Frances Howard-Snyder - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Frances Howard-Snyder
Utilitas, Oct 28, 2005
Agnes's brakes fail. Should she continue straight into the busy intersection or should she swerve... more Agnes's brakes fail. Should she continue straight into the busy intersection or should she swerve into the field? Add to the story, what Agnes does not and cannot know, that continuing into the intersection will cause no harm, whereas swerving into the apparently empty field will cause a death. I evaluate arguments for the claim that she should enter the intersection, i.e. for objectivism about right and wrong; and arguments for the claim that she should swerve, i.e. for subjectivism about right and wrong, and conclude that subjectivism is more plausible. I also consider the view that 'ought' and 'wrong' are systematically ambiguous, that she subjectively ought to swerve and that she objectively ought to enter the intersection. I argue that most versions of this suggestion are unworkable, and that even the best version is less plausible than pure subjectivism. ' We should bear in mind the possibility that subjective factors are decisive in some choice situations and objective factors are decisive in other choice situations.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Aug 29, 2019
Some philosophers have argued that value and modality might be such that even God, an omnipotent ... more Some philosophers have argued that value and modality might be such that even God, an omnipotent being, could be forced into a tragic dilemma where every available choice is wrong, and hence fail to be morally perfect. The short story, “Time of Trial,” imagines a young man, Seth, who, through no fault of his own, is forced into an intolerably difficult moral situation. If tragic choices imply that moral perfection is impossible, then Seth must act wrongly and lose his moral integrity. If not, then perhaps God can be the morally best possible being (perfect) even in such a universe.
Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we a... more Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: (1) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; (2) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can be transferred to an accidentally true belief; (3) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then it can be warranted and accidentally true. We argue that each of these is either false or no more plausible than its denial. Along the way, we offer a solution to the Gettier Problem that is compatible with fallibilism. Mere true belief is not knowledge. Warrant is that, whatever precisely it is, (enough of which) makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. We will call the view that a belief cannot be ...
What kind of love does the commandment Love your neighbor as yourself enjoin? On the basis of tex... more What kind of love does the commandment Love your neighbor as yourself enjoin? On the basis of textual and analogical evidence, I argue that in enjoins love not unlike the natural loves we have for our family and lovers. If this is right, we can use our experience of those loves as models for how we should feel and act towards other human beings. I argue that the love this commandment advocates is emotional love, rather than practical love. I respond to a number of objections to this, and in the process, present some support for the view that we ought to love our neighbors. This leads to the question: If the love commanded by the commandment is psychological love, what does it have to say about how I should act? And if it has nothing to say about action, isn\u27t it a pretty poor sort of morality? I argue that, since love involves desires for the well-being of the beloved, one couldn\u27t genuinely love without pursuing that well-being. I concede, however, that it cannot provide a complete guide to action: there are many morally significant choice situations where it would not tell us what to do because it doesn\u27t say what people\u27s interests consist in. The commandment needs to be supplemented with some other moral facts. An objector might complain that these extra facts do all the work, that the commandment is a mere moral tautology, Try to do what is right by others. This is a false impression. The commandment entails several controversial moral claims. The rest of the dissertation discusses the more interesting of these, and tries to argue that where the commandment entails a controversial ethical position, it is correct in doing so. For example, in chapter 4, I argue that it would not attach moral significance to the distinction between killing and letting die. In chapter 5, I argue that it would allow very little room for supererogation. These two conclusions raise the question of whether it is equivalent to utilitarianism. This is not the case. There are several respects in which the commandment is inconsistent with utilitarianism. Among other differences, I point to the fact that the commandment rejects claims which are central to the very essence of consequentialism. I argue that the commandment includes (what Samuel Scheffler calls) agent-centered restrictions (it tells us to love rather than to maximize the occurrence of love) and agent-centered prerogatives (in certain situations, the commandment allows one some freedom to pursue one\u27s own projects)
The most widely taught and frequently discussed version of the "problem of evil" is known as the ... more The most widely taught and frequently discussed version of the "problem of evil" is known as the argument from gratuitous evils. Its most popular representative is William Rowe. His most famous version of the argument goes like this:
After Dinner Conversation
How does perception of sexual assault confirm or create the reality? In this work of sex ethic sh... more How does perception of sexual assault confirm or create the reality? In this work of sex ethic short story fiction, Viola is a college student at a local party. She starts drinking at the party, and gets drunk. She strikes up a conversation with, and takes an interest in Greg, one of the fellow college students at the party. She drinks and dance into the night. Eventually, with her consent, her friends leave the party, leaving her to continue socializing with people at the party. She ends up meeting a guy and having drunken sex with him at the party. The next morning she meets up with a few of her female friends that question her about the previous night. At first, they chalk up her drunken sex as a “we’ve all been there” moment, however, her friends ask her to recount the night and eventually explain to her they think she was raped. Viola isn’t so sure, but she is starting to see their perspective.
American Philosophical Quarterly, 1993
After Dinner Conversation, 2020
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In “Warrant Entails Truth”1 I argue that warrant—that, whatever it is, which makes the difference... more In “Warrant Entails Truth”1 I argue that warrant—that, whatever it is, which makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief—entails truth. And in that paper I claim to show that warrant entails truth “without assuming any particular analysis of warrant at all” (842).2 I will here present a new (and improved!) version of the argument of “Warrant Entails Truth”. This new version of the argument also provides a response to Sharon Ryan’s challenging “Does Warrant Entail Truth?”.3 The argument of this paper will rely on two claims about warrant. The first is that whether a belief is warranted or not is not a brute fact. A belief’s being warranted will supervene on other facts.4 So if I have a warranted belief that p in one world but not in another, then the first world contains some other difference on which the difference in warrant supervenes. And—here is the second claim about warrant—that other difference
Stanford Encyclopedia Entry on the nature and moral significance of the difference between doing ... more Stanford Encyclopedia Entry on the nature and moral significance of the difference between doing and allowing harm.
Philosophy through Science Fiction Stories, 2021
to find out why he is suddenly struggling with his vision and learn why but a single treatment op... more to find out why he is suddenly struggling with his vision and learn why but a single treatment option exists for macular degeneration, a condition that affects 200-million people worldwide.
The Philosophers' Magazine, 2018
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 9, 2019
This is the ninth volume of Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. As with earlier volumes, th... more This is the ninth volume of Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. As with earlier volumes, these essays follow the tradition of providing a non-sectarian and non-partisan snapshot of the subdiscipline of philosophy of religion. This subdiscipline has become an increasingly important one within philosophy over the last century, and especially over the past half century, having emerged as an identifiable subfield with this timeframe along with other emerging subfields such as the philosophy of science and the philosophy of language. This volume continues the initial intention behind the series of attracting the best work from the premier philosophers of religion, as well as including work by top philosophers outside this area when their work and interests intersect with issues in the philosophy of religion. This inclusive approach to the series provides an opportunity to mitigate some of the costs of greater specialization in our discipline, while at the same time inviting wider i...
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2016
Abstract“The Pearl of Great Price” is a short story that explores the ways faith can go wrong. Th... more Abstract“The Pearl of Great Price” is a short story that explores the ways faith can go wrong. The central character, Janet, a single mom in a dead end job, is drawn into a multi-level marketing scheme, Benevite, by an unscrupulous salesman. She is encouraged to believe in herself and her dream and to give everything she has to it. She is fed the standard clichés to the effect that you can achieve whatever you want if you try hard enough. In the end her faith in her dream leads to the loss of her relationship with her child and other losses. Her pursuit exhibits many of the standard features of faith, belief, desire, resilience, tenacity, passion, and yet she does not save herself. The story is not meant as an indictment of faith in general, but as an acknowledgement of the fact that faith can be a vice and an exploration of when this might be so.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1991
Utilitas, Oct 28, 2005
Agnes's brakes fail. Should she continue straight into the busy intersection or should she swerve... more Agnes's brakes fail. Should she continue straight into the busy intersection or should she swerve into the field? Add to the story, what Agnes does not and cannot know, that continuing into the intersection will cause no harm, whereas swerving into the apparently empty field will cause a death. I evaluate arguments for the claim that she should enter the intersection, i.e. for objectivism about right and wrong; and arguments for the claim that she should swerve, i.e. for subjectivism about right and wrong, and conclude that subjectivism is more plausible. I also consider the view that 'ought' and 'wrong' are systematically ambiguous, that she subjectively ought to swerve and that she objectively ought to enter the intersection. I argue that most versions of this suggestion are unworkable, and that even the best version is less plausible than pure subjectivism. ' We should bear in mind the possibility that subjective factors are decisive in some choice situations and objective factors are decisive in other choice situations.
