Christopher Mirus - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by Christopher Mirus

Review of Metaphysics, Nov 1, 2013

ARISTOTLE TWICE STATES, as a general truth, that being is better than nonbeing. (1) Throughout hi... more ARISTOTLE TWICE STATES, as a general truth, that being is better than nonbeing. (1) Throughout his works, moreover, the goodness of beings frequently depends on their completeness. This is not surprising, given the prominence of the complete in Aristotelian ethics, where "the best appears to be something complete," and in particular "the human good is activity of the soul according to excellence; and if there are several excellences, according to the best and most complete; and further, in a complete life." (2) Now the crucial term in this last statement is "activity," not "complete," for both inside and outside his ethics Aristotle associates the good with being in the primary sense of activity ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) or fulfillment [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. (3) Yet he seems to think that frequently, the genera] concepts of potency and act are neither necessary nor particularly appropriate for ethics or for natural science. As highly general terms of art, they tend to obscure the specific contours of the subject at hand. The complete ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) has a similar generality and flexibility--indeed, it is closely related to Aristotle's [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]--but even in translation it is somewhat less opaque. An ordinary, unpretentious notion, it can be applied helpfully to a variety of subjects without calling attention to itself. It is one of three central concepts--the determinate, the complete, and the self-sufficient--in terms of which he explores the goodness of the things that are. (4) Whether we wish to understand Aristotle's ethics, therefore, or to explore the idea of the good that animates his accounts of nature or of being as such, we may wish to have a synoptic view of what he means by the complete, and of what sorts of things qualify as complete and why. This would require: (1) surveying the completeness attained by natural substances--especially but not only living substances--in the normal course of their coming to be; (2) examining the contention that certain kinds of animal, and most likely of natural substance more generally, are more complete than others; (3) exploring his description of virtue or excellence as a completion; (4) investigating the claim that certain excellences are more complete than others; (5) understanding the completeness and incompleteness of various activities and motions. (5) Among these various tasks, the third has the advantage that it can be approached through the study of two key texts: the chapter on the complete in Metaphysics 5, Aristotle's philosophical lexicon, and a discussion of the ontology of excellence in Physics 7. In these texts Aristotle explores conceptual and ontological issues germane to a general concept of excellence; in both cases, the key premise is that excellence is best thought of as a completion. (6) His development of this claim draws on two larger themes. In Metaphysics 5, the concept of excellence as a completion belongs to a broad conceptual realm--explored in chapters 16-17 and 25-27--in which intelligible realities are presented metaphorically in terms of shape and size. Within this realm, excellence grows toward a limit set by the powers that make a substance what it is. (7) In the Physics, excellence belongs to a world structured by contraries and therefore also by coming to be and destruction. What it completes is a substance's power to negotiate such a world while maintaining and developing its own identity. (8) Having grown to full stature through its proper excellence, the substance can keep itself from being affected or altered in ways that would undermine its being; in so doing, it approximates the self-sufficient impassivity that Aristotle attributes to thought ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]). The themes of alteration and identity are also pursued in On the Soul 2.5, which provides an important complement to Physics 7.3. That excellences of the body and certain excellences of the soul merely imitate a kind of being that [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] exemplifies--namely, self-sufficient freedom from the conditions of bodily existence, and so also from alteration and from change in general--suggests that there will be an asymmetry between the excellence of the soul's thinking part and other sorts of excellence. …

Review of Metaphysics, Sep 1, 2015

FEREJOHN, Michael T. Formal Causes: Definition, Explanation, and Primacy in Socratic and Aristote... more FEREJOHN, Michael T. Formal Causes: Definition, Explanation, and Primacy in Socratic and Aristotelian Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. xii + 211pp. Cloth, $65.00--Two passages in the Metaphysics, 1.6.987bl-4 and 13.4.1087b22-30, comment on Socrates' concern with definitions. According to the second, "it was natural that Socrates should seek the essence. For he was seeking to deduce, and essence is the starting point of deduction." Echoing as it does Aristotle's own account of demonstration, this remark leads directly to the question of Professor Ferejohn's new book: What do Aristotle's philosophical and scientific methods owe to Socrates' interest in definitions? Ferejohn's argument unfolds in three stages: chapters one and two examine Plato's Socratic dialogues; chapters three and four take up what Ferejohn calls "canonical demonstration" in the Posterior Analytics-, and chapters five and six discuss Aristotle's subsequent philosophical development. In the first stage, Ferejohn argues that Socrates' interest in definitions emerges from his practical interest in testing those who laid claim to ethical wisdom. In Plato's dialogues, this testing leads Socrates in two stages to the invention of epistemology. The first stage occurs when, in the Laches for example, Socrates moves beyond asking whether this or that interlocutor can give an account of his alleged knowledge and begins wondering what might be required of anyone who claims to know. Ferejohn finds two necessary conditions of knowledge implicit in such "early" Socratic dialogues: knowledge requires being able to say what one is talking about (definition), and it requires being able to say why one's claims are true (explanation). These two conditions come together in the Euthyphro, where Socrates suggests that an adequate definition of piety would enable him to explain not only why certain actions are pious and others impious, but also why pious actions have certain other characteristics as well. The second stage in the invention of epistemology occurs in a later dialogue, the Meno, where Socrates provides for the first time an explicit analysis of knowledge. In the second stage, Ferejohn claims that the epistemology of the Posterior Analytics develops from reflection on the Meno's suggestion that knowledge is true belief with an explanatory account. First, Posterior Analytics 1.2-4 explores a series of requirements that demonstrative premises must meet if they are to ground knowledge; Aristotle takes these requirements to be met by definitions. Second, although Aristotle distinguishes four modes of explanation in Posterior Analytics 2. …

