Danny Frederick - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Books by Danny Frederick

This book tells part of the story of my life in a succession of anecdotes, or ‘Danecdotes,’ as a ... more This book tells part of the story of my life in a succession of anecdotes, or ‘Danecdotes,’ as a friend called them. It generally focuses on the unusual and thereby offers material for reflection. I often include some more or less philosophical reflections within the anecdotes; and such reflections often raise further questions too. The book may be considered as a contribution to ‘the philosophy of everyday life.’ The anecdotes are autobiographical and are presented in approximately chronological order. However, the book is not an autobiography. Large segments of my life have been excluded, particularly those concerning my sex life and intimate relationships. So, although the book is highly personal, it is not so personal as to be uncomfortable, either for me, or for my sexual partners, or for my intimate friends, or for my family, or for the educated reader. The topics covered include growing up in the old Notting Hill slums (long since demolished), attendance (and non-attendance) at a comprehensive school in Shepherd's Bush, cohabitation, working in a rough pub in Notting Hill, my life as an aggressive drunk, beer festivals, my on-off academic career, work as a management consultant, workplace bullying, my career as a management accountant, excelling under pressure, fall into depression, anxiety and bruxism, attempts to regain sanity, and philosophical reflections on life, work, management, morals, politics, metaphysics, God, and how to discover oneself.

The pdf is available here for free download. The paperback is available from Amazon at cost-price:
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Danecdotes-Reminiscences-Reflections-Concerning-Largely/dp/B08QFCR79S/

This is a collection of nineteen essays in the tradition of critical rationalism (as advocated by... more This is a collection of nineteen essays in the tradition of critical rationalism (as advocated by Karl Popper). All but one of the essays is previously unpublished and the one previously published paper has undergone significant revisions. The first four essays tackle topics in the philosophy of science, the first being an exposition of Popper's views, the others discussing falsifiability, truth, the aim of science, and ceteris-paribus law-statements. Five essays follow concerned with Reason, reasoning and reasons, in which faulty conceptions of theoretical and practical reason are criticised, the nature and uses of argument are discussed, and the rationality of debate, agreement and disagreement are explained. Next, there are two papers on economics, one of which is a substantial critique of the so-called subjective theory of value, the other a brief discussion of entrepreneurial insight. The last section of the book contains a miscellany of eight critical essays in which some errors of contemporary philosophers are exposed regarding issues including the interpretation of Popper’s work, the Gettier problem, no-platforming, open-mindedness, homosexual equality, tolerance, philosophical heuristics and the conduct of debate.

Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism, 2020

This book uses the concepts of freedom, indeterminism, and fallibilism to solve, in a unified way... more This book uses the concepts of freedom, indeterminism, and fallibilism to solve, in a unified way, problems of free will, knowledge, reasoning, rationality, personhood, ethics and politics. Presenting an overarching theory of human freedom, Frederick argues for an account of free will as the capacity for undetermined acts. Knowledge, rationality, and reasoning, both theoretical and practical, as well as personhood, morality and political authority, are all shown to be dependent at their roots on indeterminism and fallibility, and to be connected to individual freedom. Thought-provoking and original, Frederick’s theory of freedom examines a broad spectrum of issues, from the distinction between persons and other animals, to the purpose of the state and political authority. Offering a bold and succinct conspectus of the philosophy of freedom, this book makes surprising connections between perennial issues across the field of philosophy.

Policy of Truth, 2020

This conspectus of my new book, 'Freedom, Indeterminism, and Fallibilism' (Cham: Palgrave Macmill... more This conspectus of my new book, 'Freedom, Indeterminism, and Fallibilism' (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan), was published on the blogsite of Irfan Khawaja, Policy of Truth on 9 July 2020. It has a different focus to the synopsis of the book published on Mark Friedman's blogsite, Natural Rights Libertarian.

Published Articles by Danny Frederick

forthcoming in Philosophy of Science, ed. Eran Asoulin., 2021

Introduction to Karl Popper's philosophy of science.

Think, 2021

I criticize Brian Earp's ‘Some Writing Tips for Philosophy’. Earp's article is useful for someone... more I criticize Brian Earp's ‘Some Writing Tips for Philosophy’. Earp's article is useful for someone who wishes to do well in analytic philosophy as currently practised but it also casts doubt on why such analytic philosophy would be of interest to someone who wants to learn something new. In addition to its good tips, Earp's article contains two bad tips which, if followed, will tend to produce a paper that says next to nothing. I list the two faulty tips, show how the practices of great philosophers and scientists contradict them, then set out some contrary good tips for philosophers who aim to write a paper that makes a contribution to our knowledge.

Organon F, 2020

I explain how Karl Popper resolved the problem of induction but not the pragmatic problem of indu... more I explain how Karl Popper resolved the problem of induction but not the pragmatic problem of induction. I show that Popper’s solution to the pragmatic problem of induction is inconsistent with his solution to the problem of induction. I explain how Popper’s falsificationist epistemology can solve the pragmatic problem of induction in the same negative way that it solves the problem of induction.

Journal of Value Inquiry, 2020

John Searle, in several articles and books, has contended that institutions incorporating status ... more John Searle, in several articles and books, has contended that institutions incorporating status functions with deontic powers are created by collective acceptance. I argue that collective acceptance can create new status functions with deontic powers only if other status functions with deontic powers already exist, so that collective acceptance can create new institutions only if other institutions are presupposed. So, the claim that institutions depend upon collective acceptance involves a vicious infinite regress. I provide an example to show how an institution of slavery could be created by individual acceptances plus mutual belief about those acceptances. I consider whether an institution could be created by individual acceptances without mutual belief about those acceptances; but my conclusion is largely negative. I contend that the emergence of a new institution presupposes an existing institutional context and I explain how infinite regress can be avoided.