Oxford University Press eBooks, Aug 29, 2019
Some philosophers have argued that value and modality might be such that even God, an omnipotent ... more Some philosophers have argued that value and modality might be such that even God, an omnipotent being, could be forced into a tragic dilemma where every available choice is wrong, and hence fail to be morally perfect. The short story, “Time of Trial,” imagines a young man, Seth, who, through no fault of his own, is forced into an intolerably difficult moral situation. If tragic choices imply that moral perfection is impossible, then Seth must act wrongly and lose his moral integrity. If not, then perhaps God can be the morally best possible being (perfect) even in such a universe.
Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we a... more Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: (1) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; (2) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can be transferred to an accidentally true belief; (3) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then it can be warranted and accidentally true. We argue that each of these is either false or no more plausible than its denial. Along the way, we offer a solution to the Gettier Problem that is compatible with fallibilism. Mere true belief is not knowledge. Warrant is that, whatever precisely it is, (enough of which) makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. We will call the view that a belief cannot be ...
What kind of love does the commandment Love your neighbor as yourself enjoin? On the basis of tex... more What kind of love does the commandment Love your neighbor as yourself enjoin? On the basis of textual and analogical evidence, I argue that in enjoins love not unlike the natural loves we have for our family and lovers. If this is right, we can use our experience of those loves as models for how we should feel and act towards other human beings. I argue that the love this commandment advocates is emotional love, rather than practical love. I respond to a number of objections to this, and in the process, present some support for the view that we ought to love our neighbors. This leads to the question: If the love commanded by the commandment is psychological love, what does it have to say about how I should act? And if it has nothing to say about action, isn\u27t it a pretty poor sort of morality? I argue that, since love involves desires for the well-being of the beloved, one couldn\u27t genuinely love without pursuing that well-being. I concede, however, that it cannot provide a complete guide to action: there are many morally significant choice situations where it would not tell us what to do because it doesn\u27t say what people\u27s interests consist in. The commandment needs to be supplemented with some other moral facts. An objector might complain that these extra facts do all the work, that the commandment is a mere moral tautology, Try to do what is right by others. This is a false impression. The commandment entails several controversial moral claims. The rest of the dissertation discusses the more interesting of these, and tries to argue that where the commandment entails a controversial ethical position, it is correct in doing so. For example, in chapter 4, I argue that it would not attach moral significance to the distinction between killing and letting die. In chapter 5, I argue that it would allow very little room for supererogation. These two conclusions raise the question of whether it is equivalent to utilitarianism. This is not the case. There are several respects in which the commandment is inconsistent with utilitarianism. Among other differences, I point to the fact that the commandment rejects claims which are central to the very essence of consequentialism. I argue that the commandment includes (what Samuel Scheffler calls) agent-centered restrictions (it tells us to love rather than to maximize the occurrence of love) and agent-centered prerogatives (in certain situations, the commandment allows one some freedom to pursue one\u27s own projects)
The most widely taught and frequently discussed version of the "problem of evil" is known as the ... more The most widely taught and frequently discussed version of the "problem of evil" is known as the argument from gratuitous evils. Its most popular representative is William Rowe. His most famous version of the argument goes like this:
After Dinner Conversation
How does perception of sexual assault confirm or create the reality? In this work of sex ethic sh... more How does perception of sexual assault confirm or create the reality? In this work of sex ethic short story fiction, Viola is a college student at a local party. She starts drinking at the party, and gets drunk. She strikes up a conversation with, and takes an interest in Greg, one of the fellow college students at the party. She drinks and dance into the night. Eventually, with her consent, her friends leave the party, leaving her to continue socializing with people at the party. She ends up meeting a guy and having drunken sex with him at the party. The next morning she meets up with a few of her female friends that question her about the previous night. At first, they chalk up her drunken sex as a “we’ve all been there” moment, however, her friends ask her to recount the night and eventually explain to her they think she was raped. Viola isn’t so sure, but she is starting to see their perspective.
