Gilbert Plumer - Profile on Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by Gilbert Plumer

Argument and Narrative

In Scott Aikin, John Casey & Katharina Stevens (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Argumentation Theory, 2025

Lately, many have pointed out or proposed ways that arguments may be narrative and narratives may... more Lately, many have pointed out or proposed ways that arguments may be narrative and narratives may be argumentative. This chapter discusses the six basic possibilities: (1) argument in nonfictional or (2) fictional narrative; (3) nonfictional or (4) fictional narrative in argument; (5) argument by nonfictional or (6) fictional narrative. Possibilities 1-4 indicate a proper subset relation between the argument and narrative, whereas 5 and 6 indicate complete overlap. These possibilities cover such kinds of discourse as anecdotes, thought experiments, fables, and novels. Not all of the possibilities are of equal interest. Possibility 6 is the most intriguing if not suspicious—how can fiction argue for the truth of something?—and so, is accorded the most space.

Is There Such a Thing as Literary Cognition?

Ratio 34(2): 127-136, 2021

I question whether the case for “literary cognitivism” has generally been successfully made. As i... more I question whether the case for “literary cognitivism” has generally been successfully made. As it is usually construed, the thesis is easy to satisfy illegitimately because dependence on fictionality is not built in as a requirement. The thesis of literary cognitivism should say: “literary fiction can be a source of knowledge in a way that depends crucially on its being fictional” (Green’s phrasing). After questioning whether nonpropositional cognitivist views (e.g., Nussbaum’s) meet this neglected standard, I argue that if fictional narratives can impart propositional knowledge in virtue of their fictionality, it would be largely via a suppositional framework. Yet in many cases, such as Huxley’s Brave New World, the key literary supposition could simply be an epistemic possibility (‘suppose X, which for all we know, occurs sometime’), not counterfactual supposition, that is, distinctively fictional supposition. The best general case for literary cognitivism may be the limited one that literary fiction can alert us to nonactual metaphysical possibilities that may be important for understanding actuality. Yet even here, seemingly possible fictions are often impossible.

In Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Henrike Jansen, Jan Albert Van Laar & Bart Verheij (eds.), Reason to Dissent: Proceedings of the 3rd European Conference on Argumentation, Vol. III (pp. 279-289) London, UK: College Publications, 2020

Suppositional reasoning can seem spooky. Suppositional reasoners allegedly (e.g.) “extract knowle... more Suppositional reasoning can seem spooky. Suppositional reasoners allegedly (e.g.) “extract knowledge from the sheer workings of their own minds” (Rosa), even where the knowledge is synthetic a posteriori. Can literary fiction pull such a rabbit out of its hat? Where P is a work’s fictional ‘premise’, some hold that some works reason declaratively (supposing P, Q), imperatively (supposing P, do Q), or interrogatively (supposing P, Q?), and that this can be a source of knowledge if the reasoning is good. True, I will argue, although only within the context of judicious critical interpretation. Further evident constraints include that the form of the suppositional reasoning needs to be declarative or imperative, and that the fictional ‘premise’ of the work needs to be a metaphysical counterfactual possibility, not merely a temporal counterfactual and not merely an epistemic possibility or probabilistic supposition.

In Bart Garssen, et al. (eds.), Proceedings of the Ninth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation. Amsterdam: Sic Sat. pp. 913-918., 2019

Some believe that all arguments make an implicit "inference claim" that the conclusion is inferab... more Some believe that all arguments make an implicit "inference claim" that the conclusion is inferable from the premises (e.g., Bermejo-Luque, Grennan, the Groarkes, Hitchcock, Scriven). I try to show that this is confused. An act of arguing arises because an inference can be attributed to us, not a meta-level "inference claim" that would make the argument self-referential and regressive. I develop six (other) possible explanations of the popularity of the doctrine that similarly identify confusions.

In Steve Oswald & Didier Maillat (eds.), Argumentation and Inference. Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference on Argumentation, Fribourg 2017, Vol. I (pp. 365-377). London, UK: College Publications., 2018

[Winner of the 2017 AILACT Essay Prize Prize.] I argue against the skeptical epistemological view... more [Winner of the 2017 AILACT Essay Prize Prize.] I argue against the skeptical epistemological view exemplified by the Groarkes that “all theories of informal argument must face the regress problem.” It is true that in our theoretical representations of reasoning, infinite regresses of self-justification regularly and inadvertently arise with respect to each of the RSA criteria for argument cogency (the premises are to be relevant, sufficient, and acceptable). But they arise needlessly, by confusing an RSA criterion with argument content, usually premise material.

Steve Oswald & Didier Maillat (eds.), Argumentation and Inference. Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference on Argumentation, Fribourg 2017, Vol. I (pp. 519-526). London, UK: College Publcations., 2018

The transcendental approach to understanding narrative argument derives from the idea that for an... more The transcendental approach to understanding narrative argument derives from the idea that for any believable fictional narrative, we can ask—what principles or generalizations would have to be true of human nature in order for the narrative to be believable? I address two key issues: whether only realistic or realist fictional narratives are believable, and how could it be established that we have an intuitive, mostly veridical grasp of human nature that grounds believability?

The Transcendental Argument of the Novel

Journal of The American Philosophical Association 3 (2): 148-167, 2017

Can fictional narration yield knowledge in a way that depends crucially on its being fictional? T... more Can fictional narration yield knowledge in a way that depends crucially on its being fictional? This is the hard question of literary cognitivism. It is unexceptional that knowledge can be gained from fictional literature in ways that are not dependent on its fictionality (e.g., the science in science fiction). Sometimes fictional narratives are taken to exhibit the structure of suppositional argument, sometimes analogical argument. Of course, neither structure is unique to narratives. The thesis of literary cognitivism would be supported if some novels exhibit a cogent and special argument structure restricted to fictional narratives. I contend that this is the case for a kind of transcendental argument. The reason is the inclusion and pattern of occurrence of the predicate ‘believable’ in the schema. Believability with respect to fictional stories is quite a different thing than it is with respect to nonfictional stories or anything else.

Analogy, Supposition, and Transcendentality in Narrative Argument

In Paula Olmos (ed.), Narration as Argument. Cham: Springer. pp. 63-81, 2017

Rodden writes, “How do stories persuade us? How do they ‘move’—and move us? The short answer: by ... more Rodden writes, “How do stories persuade us? How do they ‘move’—and move us? The short answer: by analogies.” Rodden’s claim is a natural first view, also held by others. This chapter considers the extent to which this view is true and helpful in understanding how fictional narratives, taken as wholes, may be argumentative, comparing it to the two principal (though not necessarily exclusive) alternatives that have been proposed: understanding fictional narratives as exhibiting the structure of suppositional argument, or the structure of a kind of transcendental argument. Three key aspects of understanding a fictional narrative as an argument from analogy are identified. First, the argument will be relativistic or depend in an essential way upon the circumstances or intentions of the auditor or author. Second, in view of the first aspect, the argument will be loose and subjective, and accordingly less likely to yield knowledge. Third, the argument will not exhibit a distinctive structure applicable only to fictional narratives. I find that the third, and sometimes the first and second, of these same three aspects apply to understanding fictional narratives as suppositional arguments. I present considerations that point to a way of establishing that some extended fictions exhibit the structure of a kind of transcendental argument that is neither relativistic nor subjective, is knowledge-generating, and is uniquely applicable to fictional narratives. This supports literary cognitivism—the thesis that “literary fiction can be a source of knowledge in a way that depends crucially on its being fictional.”

Cogency: A Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation 8 (1): 89-109, 2016