Cosmos + Taxis, 2020

Contemporary liberal theorists generally support open borders and some argue that liberalism is i... more Contemporary liberal theorists generally support open borders and some argue that liberalism is incompatible with substantive immigration control. We argue that it has not been shown that there is an inconsistency in the idea of a liberal state enforcing such controls and that it may be obligatory for a liberal state to impose substantive restrictions on immigration. The immigration control on which we focus is that concerning people from societies that resemble closed societies, particularly those in which Islamic fundamentalism is endemic. We suggest that, if the threat we envision is real, then a liberal state has a right to limit immigration from such societies.

Cosmos + Taxis, 2019

Introduction to three papers, published to mark the 26th anniversary of Karl Popper's death, in C... more Introduction to three papers, published to mark the 26th anniversary of Karl Popper's death, in Cosmos + Taxis.

Cosmos + Taxis, 2019

In The Open Society and its Enemies, Karl Popper contrasts closed and open societies. He evaluate... more In The Open Society and its Enemies, Karl Popper contrasts closed and open societies. He evaluates irrationalism and the different kinds of rationalism and he argues that critical rationalism is superior. Living in an open society bestows great benefits but involves a strain that may in some people engender a longing to return to a closed society of tribal submission and an attraction for irrationalism. Attempts to recreate a closed society lead to totalitarianism. In the light of Popper's arguments I criticise contemporary identity politics and I show that identity politics is irrationalist and tends to totalitarianism.

Cosmos + Taxis, 2019

Karl Popper champions an open society in which all institutions, principles and values are open t... more Karl Popper champions an open society in which all institutions, principles and values are open to criticism. Anthony O'Hear contends that Popper's vision is utopian because an open society can survive only if some non-liberal values are assumed, including the prohibition of criticism of fundamental liberal principles and values. I correct O'Hear's interpretation of Popper and I rebut most of his criticisms, arguing that an open society is stronger if it permits criticism of all views. However, I accept and strengthen O'Hear's rejection of Popper's assimilation of an open society to a scientific community. I also suggest that the survival of open societies may require limits on immigration from societies permeated by Islamic fundamentalism or similar ideologies.

Cosmos + Taxis, 2019

Criticisms of Karl Popper’s critical rationalist epistemology are often confused and misleading. ... more Criticisms of Karl Popper’s critical rationalist epistemology are often confused and misleading. In part that is due to Popper’s somewhat lax use of language, in which technical terms are used in more than one sense. I attempt to clarify Popper’s views by regimenting his terminology. The result is offered as a clear and concise exposition of the main points of Popper’s epistemology.

Philosophy and Logic of Predication, ed. Piotr Stalmaszczyk, Jan 9, 2017

Frege proposed his doctrine of unsaturatedness as a solution to the problems of the unity of the ... more Frege proposed his doctrine of unsaturatedness as a solution to the problems of the unity of the proposition and the unity of the sentence. I show that Frege’s theory is mystical, ad hoc, ineffective, paradoxical and entails that singular terms cannot be predicates. I explain the traditional solution to the problem of the unity of the sentence, as expounded by Mill, which invokes a syncategorematic sign of predication and the connotation and denotation of terms. I streamline this solution, bring it up to date and contrast the resulting conventionalist account with Frege’s unsaturatedness account. I argue that the conventionalist account provides a clear and intelligible solution to the problem of the unity of the sentence which is free of the defects of Frege’s account. I suggest that the problem of the unity of the proposition is spurious. I recommend that the notion of unsaturatedness be extruded from serious debate.

Reason Papers, 2016

I apply Karl Popper’s conception of critical rationality to the question of personal fulfilment. ... more I apply Karl Popper’s conception of critical rationality to the question of personal fulfilment. I show that such fulfilment normally depends upon the person achieving positive freedom, and that positive freedom requires negative freedom, including freedom of expression. If the state has legitimacy, its central duty must be the enforcement of those rules that provide the best prospects for personal fulfilment for the people under its jurisdiction. The state is therefore morally debarred from suppressing freedom of expression. I consider and rebut arguments from falsity, harm, offence, and democratic principles, which are intended to show that the state should prohibit the expression of some types of content. I go on to argue that common university speech codes are incompatible with the aims of an institution of higher education.

Kritike, Dec 27, 2016

Martha Nussbaum attempts to improve the clarity of the obscure talk of feminists and conservative... more Martha Nussbaum attempts to improve the clarity of the obscure talk of feminists and conservatives about objectification in connection with sexual matters. Her discussion is a substantial improvement. However, it is inconsistent and opaque, and she continues to apply the pejorative term ‘objectification’ to activities which she herself admits are morally unproblematic and which may even be a joyous part of life. I explain the deficiencies in Nussbaum’s discussion, including the fact that she does not notice the one way of objectification that seems inherently problematic, and I show that casual sex, prostitution and pornography are normally not morally problematic even while they exhibit some of Nussbaum’s ways of objectification. The term ‘objectification’ should be eschewed because it is a barrier to clear thinking.

Organon F, 2016

I argue that the conception of reflective equilibrium that is generally accepted in contemporary ... more I argue that the conception of reflective equilibrium that is generally accepted in contemporary philosophy is defective and should be replaced with a conception of fruitful reflective disequilibrium which prohibits ad hoc manoeuvres, encourages new approaches, and eschews all justification in favour of continuous improvement. I suggest how the conception of fruitful disequilibrium can be applied more effectively to moral enquiry, to encourage genuine progress in moral knowledge, if we make moral theory empirically testable by adopting a meta-ethical postulate which is independently plausible.

