Chris J Flaherty - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by Chris J Flaherty

none, 2023

This overview looks at three technology examples that can independently create energy for use, an... more This overview looks at three technology examples that can independently create energy for use, and change the fundamentals of Military Energy Geography: how Human military activity is spread over the landscape, by using: (1) Mobile Nuclear Power Plant; (2) Robotic Mule; (3) Space-Based Solar Laser System Transferring Power onto the Earth’s Surface, creating Multiple Mobile Independent Energy Clusters supporting highly distributed Electrified Military Forces over a Hyperextended Battlefront.

Http Dx Doi Org 10 1080 14443058909386993, May 18, 2009

Lecture Notes in Energy, 2013

The economic approach to energy security tends to be descriptive and frequently concerned with ... more The economic approach to energy security tends to be descriptive and
frequently concerned with the price and supply measures of energy security.
Approaches such as these, however, are not connected with the much broader
national security and foreign relations policy realms. As well, the national security
approach to energy security allows incorporation with Critical National Infrastruc-
ture Protection (CNIP) concepts, such as 3D vulnerability analysis. This method
can be used to collect physical infrastructure vulnerability information, which can
be used to identify potential threats to energy security (as a subset of national
security).

none

Small Drone Warfare Fundamentals – has been written to help interested but inexpert readers under... more Small Drone Warfare Fundamentals – has been written to help interested but inexpert readers understand the tactical fundamentals of small drone warfare on the battlefield. Part of a broader project to address the current gap between Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) on small drone uses in current warfare; and how many in the community and military may have limited exposure, education, or experience in small drone uses on the battlefield.
Written with a view to bridge the gap in understanding small drone uses on the battlefield capabilities in the current Ukrainian War Ecosystem, which are viewed as overly technical, or too complex issues underpinning small drone uses; or are specifically classified to discuss openly in public, which limits a broader understanding of the warfighting fundamentals involved.

OODA, 2012

This research monograph - Dangerous Minds, examines the relationship between the individual belie... more This research monograph - Dangerous Minds, examines the relationship between the individual beliefs, behaviours, and tactics of an attacker. It was developed out of work, following human factors research for a ‘Scripted Agent Based Microsimulation Project’, which is currently being developed at the University of Wollongong (NSW, Australia). Another contributing factor to the development of this research monograph has been discussion posts on the GroupIntel Network.

none

This paper looks at Infantry Drone Units' organization and roles that have developed organically ... more This paper looks at Infantry Drone Units' organization and roles that have developed organically in the war in Ukraine ecosystem as a response to emerging use of the technology. In 2018, it was anticipated, "a future possibility for lone combatants on foot to operate one or possible more small UAVs as an extension of his or her own means to combat an opponent." 1 In a recent report about United States Army soldiers from the 1st Squadron War Eagles (2nd Cavalry Regiment), the Human factors element in the emerging use of drones is central to using the technology: "Our soldiers are observing trends on the battlefield. They're then seeing where we have capability gaps, and they're finding low-cost solutions to innovate" 2. The type of role change in basic Infantry skills, are: "Our soldiers are 3D printing, they're doing basic soldering, they're doing basic coding using code like Python or C++ to create low-cost solutions to tactical problems they are seeing" 3. In a recent interview with an Escadrone spokesman 4 , they stated: "FPV kamikaze is about pilots, not about drones" 5. This is because: "using an FPV drone effectively requires considerable skill … flying an FPV drone is not so hard. But if you want to use it like a weapon, you have train for a month … because it's very difficult to hit a moving target at high speed." 6 It should be noted, while Human factors are a key element in the use of drones, there is also an emerging substitution with Artificial Intelligence with this entity standing-in for the Human pilot. In comparison to a United States Switchblade 300 drone, "it can lock on to moving targets and track them automatically" 7. The same technology may reach FPV kamikazes drones soon, "thanks to new AI chips for drones, but at present it is down to operator skill" 8 .

none, 2024

This paper looks at the application of Information Intensified Combat Methods, and Acupuncture St... more This paper looks at the application of Information Intensified Combat Methods, and Acupuncture Strategy to conducting Orbital Warfare. Information Intensified Combat Methods effectively become greater Space Situational Awareness-Space Domain Awareness, which is essential for specifically identifying opponent satellites to target. The attack method, follows the Acupuncture Strategy model using grappling satellites with robotic arms, in Rendezvous Operations with uncooperative target satellites. The actual attack methodology is a Co-Orbital Antisatellite Weapons attack that can deliver an 'acupuncture prick' from an intrusive probe disabling the opponent satellite. In this paper, ground (or air launched) to space Antisatellite missiles is not considered. Currently, "the People's Republic of China, Russia, India, and the United States have tested Antisatellite missiles capable of reaching Low Earth Orbit." 1 While these weapons have dominated space war concepts, these can be bracketed between two events, beginning in 1985, when the United States used its ASM-135A to destroy a real satellite, and 2021, when Kosmos 1408 was successfully destroyed by a Russian Antisatellite missile. Debris created by this weapon use establishes a lingering space threat to all. This may signal ultimate redundancy, except where a rogue state, or extremist entity is concerned, who seek to deny space access and use, as they have little use for it themselves. CHANG MENGXIONG THEOREM In the 1990s, Chang Mengxiong, "a noted Chinese military theorist" 2 , was considered a leading advocate for China's rapid pursuit of information warfare capabilities 3. Mengxiong commenting on 'information-intensified' combat methods, likened these to-"A Chinese boxer with a knowledge of vital body points who can bring an opponent to his knees with a minimum of movement. By contrast, noninformation-intensified combat methods are like fights between villagers in which heads are broken and blood flows, but it is hard to distinguish the winner from the loser." 4 Using the analogy of acupuncture for fighting an Information Intensified Combat the objective is to use a specific strike against a mega-infrastructure site, such that the whole operation of the site is disrupted. In order for the small-scale attack to

Australian Army Journal, 2003

In the 21st century, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) cannot afford to ignore the role that mim... more In the 21st century, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) cannot afford to ignore the role that mimicry will play in contemporary conflict, particularly in unconventional or asymmetric warfare.

Journal of Australian Studies, May 1, 1989

... cit., John Masefield, Gallipoli, London, 1916; E Ashmead-Bartlett, Three Impressions', i... more ... cit., John Masefield, Gallipoli, London, 1916; E Ashmead-Bartlett, Three Impressions', in the All-Australia Memorial, Melbourne, 1920. ... For (mostly) plain diction, see Gammage, The Broken Years, 1974,passim; Patsy Adam-Smith, The Anzacs, Melbourne, 1979, chaps 10, 12, 13 ...

none, 2024

The Land-Centric view of Ukraine's strategy measures success in terms of simple transactional ter... more The Land-Centric view of Ukraine's strategy measures success in terms of simple transactional terms of occupied land seizure-this is a fundamental mistake. The Ukrainian 2024 Active Defence Mode, achieves three strategic outcomes: (1) It ties-down significantly larger Russian Ground Forces conventionally amassing attempting a breakthrough at a perceived weak point at the Line of Contact. ◄ Current Ukrainian Deep Battle Model fought in the context of Modern Positional Warfare (Zaluzhnyi, 2023), and the 2024 Active Defence Mode. Russian Ground Forces amass to breakthrough at a decisive point in the Ukrainian Line of Contact, and drive into a Killing Ground, where Ukrainian Forces enjoy drone dominance of the Immediate Airspace Above the Killing Ground (an Overhead Attack Surface), sandwiching Russian Ground Forces between two attack surfaces (the ground surface is saturated with mines). Simultaneously longrange artillery strike key targets deep within Russian rear echelons destroying artillery, air defence, communications, command and logistics organization. Ukrainian Partisan Activity Ukrainian Naval Drones warfare and strikes on Russian ports functionally defeats the Black Sea Fleet and opens access to the Black Sea. Russian Black Sea Fleet retreats Mid-range air, artillery, drone, and rocket attacks: Long-range air and missile strikes: Russian Logistics Centre Overhead Attack Surface KZ

none, 2023

Current Ukrainian Deep Battle Model fought in the context of Modern Positional Warfare, and the A... more Current Ukrainian Deep Battle Model fought in the context of Modern Positional Warfare, and the Active Defence Mode.

none, 2019

MASS OR LARGE-SCALE PARADE SECURITY: An Overview. The object of this study is to look at mass or ... more MASS OR LARGE-SCALE PARADE SECURITY: An Overview. The object of this study is to look at mass or large-scale parade security. Few publicly available guidance on public security specifically focus on parades. As commonly, parades are dealt with as a sub-set of mass gatherings, and the overwhelming focus is on event management issues.

none, 2023

‘Caught in the Sandwich Battle’ looks at the notion of an opponent land force trapped between two... more ‘Caught in the Sandwich Battle’ looks at the notion of an opponent land force trapped between two Attack Surfaces: (1) traditional Ground Surface; and, (2) an emergent plane of activity in the Immediate Airspace overlaying the Ground Surface, dominated by swarming and searching drones. Effectively what takes place is the basic geometry of traditional warfighting changes from a Proximity Battlefront on a piece of geography that an opponent is approaching, encountering tactical offensive, defensive or resistance from the other opponent, to where both opponents are traversing between two corresponding planes, with an airgap less than 1,000 meters, representing typical combat drone flying altitudes; this turns the Traditional 2D Proximity Battlefront into a 3D Combat Box, in which combat between opponent forces occur.

none, 2024

Ukraine establishing in 2024 a New Drone Army Service, and implementation of a large force on the... more Ukraine establishing in 2024 a New Drone Army Service, and implementation of a large force on the battlefield who fight their opponent with thousands of small weapon carrying drones with First Person View Capabilities represents a revolution in Battlefield View. That revolution is a radical shift from distant, and area shots viewed from an Observers’ Position, to where the Observer wearing goggles technology, can bring at the same time, at the same close-in distance, both Foreground and Background Battlefield Views.

none, 2024

This paper looks at Infantry Drone Units' organization and roles that have developed organically ... more This paper looks at Infantry Drone Units' organization and roles that have developed organically in the war in Ukraine ecosystem as a response to emerging use of the technology. In 2018, it was anticipated, "a future possibility for lone combatants on foot to operate one or possible more small UAVs as an extension of his or her own means to combat an opponent." 1 In a recent report about United States Army soldiers from the 1st Squadron War Eagles (2nd Cavalry Regiment), the Human factors element in the emerging use of drones is central to using the technology: "Our soldiers are observing trends on the battlefield. They're then seeing where we have capability gaps, and they're finding low-cost solutions to innovate" 2. The type of role change in basic Infantry skills, are: "Our soldiers are 3D printing, they're doing basic soldering, they're doing basic coding using code like Python or C++ to create low-cost solutions to tactical problems they are seeing" 3. In a recent interview with an Escadrone spokesman 4 , they stated: "FPV kamikaze is about pilots, not about drones" 5. This is because: "using an FPV drone effectively requires considerable skill … flying an FPV drone is not so hard. But if you want to use it like a weapon, you have train for a month … because it's very difficult to hit a moving target at high speed." 6 It should be noted, while Human factors are a key element in the use of drones, there is also an emerging substitution with Artificial Intelligence with this entity standing-in for the Human pilot. In comparison to a United States Switchblade 300 drone, "it can lock on to moving targets and track them automatically" 7. The same technology may reach FPV kamikazes drones soon, "thanks to new AI chips for drones, but at present it is down to operator skill" 8 .

none, 2024

Machine Gun Sub-Team(s) operate drone vehicle carrying a gun, and ISR drone. Platoon Leader(s) & ... more Machine Gun Sub-Team(s) operate drone vehicle carrying a gun, and ISR drone. Platoon Leader(s) & Communications operates an ISR & decoy drones.

