FAREED MOOSA - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Teaching Documents by FAREED MOOSA

Booysen v S - irregularities in court a quo

CHARGE SHEET AND SAP 69 IN CRIMINAL CASE

MANAGING A CRIMINAL COURT PROCESS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Papers by FAREED MOOSA

Stellenbosch law review, 2020

Obiter, Aug 3, 2021

The rule against double jeopardy entails that, generally, a person cannot be charged more than on... more The rule against double jeopardy entails that, generally, a person cannot be charged more than once for the same, or substantially the same, offence or misconduct in respect of which he or she has been convicted or acquitted. Under the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, this rule is part of an accused's right to a fair trial. This article shows that every employer prosecuted for allegedly not complying with either employees' tax obligations in the Fourth Schedule of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, or for an offence at common law, is entitled to raise the procedural defence of double jeopardy. This article argues that the recent judgment in Grayston Technology Investment (Pty) Ltd v S is authority for the proposition that, in any such prosecution, an accused employer may invoke double jeopardy, even if the prior punishment or acquittal stems from non-criminal proceedings under the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 before the Tax Court or the Tax Board. A key hypothesis of this article is the argument that double jeopardy ought not to be applied as an inflexible procedural rule in every instance. This is because such an approach would lead to the undesirable result of undermining the Legislature's objective in catering for criminal and civil sanctions in respect of certain violations of fiscal legislation. No hard-andfast rules can be laid down in advance as to when double jeopardy may be successfully invoked. Each case needs to be decided on its own facts. It is contended that when a court decides whether to uphold a double-jeopardy defence, it must strike an equitable balance between, on the one hand, the accused employer's fundamental right to a fair trial and, on the other, society's legitimate interest in ensuring that taxpayers comply with their tax obligations on pain of adequate punishment for non-compliance. Are there limits to the plea of double jeopardy by accused employers? "To me at least, it is hard to see why the double jeopardy principle should apply when the state wants to chop off my toes, but not when it seeks to slit my nose, or brand my skin, or gouge my ears, or flay my back." 1 1

SA mercantile law journal, 2021

Section 1(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 stipulates that human dign... more Section 1(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 stipulates that human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms are foundational values of South Africa’s sovereign, democratic state. Aligned herewith is s 39(1) of the Constitution, which directs that every interpretation of the Bill of Rights must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. Therefore, the Constitution’s human rights ethos, culture and spirit is a dominant theme serving as a guide when the term ‘property’ is interpreted in the context of the privacy clause (s 14(b)) and the property clause (s 25). This article argues that by applying a purposive cum contextual cum grammatical cum teleological interpretive methodology, the concept ‘property’ in ss 14(b) and 25(1) of the Constitution goes beyond the conventional ambit of common-law property. It is argued that, for constitutional purposes during tax administration, property also encompasses intangible property in the form of Bitcoin and possibly other cryptocurrencies owned by taxpayers, which represent legal interests worthy of constitutional protection during tax administration by the South African Revenue Service.

Stellenbosch law review, 2021

Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal, Feb 17, 2021

This article argues that the general approach to documentary interpretation articulated in Natal ... more This article argues that the general approach to documentary interpretation articulated in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA) (Endumeni) applies also to the interpretation of wills, subject to adaptation for context. It is argued that interpretation of wills and the application of an interpretation to a particular factual setting are coequal tasks. Each case must be decided on its own facts. The cardinal rule is the ascertainment of a testator's intention and giving effect thereto, provided that this will not bring about a violation of the law. It is argued that a court must put itself in the armchair of the testator and, after determining where the probabilities lie, it must infer or presume what the testator had in mind at the time that the will was created. Although intention is subjective, the interpretive process to determine a testator's intention is objective in form. It is argued that a court must, in every instance, understand the purpose for which it seeks to determine a testator's intention. This is so that it can undertake the correct enquiry. If the aim is to determine the meaning of a testamentary provision, then a testator's intention must be ascertained as memorialised in the written text of the will read as a whole, taking into account also the purpose of the text and its context. If, on the other hand, the aim is to determine whether a document is a testator's intended last will and testament, as is the case when section 2(3) of the Wills Act 7 of 1953 is invoked, then a testator's intention must be ascertained with reference to the document's purpose, taking also into account all legally relevant and admissible internal and external contextual factors. It is argued that all this is, as confirmed in Endumeni, consistent with the modern trend favouring an objective, purposive, contextual cum teleological mode of documentary interpretation.

Tydskrif vir die suid-afrikaanse reg, 2021

In hierdie artikel toon die outeur dat vir doeleindes van belastingadministrasie onder die Wet op... more In hierdie artikel toon die outeur dat vir doeleindes van belastingadministrasie onder die Wet op Belastingadministrasie 28 van 2011, ’n belastingbetaler, afhangende van die besondere omstandighede, aanspraak kan maak op die gemeenregtelike voordele wat verband hou met die vertrouensverhouding tussen ’n kliënt en sy/haar regsverteenwoordiger. Verder toon die toepassing van die reëls van uitleg dat, in die Wet op Belastingadministrasie, die wetgewer by implikasie die konsep “regsprofessionele privilegie” breër geformuleer het as in die gemenereg. Daarom, in hierdie konteks, is die konsep nie beperk tot lede van die regsgemeenskap wie se beroep gewoonlik betrokke is by die regspraktyk en gee van regsadvies nie. Ingevolge die Wet op Belastingadministrasie is hierdie voorreg van toepassing op alle vertroulike kommunikasie tussen ’n belastingpligtige en ’n adviseur of diensverskaffer wat in ’n professionele hoedanigheid optree wat wettiglik belastingadvies of ander regsdienste lewer wat deur die Wet op Belastingadministrasie in die vooruitsig gestel word, ongeag of sodanige derde party ’n prokureur, rekenmeester of ander professionele persoon is. Artikel 42A(1) van die Wet op Belastingadministrasie 28 van 2011 bepaal dat enige “persoon” protes tydens ’n navraag ingevolge artikel 52 mag aanteken en tydens ’n soek- en beslagleggingsoperasie wat deur artikel 61 in die vooruitsig gestel word eweneens daarteen kan protesteer. Die voorreg, wat bestaan uit regsprofessionele privilegie en litigasievoorreg, is daarop gemik om die privaatheid van belastingpligtige inligting vervat in enige vertroulike kommunikasie te beskerm en te bewaar. Aangesien hierdie bepalings geen gewag maak oor die omvang en reikwydte van regslui se voorreg in hierdie verband nie, interpreteer die outeur in hierdie artikel die formulering in die wetsartikels ooreenkomstig die gevestigde uitlegreëls. Deur ’n tekstuele modusinterpretasie te gebruik, toon die outeur dat artikels 42A en 64 nie die reg op bevoorregting skep nie. Dit erken eerder ’n voorafbestaande substantiewe reg om openbaarmaking van inligting wat uit die gemenereg afgelei word, te weier. Hierdie gemeenregtelike norm is, soos vereis deur artikel 39(3) van die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid- Afrika, 1996 in ooreenstemming met die handves van regte wat in hoofstuk 2 daarvan verskans is. Die aanvaarding van ’n doelmatige uitlegnorm toon dat ’n belastingpligtige geregtig is op die voordele wat voortspruit uit regslui se privilegie. Dit is die geval nie slegs in die eng omskrewe omstandighede genoem in artikel 42A(1) van die Wet op Belastingadministrasie nie, maar ook tydens enige ander inligtingsindeksionele proses wat deur hierdie wet gereguleer word (soos tydens ’n oudit, inspeksie, strafregtelike ondersoek en tydens ’n appèl in die belastingraad en belastinghof). Deur kontekstuele en waardegebaseerde uitlegmetodes te gebruik, voer die outeur in hierdie artikel aan dat die wetgewer by die nodige implikasie die begrip van regslui se privilegie in artikel 42A met artikel 64 van die Belastingadministrasiewet ruimer as by die gemenereg gemaak het. Gevolglik word beweer dat, vir doeleindes van hierdie statuut, regslui se voorreg nie net geëis kan word om vertroulike kommunikasie tussen ’n belastingpligtige, as kliënt, en ’n gekwalifiseerde “regspraktisyn” (naamlik ’n prokureur of advokaat) behoorlik toegelaat en ingeskryf ingevolge die Wet op Regspraktyk 28 van 2014 nie, maar ook om ’n skild te verskaf met betrekking tot vertroulike kommunikasie tussen ’n belastingpligtige en enige rekenmeester, geoktrooieerde rekenmeester, ouditeur, belastingkonsultant en ander persoon wat in ’n professionele hoedanigheid optree as ’n geregistreerde belastingpraktisyn wat voldoen aan artikel 240(1)(i) en (ii) van die Wet op Belastingadministrasie wat advies verskaf oor enige aangeleentheid wat deur artikel 240(1)(a) daarvan gedek word.