Journal of Value Inquiry, Aug 2016

Ethical intuitionists regard moral knowledge as deriving from moral intuition, moral observation,... more Ethical intuitionists regard moral knowledge as deriving from moral intuition, moral observation, moral emotion and inference. However, moral intuitions, observations and emotions are cultural artefacts which often differ starkly between cultures. Intuitionists attribute uncongenial moral intuitions, observations or emotions to bias or to intellectual or moral failings; but that leads to sectarian ad hominen attacks. Intuitionists try to avoid that by restricting epistemically genuine intuitions, observations or emotions to those which are widely agreed. That does not avoid the problem. It also limits epistemically genuine intuitions, observations or emotions to those with meagre content, and the intuitionists offer no plausible explanation for how inference from such insubstantial propositions can engender substantial moral knowledge. Instead of moral knowledge, intuitionism offers the prospect of mutual name-calling between intellectually stagnant groups. I criticise and reject the principle of phenomenal conservatism, to which intuitionists sometimes appeal.

De Ethica, Aug 18, 2016

A central problem of political philosophy is that of explaining how a state could have the moral ... more A central problem of political philosophy is that of explaining how a state could have the moral authority to enforce laws, promulgate laws which citizens are thereby obliged to obey, give new duties to citizens and levy taxes. Many rival solutions to this problem of political authority have been offered by contemporary and recent philosophers but none has obtained wide acceptance. The current debate takes no cognisance of George Berkeley’s “Passive Obedience,” in which he defends the exceptionless duty of not using force to resist the state and offers a rule-consequentialist account of morality which gives an explanation of political authority as grounded in the social connectedness of human beings. I expound, criticise and develop Berkeley’s explanation to provide a promising solution to the problem of political authority. The solution impugns the political authority of all existing states as well as an exceptionless duty of passive obedience.

The pdf is available here for free download. The paperback is available from Amazon at cost-price:
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Danecdotes-Reminiscences-Reflections-Concerning-Largely/dp/B08QFCR79S/

Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism, 2020

Policy of Truth, 2020

forthcoming in Philosophy of Science, ed. Eran Asoulin., 2021

Introduction to Karl Popper's philosophy of science.

Think, 2021

Organon F, 2020

Journal of Value Inquiry, 2020

Cosmos + Taxis, 2020

Cosmos + Taxis, 2019

Philosophy and Logic of Predication, ed. Piotr Stalmaszczyk, Jan 9, 2017

Reason Papers, 2016

Kritike, Dec 27, 2016

Organon F, 2016

Journal of Value Inquiry, Aug 2016

De Ethica, Aug 18, 2016

Philosophical Quarterly, Dec 15, 2016

In contrast to eminent historical philosophers, almost all contemporary philosophers maintain tha... more In contrast to eminent historical philosophers, almost all contemporary philosophers maintain that slavery is impermissible. In the enthusiasm of the Enlightenment a number of arguments gained currency which were intended to show that contractual slavery is not merely impermissible but impossible. Those arguments are influential today in moral, legal and political philosophy, even in discussions that go beyond the issue of contractual slavery. I explain what slavery is, giving historical and other illustrations. I examine the arguments for the impossibility of contractual slavery propounded in the Enlightenment and their offspring expounded in recent writings, including those by Barnett, Cassirer, Ellerman, Rawls, Roberts-Thomson, Satz and Steiner. I show that they involve confusions between abilities and rights, free will and freedom, directing and doing, what may be true sequentially and what may be true simultaneously, default rights and universal rights, impermissibility and impossibility, and metaphorical and literal uses of language.

Journal of Moral Philosophy 12(3): 255-66, Jun 29, 2015

I summarise a conception of morality as containing a set of rules which hold ceteris paribus and ... more I summarise a conception of morality as containing a set of rules which hold ceteris paribus and which impose pro-tanto obligations. I explain two ways in which moral rules are ceteris-paribus, according to whether an exception is duty-voiding or duty-overriding. I defend the claim that moral rules are ceteris-paribus against two qualms suggested by Luke Robinson’s discussion of moral rules and against the worry that such rules are uninformative. I show that Robinson’s argument that moral rules cannot ground pro-tanto obligations is unsound, because it confuses an absolute reason for an obligation with a reason for an absolute obligation, and because it overlooks the possibility that priority rules may be rules for ordering pro-tanto obligations rather than rules for eliminating contenders for the status of absolute obligation.

Reason Papers 37 (1): 85-87., Apr 17, 2015

I reply to Mark Friedman's response to my review of his book, 'Nozick's Libertarian Project.' I r... more I reply to Mark Friedman's response to my review of his book, 'Nozick's Libertarian Project.' I restate what I take to be the key mistakes in Friedman’s arguments for individual rights and the minimal state. I outline the explanation of the right to freedom in terms of the human capacity for critical rationality, and the explanation of the political authority of the state in rule-consequentialist terms which do not appeal to consent.

Organon F 22(1): 9-20., Feb 2015

Karl Popper lamented the prevalence of dogmatic argument in philosophy and commended the kind of ... more Karl Popper lamented the prevalence of dogmatic argument in philosophy and commended the kind of critical argument that is found in the sciences. David Miller criticises the uncritical nature of so-called critical thinking because of its attachment to dogmatic arguments. I expound and clarify Popper’s distinction between critical and dogmatic arguments and the background to it. I criticise some errors in Miller’s discussion. I reaffirm the need for philosophers to eschew dogmatic arguments in favour of critical ones.

