Donald Wittman - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by Donald Wittman

Social Science Research Network, 2005

Candidates may vary in quality, where quality is some characteristic orthogonal to policy. This "... more Candidates may vary in quality, where quality is some characteristic orthogonal to policy. This "simple modification" has for the most part defied integration into the Downsian framework. Here we add the following complicating factors. We consider the possibility that there are uninformed voters who are ignorant of the candidates' relative quality. However, a pressure group with inside information regarding the quality of the candidates may endorse one of the candidates as the high-quality candidate. We assume that the uninformed voters behave rationally in the presence of this endorsement. We show that campaign endorsements by the pressure group are generally welfare improving even though the pressure group takes advantage of its private information.

Routledge eBooks, Jan 12, 2018

Power, Voting, and Voting Power, 1981

There is little agreement regarding the appropriate definition of power. Consequently, there is a... more There is little agreement regarding the appropriate definition of power. Consequently, there is always the underlying suspicion that research on power is critically dependent upon the particular concept of power being employed, and there is a great temptation to dismiss most of the literature as being idiosyncratic without general applicability. In this paper, I demonstrate that many of the approaches to power create identical results. Thus, the generality of the results in the literature are much greater than heretofore believed.

Routledge Siena studies in political economy, Dec 9, 1998

Social Science Research Network, Sep 1, 2006

Over its long lifetime, "political economy" has had manydifferent meanings: the science... more Over its long lifetime, "political economy" has had manydifferent meanings: the science of managing the resources of a nation so as to provide wealth to its inhabitants for Adam Smith; the study of how the ownership of the means of production influenced historical processes for Marx; the study of the inter-relationship between economics and politics for some twentieth-century commentators; and for others, a methodology emphasizing individual rationality (the economic or "public choice" approach) or institutional adaptation (the sociological version). This Handbook views political economy as a grand (if imperfect) synthesis of these various strands, treating political economy as the methodology of economics applied to the analysis of political behavior and institutions.

This book refutes one of the cornerstone beliefs of economics and political science: that economi... more This book refutes one of the cornerstone beliefs of economics and political science: that economic markets are more efficient than the processes and institutions of democratic government. Wittman first considers the characteristic of efficient markets—informed, rational participants competing for well-defined and easily transferred property rights—and explains how they operate in democratic politics. He then analyzes how specific political institutions are organized to operate efficiently. "Markets" such as the the Congress in the United States, bureaucracies, and pressure groups, he demonstrates, contribute to efficient political outcomes. He also provides a theory of institutional design to explain how these political "markets" arise. Finally, Wittman addresses the methodological shortcomings of analyses of political market failure, and offers his own suggestions for a more effective research strategy. Ultimately, he demonstrates that nearly all of the arguments claiming that economic markets are efficient apply equally well to democratic political markets; and, conversely, that economic models of political failure are not more valid than the analogous arguments for economic market failure.

Over its long lifetime, "political economy" has had manydifferent meanings: the science... more Over its long lifetime, "political economy" has had manydifferent meanings: the science of managing the resources of a nation so as to provide wealth to its inhabitants for Adam Smith; the study of how the ownership of the means of production influenced historical processes for Marx; the study of the inter-relationship between economics and politics for some twentieth-century commentators; and for others, a methodology emphasizing individual rationality (the economic or "public choice" approach) or institutional adaptation (the sociological version). This Handbook views political economy as a grand (if imperfect) synthesis of these various strands, treating political economy as the methodology of economics applied to the analysis of political behavior and institutions.

The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, 2002

Oxford Handbooks Online, 2011

Hypothesis testing is the standard approach used in scientific work, but it is the wrong methodol... more Hypothesis testing is the standard approach used in scientific work, but it is the wrong methodology to use in choosing which theory most accurately de-scribes the data. This is because hypothesis testing is asymmetric and does not spec-ify the alternative hypothesis in sufficient detail. A more appropriate methodology is to engage in model choice where the contending theories are treated symmetri-cally. This chapter first explains the problems with hypothesis testing, then provides the methodology of theory choice, and finally provides examples where hypothesis testing leads to inappropriate conclusions.