This paper considers whether universally—for all (known) rational beings—an argument scheme or pa... more This paper considers whether universally—for all (known) rational beings—an argument scheme or pattern can go from being cogent (well-reasoned) to fallacious. This question has previously received little attention, despite the centrality of the concepts of cogency, scheme, and fallaciousness. I argue that cogency has vanished in this way for the following scheme, a common type of impersonal means-end reasoning: X is needed as a basic necessity or protection of human lives, therefore, X ought to be secured if possible. As it stands (with no further elaboration), this scheme is committed to the assumption that the greater the number of human lives, the better. Although this assumption may have been indisputable previously, it is clearly disputable now. It is a fallacy or non sequitur to make a clearly disputable assumption without providing any justification. Although this topic raises critical issues for practically every discipline, my primary focus is on logical (as opposed to empirical or ethical) aspects of the case, and on implications for practical and theoretical logic. I conclude that the profile of vanishing cogency of the scheme may be unique and is determined by a peculiar combination of contingent universality and changing conditions.
Resumen: Este trabajo considera si universalmente –para todos los seres raciona-les– un esquema o patrón argumentativo puede cambiar de ser cogente (bien razona-do) a falaz. Esta pregunta ha recibido poca atención anteriormente, a pesar de la cen-tralidad de los conceptos de fuerza lógica, esquema y falacia. Sostengo que la cogencia ha desaparecido de esta manera para el siguiente esquema, un tipo común de razona-miento impersonal de medios-fines: se necesita X como una necesidad básica o pro-tección de la vida humana, por lo tanto, X debe ser asegurado si es posible. Tal como está (sin más elaboración), este esquema se compromete con la suposición de que cu-anto mayor sea el número de vidas humanas, mejor es el caso. Aunque este supuesto puede haber sido indiscutible anteriormente, es claramente discutible ahora. Es un error o incongruencia hacer de una suposición algo que es claramente discutible, sin dar ninguna justificación. A pesar de que este tema plantea cuestiones críticas para prácticamente todas las disciplinas, mi objetivo principal radica en el problema lógico (en oposición a problemas empíricos o éticos), y en las implicaciones para la lógica práctica y teórica. Llego a la conclusión de que el perfil de la desaparición de la cogen-cia del esquema puede ser único y está determinado por una combinación peculiar de la contingente universalidad y las condiciones cambiantes.

In D. Mohammend & M. Lewinski (eds.), Argumentation and Reasoned Action: Proceedings of the 1st European Conference on Argumentation, Lisbon 2015, Vol. I (pp. 615-630). London: College Publications, 2016

What can make storytelling “evil” in the sense that the storytelling leads to accepting a view... more What can make storytelling “evil” in the sense that the storytelling leads to accepting a view for no good reason, thus allowing ill-reasoned action? I mean the storytelling can be argumentatively evil, not trivially that (e.g.) the overt speeches of characters can include bad arguments. The storytelling can be argumentatively evil in that it purveys false premises, or purveys reasoning that is formally or informally fallacious. My main thesis is that as a rule, the shorter the fictional narrative, the greater the potential for argumentative evil. Here, the notion of length is to be understood such that it is generally a proxy for more abstract features such as how complex and nuanced the piece is. In other argumentative contexts, length generally appears to make no comparable difference. This feature would put fictional narrative arguments in a special class beyond what is determined by obvious features, such as the definitional fact that they in some way(s) collapse two of the four traditional types of discourse: exposition, description, narration, and argument. The nonobvious features that distinguish this class have been a source of puzzlement and inquiry.

In B. J. Garssen, D. Godden, G. Mitchell & A. F. Snoeck Henkemans (eds.), Proceedings of the 8th International Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation, pp. 1169-1177. Amsterdam: Sic Sat, 2015

This paper’s main thesis is that in virtue of being believable, a believable novel makes an indir... more This paper’s main thesis is that in virtue of being believable, a believable novel makes an indirect transcendental argument telling us something about the real world of human psychology, action, and society. Three related objections are addressed. First, the Stroud-type objection would be that from believability, the only conclusion that could be licensed concerns how we must think or conceive of the real world. Second, Currie holds that such notions are probably false: the empirical evidence “is all against this idea…that readers’ emotional responses track the real causal relations between things.” Third, responding with a full range of emotions to a novel surely requires that it be believable. Yet since we know the novel is fiction, we do not believe it. So in what does its believability consist?

Informal Logic 35 (4): 488-507, 2015

If novels can be arguments, that fact should shape logic or argumentation studies as well as lite... more If novels can be arguments, that fact should shape logic or argumentation studies as well as literary studies. Two senses the term ‘narrative argument’ might have are (a) a story that offers an argument, or (b) a distinctive argument form. I consider whether there is a principled way of extracting a novel’s argument in sense (a). Regarding the possibility of (b), Hunt’s view is evaluated that many fables and much fabulist literature inherently, and as wholes, have an analogical argument structure. I argue that a better account is that some novels inherently exhibit a transcendental argument structure.