Prolegomena: Journal of Philosophy 13 (2): 303-14., Nov 19, 2014

It appears that light may be thrown on the nature of moral principles if they are construed as mo... more It appears that light may be thrown on the nature of moral principles if they are construed as moral laws analogous to ceteris-paribus laws of nature. Luke Robinson objects that the analogy either cannot explain how moral principles are necessary or cannot explain how obligations can be pro-tanto; and that a dispositional account of moral obligation has explanatory superiority over one in terms of moral laws. I explain the analogy, construing laws of nature as necessary relationships after the fashion of William Kneale and Karl Popper. I then show that Robinson’s objections are mistaken and that if the difference between a dispositional account and a law account is not merely verbal, then it is the law account that is superior. I also dispel the common confusion between the necessity of laws and the existence of forces.

How could a state have the moral authority to promulgate and enforce laws that citizens are there... more How could a state have the moral authority to promulgate and enforce laws that citizens are thereby obliged to obey? That is the problem of political authority. The Consequentialist Explanation of Political Authority contends that great social benefits depend upon there being a state with political authority. In his book, 'The Problem of Political Authority,' Michael Huemer considers different types of explanation of political authority and he rejects them all. I show that the objections he raises to consequentialist accounts are confused and that they fail to connect with the Consequentialist Explanation of Political Authority. Huemer argues that anarchy of a particular kind would be better than the states that exist in current Western societies. I explain why that argument, if it were successful, would be an effective objection to the Consequentialist Explanation of Political Authority.

Reason Papers 37 (1): 164-69., Apr 17, 2015

I summarise Robert Audi's 'Moral Perception.' I concede that there is such a thing as moral perce... more I summarise Robert Audi's 'Moral Perception.' I concede that there is such a thing as moral perception. However, moral perceptions are culturally-relative, which refutes Audi’s claims that moral perception may ground moral knowledge and that it provides inter-subjectively accessible grounds which make ethical objectivity possible. Audi's attempt to avoid the refutation tends to convert rational disputes into ad hominem ones. I illustrate that with the example of the ethics of prostitution.

Reason Papers 36 (1): 132-42, Sep 3, 2014

Review of Mark D. Friedman's defence of Nozick's 'Anarchy, State, and Utopia.'

Libertarian Papers 5 (1): 45-66., 2013

In 'Escape from Leviathan,' Jan Lester sets out a conception of liberty as absence of imposed cos... more In 'Escape from Leviathan,' Jan Lester sets out a conception of liberty as absence of imposed cost which, he says, advances no moral claim and does not premise an assignment of property rights. He argues that, so conceived, liberty implies libertarian property rules, free-market anarchy and the maximisation of welfare. However, analysis of Lester’s conception of liberty shows it to be inconsistent with liberty as ordinarily conceived, and that maximising liberty, as Lester conceives it, would run counter to self-ownership, private property, open markets and improving welfare. Lester seems to arrive at his conclusions only because, in his arguments, he abandons his own account of liberty and derives his conclusions instead from familiar libertarian assumptions about property rights.

The theme of this book is that the gay community has stereotyped itself and has imposed a conform... more The theme of this book is that the gay community has stereotyped itself and has imposed a conformity upon its members that stifles their development and forces them to suppress aspects of themselves that do not fit the approved model of the gay lifestyle. The review focuses on, and criticises, Peter Tatchell's contribution.

The authors of the papers in A Simple Matter of Justice? reject something they label “heterosexis... more The authors of the papers in A Simple Matter of Justice? reject something they label “heterosexism.” Their writing is obscure, but it seems they desire a state-regimented conformity, with state-approved roles for gays, for lesbians and for others, with state hand-outs and other privileges for all manner of favoured groups, and with no possibility of anyone indulging in the pleasures of “commercial consumerism.” None of the authors appears concerned with the demand that, provided he/she does not violate anyone’s rights, the state should not put any barriers in the way of the sexually active citizen. The Geography of Perversion is a dull and ponderous history of European ideas about male homosexual behaviour, which in places seems to be little more than lists of what various people said. It is appallingly written in grandiloquent language larded with daft Marxist clichés.

Hillel Steiner’s argument in this book is bold, imaginative and illuminating, despite being vitia... more Hillel Steiner’s argument in this book is bold, imaginative and illuminating, despite being vitiated by some logical errors and a wholly impractical redistributive method.

In many of his publications, Karl Popper was highly critical of essentialism. In recent decades t... more In many of his publications, Karl Popper was highly critical of essentialism. In recent decades there has been a revival of essentialism in philosophy. However, modern essentialism, unlike its traditional version, is not undermined by Popper's arguments against essentialism. To some extent Popper recognised that, in that he proposed an essentialist theory himself. But his criticism of some aspects of modern essentialism was the product of confusion.

I explain what haecceities are and the role they play in our thought and talk about specific indi... more I explain what haecceities are and the role they play in our thought and talk about specific individual things, whether those things are concrete or abstract. Everything that can be referred to by using a singular term has a haecceity. I distinguish between singular terms and general terms, on the one hand, and subject terms and predicate terms, on the other. I distinguish three types of sentence: singular predications; general predications; and singular quantifications. I show how singular predications can be eliminated without loss of content, provided we have singular quantifications as well as general predications. This should not be confused with Quine's "elimination of singular terms." I say a few words about propositions.