Homo Oeconomicus, 2016

Edmund Phelps argues against present day capitalism and economic theory because the former has lo... more Edmund Phelps argues against present day capitalism and economic theory because the former has lost it dynamism and the latter has ignored the human spirit. He provides little evidence that things are getting worse and ignores how economic takes into account human desire for autonomy and creativity. Phelps looks fondly on his liberal arts education, but his reason for doing so is slipshod and unworthy of a Nobel Prize winner.

Teoria De La Democracia Una Aproximacion Economica 1980 Isbn 84 7196 292 6 Pags 267 292, 1980

Is the choice in Iraq between anarchy and a ruthless dictatorship or is there a middle way? And i... more Is the choice in Iraq between anarchy and a ruthless dictatorship or is there a middle way? And if there is a middle way in Iraq or elsewhere, what conditions foster such an outcome? The fundamental political problem is that the power to prevent anarchy is also the power to impose one’s will. A raw application of public choice theory would lead one to expect that those with military and political power would further their own self interest at the expense of the rest of the population. Yet, contrary to the public choice paradigm, we do observe relatively benign dictatorships in some countries and a relative respect for property and civil rights in the democracies of North America and Western Europe. Here we explain why the choice need not be limited to brutish anarchy and a self-aggrandizing Leviathan. At the same time, we explain why dictatorships are inclined to take bad economic policies.

Econ Journal Watch, 2005

A COMMON COMPLAINT BY AUTHORS IS THAT THEIR REVIEWERS have misinterpreted what the author has sai... more A COMMON COMPLAINT BY AUTHORS IS THAT THEIR REVIEWERS have misinterpreted what the author has said. This is not my complaint here, because Bryan Caplan has explained my position better than I have. And I certainly cannot complain when Caplan sees my views as being more opposed to Lenin’s views than Milton Friedman’s are. Furthermore, I agree with two of Caplan’s major points: (1) that people are more likely to be irrational or uninformed (I add the latter because it is often hard to distinguish the two) when the cost of being so is slight; and (2) that more empirical work on voter rationality is needed (as an aside, I would like to add that Caplan has made important steps in this direction).

Social Science Research Network, 2005

Candidates may vary in quality, where quality is some characteristic orthogonal to policy. This "... more Candidates may vary in quality, where quality is some characteristic orthogonal to policy. This "simple modification" has for the most part defied integration into the Downsian framework. Here we add the following complicating factors. We consider the possibility that there are uninformed voters who are ignorant of the candidates' relative quality. However, a pressure group with inside information regarding the quality of the candidates may endorse one of the candidates as the high-quality candidate. We assume that the uninformed voters behave rationally in the presence of this endorsement. We show that campaign endorsements by the pressure group are generally welfare improving even though the pressure group takes advantage of its private information.

Routledge eBooks, Jan 12, 2018

Power, Voting, and Voting Power, 1981

There is little agreement regarding the appropriate definition of power. Consequently, there is a... more There is little agreement regarding the appropriate definition of power. Consequently, there is always the underlying suspicion that research on power is critically dependent upon the particular concept of power being employed, and there is a great temptation to dismiss most of the literature as being idiosyncratic without general applicability. In this paper, I demonstrate that many of the approaches to power create identical results. Thus, the generality of the results in the literature are much greater than heretofore believed.

Routledge Siena studies in political economy, Dec 9, 1998

Social Science Research Network, Sep 1, 2006

Over its long lifetime, "political economy" has had manydifferent meanings: the science... more Over its long lifetime, "political economy" has had manydifferent meanings: the science of managing the resources of a nation so as to provide wealth to its inhabitants for Adam Smith; the study of how the ownership of the means of production influenced historical processes for Marx; the study of the inter-relationship between economics and politics for some twentieth-century commentators; and for others, a methodology emphasizing individual rationality (the economic or "public choice" approach) or institutional adaptation (the sociological version). This Handbook views political economy as a grand (if imperfect) synthesis of these various strands, treating political economy as the methodology of economics applied to the analysis of political behavior and institutions.