Notre Dame philosophical reviews, 2009

Review of Metaphysics, 2017

Review of Metaphysics, 2015

Beginning with Aristotle's statement in Physics II.2 that motion must be continuous to be for the... more Beginning with Aristotle's statement in Physics II.2 that motion must be continuous to be for the sake of an end, I argue that properly understood, continuity is actually a sufficient condition for the goaldirectedness of any motion in Aristotle's teleology. I establish this conclusion first for the simple motions discussed in Physics V-VI, and then for complex changes such as the generation and development of a living thing. In both steps of the argument, the notion of καθ' αυτό agency serves as a key link between continuity and goal-directedness. The understanding o f Aristotle's teleology that emerges from the consideration of continuity, finally, fits Aristotle's discussion of that for the sake of which in Generation and Corruption II.9 and Physics II.8. 1 Parallel texts are Phys. II.8, 199a8-9: "Further, in as many things as have some end, the first and the successive are done for the sake of this"; and PA 1.1, 641 b24-6: "We always say that this is for the sake of that, whenever there is clearly some end at which the motion concludes, should nothing stand in the way." Similar statements can be found elsewhere (in Phys. II.3 and II.7, for example), but these three are the most complete. For condition (a), see the discussion of Aristotle's concept of limit (πέρας) in my forthcoming. On condition (c). see my also forthcoming. ' Lines 226b23-227al0 of this chapter retain Bekker's numbering, but the passage was reconstructed by Ross for the OCT edition as follows: 226b23, 227a7-10, 226b26-7, 226b23-5, 226b27-35, 227al-6, 227al0.

Review of Metaphysics, Jun 1, 2019

Review of Metaphysics, Sep 1, 2020

The Quarterly Review of Biology, Jun 1, 2005

Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 2019

Working within the Aristotelian tradition, I argue that relation is not a category but a transcen... more Working within the Aristotelian tradition, I argue that relation is not a category but a transcendental property of being. By this I mean that all substances are actualized, and hence defined, relationally: all actuality is interactuality.Interactuality is the locus for the relational categories of substance, action, being-affected, number, and most types of quality. The interactuality of corporeal beings is further conditioned by relations of setting; here we find the relational categories of place (where), quantity in the sense of size, quality in the sense of shape, and time (when). In offering a relational account of substance, I distinguish between external relata (physical environment, objects of sensation and knowledge as external) and internal relata (one’s body, objects of sensation and knowledge as internal). This distinction between external and internal relata is transcended in the case of the Trinity, insofar as the divine persons are both perfectly distinct and perfectly united.

