Erik Sather - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
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Papers by Erik Sather
Social Science Research Network, 2001
We consider an economy where most of the health care is publicly provided, and where there is wai... more We consider an economy where most of the health care is publicly provided, and where there is waiting time for several types of treatments. Private health care without waiting time is an option for the patients in the public health queue. We show that although patients with low waiting costs will choose public treatment, they may be better off with waiting time than without. The reason is that waiting time induces patients with high waiting costs to choose private treatment, thus reducing the cost of public health care that everyone pays for. Even if higher quality (i.e. zero waiting time) can be achieved at no cost, the self-selection induced redistribution may imply that it is socially optimal to provide health care publicly and at an inferior quality level. We give a detailed discussion of the circumstances in which it is optimal to have waiting time for public health treatment. Moreover, we study the interaction between this quality decision and the optimal tax/subsidy on private health care.
In-plane analysis of a unit cell honeycomb structure with 2-D shell elements ....10 4.3 In-plane ... more In-plane analysis of a unit cell honeycomb structure with 2-D shell elements ....10 4.3 In-plane analysis of a unit cell honeycomb structure with 3-D solid elements ....11 4.4 General 3-D analysis of a unit cell for a complete set of elastic moduli ..
Journal of Health Economics, 2003
We consider an economy where most of the health care is publicly provided, and where there is wai... more We consider an economy where most of the health care is publicly provided, and where there is waiting time for several types of treatments. Private health care without waiting time is an option for the patients in the public health queue. We show that although patients with low waiting costs will choose public treatment, they may be better off with waiting time than without. The reason is that waiting time induces patients with high waiting costs to choose private treatment, thus reducing the cost of public health care that everyone pays for. Even if higher quality (i.e. zero waiting time) can be achieved at no cost, the self-selection induced redistribution may imply that it is socially optimal to provide health care publicly and at an inferior quality level. We give a detailed discussion of the circumstances in which it is optimal to have waiting time for public health treatment. Moreover, we study the interaction between this quality decision and the optimal tax/subsidy on private health care.
Labour, 2005
It is a stated aim to improve physician services in underserved sectors and areas. Increased wage... more It is a stated aim to improve physician services in underserved sectors and areas. Increased wages is one instrument for boosting the hours provided by the personnel to the prioritized sub-markets. This study applies an econometric framework that allows for non-convex budget sets, non-linear labour supply curves and imperfect markets with institutional constraints. The labour supply decision is viewed as a choice from a set of discrete alternatives (job packages) in a structural labour supply model estimated on Norwegian micro data. An out-of-sample prediction is also presented and evaluated by means of a natural experiment.
When entering the job market, nurses choose among different kind of jobs. Each of these jobs is c... more When entering the job market, nurses choose among different kind of jobs. Each of these jobs is characterized by wage, sector (primary care or hospital) and shift (daytime work or shift). This paper estimates a multisector-job-type random utility model of labor supply on data for Norwegian registered nurses in 2000. The empirical model implies that labor supply is rather inelastic;
Social Science Research Network, 2001
We consider an economy where most of the health care is publicly provided, and where there is wai... more We consider an economy where most of the health care is publicly provided, and where there is waiting time for several types of treatments. Private health care without waiting time is an option for the patients in the public health queue. We show that although patients with low waiting costs will choose public treatment, they may be better off with waiting time than without. The reason is that waiting time induces patients with high waiting costs to choose private treatment, thus reducing the cost of public health care that everyone pays for. Even if higher quality (i.e. zero waiting time) can be achieved at no cost, the self-selection induced redistribution may imply that it is socially optimal to provide health care publicly and at an inferior quality level. We give a detailed discussion of the circumstances in which it is optimal to have waiting time for public health treatment. Moreover, we study the interaction between this quality decision and the optimal tax/subsidy on private health care.
In-plane analysis of a unit cell honeycomb structure with 2-D shell elements ....10 4.3 In-plane ... more In-plane analysis of a unit cell honeycomb structure with 2-D shell elements ....10 4.3 In-plane analysis of a unit cell honeycomb structure with 3-D solid elements ....11 4.4 General 3-D analysis of a unit cell for a complete set of elastic moduli ..
Journal of Health Economics, 2003
We consider an economy where most of the health care is publicly provided, and where there is wai... more We consider an economy where most of the health care is publicly provided, and where there is waiting time for several types of treatments. Private health care without waiting time is an option for the patients in the public health queue. We show that although patients with low waiting costs will choose public treatment, they may be better off with waiting time than without. The reason is that waiting time induces patients with high waiting costs to choose private treatment, thus reducing the cost of public health care that everyone pays for. Even if higher quality (i.e. zero waiting time) can be achieved at no cost, the self-selection induced redistribution may imply that it is socially optimal to provide health care publicly and at an inferior quality level. We give a detailed discussion of the circumstances in which it is optimal to have waiting time for public health treatment. Moreover, we study the interaction between this quality decision and the optimal tax/subsidy on private health care.
Labour, 2005
It is a stated aim to improve physician services in underserved sectors and areas. Increased wage... more It is a stated aim to improve physician services in underserved sectors and areas. Increased wages is one instrument for boosting the hours provided by the personnel to the prioritized sub-markets. This study applies an econometric framework that allows for non-convex budget sets, non-linear labour supply curves and imperfect markets with institutional constraints. The labour supply decision is viewed as a choice from a set of discrete alternatives (job packages) in a structural labour supply model estimated on Norwegian micro data. An out-of-sample prediction is also presented and evaluated by means of a natural experiment.
When entering the job market, nurses choose among different kind of jobs. Each of these jobs is c... more When entering the job market, nurses choose among different kind of jobs. Each of these jobs is characterized by wage, sector (primary care or hospital) and shift (daytime work or shift). This paper estimates a multisector-job-type random utility model of labor supply on data for Norwegian registered nurses in 2000. The empirical model implies that labor supply is rather inelastic;