Hrishikesh Joshi (forthcoming) is a useful introduction to the myriad of claims and supporting th... more Hrishikesh Joshi (forthcoming) is a useful introduction to the myriad of claims and supporting theories advanced by proponents of open or nearly open borders, and the counter-arguments asserted by those defending the right of liberal states to impose more extensive immigration controls. It does, however, have one striking and apparently culpable defect, namely, it fails to consider the strongest argument in favour of immigration control. That argument was propounded by us and is recapitulated here.

I present a diversity of theories of freedom which I compare and contrast. I begin with a brief s... more I present a diversity of theories of freedom which I compare and contrast. I begin with a brief summary of my own recently published theory, which I show to be superior to the other theories considered. I find that there are various weaknesses or errors in the other theories and that my own theory is the only one that gives an adequate explanation of why freedom, or a free society, is desirable.

I distinguish arguments and arguing and I explain some important logical features of arguments. I... more I distinguish arguments and arguing and I explain some important logical features of arguments. I then explain how philosophers have been misled, apparently by Euclid, into giving seriously mistaken accounts of arguing. I give a few examples. I then offer a seven-step guide on how to argue. After that, I conclude.

‘Against the Philosophical Tide: Essays in Popperian Critical Rationalism’ (Yeovil: Critias, 2020), 2020

Criticisms of Karl Popper's critical rationalist epistemology are often confused and misleading. ... more Criticisms of Karl Popper's critical rationalist epistemology are often confused and misleading. In part that is due to Popper's somewhat lax use of language, in which technical terms are used in more than one sense. I attempt to clarify Popper's views by regimenting his terminology. The result is offered as a clear and concise exposition of the main points of Popper's epistemology.

‘Against the Philosophical Tide: Essays in Popperian Critical Rationalism’ (Yeovil: Critias, 2020), 2020

David Miller propounds a theory of objective knowledge from which he mistakenly derives some cons... more David Miller propounds a theory of objective knowledge from which he mistakenly derives some consequences about question-begging and persuasion that appear to be false. He makes a further claim about persuasion that also seems false. I argue that Miller’s account of objective knowledge is explanatorily weak unless supplemented with an account of subjective knowledge and that the latter enables us to extricate Miller’s theory from the falsehoods he associates with it.

‘Against the Philosophical Tide: Essays in Popperian Critical Rationalism’ (Yeovil: Critias, 2020), 2020

David Miller argues that there are no good reasons, either sufficient or insufficient. I show tha... more David Miller argues that there are no good reasons, either sufficient or insufficient. I show that most of his arguments are invalid or unsound. Several of his arguments depend upon the false claim that every deductively valid argument is circular. I accept one of Miller's arguments for the conclusion that there are no good reasons which are less-than-sufficient. I accept one of his arguments to the conclusion that there are no probative sufficient reasons. But I explain how there are epistemic sufficient reasons which are relative to the game of science and how their existence is consistent with Miller's main contentions while avoiding Miller's apparently anarchic account of our knowledge.

‘Against the Philosophical Tide: Essays in Popperian Critical Rationalism’ (Yeovil: Critias, 2020), 2020

David Miller claims that every valid deductive argument begs the question. Other philosophers and... more David Miller claims that every valid deductive argument begs the question. Other philosophers and logicians have made similar claims. I show that the claim is false. Its appeal depends on the existence of logical terminology, particularly concerning what a proposition 'contains' or its 'logical content,' that is best understood as metaphoric and that, given its aptness to mislead, would be better eschewed. I show how the terminology appears to derive from early modern theories of the nature of mind, ideas and reasoning that have since been rejected.

‘Against the Philosophical Tide: Essays in Popperian Critical Rationalism’ (Yeovil: Critias, 2020), 2020

I show how Karl Popper reconciled scepticism with epistemology and how he retrogressed when he id... more I show how Karl Popper reconciled scepticism with epistemology and how he retrogressed when he identified truth as our epistemic aim. I criticise David Miller's defence of Popper's error and I consider and rebut objections, derived from Popper and Miller, to a purely sceptical epistemology.

‘Against the Philosophical Tide: Essays in Popperian Critical Rationalism’ (Yeovil: Critias, 2020), 2020

Two common claims in philosophy are that deep disagreements cannot, in principle, be resolved by ... more Two common claims in philosophy are that deep disagreements cannot, in principle, be resolved by argument and that normal disagreements will be resolved by argument. In each claim it is assumed that the parties to the disagreement are rational. I argue that both claims are false. The first fails to take account of refutations. The second fails to recognise the role of conjectures in the dynamics of the growth of knowledge. There is no disagreement such that it is impossible for rational parties to reach agreement by argument; but there is also no disagreement for which parties are rationally required to reach agreement by argument. Given the same evidence, it may be rational for one person to believe a specific proposition and another to believe its negation.

Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane claim that a situation involving some trapped miners involves a ... more Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane claim that a situation involving some trapped miners involves a deontic paradox the resolution of which requires rejecting the logical law of modus ponens. I show that the appearance of paradox results from confusion and that the miners case supplies no cogent reason for impugning modus ponens.

‘Against the Philosophical Tide: Essays in Popperian Critical Rationalism’ (Yeovil: Critias, 2020), 2020

Edmund Gettier’s three-page article is generally regarded as a classic of epistemology. I argue t... more Edmund Gettier’s three-page article is generally regarded as a classic of epistemology. I argue that Gettier cases depend upon three false assumptions but that there are other problems with the definition of knowledge as justified true belief. I suggest that we follow Karl Popper in abandoning individual and subjective epistemologies of justification in favour of theories of social, objective and conjectural knowledge.

