Ernest Wyciszkiewicz - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by Ernest Wyciszkiewicz

Deleted Journal, 2022

Do hIstorIans faIl In lIstenIng to each other? Methodological challenges for historical Dialogue ... more Do hIstorIans faIl In lIstenIng to each other? Methodological challenges for historical Dialogue Journal for central anD eastern european hIstory anD polItIcs aDaeQuatIo reI et Intellectus arei issue the puBlIsher Mieroszewski centre for Dialogue layout anD DesIgn super super studio Design DesKtop puBlIshIng Dolasu | pracownia graficzna eDItorIal BoarD Dr Łukasz adamski (editor-in-chief, Warsaw) Dr Igor gretskiy (saint-petersburg-tallinn) Dr paweł libera (Warsaw) Dr yana prymachenko (Managing editor, Kyiv) Dr Magdalena semczyszyn (szczecin) Dr ernest Wyciszkiewicz (Warsaw) Dr anna Wylegała (Warsaw) aDVIsory BoarD Dr Jan Behrends (leibniz centre for contemporary history, potsdam, germany) prof. arūnas Bubnys (genocide and resistance research centre in lithuania) prof. richard Butterwick-pawlikowski (ucl school of slavonic and east european studies, uK) Dr sławomir Dębski (polish Institute of International affairs, poland) prof. henryk głębocki (Jagiellonian university in Krakow, poland) Dr Mateusz gniazdowski (centre for eastern studies, poland) prof. hieronim grala (faculty of "artes liberales", university of Warsaw, poland) Dr Łukasz Kamiński (university of Wroclaw, poland) prof. Marek Kornat (cardinal stefan Wyszyński university in Warsaw, Institute of history pan, poland) prof. hennadii Korolov (Institute of history of ukraine, national academy of science of ukraine) prof. Dino Kritsiotis (university of nottingham, uK) prof. Ivan Kurilla (european university at st. petersburg, russia) Dr Kai-olaf lang (stiftung Wissenschaft und politik-german Institute for International and security affairs) prof. Šarunas liekis (Vytautas Magnus university in Kaunas, lithuania) prof. Michał Łuczewski (Institute of sociology, university of Warsaw, poland) prof. olga Malinova (hse university in Moscow, russia) prof. David Marples (university of alberta, canada) roger Moorhouse (royal historical society, uK) prof. luke March (university of edinburg, school of social and political science, uK) prof. andrzej nowak (Jagiellonian university in Krakow, pan Institute of history, poland) Dr nikita petrov (International Memorial, russia) Dr Mykoła riabchuk (Kuras Institute of political and ethnic studies, national academy of science of ukraine) prof. per anders rudling (lund university, sweden) prof. aliaksandr smalianchuk (Institute of slavic studies, pan) prof. Darius staliūnas (lithuanian Institute of history) prof. Mariusz Wołos (pedagogical university of Krakow, pan Institute of history, poland) aDDress of the eDItorIal offIce Mieroszewski centre for Dialogue

At the 14 January 2010 session of the Permanent Council of the Organization for Security and Coop... more At the 14 January 2010 session of the Permanent Council of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Kazakhstan presented its priorities for the twelve-month Presidency in the organization. The Presidency will be Kazakhstan’s means for selfpromotion and creating the country’s positive international image. Kazakhstan’s Presidency is expected to offer active support for the dialogue on the Nagorno-Karabakh issues, greater non-military assistance to Afghanistan, and deeper OSCE involvement in Central Asia problems. Even though the Kazakh Presidency asserts it attaches significance to human rights issues and democracy, reason tells one to be skeptical about such declarations. The Kazakh Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev presented on 14 January in Vienna his country’s priorities for the 2010 Presidency in OSCE. His address was accompanied by a playback of a speech by Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev. It is the first time that a post-Soviet and authoritarian country, with a large Muslim population (47%), has taken over the OSCE Presidency. It was a considerable gain in prestige for Kazakhstan to obtain the rotating Presidency. Actually, however, given the OSCE’s consensual decision-making principles, Kazakhstan’s chances of creating the organization’s policy look rather slim. The OSCE conducts its range of activities in three dimensions—the politico-military, the economic-environmental, and the human, comprising the promotion of human rights, the rule of law, and the development of democratic institutions. Kazakhstan will focus its attention largely on the first dimension. That is very much in line with the standpoint of the autocratic countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, including Russia, which have repeatedly criticized the alleged lack of balance between the first and third dimensions as well as the application of the double standards to countries ‘east’ and ‘west of Vienna’. The Politico-military Dimension. Among the issues that remain a priority Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev named: a dialogue on a new security architecture in the vast Eurasian region, stepping up efforts aimed at non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, strengthening confidence- and securitybuilding measures in Europe (Vienna Document and CFE), assisting in the resolution of protracted conflicts (he mentioned South Caucasus), and paying greater attention to countering terrorism and combating illicit drugs trafficking. Saudabayev paid special attention to the question of Afghanistan, which is not an OSCE member state, but is the organization’s cooperation partner since 2003. Saudabayev also proposed a dialogue within the OSCE on a new Treaty on European Security, an idea keenly generated by Russia’s President Dimitry Medvedev. Reaching an agreement here would not be the purpose of the dialogue—for the Russian project stands little chance of being widely accepted. 1 Kazakhstan wishes to increase the impact of its Presidency; therefore it will promote the OSCE as the main forum for discussion on the Russian proposal, in spite of Russia’s unwillingness to hand over significant competence on the discussion to the OSCE. By addressing issues of non-proliferation and utilization of nuclear weapons, areas that Kazakhstan succeeded in (successful nuclear disarmament of the country, shutting down nuclear ranges, sealing the Semipalatinsk deal on a nuclear-free zone in Central Asia), the country is

Raporty - Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2011

Deleted Journal, 2023

Pax post-Sovietica? The Final end of Post-sovietness RAsA ČePAITIeNė The Ricochet of Leninopad an... more Pax post-Sovietica? The Final end of Post-sovietness RAsA ČePAITIeNė The Ricochet of Leninopad and the second Wave of Desovietization of Lithuanian Public space TOMAs sNIeGON From state Terror to International conflict OLeKsANDRA GAIDAI 'eternal Russian-ukrainian friendship'-a case study of how a political concept was memorialized and is dememorialized yANA PRyMAcheNKO The twentieth-century colonialism within ukrainian Academic and Public Discourse in the era of Independence TesTIMONIes INTeRVIeW WITh JAKuB KuMOch how the Russian-ukrainian war broke out INTeRVIeW WITh ALexANDRu BuRIAN Moldova is a Multifaceted state in Terms of National Identity INTeRVIeW WITh seRGey TsyPLyAeV We are Aspiring Republicans ReVIeWs OLeKsANDR zAITseV history of ukrainian Nationalism Through the eyes of a czech historian ANDRzeJ GRAJeWsKI An Incomplete synthesis TABLe OF cONTeNTs arei issue 4 1 2023 9 FAREWELL TO IMAGINED POST-SOVIETNESS in bodies like the eurasian economic union, which is effectively about bilateral trade between the member states and Russia, but not actually between, let's say, Armenia and Belarus. so, there is a sort of very soviet tradition of Moscow and Russia acting as the gatekeeper to the post-soviet space. This is another aspect of what we regard as post-sovietness, but it is perhaps the most interesting one, and the war has really challenged it. Wojciech Konończuk: The Russian aggression against ukraine is actually a crucial moment in the discussion about post-sovietness because the disintegration of the post-soviet area is ongoing before our eyes. I would argue that notions such as a post-soviet area, a post-soviet region, or post-soviet states raise more questions than they answer. These are very misleading terms because we are talking about huge regions that had not been under Russian rule for long. Let's remember that some lands that belonged to the Russian empire before the First World War were united or conquered by the Russian empire only in the late nineteenth century. I'm talking about, e.g., part of Tajikistan. For most of the history of these regions of these countries, they were not part of the Russian empire or the soviet union. so, what we are actually observing is that, since 1991, the territory of the former soviet union has transformed into historical macro-regions that are completely different. We see a very different story in central Asia, in the caucasus, and in eastern europe. Another interesting argument we started to hear from ukrainian decision-makers and intellectuals-even before the full-scale Russian aggression-is that ukraine should be treated as part of central europe rather than eastern europe. For example, in October or september 2021, Dmytro Kuleba, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of ukraine, made a program statement that argued: "do not treat us as part of the eastern europe region, because our tradition, our history, our political culture is part of the central european region rather than something that is perceived as part of the traditional Russian security sphere of influence". so, why is there actually a widespread perception of the region (which for some decades was part of the soviet union) as a post-soviet area? I would respond that this is a consequence of a lack of knowledge. however, there is a broader problem. When we look at Western historiography on Russia and the Russian empire, we discover thatat least until recent times-it has been very much focused on Russia (the history of Russia, the history of the soviet union, the history of Russians). I have many arguments for why we should not use the term 'post-sovietness'. Let me present some of them, starting with political systems. arei issue arei issue 12 Łukasz adamski academia that there are, let's say, post-soviet countries or lands of historic Russia. Botakoz Kassymbekova: Although I'm not a political scientist, in the context of the January 2022 uprising in Kazakhstan I had to give a lot of interviews for the German-speaking media, simply because nobody in Germany or switzerland knew anything about Kazakhstan. The term 'post-sovietness' invites you to not pay attention to other countries except Russia. however, it is not enough to know the Russian language to understand the region. studying the region with only the help of the Russian language means that one will have a Russocentric view of it because the huge narrative that is available only in its native languages would be missed. We need to learn other languages (Kazakh, uzbek, Georgian, etc.), which is a huge challenge. Ernest Wyciszkiewicz: I don't believe Russians consider themselves post-soviet, especially younger generations. But this notion is useful for the regime, and this usefulness has been changing over time. In the 1990s, the cIs-the commonwealth of Independent states-was seen in Moscow as a method to control former soviet republics. At the same time, in the 1990s cIs was already a tool for peaceful divorce between central Asia and ukraine. so, the people knew they could not emancipate quickly, therefore they looked at cIs as a way to move away from each other in a gradual and orderly manner. Although Moscow used to perceive cIs as a consolidation tool, now Putin and his regime seem to be sort of postmodern when it comes reconstructing something that cannot be the soviet union as it was, but the Kremlin can make political use of soviet legacy. I don't believe that Putin wants to recreate the soviet union. It is something else. And he no longer thinks about the post-soviet area as something that can be re-established as a homogeneous thing. I believe that the concept of Ruski Mir is sort of his response to this concept; however, it actually contradicts the post-soviet concept because it emphasizes the role of Russian-speaking people, and the Russian ethnic space (as seen by him) is considered something that should be under Russian control, for historical or other reasons. Łukasz Adamski: The croatians hate this concept, of course. Kataryna Wolczuk: exactly. so, while I'm trying to differentiate the post-soviet space, I'm replicating those biases and generalizations. Voice from the audience. I was surprised that there is still a question about whether we should use this whole post-soviet concept. It is a legacy of a certain perception of the soviet union. And it's an easy and arei issue 14 Łukasz adamski lazy concept. It's obvious that we shouldn't use the concept of post-soviet. Let me talk about Kazakhstan or Georgia, or ukraine. But should we use post-socialism? For Poland, for hungary? Łukasz Adamski: What I can add on my side is that we have a problem with the terms 'post-communist country' and 'new eu member states'. Poland, for example, has 18 years in the eu; Finland, I think 27; but Finland is a mature eu member, and Poland is a new eu member state. And there are lots of similar examples of inertial thinking, both in the academic community and in political discourse. Kataryna Wolczuk: When we talked about the commonwealth of Independent states, for example, as the organizing framework in the 1990s, very few people registered that ukraine was never a fully-fledged member of cIs because it never ratified it. There is one more aspect which I found very, very interesting. The post-soviet space concept includes the Baltic countries, where-from the Russian perspective-international law doesn't operate and doesn't apply. These countries are perceived as being outside of international law, not only in terms of multilateral uN agreements, but also in terms of actual bilateral agreements. Wojciech Konończuk: yes. One of the many paradoxes regarding post-sovietness is that nations that are now called post-soviet didn't want to be part of soviet Russia, the soviet union. The soviets conquered them. Now they don't want to be called post-soviet, but they're called post-soviet. so, for me, this is like an explanation of the Russian special right, the Russian special role. I don't think that if the Russian Federation collapsed, the nations which would emerge would be called post-Russian. Because what unites Poland and Finland is that they were part of the same state for more than a century, but nobody called Poland or Finland post-Russian states after 1918, right? Rather, they are post-imperial states. so, we should be careful in using this concept. Ernest Wyciszkiewicz: I believe the huge challenge for intellectuals and scholars is to leave their ivory towers. It is important to publish books and deconstruct or reconstruct the notion of post-sovietness, but it is equally or even more important to reach out to the public and explain that terms and frames matter. The public needs to be aware that 9 Pavlo Batycʹkyj (1910-1983): soviet military leader, hero of the soviet union (1965), Marshal of the soviet union (1968). he was born in Kharkiv and graduated from the Frunze Military Academy (1938) and the Academy of General staff (1948). During World War II, he commanded the 1st and 2nd corps of the ukrainian front, and the 1st and 3rd corps of the Belorussian front. After the war, he occupied leading positions in the soviet Army. From 1965 to 1966, Batytskyi was Deputy chief of the General staff of the ussR Armed Forces; from 1966 to 1978 , he was commander-in-chief of the Air Defense Forces, Deputy of the Minister of Defense. he died in Moscow. For more details, see EIU, I (2003), 200. 10 This refers to the events of so-called ʻBlack saturdayʼ (27 October 1962) when the u-2 American reconnaissance aircraft was shot down. arei issue 24 IntervIew wIth Prof. SerhII PlokhII last names: harbuz 11 and hrečko. 12 Let us have a look at the Red Army commanders' last names: we see not Malynovsʹkyj, 13 but hrečko! 14 All of them were ukrainian. There is nothing unique here. stalin had the same story with his own people from the caucasus. Khrushchev's pool consisted of ukrainian natives. since Putin came to power, positions of Russian power have been occupied...

Sprawy Międzynarodowe, Aug 21, 2020

Sankcje jako forma dialogu Sanctions as a form of dialogue The article proposes a broader view on... more Sankcje jako forma dialogu Sanctions as a form of dialogue The article proposes a broader view on international economic sanctions. They should be recognized not only as a tool of coercion but multifunction foreign policy instrument to pu nish, detere, reassure and signal. As a matter of fact restrictions have turned into an important ingredient of political dialogue. The article questions the dominant approach focused on narrowly defi ned effectiveness measured by a visible and major change in a target's policy. Looking at sanctions as a form of communicating preferences and interests, as well as an element of bargaining game, allows to better understand their political functions and thus to nuance an assessment of their effectiveness. The signifi cance of restrictions introduced after the annexation of Crimea and later on goes beyond provoking a change in Russian policy, beyond critique of past misdeeds and an attempt to restore the status quo. Actually, they are about sending a credible signal to the future to convince potential Russian followers that their actions will be charged with specifi c costs.

are among the regular and ad hoc contributors to Intersection: Russia/Europe/World, an online pub... more are among the regular and ad hoc contributors to Intersection: Russia/Europe/World, an online publication on Russian foreign and domestic affairs. The Intersection is a new-generation online magazine that combines features of a think-tank, regional studies journal and an 3

Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny, 2006

Vilnius : Vilnius Institute for Policy Analysis, 2021

Putin's rule and the return of great power ambitions Tools for strategic narration Narrative 1. E... more Putin's rule and the return of great power ambitions Tools for strategic narration Narrative 1. European security architecture is in crisis Narrative 2. The US / and NATO / are destabilising the region Narrative 3. The Russian sphere of influence Narrative 4. The irrational Baltic States and Poland The way forward CHAPTER III. EUROPEAN VULNERABILITY TO RUSSIAN NARRATIVES AND INFLUENCE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE A possibly lighter American engagement France as a leader of the "European autonomy" initiative Germany as a leader of dialogue on European security architecture The receptiveness of Russian narratives on European security architecture in the West Conclusion CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 2 From', 8 March 2018 https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF382.html 2 Ben O'Loughlin, Alister Miskimmon and Laura Roselle, Forging the World: Strategic Narratives and International Relations,

Europe has virtually come to a halt, and relations with Russia were temporarily frozen. And altho... more Europe has virtually come to a halt, and relations with Russia were temporarily frozen. And although these relations are likely to return to their previous level, no positive breakthrough should be expected. The likeliest scenario for NATO is that a discussion will be initiated about its future (with work launched on a new strategic concept) and that-importantly for Poland-there will be some kind of a back-to-roots evolution, with emphasis placed on NATO as a military alliance defending its member states, rather than an instrument of stabilization and political transformation in its immediate surroundings. 3 Dismissing Russian preparations was no doubt a grave mistake on the part of Georgia, which ignored the possibility of a large-scale Russian armed intervention. This can be inferred from the course of the fighting and the absence of obvious tactical moves, such as cutting off the Roki Tunnel-Tskhinvali road or launching acts of sabotage after the entry of the main Russian forces, lack of armor-piercing weapons and insufficient stocks of anti-aircraft weapons, and finally Georgians' helter-skelter retreat, involving dropping arms and materiel on territories captured by the Russians. It cannot be ruled out, though, that President Saakashvili's actual goal was not to take over the whole or part of South Ossetia, but rather to provoke Russia to take actions to which the Western states and international organizations would have to respond. Russian charges of Georgian-perpetrated genocide against Tskhinvali population should also be examined. The use of highly inaccurate Grad rocket launchers to shell South Ossetia's capital on the night

Routledge eBooks, Jun 6, 2022

Navigating Europe Through Stormy Waters, 2014

Sprawy Miedzynarodowe, Aug 21, 2020