South African Law Journal, 2021

Journal of juridical science, Aug 23, 2019

This article argues that, for purposes of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, Bitcoin and cryptocurren... more This article argues that, for purposes of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies operating in a like manner are incorporeal property with a comparable value in real currency. The fundamental basis for the advancement of the hypothesis that such cryptocurrencies give rise to protectable proprietary rights are: (i) the rights exist digitally in cyberspace; (ii) the rights have value to their users; (iii) the rights are capable of being owned as cyberproperty; (iv) the rights can be transferred electronically by a possessor of a unique public-private cryptography protected keypair, and (v) the rights can be proved by entries in a digital ledger that records the historical chain of ownership transfers. This article argues further that the average, fair market value of the cryptocurrency in South African Rands on the date of its receipt or accrual as a revenue asset must be included in a taxpayer's gross income. It is further argued that this value ought to be the average price of the cryptocurrency determined with reference to at least two pricing indices commonly used or accepted in the marketplace.

Revenue law journal, 2018

Grammatical, purposive, contextual, teleological and comparative interpretations are the most com... more Grammatical, purposive, contextual, teleological and comparative interpretations are the most commonly used modalities for construing statutory texts. In Australia, interpretation of tax laws involves a combination of taking account of the law-text, its context, and its underlying purpose or policy. Ultimately, the meaning ascribed must be that which best reflects and gives effect to the legislature's intention as emerging from the statute. A value-based (teleological) interpretive approach does not, as yet, have a strong foothold in Australian jurisprudence, except to a limited extent under, for example, s 30 of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) and s 32(1) of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic). In South Africa, on the other hand, the basic approach to interpreting tax legislation is that its words are to be construed by reading and understanding the whole text in the light of its broader context. A meaning assigned must be appropriate and consistent within the limits of (i) the language of the text, (ii) the context and purpose of the text, (iii) the overall objectives of the legislation, and (iv) the relevant values and/or fundamental rights arising from the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 ('the SA Constitution'). As a result of the SA Constitution's supremacy and the provisions of s 39(2) therein, the meaning ascribed to a law-text must be that which, all legally relevant things considered, best promotes the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.

HSOA journal of forensic, legal & investigative sciences, Dec 18, 2017

The South African Revenue Service (SARS) is responsible for collecting sufficient taxes that woul... more The South African Revenue Service (SARS) is responsible for collecting sufficient taxes that would capacitate the South African government to satisfy the needs of its people. The "privilege of serving the citizenry who invest their trust and taxes in the public administration" 1 necessitates that SARS and its officials act in the public interest and for public benefit [1]. As a creation of statute, SARS is imbued with statutorily conferred public powers 2. Under the Tax Administration Act 3 (TAA), its powers include field audits (s 40), criminal investigations (s 41), unannounced on-site inspections (s 45), warranted (s 61) and warrantless searches (s 63). These provisions create a web of related, although independent, powers, each permitting SARS

HSOA journal of forensic, legal & investigative sciences, Dec 26, 2018

Section 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 directs that when any leg... more Section 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 directs that when any legislation is interpreted, the result must be a construction that promotes 'the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights'. The Constitution omits defining the contours of this phrase. Its precise meaning has also not been the subject of a comprehensive exposition by South African courts. Thus, uncertainty exists as to the exact import of this imprecise, somewhat vague phrase. What is clear is that the Constitution differentiates between the 'spirit', the 'purport' and the 'objects' of the Bill of Rights. Therefore, they must bear different meanings for its purposes. The absence of a definition that demarcates the scope and ambit of these constitutional imperatives increases the difficulty in applying them, particularly also because they may mean different things to different people. To ensure legal certainty, a tenet of the rule of law, it is important to develop a common understanding of the 'spirit', purport and objects of the Bill of Rights' and of that which must be fostered or advanced ('promoted'). However, as this article will demonstrate with reference to judicial precedent and relevant legal cum constitutional principles, they do not lend themselves to easy interpretation. This probably also explains the absence of a fixed definition thereof in SA's constitutional architecture and jurisprudence. Hence, this article does not seek to, nor will it, carve out a finite definition of the constituent elements at the epicentre of the interpretive directive in section 39(2) of the Constitution.