I consider cases in which risk or ignorance create barriers to our discovery of what we ought to ... more I consider cases in which risk or ignorance create barriers to our discovery of what we ought to do. I argue that neither expected utility theory, nor the maximin principle, nor a timid gambling temperament, is relevant to discovering what we ought to do in one-off or infrequently recurring types of decisions involving risk, or to decisions involving ignorance. I argue, contra Kolodny and MacFarlane, that the miners case does not require us to give up any classical logical principle in order to avoid contradiction. I reject Graham’s claim that the appearance of contradiction depends upon a confusion between acting rightly and not being blameworthy. In the cases of risk and ignorance discussed, we cannot know what we ought to do; and any way of deciding what we shall do is objectively arbitrary even if it reflects our gambling temperament. Subjective probability and the subjective ought should be repudiated.

‘Against the Philosophical Tide: Essays in Popperian Critical Rationalism’ (Yeovil: Critias, 2020), 2020

The subjective theory of value is acclaimed as a major advance in economics. That theory is nowad... more The subjective theory of value is acclaimed as a major advance in economics. That theory is nowadays usually taken to imply value subjectivism. I suggest instead that the theory be viewed as an evolution of thought with four stages: the substitution of relational for intrinsic theories of objective value; the recognition that social-scientific explanations refer to the theories about value that agents accept; the rejection of objective values; the substitution of preferences or evaluations for theories of value. I explain that the first two developments were progressive, the latter two regressive.

‘Against the Philosophical Tide: Essays in Popperian Critical Rationalism’ (Yeovil: Critias, 2020), 2020

I criticise, from a critical rationalist perspective, Israel Kirzner's notion of entrepreneurial ... more I criticise, from a critical rationalist perspective, Israel Kirzner's notion of entrepreneurial alertness and Matthew McCaffrey's endorsement of Joseph Salerno's rival account of entrepreneurial judgment.

'Freedom, Indeterminism, and Fallibilism' (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020); ‘Against the Philosophical Tide: Essays in Popperian Critical Rationalism’ (Yeovil: Critias, 2020)., 2020

I explain how the growth of knowledge depends upon World 3 even though it involves creative disco... more I explain how the growth of knowledge depends upon World 3 even though it involves creative discovery. I show the falsity of the oft-repeated claim that the conclusion of a valid argument is contained in its premises and I explain how that claim is a consequence of early modern conceptions of logical analysis, the structure of propositions and concepts, and the nature of necessary truth. I argue that inference, and also logical analysis, is a matter of guessing and testing, that is, a matter of discovery that depends upon World 3. I explain in what sense it is true that, as Karl Popper says, ‘we never know what we are talking about.’

‘Against the Philosophical Tide: Essays in Popperian Critical Rationalism’ (Yeovil: Critias, 2020), 2020

It is often contended that the special sciences, and even fundamental physics, make use of ceteri... more It is often contended that the special sciences, and even fundamental physics, make use of ceteris-paribus law-statements. Yet there are general concerns that such law-statements are vacuous or untestable or unscientific. I consider two main kinds of ceteris-paribus law-statement. I argue that neither kind is vacuous, that one of the kinds is untestable, that both kinds may count as scientific to the extent that they form parts of conjunctions that imply novel falsifiable statements which survive testing, but that one kind has an affinity with ad hoc manoeuvres that are unsatisfactory from a scientific point of view. I show that the contemporary debate about ceteris-paribus law-statements is afflicted with error and confusion because of a general failure to disentangle the notions: non-vacuous, testable, scientific, verifiable, falsifiable, and ad hoc.

I give a concise exposition of George Berkeley’s “Passive Obedience,” in which he defends the exc... more I give a concise exposition of George Berkeley’s “Passive Obedience,” in which he defends the exceptionless duty of not using force to resist the state and offers a rule-consequentialist account of morality which gives an explanation of political authority as grounded in the social connectedness of human beings. This exposition is a companion piece to my paper, “The Good Bishop and the Explanation of Political Authority,” in which I criticise and develop Berkeley’s rule consequentialism and his explanation of political authority and argue that the rule of passive obedience holds only ceteris paribus.

‘Against the Philosophical Tide: Essays in Popperian Critical Rationalism’ (Yeovil: Critias, 2020), 2020

Susan Haack criticises the US courts’ use of Karl Popper’s epistemology in discriminating accepta... more Susan Haack criticises the US courts’ use of Karl Popper’s epistemology in discriminating acceptable scientific testimony. She claims that acceptable testimony should be reliable and that Popper’s epistemology is useless in discriminating reliability. She says that Popper’s views have been found acceptable only because they have been misunderstood and she indicates an alternative epistemology which she says can discriminate reliable theories. However, her account of Popper’s views is a gross and gratuitous misrepresentation. Her alternative epistemology cannot do what she claims for it. The courts should not be concerned with reliability and, insofar as they use the term ‘reliability,’ it should be construed in a procedural rather than a substantive sense. Since Popper’s epistemology gives something like a characterisation of science at its best, the courts should continue to invoke Popper’s theories in their discrimination of acceptable testimony.

In Chapter 2 of Escape from Leviathan, Jan Lester defends two hypotheses: that instrumental ratio... more In Chapter 2 of Escape from Leviathan, Jan Lester defends two hypotheses: that instrumental rationality requires agents to maximise the satisfaction of their wants and that all agents actually meet this requirement. In addition, he argues that all agents are self-interested (though not necessarily egoistic) and he offers an account of categorical moral desires which entails that no agent ever does what he genuinely feels to be morally wrong. I show that Lester’s two hypotheses are false because they cannot accommodate weakness of will, because they are inconsistent with agency, which requires free will, because ends, obligations and values cannot be reduced to desires, and because maximisation is often not possible. Further, Lester’s claim that agents are self-interested is vacuous, his attempted reduction of moral behaviour to want-satisfaction fails, and his contention, that agents always do what they genuinely think to be morally required, seems untenable. A defence of freedom that depends on homo economicus is far from promising.