none, 2024

This overview looks at how the generic infantry rifle platoon could be converted into a tactical ... more This overview looks at how the generic infantry rifle platoon could be converted into a tactical entity that exclusively uses drones as their personal weapons. The premise of this overview-we are seeing an epoch changing increase in infantry lethality in the war in Ukraine, not unlike other rapid historical transitions that increased firepower lethality, such as Prussian's needleguns use at the Battle of Königgrätz (1866), or Turkish use of Winchester repeaters, Peabody-Martini rifles, and Gatling guns at the Siege of Plevna (1877), where the opponent suffers the shock of firepower, suffering inordinate levels of casualties in a relatively short period of time. The level of disruptive change: "[is] … reminiscent of the gradual force structure shift between the proportion of medieval 'pike' to modern 'shot' in Early Modern armies, eventually advanced technology replaces the legacy artifacts that had been the mainstay of warfare" 1. ▼ A generic infantry platoon consists of a combination of rifle and machine gun sub-teams led by its platoon leader, and sub-officers, with communications and medical support.

Teaching Documents by Chris J Flaherty

none, 2024

Ground Forces Small Drone Defensive Theory is based on the notion Drones rhizome manoeuvre over b... more Ground Forces Small Drone Defensive Theory is based on the notion Drones rhizome manoeuvre over battlespace using terrain advantages reaching their target by ‘indirect approaches’. Effectively drones achieve in the immediate airspace above an opponent all-round attack options on multiple surreptitious vectors. The opponent’s defence option is to centrally place a firepower/laser weapon to that can cover 360o on the plain, and 180o spherically.

none, 2023

This overview looks at three technology examples that can independently create energy for use, an... more This overview looks at three technology examples that can independently create energy for use, and change the fundamentals of Military Energy Geography: how Human military activity is spread over the landscape, by using: (1) Mobile Nuclear Power Plant; (2) Robotic Mule; (3) Space-Based Solar Laser System Transferring Power onto the Earth’s Surface, creating Multiple Mobile Independent Energy Clusters supporting highly distributed Electrified Military Forces over a Hyperextended Battlefront.

Http Dx Doi Org 10 1080 14443058909386993, May 18, 2009

Lecture Notes in Energy, 2013

The economic approach to energy security tends to be descriptive and frequently concerned with ... more The economic approach to energy security tends to be descriptive and
frequently concerned with the price and supply measures of energy security.
Approaches such as these, however, are not connected with the much broader
national security and foreign relations policy realms. As well, the national security
approach to energy security allows incorporation with Critical National Infrastruc-
ture Protection (CNIP) concepts, such as 3D vulnerability analysis. This method
can be used to collect physical infrastructure vulnerability information, which can
be used to identify potential threats to energy security (as a subset of national
security).

none

Small Drone Warfare Fundamentals – has been written to help interested but inexpert readers under... more Small Drone Warfare Fundamentals – has been written to help interested but inexpert readers understand the tactical fundamentals of small drone warfare on the battlefield. Part of a broader project to address the current gap between Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) on small drone uses in current warfare; and how many in the community and military may have limited exposure, education, or experience in small drone uses on the battlefield.
Written with a view to bridge the gap in understanding small drone uses on the battlefield capabilities in the current Ukrainian War Ecosystem, which are viewed as overly technical, or too complex issues underpinning small drone uses; or are specifically classified to discuss openly in public, which limits a broader understanding of the warfighting fundamentals involved.

OODA, 2012

This research monograph - Dangerous Minds, examines the relationship between the individual belie... more This research monograph - Dangerous Minds, examines the relationship between the individual beliefs, behaviours, and tactics of an attacker. It was developed out of work, following human factors research for a ‘Scripted Agent Based Microsimulation Project’, which is currently being developed at the University of Wollongong (NSW, Australia). Another contributing factor to the development of this research monograph has been discussion posts on the GroupIntel Network.

