Faam Winden - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by Faam Winden

European Journal of Political Economy, Aug 1, 1990

Studies offering a formal description of interest group behaviour aimed at influencing government... more Studies offering a formal description of interest group behaviour aimed at influencing government policy typically use an 'influence function' to represent the transformation of resources into political influence. A formal model of the interaction underlying this transformation, however, appears to be lacking: the pressure process itself is treated as a 'black box'. In this paper we try to shed some light on this process. To that purpose the paper starts out with a formalization of political pressure, central to which is the transmission of information. Then a simple but basic game is presented formalizing the interaction between a government and an interest group. It is shown that pressure can be part of a sequential equilibrium. The results and insights obtained from the model are discussed and evaluated in a broader game-theoretical perspective.

Journal of Public Economics, Dec 1, 2009

People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the ... more People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication, or visit the DOI to the publisher's website. • The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review. • The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page numbers. Link to publication General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal. If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the "Taverne" license above, please follow below link for the End User Agreement:

A model is presented which places the decision to vote or abstain in a rational choice framework.... more A model is presented which places the decision to vote or abstain in a rational choice framework. It is shown that casting a vote may well be a rational act, following from an individual cost-benefit analysis. It is argued that (reference-)group interests play an important role when an individual determines actions in the political sphere. Through its (relative) turnout, a group can affect future tax rates to which its members are liable, and an optimal turnout-level is derived for each group. Using this optimal level, within-group processes are analyzed, where certain group members (‘producers of social pressure’) try to convince others to go and vote. For these producers, voting is shown to be a rational act. Other members may give in to this pressure and be induced to cast a vote. These members may be thought to vote out of a sense of ‘civic duty’. Equilibria for the model, characterized by positive turnout, are derived, an example is presented, and the results are discussed.

Meteor Research Memorandum, 2005

This paper experimentally studies the effects of competition in a social dilemma where people's a... more This paper experimentally studies the effects of competition in a social dilemma where people's actions can not be contractually fixed. We find that, in comparison with no competition, the presence of competition does neither increase efficiency nor does it yield any gains in earnings for the short side of the exchange relation. Moreover, competition has a clearly negative impact on the disposition towards others and on the experienced well-being of those on the long side. Since subjective well-being improves only for those on the short side competition contributes to larger inequalities in experienced well-being. All in all competition does not show up as a positive force in our environment.

European Journal of Political Research, Mar 1, 1987

In this article simulation results are used to analyze the capacity of a general politicoeconomic... more In this article simulation results are used to analyze the capacity of a general politicoeconomic model, developed by one of the authors, to generate cycles of various lengths. The model describes behaviour of individuals and organizations in the economic as well as the political sphere. The interaction between both spheres gives rise to short term (business) cycles as well as long term (Kondratieff) cycles. The analyses concentrate on the effect variations in the political sector (regarding, e.g., party identification on non-economic grounds, the sensitivity of voters, and the discount parameter for past economic results) have on the cycles found.

Springer eBooks, 1998

General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public port... more General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.-Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research-You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain-You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright, please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

Journal of Economic Psychology, Dec 1, 1991

ABSTRACT Corruption in the public sector erodes tax compliance and leads to higher tax evasion. M... more ABSTRACT Corruption in the public sector erodes tax compliance and leads to higher tax evasion. Moreover, corrupt public officials abuse their public power to extort bribes from the private agents. In both types of interaction with the public sector, the private agents are bound to face uncertainty with respect to their disposable incomes. To analyse effects of this uncertainty, a stochastic dynamic growth model with the public sector is examined. It is shown that deterministic excessive red tape and corruption deteriorate the growth potential through income redistribution and public sector inefficiencies. Most importantly, it is demonstrated that the increase in corruption via higher uncertainty exerts adverse effects on capital accumulation, thus leading to lower growth rates.