‘Against the Philosophical Tide: Essays in Popperian Critical Rationalism’ (Yeovil: Critias, 2020), 2020

If the task of theoretical reason is to discover truth, or reasons for belief, then theoretical r... more If the task of theoretical reason is to discover truth, or reasons for belief, then theoretical reason is impossible. Attempts to circumvent that by appeal to probabilities are self-defeating. If the task of practical reason is to discover what we ought to do or what actions are desirable or valuable, then practical reason is impossible. Appeals to the subjective ought or to subjective probabilities are self-defeating. Adapting Karl Popper, I argue that the task of theoretical reason is to obtain theories that we can agree to instate given that they appear to have greater explanatory merit than their rivals. I then argue that the task of practical reason is to decide which ought-propositions to act on. As a consequence theoretical reason is seen as a branch of practical reason. This approach makes both theoretical and practical reason practicable and free of the defects of the usual accounts.

It is often claimed that journalism provided for profit in a competitive market is biased, dumbed... more It is often claimed that journalism provided for profit in a competitive market is biased, dumbed-down and irresponsible, and that ‘public service’ journalism, provided or funded by government, is essential for a democratic society. Reasons given for the claim are that an informed citizenry requires unbiased reporting, that consumers do not have the competence to judge the quality of information, and that publicly-funded agencies can, whereas market exchanges cannot, take account of third-party impacts of reports. I argue that these claims reveal a misunderstanding of markets, exhibit a misplaced faith in the goodwill and the capacities of government agencies, presuppose a naïve and mistaken theory of knowledge and an untenable view of consumer passivity, ignore market mechanisms for dealing with externalities and, if acted upon consistently, would tend to bring about a stagnant and closed society governed on behalf of organised minorities.

Dummett defines a ‘predicate’ as that which combines with one or more singular terms to form a se... more Dummett defines a ‘predicate’ as that which combines with one or more singular terms to form a sentence. His account of ‘singular term’ is syntactical, involving three necessary conditions. He discusses a fourth, ‘Aristotelian’, criterion before propounding a criterion of predicate quantification which he claims to be superior to it. He tentatively proposes that the three necessary conditions plus the criterion of predicate quantification yield sufficient conditions for being a singular term. I show that Dummett’s necessary conditions fail with regard to referentially opaque contexts, negative existentials and wide-scope negations, and that he overlooks an important class of predicative expressions that satisfy his three supposedly necessary conditions for singular terms, namely, those that may appear either as adjectives or as nouns. I argue that Dummett cannot use the ‘Aristotelian’ criterion without circularity; and that, in any case, the ‘Aristotelian’ criterion fails dramatically. I also show that his criterion of predicate quantification fails with regard to expressions for colours. I end by casting doubts on the adequacy of any purely syntactical approach.

It is an article of almost religious faith in the United Kingdom that the National Health Service... more It is an article of almost religious faith in the United Kingdom that the National Health Service is far superior to a competitive market in health care services. In this brief and informal paper I show that the opposite is true. In contrast to market provision, the existence of the National Health Service entails the following. First, consumer sovereignty is virtually destroyed, since what services the consumer receives and how much he pays (through taxation) are determined by the government of the day in consultation with vested and ideological interests. Second, a person may be denied a life-saving service despite having contributed more than his fair share to National Health Service over the course of his working life. Third, people often spend less on health care than they would like to spend, because any additional contributions (via increased taxes) are not linked to any benefit specifically for the person who makes them. Fourth, provision of services free at the point of need which is not linked to what a person pays encourages a wasteful misuse of resources. Fifth, absence of competition between health care providers leads to high cost and poor quality of service and a tendency to produce a standardised service rather than a tailored one; and government attempts to address this problem usually make it worse. Sixth, people’s freedom to engage in particular activities or lifestyles is likely to be curtailed because the costs of those activities are artificially socialised. I also point out that issues of inequality or poverty are much better addressed by means other than a nationalised health service.

A list and classification of my published work on themes related to Karl Popper.

‘Against the Philosophical Tide: Essays in Popperian Critical Rationalism’ (Yeovil: Critias, 2020), 2020

Neil Levy defends no-platforming people who espouse dangerous or unacceptable views. I reject his... more Neil Levy defends no-platforming people who espouse dangerous or unacceptable views. I reject his notion of higher-order evidence as authoritarian and dogmatic. I argue that no-platforming frustrates the growth of knowledge.

James and Stuart Rachels argue that diversity amongst cultures with regard to moral rules is over... more James and Stuart Rachels argue that diversity amongst cultures with regard to moral rules is overstated because all cultures have some values in common. I show that their argument is invalid and otherwise unsound and that cultures differ substantially with regard to their moral rules.

‘Against the Philosophical Tide: Essays in Popperian Critical Rationalism’ (Yeovil: Critias, 2020), 2020

John Schwenkler asks whether we should shield ourselves from others' abhorrent beliefs. I expound... more John Schwenkler asks whether we should shield ourselves from others' abhorrent beliefs. I expound and criticise his discussion and I explain why a rational person who wants to improve his knowledge should not shield himself from abhorrent beliefs.

‘Against the Philosophical Tide: Essays in Popperian Critical Rationalism’ (Yeovil: Critias, 2020), 2020

It is often claimed that the Duhem problem shows that the notion of falsifiability is inapplicabl... more It is often claimed that the Duhem problem shows that the notion of falsifiability is inapplicable to scientific theories. I explain why the claim is false.