This book refutes one of the cornerstone beliefs of economics and political science: that economi... more This book refutes one of the cornerstone beliefs of economics and political science: that economic markets are more efficient than the processes and institutions of democratic government. Wittman first considers the characteristic of efficient markets—informed, rational participants competing for well-defined and easily transferred property rights—and explains how they operate in democratic politics. He then analyzes how specific political institutions are organized to operate efficiently. "Markets" such as the the Congress in the United States, bureaucracies, and pressure groups, he demonstrates, contribute to efficient political outcomes. He also provides a theory of institutional design to explain how these political "markets" arise. Finally, Wittman addresses the methodological shortcomings of analyses of political market failure, and offers his own suggestions for a more effective research strategy. Ultimately, he demonstrates that nearly all of the arguments claiming that economic markets are efficient apply equally well to democratic political markets; and, conversely, that economic models of political failure are not more valid than the analogous arguments for economic market failure.

Over its long lifetime, "political economy" has had manydifferent meanings: the science... more Over its long lifetime, "political economy" has had manydifferent meanings: the science of managing the resources of a nation so as to provide wealth to its inhabitants for Adam Smith; the study of how the ownership of the means of production influenced historical processes for Marx; the study of the inter-relationship between economics and politics for some twentieth-century commentators; and for others, a methodology emphasizing individual rationality (the economic or "public choice" approach) or institutional adaptation (the sociological version). This Handbook views political economy as a grand (if imperfect) synthesis of these various strands, treating political economy as the methodology of economics applied to the analysis of political behavior and institutions.

The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, 2002

Oxford Handbooks Online, 2011

Hypothesis testing is the standard approach used in scientific work, but it is the wrong methodol... more Hypothesis testing is the standard approach used in scientific work, but it is the wrong methodology to use in choosing which theory most accurately de-scribes the data. This is because hypothesis testing is asymmetric and does not spec-ify the alternative hypothesis in sufficient detail. A more appropriate methodology is to engage in model choice where the contending theories are treated symmetri-cally. This chapter first explains the problems with hypothesis testing, then provides the methodology of theory choice, and finally provides examples where hypothesis testing leads to inappropriate conclusions.

Homo Oeconomicus, 2016

Edmund Phelps argues against present day capitalism and economic theory because the former has lo... more Edmund Phelps argues against present day capitalism and economic theory because the former has lost it dynamism and the latter has ignored the human spirit. He provides little evidence that things are getting worse and ignores how economic takes into account human desire for autonomy and creativity. Phelps looks fondly on his liberal arts education, but his reason for doing so is slipshod and unworthy of a Nobel Prize winner.

Teoria De La Democracia Una Aproximacion Economica 1980 Isbn 84 7196 292 6 Pags 267 292, 1980

Is the choice in Iraq between anarchy and a ruthless dictatorship or is there a middle way? And i... more Is the choice in Iraq between anarchy and a ruthless dictatorship or is there a middle way? And if there is a middle way in Iraq or elsewhere, what conditions foster such an outcome? The fundamental political problem is that the power to prevent anarchy is also the power to impose one’s will. A raw application of public choice theory would lead one to expect that those with military and political power would further their own self interest at the expense of the rest of the population. Yet, contrary to the public choice paradigm, we do observe relatively benign dictatorships in some countries and a relative respect for property and civil rights in the democracies of North America and Western Europe. Here we explain why the choice need not be limited to brutish anarchy and a self-aggrandizing Leviathan. At the same time, we explain why dictatorships are inclined to take bad economic policies.

Econ Journal Watch, 2005

A COMMON COMPLAINT BY AUTHORS IS THAT THEIR REVIEWERS have misinterpreted what the author has sai... more A COMMON COMPLAINT BY AUTHORS IS THAT THEIR REVIEWERS have misinterpreted what the author has said. This is not my complaint here, because Bryan Caplan has explained my position better than I have. And I certainly cannot complain when Caplan sees my views as being more opposed to Lenin’s views than Milton Friedman’s are. Furthermore, I agree with two of Caplan’s major points: (1) that people are more likely to be irrational or uninformed (I add the latter because it is often hard to distinguish the two) when the cost of being so is slight; and (2) that more empirical work on voter rationality is needed (as an aside, I would like to add that Caplan has made important steps in this direction).