Max Deutsch - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by Max Deutsch

Erkenntnis

This article argues that the “qua problem” for purely causal theories of reference grounding is a... more This article argues that the “qua problem” for purely causal theories of reference grounding is an illusion. Reference can be grounded via description and fit, but purely causal reference grounding is possible too. In fact, “arguments from ignorance and error” suggest that many of our terms have had their reference grounded purely causally. If the qua problem is illusory, then there is no need to adopt a “hybrid” theory of reference grounding of the kind recently recommended by Amie Thomasson (Ontology made easy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) and Ron Mallon (The construction of human kinds, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016). This opens the door to a “discovery model” of philosophical knowledge, a model we could then choose to accept.

The Philosophical Forum, 2016

Inquiry, 2016

In my 2015 book, The Myth of the Intuitive: Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Method, I a... more In my 2015 book, The Myth of the Intuitive: Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Method, I argue that intuitions are not routinely treated as evidence in philosophy and that this significantly blunts the force of a critique of analytic philosophy that stems from results from ‘experimental philosophy’. Elijah Chudnoff, Edouard Machery and David Colaco, and Jennifer Nado – commentators who are, to varying degrees, sympathetic with aspects of experimental philosophy – critically evaluate my arguments in three essays in this issue. I here reply to these criticisms.

Mind & Language, 2009

It is argued on a variety of grounds that recent results in 'experimental philosophy of language'... more It is argued on a variety of grounds that recent results in 'experimental philosophy of language', which appear to show that there are significant cross-cultural differences in intuitions about the reference of proper names, do not pose a threat to a more traditional mode of philosophizing about reference. Some of these same grounds justify a complaint about experimental philosophy as a whole.

Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2010

Practitioners of the new 'experimental philosophy' have collected data that appear to show that s... more Practitioners of the new 'experimental philosophy' have collected data that appear to show that some philosophical intuitions are culturally variable. Many experimental philosophers take this to pose a problem for a more traditional, 'armchair' style of philosophizing. It is argued that this is a mistake that derives from a false assumption about the character of philosophical methods; neither philosophy nor its methods have anything to fear from cultural variability in philosophical intuitions. Some of the most striking results from the new 'experimental philosophy' movement are those that appear to reveal significant variability, along cultural and other dimensions, in peoples' philosophical intuitions. For example, the experimental philosophers, Weinberg et al. (2001), conducted cross-cultural empirical studies on the Gettier intuition and claim to have found that significant majorities of East Asian and Indian subjects will intuit that an agent in a Gettier case 'really knows', as opposed to 'only believes', the relevant proposition. A different group of experimental philosophers, Machery et al. (2004), undertook cross-cultural experiments on intuitions about reference, and claim to have discovered that East Asians' intuitions strongly favor a descriptivist theory of reference for proper names, while Westerners' intuitions equally strongly support Kripke's (1980) 'causal-historical' alternative. This variability, if it really exists, is interesting in itself, and cries out for some explanation. But what, if anything, does it tell us about philosophical method? Is cross-cultural variability in intuitions something that Gettier and Kripke, for example, should worry about? Some experimental philosophers say that it is. In fact, both groups of experimental philosophers mentioned above use their experimental results to challenge the more traditional, 'armchair' method of Rev.Phil.Psych.

Inquiry, 2015

Abstract Avner Baz claims that questions philosophers ask about hypothetical cases lack the kind ... more Abstract Avner Baz claims that questions philosophers ask about hypothetical cases lack the kind of ‘point’ possessed by ‘everyday’ questions. He concludes from this that there is something wrong with the philosophical practice of asking questions about hypothetical cases. This paper defends the practice from Baz’s criticism.

Recent work in-experimental semantics‖ appears to show that Western and East Asian speakers have ... more Recent work in-experimental semantics‖ appears to show that Western and East Asian speakers have significantly different intuitions about the reference of proper names. This raises a methodological question about the theory of reference and the philosophy of language as a whole. How should the discovery of this cross-cultural difference affect future theorizing? Does the result challenge the Kripkean,-causal-historical‖ theory of reference for names? How central a role do intuitions about reference or other semantic phenomena play in philosophical theorizing about language? How central a role should they play? It will be argued that the role of intuitions has been greatly exaggerated, both by experimental semanticists, and by the more traditional semanticists who are their targets. Furthermore, it will be argued that the normative question of how large a role intuitions should play should be: A very minimal one.