none

This paper looks at Infantry Drone Units' organization and roles that have developed organically ... more This paper looks at Infantry Drone Units' organization and roles that have developed organically in the war in Ukraine ecosystem as a response to emerging use of the technology. In 2018, it was anticipated, "a future possibility for lone combatants on foot to operate one or possible more small UAVs as an extension of his or her own means to combat an opponent." 1 In a recent report about United States Army soldiers from the 1st Squadron War Eagles (2nd Cavalry Regiment), the Human factors element in the emerging use of drones is central to using the technology: "Our soldiers are observing trends on the battlefield. They're then seeing where we have capability gaps, and they're finding low-cost solutions to innovate" 2. The type of role change in basic Infantry skills, are: "Our soldiers are 3D printing, they're doing basic soldering, they're doing basic coding using code like Python or C++ to create low-cost solutions to tactical problems they are seeing" 3. In a recent interview with an Escadrone spokesman 4 , they stated: "FPV kamikaze is about pilots, not about drones" 5. This is because: "using an FPV drone effectively requires considerable skill … flying an FPV drone is not so hard. But if you want to use it like a weapon, you have train for a month … because it's very difficult to hit a moving target at high speed." 6 It should be noted, while Human factors are a key element in the use of drones, there is also an emerging substitution with Artificial Intelligence with this entity standing-in for the Human pilot. In comparison to a United States Switchblade 300 drone, "it can lock on to moving targets and track them automatically" 7. The same technology may reach FPV kamikazes drones soon, "thanks to new AI chips for drones, but at present it is down to operator skill" 8 .

none, 2024

This paper looks at the application of Information Intensified Combat Methods, and Acupuncture St... more This paper looks at the application of Information Intensified Combat Methods, and Acupuncture Strategy to conducting Orbital Warfare. Information Intensified Combat Methods effectively become greater Space Situational Awareness-Space Domain Awareness, which is essential for specifically identifying opponent satellites to target. The attack method, follows the Acupuncture Strategy model using grappling satellites with robotic arms, in Rendezvous Operations with uncooperative target satellites. The actual attack methodology is a Co-Orbital Antisatellite Weapons attack that can deliver an 'acupuncture prick' from an intrusive probe disabling the opponent satellite. In this paper, ground (or air launched) to space Antisatellite missiles is not considered. Currently, "the People's Republic of China, Russia, India, and the United States have tested Antisatellite missiles capable of reaching Low Earth Orbit." 1 While these weapons have dominated space war concepts, these can be bracketed between two events, beginning in 1985, when the United States used its ASM-135A to destroy a real satellite, and 2021, when Kosmos 1408 was successfully destroyed by a Russian Antisatellite missile. Debris created by this weapon use establishes a lingering space threat to all. This may signal ultimate redundancy, except where a rogue state, or extremist entity is concerned, who seek to deny space access and use, as they have little use for it themselves. CHANG MENGXIONG THEOREM In the 1990s, Chang Mengxiong, "a noted Chinese military theorist" 2 , was considered a leading advocate for China's rapid pursuit of information warfare capabilities 3. Mengxiong commenting on 'information-intensified' combat methods, likened these to-"A Chinese boxer with a knowledge of vital body points who can bring an opponent to his knees with a minimum of movement. By contrast, noninformation-intensified combat methods are like fights between villagers in which heads are broken and blood flows, but it is hard to distinguish the winner from the loser." 4 Using the analogy of acupuncture for fighting an Information Intensified Combat the objective is to use a specific strike against a mega-infrastructure site, such that the whole operation of the site is disrupted. In order for the small-scale attack to

Australian Army Journal, 2003

In the 21st century, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) cannot afford to ignore the role that mim... more In the 21st century, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) cannot afford to ignore the role that mimicry will play in contemporary conflict, particularly in unconventional or asymmetric warfare.

Journal of Australian Studies, May 1, 1989

... cit., John Masefield, Gallipoli, London, 1916; E Ashmead-Bartlett, Three Impressions', i... more ... cit., John Masefield, Gallipoli, London, 1916; E Ashmead-Bartlett, Three Impressions', in the All-Australia Memorial, Melbourne, 1920. ... For (mostly) plain diction, see Gammage, The Broken Years, 1974,passim; Patsy Adam-Smith, The Anzacs, Melbourne, 1979, chaps 10, 12, 13 ...

