Florence Gaub - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Florence Gaub
While NATO was created with a primary outlook to the East, its Southern rim was neglected strateg... more While NATO was created with a primary outlook to the East, its Southern rim was neglected strategically until the end of the Cold War. Since then, the Alliance has undertaken a number of efforts to build strategic relationships with the Middle East and North Africa, recognizing the region’s importance for Allied security. However, looming obstacles may well interfer with NATO's efforts to enhance relations with the region. Geostrategic realities are not in NATO’s favor: it is a region of crisis; suspicious of the West in general; riddled with internal instability; and is a difficult to build ties with. This monograph examines the existing relationships as well as the remaining obstacles, and proposes solutions to the latter.
On March 17, 2011, a month after the beginning of the Libyan revolution, with up to 2,000 civilia... more On March 17, 2011, a month after the beginning of the Libyan revolution, with up to 2,000 civilians dead, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) decided on backing a no-fly zone over Libya and authorized “all necessary measures” to protect civilians. While France, Great Britain, and the United States took immediate military action using air and missile strikes, considerations to hand over military actions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) emerged within days of the operation. On March 22, 2012, NATO agreed to enforce the arms embargo against Libya; 2 days later, it announced to take over all military aspects of the UNSC 1973. On March 31, 2012, Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP) began. OUP turned out to be one of NATO’s shorter, and seemingly also less controversial, missions. Mandated by both the League of Arab States and the UN as the regime of Colonel Qaddafi was launching assaults on peacefully demonstrating citizens, its aim was to protect civilians from the air and sea. Described as a “war of choice” rather than a “war of necessity,” NATO achieved its goals more by accident than by design, according to some critics. The lessons which can be drawn from OUP are both military and political in nature. The overestimation of air power as a result of “no boots on the ground” might be a dangerous conclusion for future cases; the lack of cultural advice very likely prolonged the mission, while the shortcomings in strategic communication gave input to improve an area that is still new to NATO. The operation also highlighted a strategic dimension the Alliance was not ready to perceive—that the Mediterranean, and its Southern states, is likely to continue being a source of instability for NATO, particularly after the Arab Spring. In legal terms, the Alliance faced an important communication gap between its legal, and therefore military, mandate—the legal interpretations of UNSCR 1973 made clear that the operation did not seek to topple Colonel Gaddafi’s regime, let alone assassinate him. Its aim was solely the protection of civilians in a situation of internal conflict, and, therefore, it conformed to the norm of “Responsibility to Protect.” On the political level, heads of NATO member states made contradictory remarks calling for Gaddafi’s departure, thereby compromising the clarity of the mission. Last but not least, the aftermath of NATO’s Libya operation was not planned at all as the Libyan National Transitional Council firmly rejected any military personnel on the ground, even UN observers. As the regime’s security forces had virtually imploded, Libya’s security therefore fell into the hands of the multiple militias which continued to proliferate after the conflict had ended.
As the ‘Arab Spring’ was not anticipated by analysts, the prediction of instability has experienc... more As the ‘Arab Spring’ was not anticipated by analysts, the prediction of instability has experienced scrutiny – how was it possible not to see the factors that eventually led to the massive uprising, and is there any way to anticipate them? This report argues that the analytical failure does not reside in the overlooking of root causes such as poverty, unemployment or young population, but the failed grasp of their interplay. Rather than stacking causes on top of each other, analysts have to develop a three-dimensional approach recognising their interplay.
To begin with, conditions of instability or root causes do not stand-alone but can interact with each other, hence having either a reinforcing or levelling impact on their weakness or strength in mobilising popular unrest. Secondly, a difference has to be made between root causes as such and catalysts, which are the elements that add frustration dynamic to the root causes. Thirdly, the existence of root causes and catalysts does not in itself imply explosive potential; rather, the state’s capacity to manage these frustrations plays a decisive role in keeping them in check. Lastly, even a considerable amount of critical conditions and respective catalysts will require triggers animating the actual social dislocation.
