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Books by Dustin McWherter

By pitting Roy Bhaskar's attempt to rehabilitate ontology in the philosophy of science against Ka... more By pitting Roy Bhaskar's attempt to rehabilitate ontology in the philosophy of science against Kant's attempt to replace traditional ontology with an account of cognitive experience, this book defends the possibility of critical ontology. After an introduction to Kant's and Bhaskar's conceptions of ontology and philosophical method, it is argued that Kant's transcendental idealism cannot be defended as a non-ontological doctrine since it harbours problematic ontological assumptions. Then, it is argued that a properly modified version of Bhaskar's 'transcendental analysis of experimental activity' makes a convincing case that natural necessity is constituted by transcendentally real causal powers instead of a priori conceptual synthesis. The result is a critique of transcendental idealism and defence of transcendental realism that should appeal to those interested in critical realism, Kant's theoretical philosophy, speculative realism and the critique of 'correlationism', or the relation between natural science, metaphysics, and epistemology.

Papers by Dustin McWherter

Journal of Critical Realism, 2018

In this brief response to Guus Duindam's reply to my objections to his recent article, I explain ... more In this brief response to Guus Duindam's reply to my objections to his recent article, I explain why I think my original objections were not sufficiently answered. Although I believe Duindam advances the debate to some extent, I do not think he has fully explained how transcendental idealism accounts for the distinctive epistemic significance of experiments or how it avoids inconsistency in affirming the existence of things in themselves. (See journal version for updated page number references to Duindam 2018b).

Journal of Critical Realism, 2018

In this article I briefly respond to what I view as the most contentious parts of Guus Duindam's ... more In this article I briefly respond to what I view as the most contentious parts of Guus Duindam's defence of transcendental idealism and critique of Bhaskar’s transcendental realism. First, I argue that Duindam does not address the main problem with the transcendental idealist account of causal laws and therefore does not successfully defend it against Bhaskar’s transcendental analysis of experimental activity. Second, I argue that Duindam’s interpretation of transcendental idealism is vulnerable to the problem of the thing in itself, which further weakens his attempt to recommend transcendental idealism to critical realists. (See journal version for updated page number references to Duindam 2018).

Journal of Critical Realism, 2017

In this article, I assess Tuukka Kaidesoja's response to my objections to his critique of transce... more In this article, I assess Tuukka Kaidesoja's response to my objections to his critique of transcendental arguments and respond to his criticisms of my work. Initially, I respond to some miscellaneous issues that he raises. I then argue that his new attempt to link transcendental arguments to Kant's transcendental idealism is just as question-begging as his previous attempt, and that his problematization of Bhaskar's use of Kantian terminology is premised upon a confusion. I elaborate and defend my conception of transcendental arguments against Kaidesoja's charges of inconsistency, and highlight the roles that necessary conditions and reductio ad absurdum arguments play within transcendental analysis. I also defend the notion of relative a priority against Kaidesoja's criticism of it, contending that his elaboration of explanatory necessity still fails to clearly distinguish it from transcendental necessity. Whilst I concede the validity of his concerns about the starting point of Bhaskar's transcendental analysis of experimental activity, I nevertheless maintain that this does not undermine naturalized transcendentalism itself. I conclude that Kaidesoja's metaphilosophical naturalism is premised upon a flawed critique of transcendentalism and an insufficiently motivated alternative approach.

Philosophical Forum, 2016

This paper criticizes one of the main ways in which Kant argues for transcendental idealism by co... more This paper criticizes one of the main ways in which Kant argues for transcendental idealism by combining two previous objections to Kant's argument (made by G.E. Moore and Ralph Walker, respectively) into a unified critique. The combination of these objections creates a dilemma for Kant that hinges on the status of transcendental arguments as a possible source of a priori cognition and reveals a problematic asymmetry in his argument by elimination strategy. After the introduction (section 1), I begin by clarifying some basic terminology (section 2), proceed to present Kant's argument and its textual sources (section 3), elaborate the dialectic that involves Moore's and Walker's objections and the problem with Kant's argument (section 4), and conclude with a brief criticism of Lucy Allais's alternative interpretation of Kant's argument (section 5).

