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Papers by David Martimort

Research paper thumbnail of Weak Enforcement of Environmental Policies: A Tale of Limited Commitment and Limited Fines

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2011

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Research paper thumbnail of Le citoyen, l'expert et le politique : une rationalité complexe pour une régulation excessive du risque

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2012

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Research paper thumbnail of Build It or Not": Normative and Positive Theories of Private-Public Partnerships

This paper analyzes whether building infrastructures which are socially use- ful and managing tho... more This paper analyzes whether building infrastructures which are socially use- ful and managing those assets are two tasks which should be bundled or not. In a complete contracting framework, we first show that the two tasks should be performed altogether by the same firm when a better design of the infras- tructure helps also to save on operating costs (positive

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Research paper thumbnail of Communication by Interest Groups and the Organization of Lobbying

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Research paper thumbnail of The Simple Micro-Economics of Public-Private Partnerships

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Research paper thumbnail of The Organization of Delegated Expertise

Cepr Discussion Papers, Aug 1, 2004

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Research paper thumbnail of Renégotiation de contrats dans l’industrie du transport urbain en France

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Research paper thumbnail of Partenariats public-privé: quelques réflexions

Revue Economique, 2008

ABSTRACT This paper offers some results on the comparison of the costs and benefits associated to... more ABSTRACT This paper offers some results on the comparison of the costs and benefits associated to the Public-Private Partnerships and to the traditional mode of public contracting. We conclude by explorng the limits of the model. Classification JEL : H11

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Research paper thumbnail of Risk averse supervisors and the efficiency of collusion

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Research paper thumbnail of The Design of Transnational Public Good Mechanisms for Developing Countries

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Research paper thumbnail of Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria

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Research paper thumbnail of The Regulator and the Judge: The Optimal Mix in The Control of Environmental Risk.: Le règulateur et le juge: quelle articulation face aux activités risquées?

Revue D Economie Politique, Dec 1, 2008

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Research paper thumbnail of En premier" sale as a form of intertemporal price discrimination

Annales D Economie Et De Statistique, 2001

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Research paper thumbnail of Politics, Transaction Costs, and the Design of Regulatory Institutions

Policy Research Working Paper Series, 1999

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Research paper thumbnail of Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation

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Research paper thumbnail of Contracting for an Innovation Under Bilateral Asymmetric Information*: Contracting for Innovation Under Asymmetric Information

J Ind Econ, 2010

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Research paper thumbnail of Non-Manipulable Mechanisms: A Brief Overview

Economie Publique Public Economics, Oct 1, 2007

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Research paper thumbnail of Ren�gociation de contrats dans l'industrie du transport urbain en France

Rev Econ, 2009

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Research paper thumbnail of Solving the GlobalWarming Problem: Beyond Markets, Simple Mechanisms May Help!

ABSTRACT This paper discusses the feasibility and performances of simple mechanisms to implement ... more ABSTRACT This paper discusses the feasibility and performances of simple mechanisms to implement international environmental agreements in the multilateral externalities context of global warming. Asymmetric information and voluntary participation by sovereign and heterogeneous countries are key constraints on the design of those agreements. Mechanisms must prevent two sorts of free‐riding problems – free riding in effort provision and free riding in participation. As markets might fail to solve simultaneously those two problems, we construct instead a simple menu of options that trades off the provision of incentives for participating countries and the provision of incentives to participate. With such a mechanism, all countries voluntarily contribute to a fund, although at different intensities, but only the most efficient ones effectively reduce their pollution below its ‘business as usual’ level. Résoudre le problème du réchauffement climatique global : au‐delà des marchés, des mécanismes simples peuvent aider. Ce texte examine l'utilité et la performance de mécanismes simples pour mettre en place des accords environnementaux internationaux dans le contexte des externalités multilatérales du réchauffement global. L'information asymétrique et la nécessité d'obtenir la participation volontaire de pays hétérogènes et indépendants constituent des contraintes importantes dans le dessein de ces accords. L'utilisation de mécanismes peut prévenir deux sortes de comportement de passager clandestin ‐ dans l'effort à fournir et dans la participation. Comme les marchés peuvent faillir dans la résolution de ces deux problèmes, on construit un simple menu d'options qui négocient des relations d’équivalence entre les incitations pour les pays participants à s'impliquer, et les incitations pour les pays à participer. Avec un tel mécanisme, tous les pays contribuent volontairement à un fond , même si c'est avec des intensités diverses, mais seulement les plus efficaces réduisent effectivement leurs émissions polluantes en dessous du niveau de la routine habituelle.