none, 2024

The Land-Centric view of Ukraine's strategy measures success in terms of simple transactional ter... more The Land-Centric view of Ukraine's strategy measures success in terms of simple transactional terms of occupied land seizure-this is a fundamental mistake. The Ukrainian 2024 Active Defence Mode, achieves three strategic outcomes: (1) It ties-down significantly larger Russian Ground Forces conventionally amassing attempting a breakthrough at a perceived weak point at the Line of Contact. ◄ Current Ukrainian Deep Battle Model fought in the context of Modern Positional Warfare (Zaluzhnyi, 2023), and the 2024 Active Defence Mode. Russian Ground Forces amass to breakthrough at a decisive point in the Ukrainian Line of Contact, and drive into a Killing Ground, where Ukrainian Forces enjoy drone dominance of the Immediate Airspace Above the Killing Ground (an Overhead Attack Surface), sandwiching Russian Ground Forces between two attack surfaces (the ground surface is saturated with mines). Simultaneously longrange artillery strike key targets deep within Russian rear echelons destroying artillery, air defence, communications, command and logistics organization. Ukrainian Partisan Activity Ukrainian Naval Drones warfare and strikes on Russian ports functionally defeats the Black Sea Fleet and opens access to the Black Sea. Russian Black Sea Fleet retreats Mid-range air, artillery, drone, and rocket attacks: Long-range air and missile strikes: Russian Logistics Centre Overhead Attack Surface KZ

none, 2023

Current Ukrainian Deep Battle Model fought in the context of Modern Positional Warfare, and the A... more Current Ukrainian Deep Battle Model fought in the context of Modern Positional Warfare, and the Active Defence Mode.

none, 2019

MASS OR LARGE-SCALE PARADE SECURITY: An Overview. The object of this study is to look at mass or ... more MASS OR LARGE-SCALE PARADE SECURITY: An Overview. The object of this study is to look at mass or large-scale parade security. Few publicly available guidance on public security specifically focus on parades. As commonly, parades are dealt with as a sub-set of mass gatherings, and the overwhelming focus is on event management issues.

none, 2023

‘Caught in the Sandwich Battle’ looks at the notion of an opponent land force trapped between two... more ‘Caught in the Sandwich Battle’ looks at the notion of an opponent land force trapped between two Attack Surfaces: (1) traditional Ground Surface; and, (2) an emergent plane of activity in the Immediate Airspace overlaying the Ground Surface, dominated by swarming and searching drones. Effectively what takes place is the basic geometry of traditional warfighting changes from a Proximity Battlefront on a piece of geography that an opponent is approaching, encountering tactical offensive, defensive or resistance from the other opponent, to where both opponents are traversing between two corresponding planes, with an airgap less than 1,000 meters, representing typical combat drone flying altitudes; this turns the Traditional 2D Proximity Battlefront into a 3D Combat Box, in which combat between opponent forces occur.

none, 2024

Ukraine establishing in 2024 a New Drone Army Service, and implementation of a large force on the... more Ukraine establishing in 2024 a New Drone Army Service, and implementation of a large force on the battlefield who fight their opponent with thousands of small weapon carrying drones with First Person View Capabilities represents a revolution in Battlefield View. That revolution is a radical shift from distant, and area shots viewed from an Observers’ Position, to where the Observer wearing goggles technology, can bring at the same time, at the same close-in distance, both Foreground and Background Battlefield Views.

none, 2024

This paper looks at Infantry Drone Units' organization and roles that have developed organically ... more This paper looks at Infantry Drone Units' organization and roles that have developed organically in the war in Ukraine ecosystem as a response to emerging use of the technology. In 2018, it was anticipated, "a future possibility for lone combatants on foot to operate one or possible more small UAVs as an extension of his or her own means to combat an opponent." 1 In a recent report about United States Army soldiers from the 1st Squadron War Eagles (2nd Cavalry Regiment), the Human factors element in the emerging use of drones is central to using the technology: "Our soldiers are observing trends on the battlefield. They're then seeing where we have capability gaps, and they're finding low-cost solutions to innovate" 2. The type of role change in basic Infantry skills, are: "Our soldiers are 3D printing, they're doing basic soldering, they're doing basic coding using code like Python or C++ to create low-cost solutions to tactical problems they are seeing" 3. In a recent interview with an Escadrone spokesman 4 , they stated: "FPV kamikaze is about pilots, not about drones" 5. This is because: "using an FPV drone effectively requires considerable skill … flying an FPV drone is not so hard. But if you want to use it like a weapon, you have train for a month … because it's very difficult to hit a moving target at high speed." 6 It should be noted, while Human factors are a key element in the use of drones, there is also an emerging substitution with Artificial Intelligence with this entity standing-in for the Human pilot. In comparison to a United States Switchblade 300 drone, "it can lock on to moving targets and track them automatically" 7. The same technology may reach FPV kamikazes drones soon, "thanks to new AI chips for drones, but at present it is down to operator skill" 8 .