‘Against the Philosophical Tide: Essays in Popperian Critical Rationalism’ (Yeovil: Critias, 2020), 2020

Theft is win-lose: the thief gains benefits at the expense of the victim. War is lose-lose: no-on... more Theft is win-lose: the thief gains benefits at the expense of the victim. War is lose-lose: no-one comes out better off. Trade is win-win: both parties gain. Altercations are lose-lose. When a person talks about ‘winning the argument,’ she is talking about winning a debate and she sees debate as win-lose. But if we partake of debates with an open mind, they can be win-win: even without agreeing, each party may learn. Unfortunately, contemporary philosophers seem to see debate as win-lose in which a ‘justified’ dogmatist triumphs.

‘Against the Philosophical Tide: Essays in Popperian Critical Rationalism’ (Yeovil: Critias, 2020), 2020

In ‘Aeon’ magazine, 2 August 2017, Professor Paul Russell maintains that identities such as race,... more In ‘Aeon’ magazine, 2 August 2017, Professor Paul Russell maintains that identities such as race, gender and sexual orientation have equal ethical standing because they cannot be discarded and they are not constituted by beliefs, values or practices. We should, he says, resist attempts to present those who identify as gay as making a choice and affirming certain values and practices that they are capable of shedding. However, such identities can be discarded and they are in part constituted by beliefs, values or practices. Russell’s defence of homosexual equality, because it focuses on the inclination to homosexuality, is pointless and useless. A proper defence of homosexual equality focuses on homosexual lifestyles and argues that the choice of such lifestyles is not wrong. Whether people who choose homosexual lifestyles do so because of a natural and unchangeable inclination, or whether environment or choice plays a part in bringing about that inclination, is an interesting question for science but of no concern for politics.

‘Against the Philosophical Tide: Essays in Popperian Critical Rationalism’ (Yeovil: Critias, 2020), 2020

In ‘Aeon’ magazine (2 August 2017), Professor Paul Russell claims that tolerance demands that cri... more In ‘Aeon’ magazine (2 August 2017), Professor Paul Russell claims that tolerance demands that criticism of ideologies be permitted; but it also demands that criticism of natural identities be suppressed. He says that the Left’s failure to distinguish ideological from non-ideological identities has led identity politics into intolerance. I argue that Russell’s position is self-contradictory, implying that his (ideological) liberal identity both should and should not be open to criticism. Tolerance must be extended to criticism of non-ideological identities. Laws against ‘hate speech’ are incompatible with tolerance.

‘Against the Philosophical Tide: Essays in Popperian Critical Rationalism’ (Yeovil: Critias, 2020), 2020

I point out some logical errors and infelicities in Hájek’s discussion of philosophical heuristics.

It is often heard in political debate that goods or services can be produced more cheaply in the ... more It is often heard in political debate that goods or services can be produced more cheaply in the public sector than in the private sector, because in the public sector they do not need to make a profit. I explain why that is false.

Open versus closed minds and the transformation of universities from places of education into pla... more Open versus closed minds and the transformation of universities from places of education into places of indoctrination. A one-page summary.

This is a short blog-post explaining some themes from my article, ‘The Possibility of Contractual... more This is a short blog-post explaining some themes from my article, ‘The Possibility of Contractual Slavery,’ which was published by OUP in The Philosophical Quarterly. In the blog piece, and in more detail in the article, I criticise Spinoza, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Kant, Cassirer and Rawls, as well as the libertarians Randy Barnet and Hillel Steiner. The blog piece is available (free) here:

http://blog.oup.com/2016/02/slavery-contracts/

The UK School Curriculum and Assessment Authority proposes a set of values to which everyone can ... more The UK School Curriculum and Assessment Authority proposes a set of values to which everyone can subscribe, which can provide schools with a secure basis for the provision of spiritual, moral, social and cultural education. The proposal is misguided. The code would be determined by political negotiation, which would bring the whole idea of moral education into disrepute, and it would be an impediment to moral advancement, which requires trial and error experimentation. Imposing a code on all state schools would be political indoctrination; and in a pluralistic society any non-vacuous statement of values will meet with objections from some sections of society. Further, the proposed statement of values is open to objections on moral and other grounds. The aims of the proposal would be best met by privatising schools. Given vested-interest opposition to privatisation, the most realistic option is to alter the Local Management of Schools regime to allow schools to innovate in moral teaching and training, to strengthening parental choice, and to increase competition between schools.

A complete deregulation of pub opening hours should: • reduce nuisance and disorder; • contribu... more A complete deregulation of pub opening hours should:
• reduce nuisance and disorder;
• contribute to a reduction in the number and severity of alcohol problems;
• give a boost to the economy;
• help to promote tourism;
• lessen government interference with personal liberty.
Complete deregulation - or even liberalisation - of permitted opening hours will lead to many pubs staying open later. Some pubs which stay open later may cause a nuisance to nearby residents. Selective remedies will therefore need to be made available to enable local residents to deal with those particular pubs which are a nuisance, e.g. by allowing the earlier closing time of 11.00 p.m. to be re-imposed by local licensing justices. With this safeguard, deregulation can deliver all the benefits listed above while avoiding problems of public disturbance. It will bring us in line with the more civilised approach to drinking that prevails in many other countries, particularly on the Continent.

Environmental Accounting is economically ignorant.

My mother's father was a professional boxer in Britain in the 1920s and 1930s. This photo-booklet... more My mother's father was a professional boxer in Britain in the 1920s and 1930s. This photo-booklet gives a short history of his boxing career.

Cosmos + Taxis, 2020