SA Mercantile Law Journal = SA Tydskrif vir Handelsreg, 2013

Section 23 of the Income Tax Act prohibits, in relation to any year of assessment, a deduction of... more Section 23 of the Income Tax Act prohibits, in relation to any year of assessment, a deduction of 'the cost incurred in the maintenance of any taxpayer, his family or establishment' as well as any 'domestic or private expenses'. The cumulative effect of these prohibitions is that, for income tax purposes, it renders non-deductible such expenses as are in the nature of, for example, medical costs incurred by a taxpayer in respect of himself or his spouse or child or on behalf of any other dependant.

De Rebus, Jul 1, 2013

It is not uncommon for spouses married in community of property to borrow funds under a secured l... more It is not uncommon for spouses married in community of property to borrow funds under a secured loan or to be mortgagors under a mortgage agreement in which they pledge their immovable property as security for a loan. In such instances, they are 'consumers' as defined in s 1 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (NCA). The lender or mortgagee (as the case may be) is a 'credit provider' as defined (s 1) (see ABSA Bank Ltd v Brown and Another; ABSA Bank Ltd v Van Deventer and Another [2012] JOL 28445 (ECP)).

SA Mercantile Law Journal = SA Tydskrif vir Handelsreg, 2012

The controversial Tax Administration Act (TAA) was passed by the National Assembly in November 20... more The controversial Tax Administration Act (TAA) was passed by the National Assembly in November 2011 and came into effect on 1 October 2012. It is designed to align into a single piece of legislation the administration of various tax Acts and promote their efficient and effective administration. It imposes obligations on a wide range of persons - taxpayers, non-taxpayers, representative taxpayers, registered tax practitioners, withholding agents, a responsible third party, shareholders, employers, vendors, and, generally, any person in possession or control of information or relevant material pertaining to a taxpayer's affairs. In certain defined instances, ss 62 and 63 of the TAA empower the South African Revenue Service (SARS) to conduct search and seizure operations without a warrant. This it can do with the assistance of the South African Police Service (SAPS). The TAA makes no provision for judicial or other oversight relating to the exercise of this power vested in the hands of an administrative functionary within an organ of state.

Booysen v S - irregularities in court a quo

CHARGE SHEET AND SAP 69 IN CRIMINAL CASE

MANAGING A CRIMINAL COURT PROCESS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Stellenbosch law review, 2020