Journal of Critical Realism, 2015

In this debate article I respond to Alison Assiter’s various objections and points regarding my w... more In this debate article I respond to Alison Assiter’s various objections and points regarding my work on Kant’s empirical realism, his relation to ontology, and related issues.

Journal of Critical Realism, 2015

The purpose of this dialogue between an ‘empirical realist’ and a ‘traditional ontologist’ is to ... more The purpose of this dialogue between an ‘empirical realist’ and a ‘traditional ontologist’ is to clarify and evaluate the presuppositions of the kind of anti-ontological position exemplified by empirical realism. After ontology is defined and the empirical realist’s position explained, the traditional ontologist pursues a series of dialectical developments and criticisms of the empirical realist’s claim to have a coherently non-ontological position. The eventual conclusion is that the empirical realist’s opposition to ontology just arbitrarily assumes ontology to be associated with infallibilism (by way of logically necessary truth) and incompatible with fallibilism instead of conveying the illegitimacy of ontology itself or convincingly explaining the non-ontological standing of their position. The significance of this dialogue for critical realism is that it extends the case against anti-ontological epistemologies in general and empirical realism in particular by demonstrating the problems that result from the attempt to evade the charge of an implicit ontology.

Journal of Critical Realism, 2015

A short piece for the issue of Journal of Critical Realism in memory of Roy Bhaskar, in which I e... more A short piece for the issue of Journal of Critical Realism in memory of Roy Bhaskar, in which I explain my view of the significance of Bhaskar's work and my plans to develop it further.

Journal of Critical Realism, 2015

This essay offers some fairly extensive objections to the critique of Bhaskar's use of transcende... more This essay offers some fairly extensive objections to the critique of Bhaskar's use of transcendental arguments found in chapter four of Tuukka Kaidesoja's Naturalizing Critical Realist Social Ontology (2013). The essay has three sections that correspond to three sets of objections, each of which centres around a certain topic in Kaidesoja's critique. The first concerns Kaidesoja's appeal to the connection between transcendental arguments and Kant's transcendental idealism to criticize Bhaskar. The second concerns Kaidesoja's problematization of a posteriori premises in Bhaskar's transcendental arguments. The third concerns Kaidesoja's rejection of the prospect of 'naturalized transcendental arguments' and the non-transcendental 'naturalistic arguments' he proposes as an alternative. The overall aim of this essay is not just to defend Bhaskar's naturalized transcendentalism against Kaidesoja's metaphilosophical naturalism but also to help counter the association of transcendental philosophy with anti-naturalistic apriorism, foundationalism, idealism, and infalliblism frequently voiced by anti-transcendental philosophers.

Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, 2012

In this essay I attempt a thorough reconstruction and modification of Roy Bhaskar's "transcendent... more In this essay I attempt a thorough reconstruction and modification of Roy Bhaskar's "transcendental analysis of experimental activity" to show that this analysis contains a powerful critique of regularity theories of causal laws and a strong case for a transcendental realist, powers-based theory of causal laws. Despite the short and scattered places in which this analysis occurs in Bhaskar's texts, my reconstruction synthesizes these textual resources to formulate a unified analysis of experimentation that derives three distinct conclusions from four presuppositions and a complex of transcendental arguments. These conclusions are: 1) Extra-experimental reality is, to a significant extent, an open system, 2) Causal laws must be distinguished from constant conjunctions of events, and 3) Causal laws are the transcendentally real tendencies of generative mechanisms.

Kantian Review, 2012

Since the initial reception of the Critique of Pure Reason transcendental idealism has been perce... more Since the initial reception of the Critique of Pure Reason transcendental idealism has been perceived and criticized as a form of subjective idealism regarding space, time, and the objects within them, despite Kant's protestations to the contrary. In recent years, some commentators have attempted to counter this interpretation by presenting transcendental idealism as a primarily epistemological doctrine rather than a metaphysical one. Others have insisted on the metaphysical character of transcendental idealism. Within these debates, Kant's rejection of ontology (of the kind exemplified by Wolff and Baumgarten) has received comparatively little treatment, although it is often acknowledged. The present essay seeks to contribute to the secondary literature on Kant by offering an analysis of this claim and elaborating its consequences for transcendental idealism. This will take the form of a critical examination of transcendental idealism's supposed ontological agnosticism—that is, its disavowal of any ontological claims. The overall conclusion is that Kant's rejection of ontology is deeply problematic, and to such an extent that it may be necessary to reconsider the possibilities of defending transcendental idealism as a purely epistemological, non-ontological doctrine.