none, 2024

Machine Gun Sub-Team(s) operate drone vehicle carrying a gun, and ISR drone. Platoon Leader(s) & ... more Machine Gun Sub-Team(s) operate drone vehicle carrying a gun, and ISR drone. Platoon Leader(s) & Communications operates an ISR & decoy drones.

none, 2024

This overview looks at how the generic infantry rifle platoon could be converted into a tactical ... more This overview looks at how the generic infantry rifle platoon could be converted into a tactical entity that exclusively uses drones as their personal weapons. The premise of this overview-we are seeing an epoch changing increase in infantry lethality in the war in Ukraine, not unlike other rapid historical transitions that increased firepower lethality, such as Prussian's needleguns use at the Battle of Königgrätz (1866), or Turkish use of Winchester repeaters, Peabody-Martini rifles, and Gatling guns at the Siege of Plevna (1877), where the opponent suffers the shock of firepower, suffering inordinate levels of casualties in a relatively short period of time. The level of disruptive change: "[is] … reminiscent of the gradual force structure shift between the proportion of medieval 'pike' to modern 'shot' in Early Modern armies, eventually advanced technology replaces the legacy artifacts that had been the mainstay of warfare" 1. ▼ A generic infantry platoon consists of a combination of rifle and machine gun sub-teams led by its platoon leader, and sub-officers, with communications and medical support.

none, 2024

Ground Forces Small Drone Defensive Theory is based on the notion Drones rhizome manoeuvre over b... more Ground Forces Small Drone Defensive Theory is based on the notion Drones rhizome manoeuvre over battlespace using terrain advantages reaching their target by ‘indirect approaches’. Effectively drones achieve in the immediate airspace above an opponent all-round attack options on multiple surreptitious vectors. The opponent’s defence option is to centrally place a firepower/laser weapon to that can cover 360o on the plain, and 180o spherically.

none, 2024

Modelling potential tactics using various types of drone technologies currently exhibited in Ukra... more Modelling potential tactics using various types of drone technologies currently exhibited in Ukrainian War Ecosystem applied to an attack scenario on a River Bridging Attempt by Opponent Forces, some 7-Point Drone Attack Vectors can be identified: (1) Attack from upstream by surface drone flotilla; (2) Attack from downstream by surface drone flotilla; (3) Underwater attack by submerged drones; (4) Drone air attack and maraud over Opponent’s own-side of the river crossing; (5) Air drone maraud-attack over crossing; (6) Air drone maraud-attack over opposite bank where Opponent forces are leaving the bridge; (7) Ground drone attack with mine laying/heavy weapons fire.

none, 2024

The following model is a tabletop re-analysis of various possible components based on Open-Source... more The following model is a tabletop re-analysis of various possible components based on Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) on small drone uses in current warfare using a November 2023 case study of a Russian Infantry Assault on a Ukrainian Position Supported by FPV Drones in the Priyutny District.

none, 2024

As a result, of the war in Ukraine, Ukrainian Forces and potentially the Russian Army, may develo... more As a result, of the war in Ukraine, Ukrainian Forces and potentially the Russian Army, may develop drone use technology to the point, where pilots can radically ‘displace’ the kill zone they can create, with sustained weaponized drone coverage in a number a dynamic directions from Concealed-Covered-Protected positions well-off the immediate battlefield. So much so, an opponent under fire will have little sense as to where is the attack’s point of origin. Effectively, combat power is expressed in terms of deploying rhizome manoeuvring drones as the main weapon to deliver firepower, that can be ‘thrown’ in a multiplicity of directions, like a ventriloquist throws their voice fooling someone.