In D. Mohammed & M. Lewiński (eds.), Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation. Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric, and the University of Windsor. pp. 1-5, 2013

In Frank Zenker (ed.), Argumentation: Cognition & Community. Proceedings of the 9th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation, pp. 1-9, 2011

"Ethical criticism" is an approach to literary studies that holds that reading certain carefully ... more "Ethical criticism" is an approach to literary studies that holds that reading certain carefully selected novels can make us ethically better people, e.g., by stimulating our sympathetic imagination (Nussbaum). I try to show that this nonargumentative approach cheapens the persuasive force of novels and that its inherent bias and censorship undercuts what is perhaps the principal value and defense of the novel—that reading novels can be critical to one's learning how to think.

In Frank Zenker (ed.), Argumentation: Cognition & Community. Proceedings of the 9th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation. pp. 1-4 ., 2011

In Frans H. van Eemeren, Bart Garssen, David Godden & Gordon Mitchell (eds.), Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation. Amsterdam: Rozenberg / Sic Sat. pp. 1547-1558, 2011

The common view is that no novel IS an argument, though it might be reconstructed as one. This is... more The common view is that no novel IS an argument, though it might be reconstructed as one. This is curious, for we almost always feel the need to reconstruct arguments even when they are uncontroversially given as arguments, as in a philosophical text. We make the points as explicit, orderly, and (often) brief as possible, which is what we do in reconstructing a novel’s argument. The reverse is also true. Given a text that is uncontroversially an explicit, orderly, and brief argument, in order to enhance plausibility, our first instinct is to flesh it out with illustrations and relationships to everyday life. If this process is fictive (e.g., with “thought experiments”) and orderly, it is story-telling. This paper investigates whether there is a principled way of determining a novel’s argument, which should contribute as much to understanding arguments as to understanding novels.

Juho Ritola (ed.), Argument Cultures. Proceedings of the 8th OSSA Conference. Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation, pp. 1-4, 2009

In Hans V. Hansen, Christopher W. Tindale, J. Anthony Blair, Ralph H. Johnson & David M. Godden (eds.), Dissensus and the Search for Common Ground. Proceedings 2007. Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation. pp. 1-9, 2007

One might ask of two or more texts—what can be inferred from them, taken together? If the texts h... more One might ask of two or more texts—what can be inferred from them, taken together? If the texts happen to contradict each other in some respect, then the unadorned answer of standard logic is EVERYTHING. But it seems to be a given that we often successfully reason with inconsistent information from multiple sources. The purpose of this paper will be to attempt to develop an adequate approach to accounting for this given.

In Frans H. van Eemeren, J. Anthony Blair, Charles A. Willard & A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans (eds.), Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation. Amsterdam: Sic Sat. pp. 803-806, 2003

Our thesis is that reasoning plays a greater—or at least a different—role in understanding oral d... more Our thesis is that reasoning plays a greater—or at least a different—role in understanding oral discourse such as lectures and speeches than it does in understanding comparatively long written discourse. For example, both reading and listening involve framing hypotheses about the direction the discourse is headed. But since a reader can skip around to check and revise hypotheses, the reader’s stake in initially getting it right is not as great as the listener’s, who runs the risk of getting hopelessly lost. We also consider how representing the content of discourse and dealing with its pragmatic logic differs in reading and listening.

In Hans V. Hansen, Christopher W. Tindale, J. Anthony Blair, Ralph H. Johnson & Robert C. Pinto (eds.), Argumentation and its Applications. Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation. pp. 1-8, 2002

There is ample justification for having analogical material in standardized tests for graduate sc... more There is ample justification for having analogical material in standardized tests for graduate school admission, perhaps especially for law school. We think that formal-analogy questions should compare different scenarios whose structure is the same in terms of the number of objects and the formal properties of their relations. The paper deals with this narrower question of how legitimately to have formal analogy test items, and the broader question of what constitutes a formal analogy in general.

Argument and Narrative

In Scott Aikin, John Casey & Katharina Stevens (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Argumentation Theory, 2025

Is There Such a Thing as Literary Cognition?