Book Reviews by Dustin McWherter

Philosophical Quarterly, 2016

My review of Francesco Berto and Matteo Plebani's 'Ontology and Metaontology: A Contemporary Guide'.

Journal of Critical Realism, Jul 2016

My review of Christopher Norris's Philosophy Outside-In: A Critique of Academic Reason.

Radical Philosophy, Jul 2007

My review of Iain Hamilton Grant's Philosophies of Nature After Schelling. (I should also note he... more My review of Iain Hamilton Grant's Philosophies of Nature After Schelling. (I should also note here that, in this review, I claimed that Grant failed to engage with rival interpretations of Schelling given by Zizek and Wirth, but I learned afterward that he had in fact done so in separate papers published around this time.)

Selected Talks and Conference Papers by Dustin McWherter

An introductory talk on Bhaskar's transcendental realism, given at the pre-conference workshop to... more An introductory talk on Bhaskar's transcendental realism, given at the pre-conference workshop to the 2016 IACR Annual Conference in Cardiff.

A very short presentation I gave for a symposium introducing Francois Laruelle's Non-Philosophy i... more A very short presentation I gave for a symposium introducing Francois Laruelle's Non-Philosophy in 2011. (Some references have been updated to more recent versions.)

This is a paper I presented at the conference 'Practicing Philosophy in Lebanon: Authors, Texts, ... more This is a paper I presented at the conference 'Practicing Philosophy in Lebanon: Authors, Texts, Trends', UNESCO World Philosophy Day Colloquium, in 2013 at the American University of Beirut, now published in the conference proceedings. It represents a line of research that I planned to pursue further at the time but have since suspended in favour of others.

By pitting Roy Bhaskar's attempt to rehabilitate ontology in the philosophy of science against Ka... more By pitting Roy Bhaskar's attempt to rehabilitate ontology in the philosophy of science against Kant's attempt to replace traditional ontology with an account of cognitive experience, this book defends the possibility of critical ontology. After an introduction to Kant's and Bhaskar's conceptions of ontology and philosophical method, it is argued that Kant's transcendental idealism cannot be defended as a non-ontological doctrine since it harbours problematic ontological assumptions. Then, it is argued that a properly modified version of Bhaskar's 'transcendental analysis of experimental activity' makes a convincing case that natural necessity is constituted by transcendentally real causal powers instead of a priori conceptual synthesis. The result is a critique of transcendental idealism and defence of transcendental realism that should appeal to those interested in critical realism, Kant's theoretical philosophy, speculative realism and the critique of 'correlationism', or the relation between natural science, metaphysics, and epistemology.

Journal of Critical Realism, 2018

In this brief response to Guus Duindam's reply to my objections to his recent article, I explain ... more In this brief response to Guus Duindam's reply to my objections to his recent article, I explain why I think my original objections were not sufficiently answered. Although I believe Duindam advances the debate to some extent, I do not think he has fully explained how transcendental idealism accounts for the distinctive epistemic significance of experiments or how it avoids inconsistency in affirming the existence of things in themselves. (See journal version for updated page number references to Duindam 2018b).

Journal of Critical Realism, 2018

In this article I briefly respond to what I view as the most contentious parts of Guus Duindam's ... more In this article I briefly respond to what I view as the most contentious parts of Guus Duindam's defence of transcendental idealism and critique of Bhaskar’s transcendental realism. First, I argue that Duindam does not address the main problem with the transcendental idealist account of causal laws and therefore does not successfully defend it against Bhaskar’s transcendental analysis of experimental activity. Second, I argue that Duindam’s interpretation of transcendental idealism is vulnerable to the problem of the thing in itself, which further weakens his attempt to recommend transcendental idealism to critical realists. (See journal version for updated page number references to Duindam 2018).

