David Martimort - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
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Papers by David Martimort
Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2011
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Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2012
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This paper analyzes whether building infrastructures which are socially use- ful and managing tho... more This paper analyzes whether building infrastructures which are socially use- ful and managing those assets are two tasks which should be bundled or not. In a complete contracting framework, we first show that the two tasks should be performed altogether by the same firm when a better design of the infras- tructure helps also to save on operating costs (positive
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Cepr Discussion Papers, Aug 1, 2004
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Revue Economique, 2008
ABSTRACT This paper offers some results on the comparison of the costs and benefits associated to... more ABSTRACT This paper offers some results on the comparison of the costs and benefits associated to the Public-Private Partnerships and to the traditional mode of public contracting. We conclude by explorng the limits of the model. Classification JEL : H11
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Revue D Economie Politique, Dec 1, 2008
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Annales D Economie Et De Statistique, 2001
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Policy Research Working Paper Series, 1999
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J Ind Econ, 2010
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Economie Publique Public Economics, Oct 1, 2007
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Rev Econ, 2009
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ABSTRACT This paper discusses the feasibility and performances of simple mechanisms to implement ... more ABSTRACT This paper discusses the feasibility and performances of simple mechanisms to implement international environmental agreements in the multilateral externalities context of global warming. Asymmetric information and voluntary participation by sovereign and heterogeneous countries are key constraints on the design of those agreements. Mechanisms must prevent two sorts of free‐riding problems – free riding in effort provision and free riding in participation. As markets might fail to solve simultaneously those two problems, we construct instead a simple menu of options that trades off the provision of incentives for participating countries and the provision of incentives to participate. With such a mechanism, all countries voluntarily contribute to a fund, although at different intensities, but only the most efficient ones effectively reduce their pollution below its ‘business as usual’ level. Résoudre le problème du réchauffement climatique global : au‐delà des marchés, des mécanismes simples peuvent aider. Ce texte examine l'utilité et la performance de mécanismes simples pour mettre en place des accords environnementaux internationaux dans le contexte des externalités multilatérales du réchauffement global. L'information asymétrique et la nécessité d'obtenir la participation volontaire de pays hétérogènes et indépendants constituent des contraintes importantes dans le dessein de ces accords. L'utilisation de mécanismes peut prévenir deux sortes de comportement de passager clandestin ‐ dans l'effort à fournir et dans la participation. Comme les marchés peuvent faillir dans la résolution de ces deux problèmes, on construit un simple menu d'options qui négocient des relations d’équivalence entre les incitations pour les pays participants à s'impliquer, et les incitations pour les pays à participer. Avec un tel mécanisme, tous les pays contribuent volontairement à un fond , même si c'est avec des intensités diverses, mais seulement les plus efficaces réduisent effectivement leurs émissions polluantes en dessous du niveau de la routine habituelle.
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Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2011
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Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2012
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This paper analyzes whether building infrastructures which are socially use- ful and managing tho... more This paper analyzes whether building infrastructures which are socially use- ful and managing those assets are two tasks which should be bundled or not. In a complete contracting framework, we first show that the two tasks should be performed altogether by the same firm when a better design of the infras- tructure helps also to save on operating costs (positive
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Cepr Discussion Papers, Aug 1, 2004
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Revue Economique, 2008
ABSTRACT This paper offers some results on the comparison of the costs and benefits associated to... more ABSTRACT This paper offers some results on the comparison of the costs and benefits associated to the Public-Private Partnerships and to the traditional mode of public contracting. We conclude by explorng the limits of the model. Classification JEL : H11
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
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Revue D Economie Politique, Dec 1, 2008
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Annales D Economie Et De Statistique, 2001
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Policy Research Working Paper Series, 1999
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J Ind Econ, 2010
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Economie Publique Public Economics, Oct 1, 2007
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Rev Econ, 2009
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ABSTRACT This paper discusses the feasibility and performances of simple mechanisms to implement ... more ABSTRACT This paper discusses the feasibility and performances of simple mechanisms to implement international environmental agreements in the multilateral externalities context of global warming. Asymmetric information and voluntary participation by sovereign and heterogeneous countries are key constraints on the design of those agreements. Mechanisms must prevent two sorts of free‐riding problems – free riding in effort provision and free riding in participation. As markets might fail to solve simultaneously those two problems, we construct instead a simple menu of options that trades off the provision of incentives for participating countries and the provision of incentives to participate. With such a mechanism, all countries voluntarily contribute to a fund, although at different intensities, but only the most efficient ones effectively reduce their pollution below its ‘business as usual’ level. Résoudre le problème du réchauffement climatique global : au‐delà des marchés, des mécanismes simples peuvent aider. Ce texte examine l'utilité et la performance de mécanismes simples pour mettre en place des accords environnementaux internationaux dans le contexte des externalités multilatérales du réchauffement global. L'information asymétrique et la nécessité d'obtenir la participation volontaire de pays hétérogènes et indépendants constituent des contraintes importantes dans le dessein de ces accords. L'utilisation de mécanismes peut prévenir deux sortes de comportement de passager clandestin ‐ dans l'effort à fournir et dans la participation. Comme les marchés peuvent faillir dans la résolution de ces deux problèmes, on construit un simple menu d'options qui négocient des relations d’équivalence entre les incitations pour les pays participants à s'impliquer, et les incitations pour les pays à participer. Avec un tel mécanisme, tous les pays contribuent volontairement à un fond , même si c'est avec des intensités diverses, mais seulement les plus efficaces réduisent effectivement leurs émissions polluantes en dessous du niveau de la routine habituelle.
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Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact