Elise Giuliano - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by Elise Giuliano

Political Studies Review, 2013

This work is about the new scramble for African resources and, to some extent, African markets by... more This work is about the new scramble for African resources and, to some extent, African markets by what Carmody refers to as the old economic powers comprising Britain, France, the European Union, the United States of America, Japan and South Africa, and the so-called new powers comprising Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC). Carmody emphasises the importance of the role of African leadership in determining the future of Africa in the new scramble, which he also refers to as ‘a scramble in Africa’ to distinguish it from the scramble for Africa of the late nineteenth century, which was characterised by European military rivalry and markets, and in which the rules for the division of Africa were established at the Berlin Conference of 1884–5. The book’s central argument is embedded in the contradictions between the growth of the global economy and the fixed amount of natural resources. Carmody further argues that the old and new powers are scrambling for African resources in a global economy that is technologically dynamic and expansive, and wherein multinational companies seek out low-cost labour sites for assembly operations to reduce costs and raise profits (pp. 6–7). In essence, the book moves beyond looking at Africa as a ‘dark continent’ with nothing to offer, and a continent to be civilised, as characterised in the literature of the late nineteenth century on the scramble for Africa. Besides this opportunity in which African leadership can negotiate advantageously for Africa (p. 191), Carmody warns against the past and present gloomy exploitative strategies of the old and new powers. He points out that African economies were structured to meet the demands of industrialising Europe by producing raw materials. This extroversion of Africa, whereby its economy was oriented to meet the needs of other people in other places, continues. Threequarters of what Africa exports are unprocessed primary commodities such as oil or copper, and many of the biggest companies exploiting African resources are foreign owned – so profits mainly flow elsewhere (pp. 2–5). The book has a few shortcomings: structurally chapter 8 is unnecessary. The discussions of China and India in this chapter could have been exhaustively discussed in chapters 3 and 4, respectively (pp. 85–9, pp. 100–1). The book adopts a non-systematic methodological approach comprising mainly secondary sources, and the small amount of empirical investigation mentioned in chapter 8 is a little too late for preparing the reader to understand the literature better (p. 159). This is a remarkably well-argued book addressing the interests and strategies of the old and new powers. I would recommend it for students of international relations and particularly development studies, as a valuable addition to the post-development perspective literature.

PonarsEuarasia - Policy Memos, 2013

Russia has experienced a number of natural disasters in recent years causing hundreds of deaths a... more Russia has experienced a number of natural disasters in recent years causing hundreds of deaths and a massive loss of homes and property. The deadly and dramatic nature of disasters stirs people to seek an explanation for what has taken place—a process that entails assigning responsibility and placing blame. Because government is responsible for disaster preparedness and management, infrastructure, and laws regulating the safety and property of citizens, people make judgments about government performance when a disaster occurs. While in some cases citizens deem government to have been culpable and incompetent (Hurricane Katrina), in others they determine that it saved lives and property, dealt equitably with victims’ needs, and effectively managed the damage that occurred. In general, when a natural disaster occurs, citizens may react in several ways: by assigning blame to the government, by giving credit to the government, or by viewing the event as outside the realm of politics al...

PonarsEuarasia - Policy Memos, 2015

What were the origins of separatism in the Donbas? When the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) and t... more What were the origins of separatism in the Donbas? When the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) and the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) were first proclaimed in early April 2014, their provenance was unclear, to put it mildly. Their self-appointed leaders were not well known. The organizations they represented before 2014 could generously be described as politically marginal. And yet, support for separatism in the Donbas began to grow. By the time armed militants began taking over regional government buildings in Donetsk in early April, large crowds accompanied them.

