Fabio Paglieri - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Fabio Paglieri
Human choices are context-dependent, and options evaluation is biased by the quality and quantity... more Human choices are context-dependent, and options evaluation is biased by the quality and quantity of available alternatives. In the attraction effect, apparently irrelevant dominated decoys have proven effective in shifting preferences in numerous laboratory experiments, yet its relevance in real-life consumer choices remains disputed. Part of the problem lies in the differences between laboratory settings and realistic scenarios: in the lab, participants are typically tested on ternary choices, deliberately excluding any interference from other context effects; in contrast, in real life, consumers face choices among a high number of options, and interactions with other context effects are frequent. In this paper, we present two experiments that investigate how these factors modulate the attraction effect: in particular, we systematically manipulate the number of decoys (study1), and the number of options available to decision makers (study2). Our findings provide a rich map of the effects of asymmetrically dominated decoys in larger multialternative decision contexts, suggesting that: (i) the attraction effect remains significant for up to 5 options; (ii) two converging decoys are more effective than one, but (iii) adding more can undermine the effect; (iv) compromise options have a peculiar dampening influence on decoys, making them ineffective at targeting the intermediate option.
Animal cognition, Feb 23, 2024
Decision-making has been observed to be systematically affected by decoys, i.e., options that sho... more Decision-making has been observed to be systematically affected by decoys, i.e., options that should be irrelevant, either because unavailable or because manifestly inferior to other alternatives, and yet shift preferences towards their target. Decoy effects have been extensively studied both in humans and in several other species; however, evidence in non-human primates remains scant and inconclusive. To address this gap, this study investigates how choices in capuchin monkeys (Sapajus spp.) are affected by different types of decoys: asymmetrically dominated decoys, i.e., available and unavailable options that are inferior to only one of the other alternatives, and phantom decoys, i.e., unavailable options that are superior to another available alternative. After controlling for the subjective strength of initial preferences and the distance of each decoy from its target in attribute space, results demonstrate a systematic shift in capuchins' preference towards the target of both asymmetrically dominated decoys (whether they are available or not) and phantom decoys, regardless of what options is being targeted by such decoys. This provides the most comprehensive evidence to date of decoy effects in non-human primates, with important theoretical and methodological implications for future comparative studies on context effects in decision-making.
In the delay choice task, in which individuals face choices between smaller immediate rewards and... more In the delay choice task, in which individuals face choices between smaller immediate rewards and larger delayed rewards, humans discount larger/more preferred delayed rewards less steeply than smaller/less preferred ones (magnitude effect). However, this effect has not yet been observed in animals either for quantity or quality of the reward. We aimed to assess whether in a delay choice task capuchins (i) show a magnitude effect, and (ii) value more the quality or the quantity of the reward. Six subjects were presented with four conditions: (i) 2 pieces of low-preferred food vs. 6 pieces of high-preferred food (2 low-6 high); (ii) 2 pieces of high-preferred food vs. 6 pieces of low-preferred food (2 high-6 low); (iii) 2 pieces of low-preferred food vs. 6 pieces of low-preferred food (2 low-6 low); and (iv) 2 pieces of high-preferred food vs. 6 pieces of high-preferred food (2 high-6 high). Overall, we failed to observe a magnitude effect since capuchins did not choose the larger de...
Philosophy & technology, Apr 20, 2024
This paper discusses some societal implications of the most recent and publicly discussed applica... more This paper discusses some societal implications of the most recent and publicly discussed application of advanced machine learning techniques: generative AI models, such as ChatGPT (text generation) and DALL-E (text-to-image generation). The aim is to shift attention away from conceptual disputes, e.g. regarding their level of intelligence and similarities/differences with human performance, to focus instead on practical problems, pertaining the impact that these technologies might have (and already have) on human societies. After a preliminary clarification of how generative AI works (Sect. 1), the paper discusses what kind of transparency ought to be required for such technologies and for the business model behind their commercial exploitation (Sect. 2), what is the role of user-generated data in determining their performance and how it should inform the redistribution of the resulting benefits (Sect. 3), the best way of integrating generative AI systems in the creative job market and how to properly negotiate their role in it (Sect. 4), and what kind of "cognitive extension" offered by these technologies we ought to embrace, and what type we should instead resist and monitor (Sect. 5). The last part of the paper summarizes the main conclusions of this analysis, also marking its distance from other, more apocalyptic approaches to the dangers of AI for human society.
