G. Brachet - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Gérard BRACHET is consultant in space policy,
President of the Air and Space Academy (Académie de l'Air et de l'Espace) from 2009 to 2012, Member of the International Academy of Astronautics.
Engineering degree from the Ecole Nationale Supérieure d'Aéronautique (1967).
Master of Sciences in Aeronautics and Astronautics from the University of Washington (1968).
1970 to 1982: various positions at Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales (CNES), the French Space Agency.
Chairman of the European Space Agency's Programme Board for Earth observation from 1979 to 1981.
1982 to 1994: Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of SPOT IMAGE, the company set up by CNES to
develop the market for remote sensing imagery from the SPOT series of satellites.
1995 to 1997, Director for programmes, planning and industrial policy at CNES.
1997 to 2002: Director General of CNES
Chairman of the international "Committee on Earth Observation Satellites (CEOS)" in 1997.
From 2003 onwards, consultant on space policy issues and space applications, advising industry and
government institutions, in particular the European Commission and the European Space Agency.
Research associate at Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), Paris.
June 2006 to June 2008, chairman of the United Nations Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN COPUOS).
2012 - 2013, expert from France in the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) set up by the Secretary General of the United Nations to develop “Transparency and Confidence Building Measures” in outer space.
Honors and Awards:
1985: “1985 Laurels” of Aviation Week and Space Technology
1992: Brock Gold Medal Award of the International Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing
1994: Gold Medal of the British Remote Sensing Society
2007: Social Sciences Award of the International Academy of Astronautics
2015: Distinguished Service Award of the International Astronautical Federation
Officier de l'Ordre National du Mérite
Officier de la Légion d'Honneur
Phone: +33623350861
Address: 37 rue Tournefort, 75005 Paris, France
less
Uploads
Papers by G. Brachet
The European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks SUMMARY The nuclear policy of t... more The European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks SUMMARY The nuclear policy of the four states of the Visegrád Group, both during Soviet times and since the end of the cold war, has been primarily influenced by, and dependent on, the military alliances to which they belong. Although the framework of the Warsaw Treaty Organization was significantly different from the procedures of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), there has been a strong continuity in terms of the non-nuclear pro-activism of the Visegrád Group. Since the 1960s Central European states have been quick to join the relevant arms control agreements and export control regimes. Active participation in this field was encouraged by the Soviet Union and is in line with the priorities of the European Union and NATO, which guarantees that the non-nuclear stance of these states is likely to remain firm in the future. Despite a few cases in which Central European states hold slightly different positio...
Space Policy, 2006
A common European defence policy is still at a very preliminary stage, and although some limited ... more A common European defence policy is still at a very preliminary stage, and although some limited progress has recently been made, it is a politically sensitive issue. In contrast to scientific research or large industrial ventures such as aircraft development, where Europe has moved forward rather well, obstacles to further integration in defence and security matters are numerous. Space systems could be used to facilitate such integration as their duplication is costly and so much remains to be done in Europe in this field. A common European 'vision' for the role of space systems in security and defence thus needs to be developed. This article reviews the role of space in security and defence missions, the technology and industrial base Europe needs, and its capability and autonomy in achieving access to space. Space system vulnerability and the means of minimizing it are addressed, including measures to prevent the weaponization of space. The possible role of ESA in support of the European Defence Agency for defence space systems development is identified, along with the need for ad hoc organizations for operational exploitation. Ten recommendations are made that would permit progress at the European level, following the path already successfully achieved in the civilian domain.
Space Policy, 2014
Abstract Space systems play an important role in sustaining the development, prosperity and secur... more Abstract Space systems play an important role in sustaining the development, prosperity and security of many nations. As more nations become critically reliant on space systems, questions of maintaining safety and strategic stability in outer space have come to the fore. Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures (TCBMs) for outer space activities have an important role to play in providing clarity about the intentions of States and in articulating norms of behaviour in outer space. TCBMs take several forms. They may be the elaboration of basic principles related to the exploration and use of outer space, political measures related to establishing norms of conduct, information-sharing activities to improve the transparency of outer space activities, operational practices which demonstrate a commitment to mutual cooperation in outer space, or consultative mechanisms. We present an analytical framework for evaluating potential TCBMs and illustrate the application of this framework to examples of potential operational, regulatory, treaty-based and declaratory TCBMs.
Space Policy, 2011
The authors examine the principles, goals and guidelines in the new US NSP. While in general favo... more The authors examine the principles, goals and guidelines in the new US NSP. While in general favourable to the overall direction of the policy, noting that Europe too has similar goals or, in some cases, should be adopting US ideas, they are sceptical about certain aspects, such as the greater emphasis on commercial partnerships with NASA and the continuing protectionist launch policy. Particular points of concern are the vagueness and lack of clear goals in the human spaceflight programme and the US position on space weaponization at the Conference on Disarmament. Nevertheless, they believe that a similar type of EUwide policy should be developed by the European Commission.
