Frank Claudio Sanabria Iparraguirre - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Frank Claudio Sanabria Iparraguirre
Ell esta nota se r etieren los enfoques teoricos en econcmfa que pueden ser utilizados como marco... more Ell esta nota se r etieren los enfoques teoricos en econcmfa que pueden ser utilizados como marco de 1", indagaci6n acerca de las causas de La violencia en colombia, se relacionan los r:rabajos >:eciente" de los economists" colombiano", en ..1 marco de dOBapToximilciones te6rica", y se formulan las posibles direcciones de 1s indagaci6n .rueura .
Regulation & Governance, 2019
There is broad consensus in the literature on regulatory enforcement and compliance that politics... more There is broad consensus in the literature on regulatory enforcement and compliance that politics matters. However, there is little scholarly convergence on what politics is or rigorous theorization and empirical testing of how politics matters. Many enforcement and compliance studies omit political variables altogether. Among those that address political influences on regulatory outcomes, politics has been defined in myriad ways and, too often, left undefined. Even when political constructs are explicitly operationalized, the mechanisms by which they influence regulatory outcomes are thinly hypothesized or simply ignored. If politics is truly as important to enforcement and compliance outcomes as everyone in the field seems to agree, regulatory scholarship must make a more sustained and systematic effort to understand their relationship, because overlooking this connection risks missing what is actually driving regulatory outcomes. This article examines how the construct of "politics" has been conceptualized in regulatory theory and analyzes how it has been operationalized in empirical studies of regulatory enforcement and compliance outcomes. It brings together scholarship across disciplines that rarely speak but have much to say to one another on this subject in order to constitute a field around the politics of regulation. The goal is to sharpen theoretical and empirical understandings of when and how regulation works by better accounting for the role politics plays in its enforcement.
There is broad consensus in the literature on regulatory enforcement and compliance that politics... more There is broad consensus in the literature on regulatory enforcement and compliance that politics matters. However, there is little scholarly convergence on what politics is or rigorous theorization and empirical testing of how politics matters. Many enforcement and compliance studies omit political variables altogether. Among those that address political influences on regulatory outcomes, politics has been defined in myriad ways and, too often, left undefined. Even when political constructs are explicitly operationalized, the mechanisms by which they influence regulatory outcomes are thinly hypothesized or simply ignored. If politics is truly as important to enforcement and compliance outcomes as everyone in the field seems to agree, regulatory scholarship must make a more sustained and systematic effort to understand their relationship, because overlooking this connection risks missing what is actually driving regulatory outcomes. This article examines how the construct of "politics" has been conceptualized in regulatory theory and analyzes how it has been operationalized in empirical studies of regulatory enforcement and compliance outcomes. It brings together scholarship across disciplines that rarely speak but have much to say to one another on this subject in order to constitute a field around the politics of regulation. The goal is to sharpen theoretical and empirical understandings of when and how regulation works by better accounting for the role politics plays in its enforcement.
This chapter focuses on welfare fraud investigators, who check the compliance of recipients to th... more This chapter focuses on welfare fraud investigators, who check the compliance of recipients to the bureaucratic rules regulating the payment of welfare benefits. Its aim is twofold. First, it sheds light on an under-researched bureaucratic investigation function, which is key to anti-welfare fraud policies, themselves at the core of recent changes in the social state. Second, it draws on this case to address the question of contradictory trends between a high level of discretion, often enjoyed by inspectors, and a tendency toward the standardization of inspection practices. It shows how the combination of these two apparently mutually exclusive tendencies reinforces inspection work, surveillance, and sanctions over welfare recipients. It is based on a long-term fieldwork in French welfare organizations.
Ell esta nota se r etieren los enfoques teoricos en econcmfa que pueden ser utilizados como marco... more Ell esta nota se r etieren los enfoques teoricos en econcmfa que pueden ser utilizados como marco de 1", indagaci6n acerca de las causas de La violencia en colombia, se relacionan los r:rabajos >:eciente" de los economists" colombiano", en ..1 marco de dOBapToximilciones te6rica", y se formulan las posibles direcciones de 1s indagaci6n .rueura .
Regulation & Governance, 2019
There is broad consensus in the literature on regulatory enforcement and compliance that politics... more There is broad consensus in the literature on regulatory enforcement and compliance that politics matters. However, there is little scholarly convergence on what politics is or rigorous theorization and empirical testing of how politics matters. Many enforcement and compliance studies omit political variables altogether. Among those that address political influences on regulatory outcomes, politics has been defined in myriad ways and, too often, left undefined. Even when political constructs are explicitly operationalized, the mechanisms by which they influence regulatory outcomes are thinly hypothesized or simply ignored. If politics is truly as important to enforcement and compliance outcomes as everyone in the field seems to agree, regulatory scholarship must make a more sustained and systematic effort to understand their relationship, because overlooking this connection risks missing what is actually driving regulatory outcomes. This article examines how the construct of "politics" has been conceptualized in regulatory theory and analyzes how it has been operationalized in empirical studies of regulatory enforcement and compliance outcomes. It brings together scholarship across disciplines that rarely speak but have much to say to one another on this subject in order to constitute a field around the politics of regulation. The goal is to sharpen theoretical and empirical understandings of when and how regulation works by better accounting for the role politics plays in its enforcement.
There is broad consensus in the literature on regulatory enforcement and compliance that politics... more There is broad consensus in the literature on regulatory enforcement and compliance that politics matters. However, there is little scholarly convergence on what politics is or rigorous theorization and empirical testing of how politics matters. Many enforcement and compliance studies omit political variables altogether. Among those that address political influences on regulatory outcomes, politics has been defined in myriad ways and, too often, left undefined. Even when political constructs are explicitly operationalized, the mechanisms by which they influence regulatory outcomes are thinly hypothesized or simply ignored. If politics is truly as important to enforcement and compliance outcomes as everyone in the field seems to agree, regulatory scholarship must make a more sustained and systematic effort to understand their relationship, because overlooking this connection risks missing what is actually driving regulatory outcomes. This article examines how the construct of "politics" has been conceptualized in regulatory theory and analyzes how it has been operationalized in empirical studies of regulatory enforcement and compliance outcomes. It brings together scholarship across disciplines that rarely speak but have much to say to one another on this subject in order to constitute a field around the politics of regulation. The goal is to sharpen theoretical and empirical understandings of when and how regulation works by better accounting for the role politics plays in its enforcement.
This chapter focuses on welfare fraud investigators, who check the compliance of recipients to th... more This chapter focuses on welfare fraud investigators, who check the compliance of recipients to the bureaucratic rules regulating the payment of welfare benefits. Its aim is twofold. First, it sheds light on an under-researched bureaucratic investigation function, which is key to anti-welfare fraud policies, themselves at the core of recent changes in the social state. Second, it draws on this case to address the question of contradictory trends between a high level of discretion, often enjoyed by inspectors, and a tendency toward the standardization of inspection practices. It shows how the combination of these two apparently mutually exclusive tendencies reinforces inspection work, surveillance, and sanctions over welfare recipients. It is based on a long-term fieldwork in French welfare organizations.