Frank Hindriks - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by Frank Hindriks

Synthese

We propose a bridge-builder perspective on social ontology. Our point of departure is that an imp... more We propose a bridge-builder perspective on social ontology. Our point of departure is that an important task of philosophy is to provide the bigger picture. To this end, it should investigate folk views and determine whether and how they can be preserved once scrutinized from the perspective of the sciences. However, the sciences typically present us with a fragmented picture of reality. Thus, an important intermediate step is to integrate the most promising social scientific theories with one another. In addition to this, social ontology can provide input to and benefit from other philosophical disciplines that engage in normative theorizing. Thus, we propose that social ontology connects not only with folk ontology and scientific ontology but also with fields such as ethics and political philosophy. Building bridges between them serves to formulate a credible and encompassing worldview that is of theoretical and practical significance.

Social Theory and Practice

Moral agents possess a moral point of view: they have a moral identity or a moral self-conception... more Moral agents possess a moral point of view: they have a moral identity or a moral self-conception. This implies that, in order for an organization to be a moral agent, it must have a moral point of view. Importantly, acquiring such a point of view is a social process. In light of this, I argue that collective moral agency is a social construct. It follows that organizations can but need not be moral agents. This raises questions about the

Tuomela on Sociality

Institutions depend on rules. But on what kind of rules? It has been argued that they depend on c... more Institutions depend on rules. But on what kind of rules? It has been argued that they depend on constitutive rules, this in contrast to ordinary social practices, which depend on regulative rules instead. The underlying idea is that constitutive rules differ categorically from regulative rules. Against this, I argue that regulative rules can be transformed into constitutive rules by doing little more than introducing a status term. The presence or absence of a status term does not make a difference to whether a social practice qualifies as an institution. In light of this, I propose that, pace Searle, there can be institutions without constitutive rules. Furthermore, even if it sounds somewhat paradoxical, regulative rules can constitute institutions. This implies that the distinction between social practices and institutions cannot be drawn in terms of these two kinds of rules. Following Tuomela, I propose to draw this distinction in terms of social norms instead: in contrast to ordinary social practices, institutions are governed by social norms. Hence, what is distinctive of institutions is that they feature deontic powers.

Journal of Social Ontology, 2020

We propose a new framework to unify three conceptions of institutions that play a prominent role ... more We propose a new framework to unify three conceptions of institutions that play a prominent role in the philosophical and scientific literature: the equilibria account, the regulative rules account, and the constitutive rules account. We argue that equilibrium-based and rule-based accounts are individually inadequate, but that jointly they provide a satisfactory conception of institutions as rules-in-equilibrium. In the second part of the paper we show that constitutive rules can be derived from regulative rules via the introduction of theoretical terms. We argue that the constitutive rules theory is reducible to the rules-in equilibrium theory, and that it accounts for the way in which we assign names to social institutions.

Economics and Philosophy

Institutions can be strong or weak. But what does this mean? Equilibrium theories equate institut... more Institutions can be strong or weak. But what does this mean? Equilibrium theories equate institutions with behavioural regularities. In contrast, rule theories explicate them in terms of a standard that people are supposed to meet. I propose that, when an institution is weak, a discrepancy exists between the regularity and the standard or rule. To capture this discrepancy, I present a hybrid theory, the Rules-and-Equilibria Theory. According to this theory, institutions are rule-governed behavioural regularities. The Rules-and-Equilibria Theory provides the basis for two measures of institutional strength. First, institutions that pertain to coordination games solve problems of information. Their strength is primarily a matter of the expected degree of compliance. Second, institutions that concern mixed-motive games solve problems of motivation. Their strength can be measured in terms of the weight people attribute to its rule.

Philosophical Psychology

In light of recent empirical data, many psychologists and philosophers have turned away from rati... more In light of recent empirical data, many psychologists and philosophers have turned away from rationalism about moral judgment and embraced sentimentalism. In the process, they have rejected the classical "moral signature" as a way of distinguishing moral from conventional norms in favor of a sentimentalist approach to carving out the moral domain. In this paper, we argue that this sentimentalist turn has been made prematurely. Although we agree that the experiments reveal that the classical approach is flawed, we propose to replace it with an alternative, according to which a norm is moral precisely if it is justifiable to all. This does not hold for most norms based on disgust or loyalty to a particular community. We accommodate the fact that such norms are not merely conventional by introducing a third domain, the domain of ethics. Our proposal reveals that (psychological) rationalism is still a viable option, as a lot of the experimental evidence that features emotions concerns the domain of ethics rather than morality.

Review of Philosophy and Psychology

Experimental philosophers have discovered a large number of asymmetries in our intuitions about p... more Experimental philosophers have discovered a large number of asymmetries in our intuitions about philosophically significant notions. Often those intuitions turned out to be sensitive to normative factors. Whereas optimists have insisted on a unified explanation of these findings, pessimists have argued that it is impossible to formulate a single factor explanation. I defend the intermediate position according to which unification is possible to some extent, but should be pursued within limits. The key issue that I address is how it is possible to set such limits in a way that is true to the phenomena. In the past decade or so, experimental philosophers have made a large number of surprising findings about philosophically significant notions such as acting intentionally, deciding, being free, and causing. As it turns out, intuitions about most of these notions are influenced by normative factors (Knobe 2003, 2010a; Phillips et al. 2011). I refer to those for which this holds as 'the Normativity Findings'. 1 Many Normativity Findings pose a challenge to existing analyses of the relevant notions, as they were previously thought to be independent of normative factors. Joshua Knobe (2010b; Pettit and Knobe 2009) has argued that a unified explanation can and should be provided of all Normativity Findings. In this paper, I investigate whether Knobe's optimism about explanatory unification is warranted. I ask whether it is possible and desirable to identify a single factor that explains all the Normativity Finding at once. 2

Economics and Philosophy, 2016

: Freedom is often analysed in terms of the absence of intentionally imposed constraints. I defen... more : Freedom is often analysed in terms of the absence of intentionally imposed constraints. I defend the alternative view on which the relevant constraints are those for which some agent can be held morally responsible. I argue that this best captures the relation between freedom and respect. Berlin (1969) correctly points out that intentional restrictions exhibit ill will and hence are disrespectful. However, the same holds, I argue, for restrictions that are due to indifference. Berlin also observed that it would be counterintuitive if an agent could increase her freedom by changing her preferences. I criticize the argument that Dowding and Van Hees (2007, 2008) present according to which this observation counts in favour of explicating freedom in terms of intentionality.

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2015

Recent experiments in moral psychology have been taken to imply that moral reasoning only serves ... more Recent experiments in moral psychology have been taken to imply that moral reasoning only serves to reaffirm prior moral intuitions. More specifically, Jonathan Haidt concludes from his moral dumbfounding experiments, in which people condemn other people's behavior, that moral reasoning is biased and ineffective, as it rarely makes people change their mind. I present complementary evidence pertaining to self-directed reasoning about what to do. More specifically, Albert Bandura's experiments concerning moral disengagement reveal that moral reasoning often does contribute effectively to the formation of moral judgments. And such reasoning need not be biased. Once this evidence is taken into account, it becomes clear that both cognition and affect can play a destructive as well as a constructive role in the formation of moral judgments. Keywords Moral reasoning. Moral dumbfounding. Moral disengagement. Cognitive dissonance. Reason. Emotion Folk wisdom has it that you should think before you act. The underlying idea is that people often come to regret acting on impulse. The folk wisdom seems to be inspired at least in part by moral concerns. People might end up doing the wrong thing when they act in a rash manner. On a pre-reflective or common sense picture of morality, then, it is a good idea to consider moral matters explicitly and think about them carefully. This picture, however, has come under substantial pressure. A lot of research in psychology suggests that conscious reasoning as such is of limited use and merely serves to confirm beliefs we already have

Journal of Institutional Economics, 2015

Our goal is to develop a theory that combines the best insights of philosophical and scientific t... more Our goal is to develop a theory that combines the best insights of philosophical and scientific theories of institutions. We are not committeda priorito save the commonsense notion of institution, or the thesis of human exceptionalism. We think that human cognition is important, but we do not claim that common knowledge or collective intentions are necessary for coordination. Like most of our commentators, we believe that there is continuity between simple rules of precedence and sophisticated institutions like property, marriage, or money. Finally, we argue that a satisfactory account of institutions must be compatible with different theories of normativity, specifying the social and psychological mechanisms that make it possible to override selfish desires.

Journal of Philosophical Research, 2014

Suppose that someone who asserts a proposition ought to know that proposition. Is this a deep tru... more Suppose that someone who asserts a proposition ought to know that proposition. Is this a deep truth that concerns the nature of assertion? Timothy Williamson (1996, 2000) provides a positive answer to this question when he argues that this obligation features in the rule that is constitutive of assertion. Hindriks (2007) criticizes this claim and defends a different understanding of assertion as the linguistic expression of belief to which we refer as 'the expression account of assertion.' Hindriks does not deny, however, that typically people ought to know that which they assert. He argues that a knowledge rule can be derived from the expression account of assertion together with the claim that belief is governed by a knowledge rule. As a knowledge requirement applies to it only derivatively, the fact that assertion is governed by a knowledge rule does not concern the nature of assertion. The key claim that Hindriks defends, then, is that the knowledge requirement applies directly to belief and only derivatively to assertion. His argument for this claim entails that the derived knowledge rule of assertion features a knowledge requirement only for situations in which it is impermissible to lie. Brian Ball criticizes the presented derivation-henceforth 'the Derivation' 1-arguing that Hindriks commits a fallacy of equivocation. The knowledge rule of belief features an epistemic norm, whereas the derived conclusion "purports to articulate a moral norm" (Ball 2014, xx, our italics). Ball goes on to claim that "[t]his equivocation between two senses of 'must' constitutes a serious-indeed devastating-flaw in Hindriks's attempted derivation" (ibid.). In this reply, we argue that this charge is mistaken. A mere ambiguity does not constitute a fallacy of equivocation. As Charles Hamblin explains, more needs to be done in order to establish that this fallacy has been committed: In many contexts the two subsenses of moral words [e.g. moral and legal duty] can be conflated without risk, so that a charge of Equivocation needs to be backed

Erkenntnis, 2014

Corporate responsibility requires a conception of collective agency on which collective agents ar... more Corporate responsibility requires a conception of collective agency on which collective agents are able to form moral judgments and act on them. In spite of claims to the contrary, existing accounts of collective agency fall short of this kind of corporate autonomy, as they fail to explain how collective agents might be responsive to moral reasons. I discuss how a recently proposed conception of shared valuing can be used for developing a solution to this problem. Although the resulting conception of corporate autonomy is useful for making sense of corporate responsibility, it also gives rise to what I call 'the Corporate Autonomy Problem'. Autonomous collective agents are in principle entitled to the same rights as autonomous individual agents. However, at least some individual rights, such as the right to vote, the right to life, and the right not to be enslaved cannot plausibly be attributed to collective agents. This intuition is supported by normative individualism, the position according to which corporate agents are not entitled to nonderivative rights at all. I argue that without a proper solution to this problem-I sketch the available options-saving corporate responsibility requires giving up on normative individualism. Collective agents are often blamed for what they do, and sometimes praised. US President Barack Obama, for instance, praised the Supreme Court for its decision on the Affordable Care Act. 1 In addition to moral responsibility, people often ascribe rights and obligations to collective agents. A controversial case is Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, a 2010 ruling of the US Supreme Court. According

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2006

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Social Jacts: Collective Intentionality, 2002

The SAGE Handbook of the Philosophy of Social …, 2011