The SARSAT/COSPAS satellite network uses 121.5 and 406 MHz buoys to locate ships and aircraft in ... more The SARSAT/COSPAS satellite network uses 121.5 and 406 MHz buoys to locate ships and aircraft in distress. The 121.5 MHz system, obligatory on many aircraft, gives localization to within 10 km, and, despite being subject to considerable radio interference and a poor signal to noise ratio, is responsible for saving nearly 200 lives. The 406 MHz location error is 2 km in 75% of cases, and less than or equal to 2 hr for 95% of cases in the worst conditions. It suffers however from interference from illegal broadcasts in the frequency band.
The European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks SUMMARY The secure and sustaina... more The European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks SUMMARY The secure and sustainable use of outer space has become a concern. More than 60 nations and regional governmental organizations operate satellites in earth orbit and a large number of private companies operate commercial satellite systems. The number of systems deployed in low earth orbit and on the geostationary ring creates new risks of interference and of physical collision. There is also the risk of outer space becoming a battlefield. While it seems that the deployment of weapons in outer space has not taken place, ground-based weapons can be used against spacecraft in low orbits. Also, technologies for the jamming and blinding of satellites are becoming easily accessible. Several initiatives have emerged in recent years to establish the 'rules of the road' in outer space. Russia and China tabled a draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space at the Conference on Disarmament in 2008 and, the same year, the European Union (EU) proposed an International Code of Conduct for outer space. In 2013 the United Nations General Assembly unanimously endorsed the report from the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space that it had set up in 2010. Despite this flurry of activity, disagreements persist and no concrete measures have been agreed so far. If it wants to be a significant actor, the EU needs to step up its efforts to reinforce its voice in international discussions on the security of outer space activities.
Geoscience and Remote Sensing IEEE International Symposium, 1989
Geocarto International, 1986
A common European defence policy is still at a very preliminary stage, and although some limited ... more A common European defence policy is still at a very preliminary stage, and although some limited progress has recently been made, it is a politically sensitive issue. In contrast to scientific research or large industrial ventures such as aircraft development, where Europe has moved forward rather well, obstacles to further integration in defence and security matters are numerous. Space systems could be used to facilitate such integration as their duplication is costly and so much remains to be done in Europe in this field. A common European 'vision' for the role of space systems in security and defence thus needs to be developed. This article reviews the role of space in security and defence missions, the technology and industrial base Europe needs, and its capability and autonomy in achieving access to space. Space system vulnerability and the means of minimizing it are addressed, including measures to prevent the weaponization of space. The possible role of ESA in support of the European Defence Agency for defence space systems development is identified, along with the need for ad hoc organizations for operational exploitation. Ten recommendations are made that would permit progress at the European level, following the path already successfully achieved in the civilian domain.
The authors examine the principles, goals and guidelines in the new US NSP. While in general favo... more The authors examine the principles, goals and guidelines in the new US NSP. While in general favourable to the overall direction of the policy, noting that Europe too has similar goals or, in some cases, should be adopting US ideas, they are sceptical about certain aspects, such as the greater emphasis on commercial partnerships with NASA and the continuing protectionist launch policy. Particular points of concern are the vagueness and lack of clear goals in the human spaceflight programme and the US position on space weaponization at the Conference on Disarmament. Nevertheless, they believe that a similar type of EUwide policy should be developed by the European Commission.
GMES (Global Monitoring for Environment and Security) is an idea which originated during a meet... more GMES (Global Monitoring for Environment and Security) is an idea which originated during a meeting organized by the European Commission in Baveno, Italy, in May 1998. This meeting generated what was called at the time the “Baveno initiative”, a call for Europe to get its act together in the field of environment monitoring from space, define a well articulated strategy in this area and build upon its excellent scientific research community, its proven technical prowess in Earth observation from space and its nascent political will to express its objectives in international fora related to climate change and other global environment topics. Indeed, Europe was very active in the eighties and nineties in the most advanced areas of global monitoring but its rather uncoordinated efforts (even within the European Commission) lacked visibility. They also did not appear to fit into a clearly established strategy. The Baveno initiative was an attempt to remedy this situation. It had to build upon a growing European concern with global environment protection issues and find its proper place within a developing “European Strategy for Space” where the European Space Agency and the European Union are more and more required to work together.
GMES was also extended to include the “security” aspects of global monitoring, the word “security” being understood in its wider sense, a move that produced a number of questions and misunderstandings, but opened the door for many in Europe to realize that monitoring activities of the Earth’ land masses, oceans and atmosphere do include a security dimension.