International Philosophical Quarterly, 2012

Review of Metaphysics, 2012

Review of Metaphysics, Mar 1, 2012

DEVELOPING AND REWORKING the young Platonic tradition, Aristotle twice affirms that being is bett... more DEVELOPING AND REWORKING the young Platonic tradition, Aristotle twice affirms that being is better than nonbeing. (1) For both Plato and Aristotle, this affirmation shapes a worldview; it is the fragile heartbeat of an essay at wisdom, guarded and sustained with enormous resolve and creativity. Yet one would like to know whether, and how, such a claim can be cashed out in more analytic terms: whether it can yield conceptual as well as poetic clarity. In Aristotle's case a number of ideas are relevant--most obviously, the distinction between power and act, which structures his entire account of bodily things as underlying and tending toward the fullness of life and activity that is their complete being. (2) This distinction, however, is one of his most prized philosophic innovations, and one that belongs properly to first philosophy; for both reasons, he often withholds it from explicit play in his treatises. If we collect his scattered comments about the good in general, we find that they indeed support a connection between goodness--or goodness and beauty--and being, but that this connection is often expressed in more readily available terms: the good or beautiful is said to be, for example, fitting, proportionate, or great. Three concepts, however, dominate Aristotle's general statements about the good: good things are ordered and determinate, they are complete, and they are self-sufficient. (3) The theme of self-sufficiency is familiar to students of Aristotle's ethics and politics, but appears also in his biology and his theology. (4) What is self-sufficient has its being, and hence its goodness, in and from itself. The same is true of completeness, the condition of whatever has attained its proper end, and thus fully actualized its potential. (5) Prior to both completeness and self-sufficiency, however, are the twin concepts of order and determinacy, and it is with these that we are here concerned. Beginning with Aristotle's well-known views about the causal role of the good in both nature and human affairs, we shall gradually make our way to his identification of order as a characteristic of the good in nature (section I). Then, after pausing to consider the relation between goodness and beauty (II), we shall approach determinacy by way of the related concepts of limit and the unlimited, relating both limit and the determinate to form (III). The body of the paper will conclude by discussing the determinate and the good in Aristotle's ethics and metaphysics (IV). Finally, with a view to understanding more deeply Aristotle's treatment of order and the determinate, I shall close with a brief reflection on their place in his understanding of nature as a whole (V). The following investigation presupposes two important points. First, although Aristotle tends to develop each science dialectically on its own terms, nevertheless statements made in one work (whether speculative or practical) are generally coherent with those made in others. Each work tends, from its own starting points, toward a unified vision of reality, and does so with remarkable success. Note that if this assumption is correct, particular investigations based on it should tend to reinforce the assumption itself; the present study, I believe, is a case in point. Second, Aristotle in fact has a unified understanding of the good. It is true that in Nicomachean Ethics 1.6 he denies that any one thing answers to the word "good." However, he also suggests two ways in which this disunity may be mitigated. (6) First, it may be that nonsubstances are called good by reference to the good of substances (that is, the good is spoken of by homonymy pros hen); second, though the goods of substances are diverse in kind, good a may well be to substance A as good b is to substance B (that is, the good is spoken of by analogy or proportion). In short, the good may well have exactly as much unity as does being itself. Note that, although these presuppositions must be stated at the outset, neither will figure explicitly in the following discussion. …

Review of Metaphysics, Jun 1, 2004

IN GENERATION AND CORRUPTION 2.9, Aristotle sets out to give an account of "how many and wha... more IN GENERATION AND CORRUPTION 2.9, Aristotle sets out to give an account of "how many and what are the principles of all coming to be are like." (1) In doing so, he situates the cause "for the sake of which," [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], within a causal nexus familiar to readers of Physics 2. It is constituted by the end--that is, the form produced--by the matter in which it is produced, and by the agent that produces it. In Meteorology 4.12, moreover, he explains that form itself must be understood in terms of the species-typical activities that follow upon its presence and for the sake of which the composite substance exists. He thus recognizes two sorts of ends, form and activity, of which the latter seems to be ultimate. Although form is the immediate end of coming to be, a composite substance exists in the last analysis for the sake of its activity. In the following pages, I argue that the foregoing statements implicitly contain a simple yet complete account of Aristotle's teleology. In De anima 2.1, Aristotle states that the term "actuality" ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) signifies both form, or first actuality, and activity, or second actuality. (2) Form is the actuality of a natural body, in other words, but this actuality brings with it a capacity for further actuality--that is, for activity of a certain kind. If, however, both form and activity are ends, then that for the sake of which seems to coincide perfectly with actuality. This conclusion entails that the roots of Aristotle's teleology are not bound up with his biology, as several contemporary writers have suggested. (3) They are not even to be found in his understanding of nature in general, but rather in his first philosophy or metaphysics. Although I am not primarily concerned with the theological dimensions of Aristotle's teleology, the question of God will appear early in the following discussion and reappear several times, reminding us of the need for a properly metaphysical analysis. As Metaphysics 6.1 tells us, it is the existence of an immovable substance or substances that distinguishes the science of nature from first philosophy. (4) Indeed, Aristotle's theological commitments reveal that an accurate account of his teleology cannot depend on the notion of change, even change for the sake of an end. As we shall see in a moment, he himself highlights the problematic relation between that for the sake of which and change when he asks, in the Metaphysics, how final causality can pertain to unchanging substances such as God. Our immediate point of departure, however, is the claim in Physics 2.2 that every outcome of a continuous change, provided that it be "what is best," is an end. In section 1, after briefly introducing this text, I lay out a serious challenge that any interpreter must face. This is Aristotle's suggestion, in the theological aporia just mentioned and in its later resolution, that there cannot be a strong, general connection between [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] and motion or change. This section concludes with a brief clarification of Aristotle's use of the term "motion" [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] as opposed to "change" [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], the text from Physics 2.2. In section 2, I begin to address the challenge formulated in section one by showing that theology aside, Aristotle's account of natural substances precludes any account of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] in terms of motion. This is because every composite substance is, simply as such, for the sake of its form. Then, having considered the inadequacy of motion as a context for understanding Aristotle's teleology, we shall turn to the more basic, metaphysical concept of actuality. It is in terms of actuality, I shall argue, that Aristotle provides a unified account of both being for the sake of an end, which need not involve motion, and the more familiar coming to be or change for the sake of an end, which obviously does. …