Sistemi intelligenti, 2012
Nel loro puntuale e chiaro riassunto del ricco dibattito sulla mente estesa, Di Francesco e Pired... more Nel loro puntuale e chiaro riassunto del ricco dibattito sulla mente estesa, Di Francesco e Piredda (questo numero) mostrano chiaramente la doppia anima di questo approccio allo studio della cognizione: da un lato, l'anima più schiettamente funzionalista, in un certo senso in continuità con vari elementi presenti nel paradigma classico delle scienze cognitiva (primo fra tutti, il rappresentazionalismo), ma fortemente critica sull'idea che i veicoli del mentale si realizzino necessariamente nella testa (Clark e Chalmers 1998; ...
Sistemi intelligenti, 2013
Sistemi intelligenti, 2014
Educational Psychologist, Sep 6, 2016
We summarize the argumentative theory of reasoning, which claims that the main function of reason... more We summarize the argumentative theory of reasoning, which claims that the main function of reasoning is to argue. In this theory, argumentation is seen as being essentially cooperative (people have to listen to others' arguments and be ready to change their mind) but with an adversarial dimension (their goal as argument producers is to convince). Consistent with this theory, the experimental literature shows that solitary reasoning is biased and lazy, whereas reasoning in group discussion produces good results, provided some conditions are met. We formulate recommendations for improving reasoning performance, mainly, to make people argue more and better by creating felicitous conditions for group discussion. We also make some suggestions for improving solitary reasoning, in particular to maximize students' exposure to arguments challenging their positions. Teaching people about the value of argumentation is likely to improve not only immediate reasoning performance but also long-term solitary reasoning skills.
Sistemi intelligenti, 2009
L'articolo di Massimo Marraffa (in questo numero di «Sistemi Intelligenti») sulla co... more L'articolo di Massimo Marraffa (in questo numero di «Sistemi Intelligenti») sulla cosiddetta filosofia sperimentale (o X-Phi) ha vari pregi. Innanzitutto, presenta in modo conciso e chiaro un'area di crescente interesse nella ricerca filosofica internazionale, ancora poco nota in Italia. In secondo luogo, offre un'analisi equilibrata di due possibili reazioni a questo nuovo settore di studio, fra loro in netta opposizione: da un lato, l'idea che le evidenze raccolte dalla filosofia sperimentale decretino la fine dell'appello aprioristico all'intuizione in ...
Sistemi intelligenti, 2012
Ventitré anni di sIstemI IntellIgentI «sistemi intelligenti» esiste da ventitré anni e, dato che ... more Ventitré anni di sIstemI IntellIgentI «sistemi intelligenti» esiste da ventitré anni e, dato che il settore di ricerca di cui si occupa si trasforma rapidamente, è giusto chiedersi che cosa è cambiato da allora e fare un bilancio della rivista. Fare un bilancio significa dire quali sono le cose buone e quali sono quelle cattive. Le cose buone della rivista a me sembrano evidenti ma non le dirò qui perché, essendo stato il direttore della rivista in questi ventitré anni, non mi sembra appropriato dirle. Ma debbo almeno dire che «sistemi intelligenti» ha ...
Springer eBooks, 2016
Building on evidence from the field of risk perception and communication, two key roles of argume... more Building on evidence from the field of risk perception and communication, two key roles of argumentation in crisis management are highlighted: (1) balancing trust construction and persuasive goals in crisis prevention and preparedness, and (2) ensuring time-efficient cross-examination of choice options in group decision making at a time of crisis. The implications for an information fusion approach to crisis management are discussed, suggesting a rich potential for future research.