American Philosophical Quarterly, 1993
After Dinner Conversation, 2020
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In “Warrant Entails Truth”1 I argue that warrant—that, whatever it is, which makes the difference... more In “Warrant Entails Truth”1 I argue that warrant—that, whatever it is, which makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief—entails truth. And in that paper I claim to show that warrant entails truth “without assuming any particular analysis of warrant at all” (842).2 I will here present a new (and improved!) version of the argument of “Warrant Entails Truth”. This new version of the argument also provides a response to Sharon Ryan’s challenging “Does Warrant Entail Truth?”.3 The argument of this paper will rely on two claims about warrant. The first is that whether a belief is warranted or not is not a brute fact. A belief’s being warranted will supervene on other facts.4 So if I have a warranted belief that p in one world but not in another, then the first world contains some other difference on which the difference in warrant supervenes. And—here is the second claim about warrant—that other difference
Stanford Encyclopedia Entry on the nature and moral significance of the difference between doing ... more Stanford Encyclopedia Entry on the nature and moral significance of the difference between doing and allowing harm.
Philosophy through Science Fiction Stories, 2021
to find out why he is suddenly struggling with his vision and learn why but a single treatment op... more to find out why he is suddenly struggling with his vision and learn why but a single treatment option exists for macular degeneration, a condition that affects 200-million people worldwide.
The Philosophers' Magazine, 2018
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 9, 2019
This is the ninth volume of Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. As with earlier volumes, th... more This is the ninth volume of Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. As with earlier volumes, these essays follow the tradition of providing a non-sectarian and non-partisan snapshot of the subdiscipline of philosophy of religion. This subdiscipline has become an increasingly important one within philosophy over the last century, and especially over the past half century, having emerged as an identifiable subfield with this timeframe along with other emerging subfields such as the philosophy of science and the philosophy of language. This volume continues the initial intention behind the series of attracting the best work from the premier philosophers of religion, as well as including work by top philosophers outside this area when their work and interests intersect with issues in the philosophy of religion. This inclusive approach to the series provides an opportunity to mitigate some of the costs of greater specialization in our discipline, while at the same time inviting wider i...
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2016
Abstract“The Pearl of Great Price” is a short story that explores the ways faith can go wrong. Th... more Abstract“The Pearl of Great Price” is a short story that explores the ways faith can go wrong. The central character, Janet, a single mom in a dead end job, is drawn into a multi-level marketing scheme, Benevite, by an unscrupulous salesman. She is encouraged to believe in herself and her dream and to give everything she has to it. She is fed the standard clichés to the effect that you can achieve whatever you want if you try hard enough. In the end her faith in her dream leads to the loss of her relationship with her child and other losses. Her pursuit exhibits many of the standard features of faith, belief, desire, resilience, tenacity, passion, and yet she does not save herself. The story is not meant as an indictment of faith in general, but as an acknowledgement of the fact that faith can be a vice and an exploration of when this might be so.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1991
"The Pearl of Great Price" is a short story that explores the ways faith can go wrong. The centra... more "The Pearl of Great Price" is a short story that explores the ways faith can go wrong. The central character, Janet, a single mom in a dead end job, is drawn into a multi-level marketing scheme, Benevite, by an unscrupulous salesman. She is encouraged to believe in herself and her dream and to give everything she has to it. She is fed the standard clichés to the effect that you can achieve whatever you want if you try hard enough. In the end her faith in her dream leads to the loss of her relationship with her child and other losses. Her pursuit exhibits many of the standard features of faith, belief, desire, resilience, tenacity, passion, and yet she does not save herself. The story is not meant as an indictment of faith in general, but as an acknowledgement of the fact that faith can be a vice and an exploration of when this might be so.