GMES is first and foremost an attempt to define a European strategy. It is not a space project, nor even a monitoring programme, but will eventually incorporate an implementation plan which will call upon various monitoring techniques, including observations from space and in situ, ambitious modelling projects and connections with society’s more urgent requirements with respect to environment protection and prevention or reduction of risks related to natural hazards. This will entail significant efforts to inform the user communities and to convince them of the relevance and usefulness of this initiative. It will also provide a sound basis for the European contribution to the new initiative for an improved coordination of strategies and systems for Earth observations called for by the Earth Observation Summit held in Washington on July 31st, 2003.
The European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks SUMMARY The nuclear policy of t... more The European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks SUMMARY The nuclear policy of the four states of the Visegrád Group, both during Soviet times and since the end of the cold war, has been primarily influenced by, and dependent on, the military alliances to which they belong. Although the framework of the Warsaw Treaty Organization was significantly different from the procedures of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), there has been a strong continuity in terms of the non-nuclear pro-activism of the Visegrád Group. Since the 1960s Central European states have been quick to join the relevant arms control agreements and export control regimes. Active participation in this field was encouraged by the Soviet Union and is in line with the priorities of the European Union and NATO, which guarantees that the non-nuclear stance of these states is likely to remain firm in the future. Despite a few cases in which Central European states hold slightly different positio...
Space Policy, 2006
A common European defence policy is still at a very preliminary stage, and although some limited ... more A common European defence policy is still at a very preliminary stage, and although some limited progress has recently been made, it is a politically sensitive issue. In contrast to scientific research or large industrial ventures such as aircraft development, where Europe has moved forward rather well, obstacles to further integration in defence and security matters are numerous. Space systems could be used to facilitate such integration as their duplication is costly and so much remains to be done in Europe in this field. A common European 'vision' for the role of space systems in security and defence thus needs to be developed. This article reviews the role of space in security and defence missions, the technology and industrial base Europe needs, and its capability and autonomy in achieving access to space. Space system vulnerability and the means of minimizing it are addressed, including measures to prevent the weaponization of space. The possible role of ESA in support of the European Defence Agency for defence space systems development is identified, along with the need for ad hoc organizations for operational exploitation. Ten recommendations are made that would permit progress at the European level, following the path already successfully achieved in the civilian domain.
Space Policy, 2014
Abstract Space systems play an important role in sustaining the development, prosperity and secur... more Abstract Space systems play an important role in sustaining the development, prosperity and security of many nations. As more nations become critically reliant on space systems, questions of maintaining safety and strategic stability in outer space have come to the fore. Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures (TCBMs) for outer space activities have an important role to play in providing clarity about the intentions of States and in articulating norms of behaviour in outer space. TCBMs take several forms. They may be the elaboration of basic principles related to the exploration and use of outer space, political measures related to establishing norms of conduct, information-sharing activities to improve the transparency of outer space activities, operational practices which demonstrate a commitment to mutual cooperation in outer space, or consultative mechanisms. We present an analytical framework for evaluating potential TCBMs and illustrate the application of this framework to examples of potential operational, regulatory, treaty-based and declaratory TCBMs.
Space Policy, 2011
The authors examine the principles, goals and guidelines in the new US NSP. While in general favo... more The authors examine the principles, goals and guidelines in the new US NSP. While in general favourable to the overall direction of the policy, noting that Europe too has similar goals or, in some cases, should be adopting US ideas, they are sceptical about certain aspects, such as the greater emphasis on commercial partnerships with NASA and the continuing protectionist launch policy. Particular points of concern are the vagueness and lack of clear goals in the human spaceflight programme and the US position on space weaponization at the Conference on Disarmament. Nevertheless, they believe that a similar type of EUwide policy should be developed by the European Commission.
The SARSAT/COSPAS satellite network uses 121.5 and 406 MHz buoys to locate ships and aircraft in ... more The SARSAT/COSPAS satellite network uses 121.5 and 406 MHz buoys to locate ships and aircraft in distress. The 121.5 MHz system, obligatory on many aircraft, gives localization to within 10 km, and, despite being subject to considerable radio interference and a poor signal to noise ratio, is responsible for saving nearly 200 lives. The 406 MHz location error is 2 km in 75% of cases, and less than or equal to 2 hr for 95% of cases in the worst conditions. It suffers however from interference from illegal broadcasts in the frequency band.
The European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks SUMMARY The secure and sustaina... more The European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks SUMMARY The secure and sustainable use of outer space has become a concern. More than 60 nations and regional governmental organizations operate satellites in earth orbit and a large number of private companies operate commercial satellite systems. The number of systems deployed in low earth orbit and on the geostationary ring creates new risks of interference and of physical collision. There is also the risk of outer space becoming a battlefield. While it seems that the deployment of weapons in outer space has not taken place, ground-based weapons can be used against spacecraft in low orbits. Also, technologies for the jamming and blinding of satellites are becoming easily accessible. Several initiatives have emerged in recent years to establish the 'rules of the road' in outer space. Russia and China tabled a draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space at the Conference on Disarmament in 2008 and, the same year, the European Union (EU) proposed an International Code of Conduct for outer space. In 2013 the United Nations General Assembly unanimously endorsed the report from the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space that it had set up in 2010. Despite this flurry of activity, disagreements persist and no concrete measures have been agreed so far. If it wants to be a significant actor, the EU needs to step up its efforts to reinforce its voice in international discussions on the security of outer space activities.