Argument & Computation, May 4, 2014
Philosophy & Technology, Jun 5, 2016
In spite of significant research efforts, argument technologies do not seem poised to scale up as... more In spite of significant research efforts, argument technologies do not seem poised to scale up as much as most commentators would hope or even predict. In this paper, I discuss what obstacles bar the way to more widespread success of argument technologies and venture some suggestions on how to circumvent such difficulties: doing so will require a significant shift in how this research area is typically understood and practiced. I begin by exploring a much broader yet closely related question: To what extent are people natively good at arguing? This issue has always been central to philosophical reflection and it has become even more urgent nowadays, with the explosion of persuasive technologies and unprecedented opportunities for large-scale social influence. The answer hinges on what aspect of argumentation is taken under consideration: evidence suggests that people are relatively bad at analyzing the structure of arguments, especially when these are presented out of context and in abstract terms; in contrast, data show that even laymen tend to excel in the interactive practice of argumentation, in particular when motivation is high and something significant is at stake. Unfortunately, current argument technologies are more closely tailored to the former type of activity than to the latter, which is the main reason behind their relative lack of success with the general public. Changing this state of affair will require a commitment to ecological argument technologies: that is, technologies designed to support real-time, engaging and meaningful argumentative interactions performed by laypeople in their ordinary life, instead of catering to the highly specific needs of a minority of niche users (typically, argumentation scholars).
Argument & Computation, Apr 16, 2014
This paper outlines an integrated approach to trust and relevance with respect to arguments: in p... more This paper outlines an integrated approach to trust and relevance with respect to arguments: in particular, it is suggested that trust in relevance has a central role in argumentation. We first distinguish two types of argumentative relevance: internal relevance, i.e. the extent to which a premise has a bearing on its purported conclusion, and external relevance, i.e. a measure of how much a whole argument is pertinent to the matter under discussion, in the broader dialogical context where it is proposed. Then, we argue that judgements of internal relevance heavily rely on trust, and that such trust, although occasionally misplaced (e.g. in some so-called fallacies of relevance), is nonetheless based on several reasons, and thus often justified, by either epistemic or pragmatic considerations. We conclude by sketching potential methods to formally model trust in argumentative relevance, and briefly discussing the technological implications of this line of research.
Topoi-an International Review of Philosophy, Feb 15, 2015
Human choices are context-dependent, and options evaluation is biased by the quality and quantity... more Human choices are context-dependent, and options evaluation is biased by the quality and quantity of available alternatives. In the attraction effect, apparently irrelevant dominated decoys have proven effective in shifting preferences in numerous laboratory experiments, yet its relevance in real-life consumer choices remains disputed. Part of the problem lies in the differences between laboratory settings and realistic scenarios: in the lab, participants are typically tested on ternary choices, deliberately excluding any interference from other context effects; in contrast, in real life, consumers face choices among a high number of options, and interactions with other context effects are frequent. In this paper, we present two experiments that investigate how these factors modulate the attraction effect: in particular, we systematically manipulate the number of decoys (study1), and the number of options available to decision makers (study2). Our findings provide a rich map of the effects of asymmetrically dominated decoys in larger multialternative decision contexts, suggesting that: (i) the attraction effect remains significant for up to 5 options; (ii) two converging decoys are more effective than one, but (iii) adding more can undermine the effect; (iv) compromise options have a peculiar dampening influence on decoys, making them ineffective at targeting the intermediate option.
Animal cognition, Feb 23, 2024
Decision-making has been observed to be systematically affected by decoys, i.e., options that sho... more Decision-making has been observed to be systematically affected by decoys, i.e., options that should be irrelevant, either because unavailable or because manifestly inferior to other alternatives, and yet shift preferences towards their target. Decoy effects have been extensively studied both in humans and in several other species; however, evidence in non-human primates remains scant and inconclusive. To address this gap, this study investigates how choices in capuchin monkeys (Sapajus spp.) are affected by different types of decoys: asymmetrically dominated decoys, i.e., available and unavailable options that are inferior to only one of the other alternatives, and phantom decoys, i.e., unavailable options that are superior to another available alternative. After controlling for the subjective strength of initial preferences and the distance of each decoy from its target in attribute space, results demonstrate a systematic shift in capuchins' preference towards the target of both asymmetrically dominated decoys (whether they are available or not) and phantom decoys, regardless of what options is being targeted by such decoys. This provides the most comprehensive evidence to date of decoy effects in non-human primates, with important theoretical and methodological implications for future comparative studies on context effects in decision-making.