Journal of Critical Realism, 2017

In this article, I assess Tuukka Kaidesoja's response to my objections to his critique of transce... more In this article, I assess Tuukka Kaidesoja's response to my objections to his critique of transcendental arguments and respond to his criticisms of my work. Initially, I respond to some miscellaneous issues that he raises. I then argue that his new attempt to link transcendental arguments to Kant's transcendental idealism is just as question-begging as his previous attempt, and that his problematization of Bhaskar's use of Kantian terminology is premised upon a confusion. I elaborate and defend my conception of transcendental arguments against Kaidesoja's charges of inconsistency, and highlight the roles that necessary conditions and reductio ad absurdum arguments play within transcendental analysis. I also defend the notion of relative a priority against Kaidesoja's criticism of it, contending that his elaboration of explanatory necessity still fails to clearly distinguish it from transcendental necessity. Whilst I concede the validity of his concerns about the starting point of Bhaskar's transcendental analysis of experimental activity, I nevertheless maintain that this does not undermine naturalized transcendentalism itself. I conclude that Kaidesoja's metaphilosophical naturalism is premised upon a flawed critique of transcendentalism and an insufficiently motivated alternative approach.

Philosophical Forum, 2016

This paper criticizes one of the main ways in which Kant argues for transcendental idealism by co... more This paper criticizes one of the main ways in which Kant argues for transcendental idealism by combining two previous objections to Kant's argument (made by G.E. Moore and Ralph Walker, respectively) into a unified critique. The combination of these objections creates a dilemma for Kant that hinges on the status of transcendental arguments as a possible source of a priori cognition and reveals a problematic asymmetry in his argument by elimination strategy. After the introduction (section 1), I begin by clarifying some basic terminology (section 2), proceed to present Kant's argument and its textual sources (section 3), elaborate the dialectic that involves Moore's and Walker's objections and the problem with Kant's argument (section 4), and conclude with a brief criticism of Lucy Allais's alternative interpretation of Kant's argument (section 5).

Journal of Critical Realism, 2015

In this debate article I respond to Alison Assiter’s various objections and points regarding my w... more In this debate article I respond to Alison Assiter’s various objections and points regarding my work on Kant’s empirical realism, his relation to ontology, and related issues.

Journal of Critical Realism, 2015

The purpose of this dialogue between an ‘empirical realist’ and a ‘traditional ontologist’ is to ... more The purpose of this dialogue between an ‘empirical realist’ and a ‘traditional ontologist’ is to clarify and evaluate the presuppositions of the kind of anti-ontological position exemplified by empirical realism. After ontology is defined and the empirical realist’s position explained, the traditional ontologist pursues a series of dialectical developments and criticisms of the empirical realist’s claim to have a coherently non-ontological position. The eventual conclusion is that the empirical realist’s opposition to ontology just arbitrarily assumes ontology to be associated with infallibilism (by way of logically necessary truth) and incompatible with fallibilism instead of conveying the illegitimacy of ontology itself or convincingly explaining the non-ontological standing of their position. The significance of this dialogue for critical realism is that it extends the case against anti-ontological epistemologies in general and empirical realism in particular by demonstrating the problems that result from the attempt to evade the charge of an implicit ontology.

Journal of Critical Realism, 2015

A short piece for the issue of Journal of Critical Realism in memory of Roy Bhaskar, in which I e... more A short piece for the issue of Journal of Critical Realism in memory of Roy Bhaskar, in which I explain my view of the significance of Bhaskar's work and my plans to develop it further.

