industrie de la finance a connu une multiplication d’innovations qui peuvent bouleverser les services financiers traditionnels. Elles brouillent les frontieres entre banques et start-ups, accelererent les transactions, democratisent l'acces au credit, tout en imposant aux regulateurs le defi de construire un cadre reglementaire qui reequilibre le compromis entre stabilite financiere, concurrence innovation.Dans cette these, d'abord je reponds a cette question : comment les innovations influencent-elles la concurrence dans la banque de detail ? Un premier enjeu consiste a comprendre pourquoi certains de ces services innovants sont offerts par les plateformes non-bancaires, et comment les banques peuvent rivaliser avec des participants qui appliquent un modele d'affaire different. Apres, je regarde quels sont les facteurs d’adoption de l'innovation par les consommateurs. Pour repondre a cette question, j'etudie a l'aide d'outils d'analyse empirique l&...

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014

Competition law journal, 2022

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, Nov 25, 2015

Over the recent years, the development of Internet banking and mobile banking has had a considera... more Over the recent years, the development of Internet banking and mobile banking has had a considerable impact on competition in the retail banking industry. In some countries, the regulatory framework has been adapted to allow non-banks to operate in retail payments and compete with banks for deposits. Several platforms or large retailers have started to offer innovative financial products to their customers. In this paper, we survey the issues related to innovation and competition in Internet banking and mobile banking and discuss some perspectives for future research.

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Research Series, 2015

Payment platforms o¤er intermediation services to consumers and merchants that interact on a prod... more Payment platforms o¤er intermediation services to consumers and merchants that interact on a product market. The merchant’s bank (the acquirer) usually pays an interchange fee to the consumer’s bank (the issuer) that impacts the allocation of the total transaction fee between consumers and merchants. This paper studies whether a monopolistic payment platform chooses an interchange fee that exceeds the socially optimal one when there is "double internalization". We refer to "double internalization" as a situation in which both consumers and merchants internalize a fraction of the other side’s net costs of transacting on the platform. We show that double internalization may occur when the interchange fee is no longer neutral on the product market and compare the pro…t-maximizing interchange fee to the welfare-maximizing one.

Review of Network Economics, 2020

We use data from the two leading US platforms, Prosper and Lending Club, to explore the drivers o... more We use data from the two leading US platforms, Prosper and Lending Club, to explore the drivers of the growing consumer demand for peer-to-peer (P2P) credit. Despite the online nature of new entrants, we rely on the spatial autoregressive model because spatial effects play an important role. Our findings suggest that the initial growth of P2P lending was spurred by the global financial crisis, but its growth after 2011 occurred in counties that were underserved by bank branches. The growth of P2P lending is slower in counties with high bank concentration and this factor is the most robust, stable over time and economically important in our study. Counties with lower population density, lower share of educated and young people experience lower growth of P2P lending, consistent with the hypothesis that learning costs deter the entry of new entrants.

Review of Network Economics, 2017

When a consumer pays by card, the merchant’s bank pays to the consumer’s bank an interchange fee.... more When a consumer pays by card, the merchant’s bank pays to the consumer’s bank an interchange fee. In this article, we construct a general model of a card platform that unifies the literature on interchange fees. We enrich the existing frameworks by analyzing the choice of the interchange fee when consumer demand is elastic to retail prices. We show that the difference between the privately set structure of payment card fees and the socially optimal one depends both on banks’ and merchants’ pass-through of their costs to consumers. We argue that the maturity of the payment card market impacts the redistributive effects of interchange fees (i.e. between consumers and merchants, card and cash users) and therefore, their optimal regulation.

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015

Over the recent years, the development of Internet banking and mobile banking has had a considera... more Over the recent years, the development of Internet banking and mobile banking has had a considerable impact on competition in the retail banking industry. In some countries, the regulatory framework has been adapted to allow non-banks to operate in retail payments and compete with banks for deposits. Several platforms or large retailers have started to offer innovative financial products to their customers. In this paper, we survey the issues related to innovation and competition in Internet banking and mobile banking and discuss some perspectives for future research.

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015

In several industries, merchants have the choice to offer add-on services to consumers either the... more In several industries, merchants have the choice to offer add-on services to consumers either themselves or through a platform. In this paper, we analyze whether a platform has an incentive to impose exclusive contracts to merchants when the latter can bundle an add-on service to a primary product and compete with the platform. We show that the platform never imposes exclusive contracts when the maximum value that consumers assign to the primary product is high. When the maximum value of the primary product decreases, the platform trades off between increasing consumer demand by offering exclusive contracts and increasing merchants' acceptance of its service by offering non exclusive contracts.

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014

Over the recent years, the development of mobile banking and Internet banking has had a considera... more Over the recent years, the development of mobile banking and Internet banking has had a considerable impact on competition in the retail banking industry. In some countries, the regulatory framework has been adapted to allow non-banks to operate in retail payments and compete with banks for deposits. Several Internet Service Providers or large retailers have started to offer innovative financial products to their customers. In this paper, we analyse how the industrial organization literature can be used to study recent innovations in retail banking and discuss some perspectives for future research.

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014

Payment platforms o¤er intermediation services to consumers and merchants that interact on a prod... more Payment platforms o¤er intermediation services to consumers and merchants that interact on a product market. The merchant's bank (the acquirer) usually pays an interchange fee to the consumer's bank (the issuer) that impacts the allocation of the total transaction fee between consumers and merchants. This paper studies whether a monopolistic payment platform chooses an interchange fee that exceeds the socially optimal one when there is "double internalization". We refer to "double internalization" as a situation in which both consumers and merchants internalize a fraction of the other side's net costs of transacting on the platform. We show that double internalization may occur when the interchange fee is no longer neutral on the product market and compare the pro…t-maximizing interchange fee to the welfare-maximizing one.

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016

Peer-to-peer lending platforms are online intermediaries that match lenders with borrowers. We us... more Peer-to-peer lending platforms are online intermediaries that match lenders with borrowers. We use data from the two leading P2P consumer lending platforms, Prosper and Lending Club, to explore main drivers of their expansion in the United States. We exploit the heterogeneity in local credit markets at the county level to analyze three hypotheses for the penetration of online lenders: 1) crisis-related; 2) competition-related; and 3) innovation-related. Our findings support the crisis-related and competition-related hypothesis, as lending platforms have expended more to counties with overleveraged banks and lower density of branch network. At the same time, lending platforms have difficulty penetrating countries with high bank concentration. We also document that spatial, socioeconomic and demographic characteristics determine the expansion of online lenders.

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2020

In several industries, merchants have the choice to offer add-on services to consumers either the... more In several industries, merchants have the choice to offer add-on services to consumers either themselves or through a platform. In this paper, we analyze whether a platform has an incentive to impose exclusive contracts to merchants when the latter can bundle an add-on service to a primary product and compete with the platform. We show that the platform never imposes exclusive contracts when the maximum value that consumers assign to the primary product is high. When the maximum value of the primary product decreases, the platform trades off between increasing consumer demand by offering exclusive contracts and increasing merchants' acceptance of its service by offering non exclusive contracts.