Geoscience and Remote Sensing IEEE International Symposium, 1989
Geocarto International, 1986
A common European defence policy is still at a very preliminary stage, and although some limited ... more A common European defence policy is still at a very preliminary stage, and although some limited progress has recently been made, it is a politically sensitive issue. In contrast to scientific research or large industrial ventures such as aircraft development, where Europe has moved forward rather well, obstacles to further integration in defence and security matters are numerous. Space systems could be used to facilitate such integration as their duplication is costly and so much remains to be done in Europe in this field. A common European 'vision' for the role of space systems in security and defence thus needs to be developed. This article reviews the role of space in security and defence missions, the technology and industrial base Europe needs, and its capability and autonomy in achieving access to space. Space system vulnerability and the means of minimizing it are addressed, including measures to prevent the weaponization of space. The possible role of ESA in support of the European Defence Agency for defence space systems development is identified, along with the need for ad hoc organizations for operational exploitation. Ten recommendations are made that would permit progress at the European level, following the path already successfully achieved in the civilian domain.
The authors examine the principles, goals and guidelines in the new US NSP. While in general favo... more The authors examine the principles, goals and guidelines in the new US NSP. While in general favourable to the overall direction of the policy, noting that Europe too has similar goals or, in some cases, should be adopting US ideas, they are sceptical about certain aspects, such as the greater emphasis on commercial partnerships with NASA and the continuing protectionist launch policy. Particular points of concern are the vagueness and lack of clear goals in the human spaceflight programme and the US position on space weaponization at the Conference on Disarmament. Nevertheless, they believe that a similar type of EUwide policy should be developed by the European Commission.
GMES (Global Monitoring for Environment and Security) is an idea which originated during a meet... more GMES (Global Monitoring for Environment and Security) is an idea which originated during a meeting organized by the European Commission in Baveno, Italy, in May 1998. This meeting generated what was called at the time the “Baveno initiative”, a call for Europe to get its act together in the field of environment monitoring from space, define a well articulated strategy in this area and build upon its excellent scientific research community, its proven technical prowess in Earth observation from space and its nascent political will to express its objectives in international fora related to climate change and other global environment topics. Indeed, Europe was very active in the eighties and nineties in the most advanced areas of global monitoring but its rather uncoordinated efforts (even within the European Commission) lacked visibility. They also did not appear to fit into a clearly established strategy. The Baveno initiative was an attempt to remedy this situation. It had to build upon a growing European concern with global environment protection issues and find its proper place within a developing “European Strategy for Space” where the European Space Agency and the European Union are more and more required to work together.
GMES was also extended to include the “security” aspects of global monitoring, the word “security” being understood in its wider sense, a move that produced a number of questions and misunderstandings, but opened the door for many in Europe to realize that monitoring activities of the Earth’ land masses, oceans and atmosphere do include a security dimension.
GMES is first and foremost an attempt to define a European strategy. It is not a space project, nor even a monitoring programme, but will eventually incorporate an implementation plan which will call upon various monitoring techniques, including observations from space and in situ, ambitious modelling projects and connections with society’s more urgent requirements with respect to environment protection and prevention or reduction of risks related to natural hazards. This will entail significant efforts to inform the user communities and to convince them of the relevance and usefulness of this initiative. It will also provide a sound basis for the European contribution to the new initiative for an improved coordination of strategies and systems for Earth observations called for by the Earth Observation Summit held in Washington on July 31st, 2003.
The European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks SUMMARY The Iran nuclear issue ... more The European network of independent non-proliferation think tanks SUMMARY The Iran nuclear issue has been a test case for the role of the European Union (EU) as a global actor. The Iran deal, agreed on 15 July 2015, was a victory for EU diplomacy. Initiated at the time of the Iraq war by three European foreign ministers, the 12-year-long negotiations proved that military interventions were not the only answer to nuclear proliferation threats. However, the EU's responsibility does not end with the Iran deal and the EU will chair the monitoring of its implementation. This paper looks ahead to the future process, using three scenarios that define conflicts related to (a) the nuclear programme itself, (b) the lifting of sanctions, and (c) the potential transformation of Iranian society. While Iranian domestic politics will decide the outcome of the Iran deal— whether or not the nuclear programme will remain peaceful—the EU will face a number of policy choices with potential impacts on that outcome.