Journal of Critical Realism, 2015

This essay offers some fairly extensive objections to the critique of Bhaskar's use of transcende... more This essay offers some fairly extensive objections to the critique of Bhaskar's use of transcendental arguments found in chapter four of Tuukka Kaidesoja's Naturalizing Critical Realist Social Ontology (2013). The essay has three sections that correspond to three sets of objections, each of which centres around a certain topic in Kaidesoja's critique. The first concerns Kaidesoja's appeal to the connection between transcendental arguments and Kant's transcendental idealism to criticize Bhaskar. The second concerns Kaidesoja's problematization of a posteriori premises in Bhaskar's transcendental arguments. The third concerns Kaidesoja's rejection of the prospect of 'naturalized transcendental arguments' and the non-transcendental 'naturalistic arguments' he proposes as an alternative. The overall aim of this essay is not just to defend Bhaskar's naturalized transcendentalism against Kaidesoja's metaphilosophical naturalism but also to help counter the association of transcendental philosophy with anti-naturalistic apriorism, foundationalism, idealism, and infalliblism frequently voiced by anti-transcendental philosophers.

Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, 2012

In this essay I attempt a thorough reconstruction and modification of Roy Bhaskar's "transcendent... more In this essay I attempt a thorough reconstruction and modification of Roy Bhaskar's "transcendental analysis of experimental activity" to show that this analysis contains a powerful critique of regularity theories of causal laws and a strong case for a transcendental realist, powers-based theory of causal laws. Despite the short and scattered places in which this analysis occurs in Bhaskar's texts, my reconstruction synthesizes these textual resources to formulate a unified analysis of experimentation that derives three distinct conclusions from four presuppositions and a complex of transcendental arguments. These conclusions are: 1) Extra-experimental reality is, to a significant extent, an open system, 2) Causal laws must be distinguished from constant conjunctions of events, and 3) Causal laws are the transcendentally real tendencies of generative mechanisms.

Kantian Review, 2012

Since the initial reception of the Critique of Pure Reason transcendental idealism has been perce... more Since the initial reception of the Critique of Pure Reason transcendental idealism has been perceived and criticized as a form of subjective idealism regarding space, time, and the objects within them, despite Kant's protestations to the contrary. In recent years, some commentators have attempted to counter this interpretation by presenting transcendental idealism as a primarily epistemological doctrine rather than a metaphysical one. Others have insisted on the metaphysical character of transcendental idealism. Within these debates, Kant's rejection of ontology (of the kind exemplified by Wolff and Baumgarten) has received comparatively little treatment, although it is often acknowledged. The present essay seeks to contribute to the secondary literature on Kant by offering an analysis of this claim and elaborating its consequences for transcendental idealism. This will take the form of a critical examination of transcendental idealism's supposed ontological agnosticism—that is, its disavowal of any ontological claims. The overall conclusion is that Kant's rejection of ontology is deeply problematic, and to such an extent that it may be necessary to reconsider the possibilities of defending transcendental idealism as a purely epistemological, non-ontological doctrine.

Philosophical Quarterly, 2016

My review of Francesco Berto and Matteo Plebani's 'Ontology and Metaontology: A Contemporary Guide'.

Journal of Critical Realism, Jul 2016

My review of Christopher Norris's Philosophy Outside-In: A Critique of Academic Reason.

Radical Philosophy, Jul 2007

My review of Iain Hamilton Grant's Philosophies of Nature After Schelling. (I should also note he... more My review of Iain Hamilton Grant's Philosophies of Nature After Schelling. (I should also note here that, in this review, I claimed that Grant failed to engage with rival interpretations of Schelling given by Zizek and Wirth, but I learned afterward that he had in fact done so in separate papers published around this time.)

An introductory talk on Bhaskar's transcendental realism, given at the pre-conference workshop to... more An introductory talk on Bhaskar's transcendental realism, given at the pre-conference workshop to the 2016 IACR Annual Conference in Cardiff.

A very short presentation I gave for a symposium introducing Francois Laruelle's Non-Philosophy i... more A very short presentation I gave for a symposium introducing Francois Laruelle's Non-Philosophy in 2011. (Some references have been updated to more recent versions.)

This is a paper I presented at the conference 'Practicing Philosophy in Lebanon: Authors, Texts, ... more This is a paper I presented at the conference 'Practicing Philosophy in Lebanon: Authors, Texts, Trends', UNESCO World Philosophy Day Colloquium, in 2013 at the American University of Beirut, now published in the conference proceedings. It represents a line of research that I planned to pursue further at the time but have since suspended in favour of others.