In the delay choice task, in which individuals face choices between smaller immediate rewards and... more In the delay choice task, in which individuals face choices between smaller immediate rewards and larger delayed rewards, humans discount larger/more preferred delayed rewards less steeply than smaller/less preferred ones (magnitude effect). However, this effect has not yet been observed in animals either for quantity or quality of the reward. We aimed to assess whether in a delay choice task capuchins (i) show a magnitude effect, and (ii) value more the quality or the quantity of the reward. Six subjects were presented with four conditions: (i) 2 pieces of low-preferred food vs. 6 pieces of high-preferred food (2 low-6 high); (ii) 2 pieces of high-preferred food vs. 6 pieces of low-preferred food (2 high-6 low); (iii) 2 pieces of low-preferred food vs. 6 pieces of low-preferred food (2 low-6 low); and (iv) 2 pieces of high-preferred food vs. 6 pieces of high-preferred food (2 high-6 high). Overall, we failed to observe a magnitude effect since capuchins did not choose the larger de...
Philosophy & technology, Apr 20, 2024
This paper discusses some societal implications of the most recent and publicly discussed applica... more This paper discusses some societal implications of the most recent and publicly discussed application of advanced machine learning techniques: generative AI models, such as ChatGPT (text generation) and DALL-E (text-to-image generation). The aim is to shift attention away from conceptual disputes, e.g. regarding their level of intelligence and similarities/differences with human performance, to focus instead on practical problems, pertaining the impact that these technologies might have (and already have) on human societies. After a preliminary clarification of how generative AI works (Sect. 1), the paper discusses what kind of transparency ought to be required for such technologies and for the business model behind their commercial exploitation (Sect. 2), what is the role of user-generated data in determining their performance and how it should inform the redistribution of the resulting benefits (Sect. 3), the best way of integrating generative AI systems in the creative job market and how to properly negotiate their role in it (Sect. 4), and what kind of "cognitive extension" offered by these technologies we ought to embrace, and what type we should instead resist and monitor (Sect. 5). The last part of the paper summarizes the main conclusions of this analysis, also marking its distance from other, more apocalyptic approaches to the dangers of AI for human society.
Sistemi intelligenti, 2012
Nel loro puntuale e chiaro riassunto del ricco dibattito sulla mente estesa, Di Francesco e Pired... more Nel loro puntuale e chiaro riassunto del ricco dibattito sulla mente estesa, Di Francesco e Piredda (questo numero) mostrano chiaramente la doppia anima di questo approccio allo studio della cognizione: da un lato, l'anima più schiettamente funzionalista, in un certo senso in continuità con vari elementi presenti nel paradigma classico delle scienze cognitiva (primo fra tutti, il rappresentazionalismo), ma fortemente critica sull'idea che i veicoli del mentale si realizzino necessariamente nella testa (Clark e Chalmers 1998; ...
Sistemi intelligenti, 2013
Sistemi intelligenti, 2014
Educational Psychologist, Sep 6, 2016
We summarize the argumentative theory of reasoning, which claims that the main function of reason... more We summarize the argumentative theory of reasoning, which claims that the main function of reasoning is to argue. In this theory, argumentation is seen as being essentially cooperative (people have to listen to others' arguments and be ready to change their mind) but with an adversarial dimension (their goal as argument producers is to convince). Consistent with this theory, the experimental literature shows that solitary reasoning is biased and lazy, whereas reasoning in group discussion produces good results, provided some conditions are met. We formulate recommendations for improving reasoning performance, mainly, to make people argue more and better by creating felicitous conditions for group discussion. We also make some suggestions for improving solitary reasoning, in particular to maximize students' exposure to arguments challenging their positions. Teaching people about the value of argumentation is likely to improve not only immediate reasoning performance but also long-term solitary reasoning skills.
Sistemi intelligenti, 2009
L'articolo di Massimo Marraffa (in questo numero di «Sistemi Intelligenti») sulla co... more L'articolo di Massimo Marraffa (in questo numero di «Sistemi Intelligenti») sulla cosiddetta filosofia sperimentale (o X-Phi) ha vari pregi. Innanzitutto, presenta in modo conciso e chiaro un'area di crescente interesse nella ricerca filosofica internazionale, ancora poco nota in Italia. In secondo luogo, offre un'analisi equilibrata di due possibili reazioni a questo nuovo settore di studio, fra loro in netta opposizione: da un lato, l'idea che le evidenze raccolte dalla filosofia sperimentale decretino la fine dell'appello aprioristico all'intuizione in ...
Sistemi intelligenti, 2012
Ventitré anni di sIstemI IntellIgentI «sistemi intelligenti» esiste da ventitré anni e, dato che ... more Ventitré anni di sIstemI IntellIgentI «sistemi intelligenti» esiste da ventitré anni e, dato che il settore di ricerca di cui si occupa si trasforma rapidamente, è giusto chiedersi che cosa è cambiato da allora e fare un bilancio della rivista. Fare un bilancio significa dire quali sono le cose buone e quali sono quelle cattive. Le cose buone della rivista a me sembrano evidenti ma non le dirò qui perché, essendo stato il direttore della rivista in questi ventitré anni, non mi sembra appropriato dirle. Ma debbo almeno dire che «sistemi intelligenti» ha ...
Springer eBooks, 2016
Building on evidence from the field of risk perception and communication, two key roles of argume... more Building on evidence from the field of risk perception and communication, two key roles of argumentation in crisis management are highlighted: (1) balancing trust construction and persuasive goals in crisis prevention and preparedness, and (2) ensuring time-efficient cross-examination of choice options in group decision making at a time of crisis. The implications for an information fusion approach to crisis management are discussed, suggesting a rich potential for future research.
Argument & Computation, May 4, 2014
Philosophy & Technology, Jun 5, 2016
In spite of significant research efforts, argument technologies do not seem poised to scale up as... more In spite of significant research efforts, argument technologies do not seem poised to scale up as much as most commentators would hope or even predict. In this paper, I discuss what obstacles bar the way to more widespread success of argument technologies and venture some suggestions on how to circumvent such difficulties: doing so will require a significant shift in how this research area is typically understood and practiced. I begin by exploring a much broader yet closely related question: To what extent are people natively good at arguing? This issue has always been central to philosophical reflection and it has become even more urgent nowadays, with the explosion of persuasive technologies and unprecedented opportunities for large-scale social influence. The answer hinges on what aspect of argumentation is taken under consideration: evidence suggests that people are relatively bad at analyzing the structure of arguments, especially when these are presented out of context and in abstract terms; in contrast, data show that even laymen tend to excel in the interactive practice of argumentation, in particular when motivation is high and something significant is at stake. Unfortunately, current argument technologies are more closely tailored to the former type of activity than to the latter, which is the main reason behind their relative lack of success with the general public. Changing this state of affair will require a commitment to ecological argument technologies: that is, technologies designed to support real-time, engaging and meaningful argumentative interactions performed by laypeople in their ordinary life, instead of catering to the highly specific needs of a minority of niche users (typically, argumentation scholars).
Argument & Computation, Apr 16, 2014
This paper outlines an integrated approach to trust and relevance with respect to arguments: in p... more This paper outlines an integrated approach to trust and relevance with respect to arguments: in particular, it is suggested that trust in relevance has a central role in argumentation. We first distinguish two types of argumentative relevance: internal relevance, i.e. the extent to which a premise has a bearing on its purported conclusion, and external relevance, i.e. a measure of how much a whole argument is pertinent to the matter under discussion, in the broader dialogical context where it is proposed. Then, we argue that judgements of internal relevance heavily rely on trust, and that such trust, although occasionally misplaced (e.g. in some so-called fallacies of relevance), is nonetheless based on several reasons, and thus often justified, by either epistemic or pragmatic considerations. We conclude by sketching potential methods to formally model trust in argumentative relevance, and briefly discussing the technological implications of this line of research.
Topoi-an International Review of Philosophy, Feb 15, 2015