Hence, four lines of analysis are required in the assessment of a country’s vulnerability to risk and conflict: conditions, catalysts, triggers on the side of society, as well as the state’s capacity to handle these on the other side. Confusing these four elements and their interplay ultimately leads to a bodged understanding of any crisis.
Conditions are the underlying root causes for instability. These are long-term dynamics that can be static, or change only gradually over time. Root causes can be as diverse as evolution of the state, historical experiences, politicisation of regional, ethnic or religious identities, social stratification, growth of population and economy, rates of urbanization, distribution of wealth and income, access to education and opportunity, scarcity of resources, unemployment rates and so forth. Yet root causes themselves do not cause instability by merely existing; all states face potential conditions of instability without a crisis emerging. Rather, catalysts of instability become the decisive factor in the determination of actual conflict potential.
Once a condition has reached instability potential via the addition of a catalyst, it still requires a ‘trigger’, a one-time event capable of animating the actual social dislocation, conflict and instability. Triggers can be elections, natural disasters, an economic shock, death of a leader or, as seen in the case of the ‘Arab Spring’, a dramatic gesture of an individual, or mass demonstrations.
In addition to the three elements mentioned above, the actual strength or weakness of the state to handle either the conditions before they can develop actual instability potential, or manage the unrest once it breaks out, is a decisive factor. This is where Middle Eastern studies focused their interest in the past as it was here that the main explanation for continuing authoritarianism seemed to lie. However, the actual assessment of the states’ strength, in particular the role of the security sector, proved wrong – or rather, non-existent, as study of Arab armed forces had ceased in the 1970s and was replaced by mere assumptions.
Actual vulnerability to instability has to be explained by the actual interaction of these four elements. A country may very well present a large number of underlying conditions which could cause instability without it spilling into conflict or unrest, as catalysts and triggers are missing that will give them disruptive properties. Likewise, destabilizing one-off events will be lessened if they do not tap into pre-existing conditions.
In the context of the Arab Spring, this report posits that while analysts correctly identified the root causes eventually leading to the unrest, they failed to identify the catalysts, which differed considerably from case to case. As the catalysts are the determining factor in timing social dislocation, their overlooking is what ultimately led to the degree of surprise. A thorough analysis throughout 2010 would have shown that Syria and Egypt experienced massive increases in food prices, Bahrain and Yemen very rapid increases in demography and Tunisia a considerable yet rather recent mismatch between university output and labour market absorption. As the international and/or regional system underwent changes as well, all that was missing was a trigger, which eventually took place in Tunisia.
As catalysts are, simply put, any form of change in existing structures, they can be overlooked if they are as mundane as food prices or educational policy. Yet catalysts can be found elsewhere: any form of change will jeopardise stability. The challenge for analysts is then to detect change and anticipate its impact on existing social structures. In this, they have failed in 2010 and 2011.
As the Arab Spring has renewed Western interest in the political, as well as military, role of Ar... more As the Arab Spring has renewed Western interest in the political, as well as military, role of Arab armed forces, reform—rather than mere assistance—is crucial. In this monograph, the author focuses on the structural aspects of reform from which the Arab Spring forces would benefit. Seven features are identified which need to be addressed when attempting Arab military reform in the countries affected by large-scale unrest in 2011: an unclear mandate, over-politicization, a challenging ongoing security situation, limited resources, lack of civilian oversight, pockets of paramilitary activity, and, in parts, as well as the lack of an institutional perception of reform need. Their origins are elaborated as much as recommendations for what outside assistance can achieve.
This monograph examines the impact that the “Arab Spring” has had on how Arab states relate to ea... more This monograph examines the impact that the “Arab Spring” has had on how Arab states relate to each other post-regime change and post-Islamist electoral victory. It shows that the region is undergoing a profound change as some traditional regional policy actors are paralyzed by internal turmoil (such as Syria and Egypt), while others do not have a regional ambition (such as Algeria and Morocco). The region has therefore entered a Gulf moment where key decisions pertaining to the region’s future are now taken in Riyadh, Doha, and Abu Dhabi. From having once been mere bystanders of regional politics, the Gulf States have moved to become players with both the ambition and capability to shape regional dynamics. As the ripple effects of their 2014 rift show, these dynamics will have a wider Arab impact.
