David Efird - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by David Efird
Philosophical Review, 2008
... Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall, and Caroline West in “Moral Fictionalism versus the Rest,” Austra... more ... Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall, and Caroline West in “Moral Fictionalism versus the Rest,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005): 307–30 ... for example, the host of semantic objections to hermeneutic fic-tionalism about metaphysical discourse offered by Jason Stanley.6 ...
In response to John Bishop's (2007) account of passionally caused believing, Dan-Johan Eklund (20... more In response to John Bishop's (2007) account of passionally caused believing, Dan-Johan Eklund (2014) argues that conscious non-evidential believing is (conceptually) impossible, that is, it's (conceptually) impossible consciously to believe that p whilst acknowledging that the relevant evidence doesn't support p's being true, for it conflicts with belief being a truth-oriented attitude, or so he argues. In this article, we present Eklund's case against Bishop's account of passionally caused believing, and we argue that it's unpersuasive, at least to those who accept permissivism about evidence, that is, that it's possible for there to be more than one rational response to a given body of evidence. We do this through a novel application of a case of nurtured belief, that is, of a person holding a belief simply because she was caused to do so by her upbringing, and we use it to show exactly where Eklund's argument goes wrong. We conclude by drawing a general lesson drawn from this debate: if permissivism about evidence is true, then belief being truth-oriented is consistent with non-evidential believing being possible.
Analysis, 2005
We should distinguish two aspects of modal theorizing. There is the metaphysical theory of what k... more We should distinguish two aspects of modal theorizing. There is the metaphysical theory of what kind of thing (unactualized) possibilities are,
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2009
... But is the resulting version of metaphysical nihilism one that helps us see the question ... more ... But is the resulting version of metaphysical nihilism one that helps us see the question 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' as substantive and ... it is a part of everything, on its own it is a nothing, not a something (and the analogy between its role in mereology and zero in ...
European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 2005
We argue that genuine modal realism can be extended, rather than modified, so as to allow for the... more We argue that genuine modal realism can be extended, rather than modified, so as to allow for the possibility of nothing concrete, a possibility we term 'metaphysical nihilism' . The issue should be important to the genuine modal realist because, not only is metaphysical nihilism itself intuitively plausible, but also it is supported by an argument with pre-theoretically credible premises, namely, the subtraction argument. Given the soundness of the subtraction argument, we show that there are two ways that the genuine modal realist can accommodate metaphysical nihilism: (i) by allowing for worlds containing only spatiotemporal points and (ii) by allowing for a world containing nothing but the null individual. on methodological grounds, we argue that the genuine modal realist should reject the former way but embrace the latter way.
Philosophical Quarterly, 2009
Metaphysical nihilism is the view that there could have been nothing, or more precisely, that the... more Metaphysical nihilism is the view that there could have been nothing, or more precisely, that there could have been none of the things philosophers are asking about when they ask 'Why is there something rather than nothing?'. Since in asking that question they are clearly not concerned with necessarily existing abstract objects such as numbers, the recent literature on metaphysical nihilism has described the position as claiming that there could have been no concrete objects. In , Thomas Baldwin proposed an argument for metaphysical nihilism. 1
Philosophical Books, 2008
Greenberg's contribution to the volume is very long, consisting of two parts, in effect, two arti... more Greenberg's contribution to the volume is very long, consisting of two parts, in effect, two articles, 'How Facts Make Law, Parts I and II'. He argues that we cannot explain legal practices wholly by empirical means and that a full account of legal practice would require a value judgement. Dworkin agrees, of course, with this general line and welcomes Greenberg's willingness to engage general metaphysics in support.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2006
We argue that Armstrong's Combinatorialism allows for the possibility of nothing by giving a... more We argue that Armstrong's Combinatorialism allows for the possibility of nothing by giving a Combinatorial account of the empty world and show that such an account is consistent with the ontological and conceptual aims of the theory. We then suggest that the Combinatorialist should allow for ...
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2010
Could an object have only mass and no other property? In giving an affirmative answer to this que... more Could an object have only mass and no other property? In giving an affirmative answer to this question, Jonathan Schaffer (2003, pp. 136-8) proposes what he calls 'the subtraction argument' for 'the possibility of free mass'. We assess the cogency of this argument in ...
Dialectica, 2008
In this paper, we give a precise characterization of the principle of recombination and argue tha... more In this paper, we give a precise characterization of the principle of recombination and argue that it need not be subject to any restrictions.
The Journal of philosophy, 2005
6 rWA hy is there something rather than nothing?" is a peren-nial question of metaphysics, i... more 6 rWA hy is there something rather than nothing?" is a peren-nial question of metaphysics, if not the fundamental V ?question as Heidegger maintains.' But what sort of thing does this question concern? Traditionally, the question is taken to con-cern concrete objects: why is there ...
Published Papers by David Efird
Faith and Philosophy
People of faith, particularly in the Judeo-Christian tradition, worship corporately at least as o... more People of faith, particularly in the Judeo-Christian tradition, worship corporately at least as often, if not more so, than they do individually. Why do they do this? There are, of course, many reasons, some having to do with personal preference and others having to do with the theology of worship. But, in this paper, we explore one reason, a philosophical reason, which, despite recent work on the philosophy of liturgy, has gone underappreciated. In particular, we argue that corporate worship enables a person to come to know God better than they would otherwise know him in individual worship.
We present a new understanding of Christ’s real presence in the Eucharist on the model of Stump’s... more We present a new understanding of Christ’s real presence in the Eucharist on the model of Stump’s account of God’s omnipresence and Green and Quan’s account of experiencing God in Scripture. On this understanding, Christ is derivatively, rather than fundamentally, located in the consecrated bread and wine, such that Christ is present to the believer through the consecrated bread and wine, thereby making available to the believer a second-person experience of Christ, where the consecrated bread and wine are the way in which she shares attention with him. The consecrated bread and wine are then, in a sense, icons of Christ.
Philosophical Review, 2008
... Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall, and Caroline West in “Moral Fictionalism versus the Rest,” Austra... more ... Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall, and Caroline West in “Moral Fictionalism versus the Rest,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005): 307–30 ... for example, the host of semantic objections to hermeneutic fic-tionalism about metaphysical discourse offered by Jason Stanley.6 ...
In response to John Bishop's (2007) account of passionally caused believing, Dan-Johan Eklund (20... more In response to John Bishop's (2007) account of passionally caused believing, Dan-Johan Eklund (2014) argues that conscious non-evidential believing is (conceptually) impossible, that is, it's (conceptually) impossible consciously to believe that p whilst acknowledging that the relevant evidence doesn't support p's being true, for it conflicts with belief being a truth-oriented attitude, or so he argues. In this article, we present Eklund's case against Bishop's account of passionally caused believing, and we argue that it's unpersuasive, at least to those who accept permissivism about evidence, that is, that it's possible for there to be more than one rational response to a given body of evidence. We do this through a novel application of a case of nurtured belief, that is, of a person holding a belief simply because she was caused to do so by her upbringing, and we use it to show exactly where Eklund's argument goes wrong. We conclude by drawing a general lesson drawn from this debate: if permissivism about evidence is true, then belief being truth-oriented is consistent with non-evidential believing being possible.
Analysis, 2005
We should distinguish two aspects of modal theorizing. There is the metaphysical theory of what k... more We should distinguish two aspects of modal theorizing. There is the metaphysical theory of what kind of thing (unactualized) possibilities are,
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2009
... But is the resulting version of metaphysical nihilism one that helps us see the question ... more ... But is the resulting version of metaphysical nihilism one that helps us see the question 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' as substantive and ... it is a part of everything, on its own it is a nothing, not a something (and the analogy between its role in mereology and zero in ...
European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 2005
We argue that genuine modal realism can be extended, rather than modified, so as to allow for the... more We argue that genuine modal realism can be extended, rather than modified, so as to allow for the possibility of nothing concrete, a possibility we term 'metaphysical nihilism' . The issue should be important to the genuine modal realist because, not only is metaphysical nihilism itself intuitively plausible, but also it is supported by an argument with pre-theoretically credible premises, namely, the subtraction argument. Given the soundness of the subtraction argument, we show that there are two ways that the genuine modal realist can accommodate metaphysical nihilism: (i) by allowing for worlds containing only spatiotemporal points and (ii) by allowing for a world containing nothing but the null individual. on methodological grounds, we argue that the genuine modal realist should reject the former way but embrace the latter way.
Philosophical Quarterly, 2009
Metaphysical nihilism is the view that there could have been nothing, or more precisely, that the... more Metaphysical nihilism is the view that there could have been nothing, or more precisely, that there could have been none of the things philosophers are asking about when they ask 'Why is there something rather than nothing?'. Since in asking that question they are clearly not concerned with necessarily existing abstract objects such as numbers, the recent literature on metaphysical nihilism has described the position as claiming that there could have been no concrete objects. In , Thomas Baldwin proposed an argument for metaphysical nihilism. 1
Philosophical Books, 2008
Greenberg's contribution to the volume is very long, consisting of two parts, in effect, two arti... more Greenberg's contribution to the volume is very long, consisting of two parts, in effect, two articles, 'How Facts Make Law, Parts I and II'. He argues that we cannot explain legal practices wholly by empirical means and that a full account of legal practice would require a value judgement. Dworkin agrees, of course, with this general line and welcomes Greenberg's willingness to engage general metaphysics in support.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2006
We argue that Armstrong's Combinatorialism allows for the possibility of nothing by giving a... more We argue that Armstrong's Combinatorialism allows for the possibility of nothing by giving a Combinatorial account of the empty world and show that such an account is consistent with the ontological and conceptual aims of the theory. We then suggest that the Combinatorialist should allow for ...
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2010
Could an object have only mass and no other property? In giving an affirmative answer to this que... more Could an object have only mass and no other property? In giving an affirmative answer to this question, Jonathan Schaffer (2003, pp. 136-8) proposes what he calls 'the subtraction argument' for 'the possibility of free mass'. We assess the cogency of this argument in ...
Dialectica, 2008
In this paper, we give a precise characterization of the principle of recombination and argue tha... more In this paper, we give a precise characterization of the principle of recombination and argue that it need not be subject to any restrictions.
The Journal of philosophy, 2005
6 rWA hy is there something rather than nothing?" is a peren-nial question of metaphysics, i... more 6 rWA hy is there something rather than nothing?" is a peren-nial question of metaphysics, if not the fundamental V ?question as Heidegger maintains.' But what sort of thing does this question concern? Traditionally, the question is taken to con-cern concrete objects: why is there ...
Faith and Philosophy
People of faith, particularly in the Judeo-Christian tradition, worship corporately at least as o... more People of faith, particularly in the Judeo-Christian tradition, worship corporately at least as often, if not more so, than they do individually. Why do they do this? There are, of course, many reasons, some having to do with personal preference and others having to do with the theology of worship. But, in this paper, we explore one reason, a philosophical reason, which, despite recent work on the philosophy of liturgy, has gone underappreciated. In particular, we argue that corporate worship enables a person to come to know God better than they would otherwise know him in individual worship.
We present a new understanding of Christ’s real presence in the Eucharist on the model of Stump’s... more We present a new understanding of Christ’s real presence in the Eucharist on the model of Stump’s account of God’s omnipresence and Green and Quan’s account of experiencing God in Scripture. On this understanding, Christ is derivatively, rather than fundamentally, located in the consecrated bread and wine, such that Christ is present to the believer through the consecrated bread and wine, thereby making available to the believer a second-person experience of Christ, where the consecrated bread and wine are the way in which she shares attention with him. The consecrated bread and wine are then, in a sense, icons of Christ.