Public Choice, Oct 1, 1992

Informational lobbying-the use by interest groups of their (alleged) expertise or private informa... more Informational lobbying-the use by interest groups of their (alleged) expertise or private information on matters of importance for policymakers in an attempt to persuade them to implement particular policies-is often regarded as an important means of influence. This paper analyzes this phenomenon in a game setting. On the one hand, the interest group is assumed to have private information which is relevant to the policymaker, whilst, on the other hand, the policymaker is assumed to be fully aware of the strategic incentives of the interest group to (mis)report or conceal its private information. It is shown that in a setting of partially conflicting interests a rationale for informational lobbying can only exist if messages bear a cost to the interest group and if the group's preferences carry information in the 'right direction'. Furthermore, it is shown that it is not the content of the message as such, but rather the characteristics of the interest group that induces potential changes in the policymaker's behavior. In addition, the model reveals some interesting results on the relation between, on the one hand, the occurrence and impact of lobbying and, on the other hand, the cost of lobbying, the stake which an interest group has in persuading the policymaker, the similarity between the policymaker's and the group's preferences, and the initial beliefs of the policymaker. Moreover, we relate the results to some empirical findings on lobbying. Much o f the pressure placed upon government and its agencies takes the form o f freely provided "'objective" studies showing the important outcomes to be expected from the enactment of particular policies (Bartlett, 1973: 133, his quotation marks).

Public Choice, Mar 1, 1989

Most analyses of preferences for government-supplied goods disregard the fact that in a democrati... more Most analyses of preferences for government-supplied goods disregard the fact that in a democratic society, these preferences are revealed by an individual choice: the vote. In this paper this is taken account of in a model, explaining the dynamics in voting behavior in a multi-party system. The model assumes that voters may be categorized into K groups of individuals, pursuing the same interests, who remember how parties do in representing these interests (given the level to which they are held responsible for government policy). The model allows one to estimate party identification, sensitiveness to economic performances, time preference, and relative preferences for public versus private goods, all for each of the groups. Furthermore, the model allows for an estimation of the level to which various parties are held responsible for government policies. An empirical application of the model to the Netherlands is presented, albeit that data restrictions did not allow a distinction of more than one group. The results in terms of significance of the coefficients as well as the interpretation of the original parameters are promising. The two main conclusions are that the relative preference for private versus collective consumption is lower than the existing ratio in the Netherlands, and that two parties forming a government coalition are not held equally responsible for the policies.

European Economic Review, Feb 1, 2012

European Economic Review, May 1, 2007

International Journal of Game Theory, Sep 1, 1996

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 1996

Artefactual Field Experiments, 2000

This paper reports on a series of signaling game experiments in which an informed sender can send... more This paper reports on a series of signaling game experiments in which an informed sender can send a costly message in order to persuade an uninformed responder. We compare the behavior of two subjects pools: 143 undergraduate students and 30 public affairs officials that are professionally familiar with strategic information transmission. The experiments comprised two parameter treatments: one with low costs for sending messages, and one with high costs. Our main conclusion is that there are neither significant nor systematic differences in the behavior of the two subject-pools.

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Dec 1, 2000

Social Science Research Network, Sep 22, 2001

Lobbying is studied in a series of signaling game experiments. Students as well as professional l... more Lobbying is studied in a series of signaling game experiments. Students as well as professional lobbyists are used as subjects. In contrast with some earlier studies, comparing students and professionals, we find significant differences in the behavior of the two subject pools. Professional subjects appear to behave more in line with the game-theoretic predictions, display a higher degree of separation, and earn more money. We show that professional rules of conduct and professionalization can explain these differences. Although our results suggest that subject surrogacy is a relevant issue in this field of research, arguments are provided why experimentation with student subjects remains useful to study lobbying.

European Journal of Political Economy, 1986

Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, Oct 22, 2014

European Journal of Political Economy, Feb 1, 1997

and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requi... more and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.-Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research-You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain-You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright, please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.