ISIS is not just a terrorist entity: it is also a cult.
In spite of geographic proximity and a number of shared interests, the European Union and Libya h... more In spite of geographic proximity and a number of shared interests, the
European Union and Libya have a history of strained relations. The war
of 2011 provided an opportunity for a fresh start, but so far neither side
has been able to reap benefits from an entirely new political situation.
Instead, Libya’s difficult internal situation has not only slowed down the
process of rapprochement, but also increased EU concern. At a time when cooperation becomes a necessity rather than a choice, Libya is now downspiralling into implosion at the levels of security, bureaucracy and economy, to the point where it cannot absorb the offers being made.
Arab military cooperation has been, over the past century, mostly a history of failures. Whether ... more Arab military cooperation has been, over the past century, mostly a history of failures. Whether the Arab League’s Defence Pact or the Middle East Command, ideas for collective security in the region all failed to move beyond the state of declarations. Most of the time, Arab states were either at open war or in cold peace. Since the Arab Spring has toppled not only regimes but also brought insecurity, new momentum has come into regional security. From joint exercises to the announcement of first an Arab and more recently an Islamic military alliance, states begin to move further into cooperation. As this Letort Paper shows, several obstacles will have to be overcome before collective security in the Middle East and North Africa can become a reality.
While Libya may have already collapsed in political and security terms, yet another disaster loom... more While Libya may have already collapsed in political and security terms, yet another disaster looms on the horizon: an economic crash which could soon unleash a humanitarian crisis if no solution is found. The main cause is the country’s economic structure: it is hugely dependent on oil to generate revenue, the majority of Libya’s population is employed by the public sector, and most of its food is imported.
Consequently, if the Libyan state goes bankrupt, it will take large parts of the population down with it.
The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national secu... more The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are
While NATO was created with a primary outlook to the East, its Southern rim was neglected strateg... more While NATO was created with a primary outlook to the East, its Southern rim was neglected strategically until the end of the Cold War. Since then, the Alliance has undertaken a number of efforts to build strategic relationships with the Middle East and North Africa, recognizing the region’s importance for Allied security. However, looming obstacles may well interfer with NATO's efforts to enhance relations with the region. Geostrategic realities are not in NATO’s favor: it is a region of crisis; suspicious of the West in general; riddled with internal instability; and is a difficult to build ties with. This monograph examines the existing relationships as well as the remaining obstacles, and proposes solutions to the latter.
On March 17, 2011, a month after the beginning of the Libyan revolution, with up to 2,000 civilia... more On March 17, 2011, a month after the beginning of the Libyan revolution, with up to 2,000 civilians dead, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) decided on backing a no-fly zone over Libya and authorized “all necessary measures” to protect civilians. While France, Great Britain, and the United States took immediate military action using air and missile strikes, considerations to hand over military actions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) emerged within days of the operation. On March 22, 2012, NATO agreed to enforce the arms embargo against Libya; 2 days later, it announced to take over all military aspects of the UNSC 1973. On March 31, 2012, Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP) began. OUP turned out to be one of NATO’s shorter, and seemingly also less controversial, missions. Mandated by both the League of Arab States and the UN as the regime of Colonel Qaddafi was launching assaults on peacefully demonstrating citizens, its aim was to protect civilians from the air and sea. Described as a “war of choice” rather than a “war of necessity,” NATO achieved its goals more by accident than by design, according to some critics. The lessons which can be drawn from OUP are both military and political in nature. The overestimation of air power as a result of “no boots on the ground” might be a dangerous conclusion for future cases; the lack of cultural advice very likely prolonged the mission, while the shortcomings in strategic communication gave input to improve an area that is still new to NATO. The operation also highlighted a strategic dimension the Alliance was not ready to perceive—that the Mediterranean, and its Southern states, is likely to continue being a source of instability for NATO, particularly after the Arab Spring. In legal terms, the Alliance faced an important communication gap between its legal, and therefore military, mandate—the legal interpretations of UNSCR 1973 made clear that the operation did not seek to topple Colonel Gaddafi’s regime, let alone assassinate him. Its aim was solely the protection of civilians in a situation of internal conflict, and, therefore, it conformed to the norm of “Responsibility to Protect.” On the political level, heads of NATO member states made contradictory remarks calling for Gaddafi’s departure, thereby compromising the clarity of the mission. Last but not least, the aftermath of NATO’s Libya operation was not planned at all as the Libyan National Transitional Council firmly rejected any military personnel on the ground, even UN observers. As the regime’s security forces had virtually imploded, Libya’s security therefore fell into the hands of the multiple militias which continued to proliferate after the conflict had ended.