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Research paper thumbnail of Transaction Costs and Incentie Theory

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Research paper thumbnail of Weak Enforcement of Environmental Policies: A Tale of Limited Commitment and Limited Fines

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2011

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Research paper thumbnail of Le citoyen, l'expert et le politique : une rationalité complexe pour une régulation excessive du risque

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2012

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Research paper thumbnail of Build It or Not": Normative and Positive Theories of Private-Public Partnerships

This paper analyzes whether building infrastructures which are socially use- ful and managing tho... more This paper analyzes whether building infrastructures which are socially use- ful and managing those assets are two tasks which should be bundled or not. In a complete contracting framework, we first show that the two tasks should be performed altogether by the same firm when a better design of the infras- tructure helps also to save on operating costs (positive

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Research paper thumbnail of Communication by Interest Groups and the Organization of Lobbying

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Research paper thumbnail of The Simple Micro-Economics of Public-Private Partnerships

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Research paper thumbnail of The Organization of Delegated Expertise

Cepr Discussion Papers, Aug 1, 2004

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Research paper thumbnail of Renégotiation de contrats dans l’industrie du transport urbain en France

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Research paper thumbnail of Partenariats public-privé: quelques réflexions

Revue Economique, 2008

ABSTRACT This paper offers some results on the comparison of the costs and benefits associated to... more ABSTRACT This paper offers some results on the comparison of the costs and benefits associated to the Public-Private Partnerships and to the traditional mode of public contracting. We conclude by explorng the limits of the model. Classification JEL : H11

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Research paper thumbnail of Risk averse supervisors and the efficiency of collusion

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Research paper thumbnail of The Design of Transnational Public Good Mechanisms for Developing Countries

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Research paper thumbnail of Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Research paper thumbnail of The Regulator and the Judge: The Optimal Mix in The Control of Environmental Risk.: Le règulateur et le juge: quelle articulation face aux activités risquées?

Revue D Economie Politique, Dec 1, 2008

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Research paper thumbnail of En premier" sale as a form of intertemporal price discrimination

Annales D Economie Et De Statistique, 2001

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Research paper thumbnail of Politics, Transaction Costs, and the Design of Regulatory Institutions

Policy Research Working Paper Series, 1999

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Research paper thumbnail of Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Research paper thumbnail of Contracting for an Innovation Under Bilateral Asymmetric Information*: Contracting for Innovation Under Asymmetric Information

J Ind Econ, 2010

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Research paper thumbnail of Non-Manipulable Mechanisms: A Brief Overview

Economie Publique Public Economics, Oct 1, 2007

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Research paper thumbnail of Ren�gociation de contrats dans l'industrie du transport urbain en France

Rev Econ, 2009

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact

Research paper thumbnail of Solving the GlobalWarming Problem: Beyond Markets, Simple Mechanisms May Help!

ABSTRACT This paper discusses the feasibility and performances of simple mechanisms to implement ... more ABSTRACT This paper discusses the feasibility and performances of simple mechanisms to implement international environmental agreements in the multilateral externalities context of global warming. Asymmetric information and voluntary participation by sovereign and heterogeneous countries are key constraints on the design of those agreements. Mechanisms must prevent two sorts of free‐riding problems – free riding in effort provision and free riding in participation. As markets might fail to solve simultaneously those two problems, we construct instead a simple menu of options that trades off the provision of incentives for participating countries and the provision of incentives to participate. With such a mechanism, all countries voluntarily contribute to a fund, although at different intensities, but only the most efficient ones effectively reduce their pollution below its ‘business as usual’ level. Résoudre le problème du réchauffement climatique global : au‐delà des marchés, des mécanismes simples peuvent aider. Ce texte examine l'utilité et la performance de mécanismes simples pour mettre en place des accords environnementaux internationaux dans le contexte des externalités multilatérales du réchauffement global. L'information asymétrique et la nécessité d'obtenir la participation volontaire de pays hétérogènes et indépendants constituent des contraintes importantes dans le dessein de ces accords. L'utilisation de mécanismes peut prévenir deux sortes de comportement de passager clandestin ‐ dans l'effort à fournir et dans la participation. Comme les marchés peuvent faillir dans la résolution de ces deux problèmes, on construit un simple menu d'options qui négocient des relations d’équivalence entre les incitations pour les pays participants à s'impliquer, et les incitations pour les pays à participer. Avec un tel mécanisme, tous les pays contribuent volontairement à un fond , même si c'est avec des intensités diverses, mais seulement les plus efficaces réduisent effectivement leurs émissions polluantes en dessous du niveau de la routine habituelle.

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Research paper thumbnail of Transaction Costs and Incentie Theory

Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact