Denis Perrin - Profile on Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by Denis Perrin

In the field of memory, it is now admitted that an experience of memory is not only the consequen... more In the field of memory, it is now admitted that an experience of memory is not only the consequence of the activation of a precise content, but also results from an inference associated with the transfer of the manner in which the process was carried out (i.e., fluency) in addition to the transfer of the process itself. The aim of this work was to show that experience of memory is also associated with the fluency that is due to the transfer of a processing carried out in our interactions with our past environment. Firstly, participants performed a perceptual discrimination task (geometric shapes: circle or square) that involves a fluent or a non-fluent gesture to respond. Motor fluency vs. non-fluency was implicitly associated with the colour of the geometric shapes. Secondly, participants had to perform a classical memory recognition task. During the recognition phase, items appeared either with the colour associated with motor fluency or with the colour associated with motor non-f...

Philosophy and the mind sciences, Feb 19, 2024

A common view about the phenomenology of episodic remembering has it that when we remember a perc... more A common view about the phenomenology of episodic remembering has it that when we remember a perceptual experience, we can relive or re-experience many of its features, but not its characteristic presence. In this paper, we challenge this common view. We first say that presence in perception divides into temporal and locative presence, with locative having two sides, an objective and a subjective one. While we agree with the common view that temporal and objective locative presence cannot be relived in remembering, we argue that subjective locative presence-the feeling of being immersed in a certain scene-can be so. Our argument for this claim starts by determining independently the underpinning mechanisms of subjective locative presence in quasi-perceptual imagination. These mechanisms are self-projection, imaginative pretence, and attentional focus. We then proceed to establish that they have been found to underpin conscious states of episodic remembering too. We conclude that episodic remembering can bring us to relive the subjective locative presence characteristic of a perceptual experience, and that the common view is mistaken. Our view-'mnemonic immersivism'-has important consequences regarding the relationships between memory and imagination and the phenomenology of episodic remembering.

A plea for a moderate embodied approach to linguistic meaning

International audienc

Deferentialism (1): Framework

Review of M. Rowlands, Memory and the Self, OUP, 2017

Recension d'ouvrage pour la revue "Memory Studies

What is the explicature of 'I'? A simulationalist vs deferentialist debate

International audienc

Causality in episodic memory: It's all about procedural memory

International audienc

Asymetries in Subjective Time

International audienc

B. Z. Mahon, "Le fardeau de la cognition incarnée" (2015)

Traduction d'articl

A Two-Level-of-Assertion Reading of Frege on Singular Thoughts

International audienc

Quelle place pour la causalité dans la mémoire ?

International audienc

Qu'est-ce qui est collectif dans la mémoire collective ?

International audienc

B. Z. Mahon, "Réponse à Glenberg : Le contenu conceptuel ne contraint pas le format représentationnel des concepts" (2015)

Traduction d'articl

New Essays on Frege’s Logical Investigations

Deferentialism (2): Theory

International audienc

La deixis incarnée

National audienc

The procedural nature of memory

International audienc

Une théorie déférentialiste de l'indexicalité linguistique

International audienc

La philosophie de la mémoire : discussion du paradigme du voyage mental dans le temps

International audienc

In the field of memory, it is now admitted that an experience of memory is not only the consequen... more In the field of memory, it is now admitted that an experience of memory is not only the consequence of the activation of a precise content, but also results from an inference associated with the transfer of the manner in which the process was carried out (i.e., fluency) in addition to the transfer of the process itself. The aim of this work was to show that experience of memory is also associated with the fluency that is due to the transfer of a processing carried out in our interactions with our past environment. Firstly, participants performed a perceptual discrimination task (geometric shapes: circle or square) that involves a fluent or a non-fluent gesture to respond. Motor fluency vs. non-fluency was implicitly associated with the colour of the geometric shapes. Secondly, participants had to perform a classical memory recognition task. During the recognition phase, items appeared either with the colour associated with motor fluency or with the colour associated with motor non-f...

Philosophy and the mind sciences, Feb 19, 2024

A common view about the phenomenology of episodic remembering has it that when we remember a perc... more A common view about the phenomenology of episodic remembering has it that when we remember a perceptual experience, we can relive or re-experience many of its features, but not its characteristic presence. In this paper, we challenge this common view. We first say that presence in perception divides into temporal and locative presence, with locative having two sides, an objective and a subjective one. While we agree with the common view that temporal and objective locative presence cannot be relived in remembering, we argue that subjective locative presence-the feeling of being immersed in a certain scene-can be so. Our argument for this claim starts by determining independently the underpinning mechanisms of subjective locative presence in quasi-perceptual imagination. These mechanisms are self-projection, imaginative pretence, and attentional focus. We then proceed to establish that they have been found to underpin conscious states of episodic remembering too. We conclude that episodic remembering can bring us to relive the subjective locative presence characteristic of a perceptual experience, and that the common view is mistaken. Our view-'mnemonic immersivism'-has important consequences regarding the relationships between memory and imagination and the phenomenology of episodic remembering.

A plea for a moderate embodied approach to linguistic meaning

International audienc

Deferentialism (1): Framework

Review of M. Rowlands, Memory and the Self, OUP, 2017

Recension d'ouvrage pour la revue "Memory Studies

What is the explicature of 'I'? A simulationalist vs deferentialist debate

International audienc

Causality in episodic memory: It's all about procedural memory

International audienc

Asymetries in Subjective Time

International audienc

B. Z. Mahon, "Le fardeau de la cognition incarnée" (2015)

Traduction d'articl

A Two-Level-of-Assertion Reading of Frege on Singular Thoughts

International audienc

Quelle place pour la causalité dans la mémoire ?

International audienc

Qu'est-ce qui est collectif dans la mémoire collective ?

International audienc

B. Z. Mahon, "Réponse à Glenberg : Le contenu conceptuel ne contraint pas le format représentationnel des concepts" (2015)

Traduction d'articl

New Essays on Frege’s Logical Investigations

Deferentialism (2): Theory

International audienc

La deixis incarnée

National audienc

The procedural nature of memory

International audienc

Une théorie déférentialiste de l'indexicalité linguistique

International audienc

La philosophie de la mémoire : discussion du paradigme du voyage mental dans le temps

International audienc