Christopher V. Mirus This dissertation addresses teleology in the writings of Aristotle and in re... more Christopher V. Mirus This dissertation addresses teleology in the writings of Aristotle and in relation to modern mechanics. In chapters one through three, I argue that Aristotle's teleology is theoretically grounded in the claim that both as an explanatory and as a causal factor, actuality is prior to potentiality. As actualities, therefore, both form and function are prior to the material and efficient causes that condition their occurrence in nature. In chapters four and five, I then consider the recent "systems" or "cybernetic" view of goal-directedness, along with some basic features of mechanical systems and laws more generally, in light of Aristotle's teleology. I conclude that from an Aristotelian point of view there is no conflict between teleological and mechanical approaches to nature.

Review of Metaphysics, Mar 1, 2004

THERE ARE ANY NUMBER OF REASONS for wanting to know what Aristotle means by "good" ([TE... more THERE ARE ANY NUMBER OF REASONS for wanting to know what Aristotle means by "good" ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]). For students of Aristotle, understanding his conception of goodness would provide an authentic Nicomachean metaethics, so to speak, a clearer view of his natural teleology, and a great deal of help in making sense of his cosmology and his metaphysics, especially the theological bits. For the less historically minded, the rebirth of virtue ethics makes the relation between nature and norm an important problem, with implications not only for ethics proper but also for social philosophy and the foundations of the social sciences. Epistemology and the philosophy of science finally have begun to take questions of value more seriously, and therefore they ought also to be interested in possible connections between knowledge of nature and the apprehension of value. Aristotle's conception of goodness is relevant to all these questions. In the following pages I shall sketch, therefore, as concisely as possible while staying close to the texts, the most prominent outlines of Aristotle's understanding of goodness. My conclusion is that goodness for Aristotle is simply actuality, considered as a standard and goal for all being. Although I am not aware of any careful argument for this thesis, I should note that it was suggested in passing by Allan Gotthelf in an essay published almost fifteen years ago. (1) More recently, Edward Halper has implied the same conclusion by using the account of substance in Metaphysics 7-8, together with the distinction between first and second actuality, to illuminate Aristotle's account of the good for individuals and states. (2) Moving back a few centuries, Thomas Aquinas was clearly aware that Aristotle identified goodness with actuality, a position that he himself also adopted. (3) In any case, a more thorough and systematic investigation will improve not only the evidence in hand that this is, indeed, Aristotle's view, but also our understanding of the view itself. My argument proceeds in four stages. In section 1, I shall consider Aristotle's identification of the good with that for the sake of which. By the end of this section, we shall already have reason to think that Aristotle understands goodness in terms of actuality. In section 2, in order to enrich the conception of goodness with which the previous section leaves us, I shall turn briefly to the relations between goodness, beauty, order, and nature. Then, resuming in section 3 the main thread of the argument, we shall consider the texts in which Aristotle associates goodness with being. Finally, in section 4 we shall see that the identification of goodness with actuality gives us a unified account of Aristotle's claims about what counts as good and why. Through the use of pros hen homonymy and analogy, the various senses of "good" are united around a core meaning in typically Aristotelian fashion. I Many of Aristotle's best known statements concerning the good have to do with its causal role in nature as that for the sake of which ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]). In Metaphysics 12.10, criticizing previous treatments of the good's causal role, he indicates how seriously he takes this identification of end and good--not just in human action, as in Nicomachean Ethics 1, but across the board: "In all things the good, especially, is a principle." (4) In the following paragraphs I shall examine the good as a causal principle, beginning by considering it as an end or that for the sake of which. Because Aristotle holds that end and form often coincide, we shall next consider his identification of the good, in many cases at least, with form. Finally, returning to the good as that for the sake of which, we shall look at cases in which the good is something other than form by examining Aristotle's endorsement in Ethics 1.1 of the adage that "the good is that at which all things aim." (5) By the end of this section we shall have on the table, ready for further discussion, the thesis that Aristotle understands goodness in terms of actuality. …

The Review of Metaphysics, 2020