As the ‘Arab Spring’ was not anticipated by analysts, the prediction of instability has experienc... more As the ‘Arab Spring’ was not anticipated by analysts, the prediction of instability has experienced scrutiny – how was it possible not to see the factors that eventually led to the massive uprising, and is there any way to anticipate them? This report argues that the analytical failure does not reside in the overlooking of root causes such as poverty, unemployment or young population, but the failed grasp of their interplay. Rather than stacking causes on top of each other, analysts have to develop a three-dimensional approach recognising their interplay.
To begin with, conditions of instability or root causes do not stand-alone but can interact with each other, hence having either a reinforcing or levelling impact on their weakness or strength in mobilising popular unrest. Secondly, a difference has to be made between root causes as such and catalysts, which are the elements that add frustration dynamic to the root causes. Thirdly, the existence of root causes and catalysts does not in itself imply explosive potential; rather, the state’s capacity to manage these frustrations plays a decisive role in keeping them in check. Lastly, even a considerable amount of critical conditions and respective catalysts will require triggers animating the actual social dislocation.
Hence, four lines of analysis are required in the assessment of a country’s vulnerability to risk and conflict: conditions, catalysts, triggers on the side of society, as well as the state’s capacity to handle these on the other side. Confusing these four elements and their interplay ultimately leads to a bodged understanding of any crisis.
Conditions are the underlying root causes for instability. These are long-term dynamics that can be static, or change only gradually over time. Root causes can be as diverse as evolution of the state, historical experiences, politicisation of regional, ethnic or religious identities, social stratification, growth of population and economy, rates of urbanization, distribution of wealth and income, access to education and opportunity, scarcity of resources, unemployment rates and so forth. Yet root causes themselves do not cause instability by merely existing; all states face potential conditions of instability without a crisis emerging. Rather, catalysts of instability become the decisive factor in the determination of actual conflict potential.
Once a condition has reached instability potential via the addition of a catalyst, it still requires a ‘trigger’, a one-time event capable of animating the actual social dislocation, conflict and instability. Triggers can be elections, natural disasters, an economic shock, death of a leader or, as seen in the case of the ‘Arab Spring’, a dramatic gesture of an individual, or mass demonstrations.
In addition to the three elements mentioned above, the actual strength or weakness of the state to handle either the conditions before they can develop actual instability potential, or manage the unrest once it breaks out, is a decisive factor. This is where Middle Eastern studies focused their interest in the past as it was here that the main explanation for continuing authoritarianism seemed to lie. However, the actual assessment of the states’ strength, in particular the role of the security sector, proved wrong – or rather, non-existent, as study of Arab armed forces had ceased in the 1970s and was replaced by mere assumptions.
Actual vulnerability to instability has to be explained by the actual interaction of these four elements. A country may very well present a large number of underlying conditions which could cause instability without it spilling into conflict or unrest, as catalysts and triggers are missing that will give them disruptive properties. Likewise, destabilizing one-off events will be lessened if they do not tap into pre-existing conditions.