Obiter, Aug 3, 2021

SA mercantile law journal, 2021

Stellenbosch law review, 2021

Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal, Feb 17, 2021

Tydskrif vir die suid-afrikaanse reg, 2021

South African Law Journal, 2021

Journal of juridical science, Aug 23, 2019

Revenue law journal, 2018

HSOA journal of forensic, legal & investigative sciences, Dec 18, 2017

HSOA journal of forensic, legal & investigative sciences, Dec 26, 2018

SA Mercantile Law Journal = SA Tydskrif vir Handelsreg, 2013

De Rebus, Jul 1, 2013

SA Mercantile Law Journal = SA Tydskrif vir Handelsreg, 2012

South African Law Journal, 2022

Taxation of legal costs in the high courts of South Africa is a quasi-judicial proceeding during ... more Taxation of legal costs in the high courts of South Africa is a quasi-judicial proceeding during which a Taxing Master assesses the fairness of a bill of costs, quantifies the amount payable to a cost creditor, and issues an allocatur which certifies the sum payable by a cost debtor. It is argued that this legal process, which is regulated by Uniform Rule 70 read with Uniform Rule 69, implicates a cost debtor’s fundamental right, under s 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, to fair dispute resolution at any independent forum. In terms of Uniform Rule 70(3B) (a), prior to the enrolment of a bill for taxation, a cost debtor is entitled ‘to inspect such documents or notes pertaining to any item on the bill’. This article argues that the inspection envisaged is a pre-taxation discovery procedure aimed at enabling a cost debtor to determine which items on a bill of costs are objectionable, and the grounds therefor. With reference to relevant judicial precedent and the established principles of interpretation, this article hypothesises that, having regard to the clear, unambiguous, peremptory language of Uniform Rule 70(3B)(a), as well as the purpose sought to be achieved by the right of inspection, the law has, in this context, excluded the operation of the cost creditor’s common-law right to assert legal professional privilege as regards documentation pertaining to any item claimed in the bill of costs. This is unlike the position prevailing at a pre-trial discovery procedure catered for in Uniform Rule 35. This article also argues that, in accordance with s 39(2) of the Constitution, the broad construction of the right of inspection under Uniform Rule 70(3B)(a) advanced here promotes both a cost debtor’s fundamental right in s 34 of the Constitution, and the values of justice and the rule of law which are deeply imbricated in the Bill of Rights.

This article deals with section 45 of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011. It argues that the i... more This article deals with section 45 of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011. It argues that the integrity and privacy of a taxpayer’s home and business environment are important rights and values to be respected and protected during tax administration by the South African Revenue Service (SARS). Their promotion is part of ‘the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’ to be fulfilled by reason of the interpretive command of section 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Every exercise of power to conduct warrantless, non-consensual tax inspections must, to be lawful, take place in an orderly fashion, with decency and due regard for taxpayers and their rights. This is so because, in a democracy, the substantive enjoyment of rights has a high premium. This article shows that, though the power of inspection invades the privacy of the taxpayer, the process itself is essential for the achievement of fiscal objectives and would pass muster if conducted in accordance with law and meets constitutional safeguards. Thus, it is argued that section 45 is not per se unconstitutional or inimical to the Constitution. It is shown that there are only limited circumstances that would justify a warrantless, non-consensual entry to premises, including a home, for purposes of an inspection. The upper limits of taxpayers’ rights may be affected by the rights or interests of others, as well as by the legitimate needs of society for, inter alia, fiscal discipline, and efficiency and effectiveness in tax collection. This article demonstrates that SARS’s powers under s 45 limits taxpayers’ fundamental right to privacy under s 36(1) of the Constitution. If correct, this would render its provisions prima facie unlawful.

Journal of juridical science, 2021

Sec. 63 of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 (TAA) grants officials of the South African Reve... more Sec. 63 of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 (TAA) grants officials of the South African Revenue Service (SARS) access to taxpayers' private and confidential information by, first, searching a taxpayer's person and premises without a warrant and, secondly, permitting the seizure of taxpayers' possessions and communications. Part One of this article (see Journal for Juridical Science 2021(1)) argued that the TAA is a "law of general application" as envisaged by the so-called "limitation clause" contained in sec. 36(1) of the Constitution, 1996 and that, in terms of the threshold stage of analysis prescribed by this provision, the exercise of the powers conferred by sec. 63(1) and (4) limits a taxpayer's constitutional right to privacy as entrenched in sec. 14 of the Constitution. In this Part Two of the article, it will be hypothesised that, although the search and seizure powers in sec. 63(1) and (4) of the TAA are not models of drafting with absolute clarity, they ought, in terms of the second stage of enquiry that is triggered by the findings in Part One, nevertheless to pass muster under sec. 36(1) of the Constitution, because of the justifiability of the limitation imposed on the right to privacy by these provisions. 8. THE SECOND ("JUSTIFICATION") PHASE OF THE ENQUIRY UNDER THE "LIMITATION CLAUSE" AS CONTAINED IN SEC. 36(1) OF THE CONSTITUTION 1 8.1 Is a warrantless search and seizure antithetical to democratic values? As shown in Part One of this article, sec. 63 of the Tax Administration Act 2 (hereafter, the "TAA") imbues the South African Revenue Service (SARS) with the power to conduct warrantless searches and seizures at taxpayers' premises for purposes of gathering information relevant to tax administration. Since "the substantive enjoyment 1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter, "the Constitution"). 2 Tax Administration Act 28/2011.