Ratio 34(2): 127-136, 2021

In Bart Garssen, et al. (eds.), Proceedings of the Ninth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation. Amsterdam: Sic Sat. pp. 913-918., 2019

The Transcendental Argument of the Novel

Journal of The American Philosophical Association 3 (2): 148-167, 2017

Analogy, Supposition, and Transcendentality in Narrative Argument

In Paula Olmos (ed.), Narration as Argument. Cham: Springer. pp. 63-81, 2017

Cogency: A Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation 8 (1): 89-109, 2016

Informal Logic 35 (4): 488-507, 2015

In Frank Zenker (ed.), Argumentation: Cognition & Community. Proceedings of the 9th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation, pp. 1-9, 2011

In Frank Zenker (ed.), Argumentation: Cognition & Community. Proceedings of the 9th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation. pp. 1-4 ., 2011

Juho Ritola (ed.), Argument Cultures. Proceedings of the 8th OSSA Conference. Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation, pp. 1-4, 2009

Informal Logic 40 (1): 147-156, 2020

This article reviews John Wood's Truth in Fiction: Rethinking its Logic (Springer 2018). Résumé: ... more This article reviews John Wood's Truth in Fiction: Rethinking its Logic (Springer 2018). Résumé: Cet article est une critique de La vérité dans la fiction: repenser sa logique (Springer 2018) de John Woods.

Suppositional reasoning can seem spooky. Suppositional reasoners allegedly (e.g.) "extract knowle... more Suppositional reasoning can seem spooky. Suppositional reasoners allegedly (e.g.) "extract knowledge from the sheer workings of their own minds" (Rosa), even where the knowledge is synthetic a posteriori. Can literary fiction pull such a rabbit out of its hat? Where P is a work's fictional 'premise', some hold that some works holistically exhibit suppositional reasoning that is declarative (supposing P, Q), imperative (supposing P, do Q), or interrogative (supposing P, Q?), and that this supports the thesis of literary cognitivism if the reasoning is good. True, I'll argue, although only within the context of judicious critical interpretation and other constraints.

The Law School Admission Test (LSAT) is designed to measure skills required for success in law sc... more The Law School Admission Test (LSAT) is designed to measure skills required for success in law school. Because these skills overlap greatly with putative critical thinking (CT) skills, the development of the test is a high-stakes meeting of CT theory and practice. This presentation summarizes the kinds of question types the LSAT currently has and is expected to have, and identifies significant trends in the nature of questions over the decades since the LSAT was first administered in 1948. The presentation considers the import of these trends for CT studies and assessment generally.
Since 1991, the scored sections of the LSAT have consisted of one multiple-choice section each of Analytical Reasoning (deductive reasoning involving set and ordering relationships) and Reading Comprehension questions, and two sections of Logical Reasoning questions, for a total of 100 questions. Logical Reasoning questions all involve argument analysis and evaluation, how new evidence impacts arguments, abduction, or how principles function in situated reasoning.
Here are a couple of examples: In a recent report Fisher (with Ennis and Scriven) made the “radical” recommendation that the definition of CT be expanded to include elementary quantitative reasoning such as basic statistics and drawing inferences from graphical representations, as well as the ability to distinguish such things as correlation/cause, and number/proportion. While LSAT Logical Reasoning questions often involve these latter distinctions and the test does have the Analytical Reasoning section, since 1982 sections designed to more substantially assess quantitative reasoning have been opposed by law schools as inappropriate. Also recommended is that any general assessment of critical thinking include a writing portion. However, although prior to 1982 the LSAT usually included scored writing measures, research consistently indicates that multiple-choice writing questions either are too easy or are unsound (e.g., turn on contentious matters of style) if sufficiently difficult. And essay measures are unreliable.

Can fictional narration yield knowledge in a way that depends crucially on its being fictional? T... more Can fictional narration yield knowledge in a way that depends crucially on its being fictional? This is the hard question of literary cognitivism. It is unremarkable or even trivial that knowledge can be gained from fictional literature in ways that are not dependent on its fictionality (e.g., the science in science fiction). Sometimes fictional narratives are taken to exhibit the structure of suppositional argument, sometimes analogical argument. Of course, neither structure is unique to narratives. The thesis of literary cognitivism would be supported if some narratives exhibit a cogent and special argument structure restricted to fictional narratives. I contend that this is the case for a kind of transcendental argument. The reason is the inclusion and pattern of occurrence of the predicate in the schema. Believability with respect to fictional stories is quite a different thing than it is with respect to nonfictional stories or anything else.