In the context of the Arab Spring, this report posits that while analysts correctly identified the root causes eventually leading to the unrest, they failed to identify the catalysts, which differed considerably from case to case. As the catalysts are the determining factor in timing social dislocation, their overlooking is what ultimately led to the degree of surprise. A thorough analysis throughout 2010 would have shown that Syria and Egypt experienced massive increases in food prices, Bahrain and Yemen very rapid increases in demography and Tunisia a considerable yet rather recent mismatch between university output and labour market absorption. As the international and/or regional system underwent changes as well, all that was missing was a trigger, which eventually took place in Tunisia.
As catalysts are, simply put, any form of change in existing structures, they can be overlooked if they are as mundane as food prices or educational policy. Yet catalysts can be found elsewhere: any form of change will jeopardise stability. The challenge for analysts is then to detect change and anticipate its impact on existing social structures. In this, they have failed in 2010 and 2011.
As the Arab Spring has renewed Western interest in the political, as well as military, role of Ar... more As the Arab Spring has renewed Western interest in the political, as well as military, role of Arab armed forces, reform—rather than mere assistance—is crucial. In this monograph, the author focuses on the structural aspects of reform from which the Arab Spring forces would benefit. Seven features are identified which need to be addressed when attempting Arab military reform in the countries affected by large-scale unrest in 2011: an unclear mandate, over-politicization, a challenging ongoing security situation, limited resources, lack of civilian oversight, pockets of paramilitary activity, and, in parts, as well as the lack of an institutional perception of reform need. Their origins are elaborated as much as recommendations for what outside assistance can achieve.
This monograph examines the impact that the “Arab Spring” has had on how Arab states relate to ea... more This monograph examines the impact that the “Arab Spring” has had on how Arab states relate to each other post-regime change and post-Islamist electoral victory. It shows that the region is undergoing a profound change as some traditional regional policy actors are paralyzed by internal turmoil (such as Syria and Egypt), while others do not have a regional ambition (such as Algeria and Morocco). The region has therefore entered a Gulf moment where key decisions pertaining to the region’s future are now taken in Riyadh, Doha, and Abu Dhabi. From having once been mere bystanders of regional politics, the Gulf States have moved to become players with both the ambition and capability to shape regional dynamics. As the ripple effects of their 2014 rift show, these dynamics will have a wider Arab impact.
ISIS is not just a terrorist entity: it is also a cult.
In spite of geographic proximity and a number of shared interests, the European Union and Libya h... more In spite of geographic proximity and a number of shared interests, the
European Union and Libya have a history of strained relations. The war
of 2011 provided an opportunity for a fresh start, but so far neither side
has been able to reap benefits from an entirely new political situation.
Instead, Libya’s difficult internal situation has not only slowed down the
process of rapprochement, but also increased EU concern. At a time when cooperation becomes a necessity rather than a choice, Libya is now downspiralling into implosion at the levels of security, bureaucracy and economy, to the point where it cannot absorb the offers being made.
Arab military cooperation has been, over the past century, mostly a history of failures. Whether ... more Arab military cooperation has been, over the past century, mostly a history of failures. Whether the Arab League’s Defence Pact or the Middle East Command, ideas for collective security in the region all failed to move beyond the state of declarations. Most of the time, Arab states were either at open war or in cold peace. Since the Arab Spring has toppled not only regimes but also brought insecurity, new momentum has come into regional security. From joint exercises to the announcement of first an Arab and more recently an Islamic military alliance, states begin to move further into cooperation. As this Letort Paper shows, several obstacles will have to be overcome before collective security in the Middle East and North Africa can become a reality.
While Libya may have already collapsed in political and security terms, yet another disaster loom... more While Libya may have already collapsed in political and security terms, yet another disaster looms on the horizon: an economic crash which could soon unleash a humanitarian crisis if no solution is found. The main cause is the country’s economic structure: it is hugely dependent on oil to generate revenue, the majority of Libya’s population is employed by the public sector, and most of its food is imported.
Consequently, if the Libyan state goes bankrupt, it will take large parts of the population down with it.
The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national secu... more The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are