Constructing Grievance, 2017

Demokratizatsiya, Mar 22, 2012

In the twenty years of Russia's existence, one of its most notable yet underappreciated achie... more In the twenty years of Russia's existence, one of its most notable yet underappreciated achievements is the fact that ethnicity has played a very minor and non-divisive role in Russian politics. The Russian Federation is a multi-ethnic, culturally diverse state in which officially-recognized ethnic minorities form 20 percent of the population. Yet political parties are not organized by nationality, voting has not occurred according to ethnic affiliation, and ethno-national separatism among the republics has dissipated. All of this is perhaps not very remarkable in the increasingly centralized and authoritarian system that Putin has established. But even before Putin's federal reforms chipped away at the autonomy that certain Russian regions had gained during the 1990s, ethnicity failed to emerge as a relevant cleavage around which politics in the Russian Federation was organized. Why?This outcome may seem puzzling, given that Russia inherited from the USSR over 100 officially recognized ethnic minorities, and over twenty ethnically-defined sub-federal territories with boundaries drawn around putative "homelands" of certain minorities. Moreover, serious campaigns for ethnic separatism developed among several ethnic republics in the early 1990s, at the same time that communities throughout Eastern Europe were asserting their right to nation-states. In fact, the threat of ethno-national secession was so substantial that many Russian leaders and Western observers at the time feared that Russia would follow the disintegration of the Soviet Union along ethnic lines. Yet support for ethno-national separatism in Russia's republics faded after only a few years, with the important exception of Chechnya. And it did not recur in the late 1990s, despite the acute financial crisis and a very weak central state made even weaker by the violent, senseless war with Chechnya.How can we make sense of the transient politicization of ethnic identity in Russian politics, especially when we know that ethnic identities continue to be deeply felt by members of Russia's ethnic minorities and that sub-state ethnic administrative territories (i.e., republics) continue to exist? This article examines why ethno-national separatism among Russia's republics developed and then dissipated in the early 1990s, as well as why it did not re-emerge in the late 1990s as a viable threat to Russia's integrity. It also briefly considers the role that ethnicity plays in the more recent political mobilizations in the North Caucasus, especially Dagestan.Analysis of the post-Soviet politics literature on ethnic mobilization in both the Soviet Union and Russia suggests several key points for understanding why the politicization of ethnicity is not an enduring feature of Russian politics. First, it is critical to understand the fundamental nature of the relationship between ethnic identity and political mobilization. Work by many post-Soviet politics scholars has made much progress in this regard, putting to rest essentialist explanations that view ethnic group mobilization as based on cultural differences and thus inevitable. Second, it is important to recognize the existence of variation in ethnic mobilization at the mass level across Russia's republics. Only some of the republics had popular, mass-based nationalist opposition movements; in others, nationalist leaders were never able to win popular support. Making sense of these facts provides insight into the weakness of ethnic mobilization in Russia more generally, as well as prospects for mobilization in the future.This leads to a second point: the most powerful explanation for nationalist mobilization across the Soviet space concerns the effects of ethno-federal institutions. Ground-breaking work by scholars such as Roeder, Bunce, Brubaker, and Suny shows how the pseudo-federal structure of the Soviet Union-its ethnic "homelands" with official languages and cultures for certain nationalities; its use of the nationality entry on internal passports; and its korenizatsiia (indigenization) policies that granted preferences to titular nationalities within the republics-served to nurture and institutionalize ethnicity within the republics, creating both national elites and masses prepared to support nationalism when the opportunity arose during glasnost. …

Ethnopolitics, 2015

Abstract This study considers how a community that supports self-rule takes shape in movements fo... more Abstract This study considers how a community that supports self-rule takes shape in movements for self-determination. Examining separatism in east Ukraine, the author suggests that the formation of community boundaries is not automatic. Boundaries are not activated by pre-existing ethnic or linguistic identities, or even by the appeals of political leaders who manipulate those identities. Instead, analysts should focus attention on how specific political developments contribute to alienation from the central state. Two factors contributed to political alienation in Ukraine: first, the material interest of industrial workers in preserving economic ties to Russia, and second, how nostalgia for the Soviet Union was strengthened by developments following the Orange Revolution and after the Maidan that emphasized an ethnically exclusivist Ukrainian national identity and gave voice to the ultranationalist far right in national politics.

World Politics, 2006

Do ethnic federations undergoing democratization promote or discourage regional secessionism? Thi... more Do ethnic federations undergoing democratization promote or discourage regional secessionism? This article argues, based on evidence from the Russian Federation, that when democratization produces a transfer of political accountability from center to region, the incentives of regional leaders shift, forcing them to react to local constituencies in order to retain office. If these constituencies desire autonomy, regional leaders must respond, making separatism not merely an opportunistic strategy but a necessary one for their own political survival. Democratization, then, can transform administrative regions into electoral arenas.However, the case of Russia also demonstrates that regional demands for autonomy are not inevitable and may dissipate after they have begun. Popular support for nationalism and separatism varied significantly among Russia's sixteen ethnic republics in the late Soviet and early post-Soviet period. This variation is explained by showing that mass nationali...

Abstract will be provided by author.

Comparative Politics, 2000

Existing theories of ethnic mobilization that rely on essentialist assumptions about voters'... more Existing theories of ethnic mobilization that rely on essentialist assumptions about voters' political preferences should be reconceptualized. Contrary to theories that assume that ethnic group members have fixed, uniform preferences in support of nationalist political ...

Post-Soviet Affairs, 2018

Donetsk and Luhansk are often labeled pro-Russian regions as a result of the founding of Peoples'... more Donetsk and Luhansk are often labeled pro-Russian regions as a result of the founding of Peoples' Republics there in spring 2014. This article investigates popular opinion in Donbas before armed conflict began, to determine whether the high concentration of ethnic Russians there drove support for separatism. Analysis of a KIIS opinion poll shows that, on the one hand, ethnic Russian respondents were divided on most separatist issues, with a minority backing separatist positions. On the other hand, they supported separatist issues in larger numbers than both ethnic Ukrainians and respondents with hybrid identities. Thus, while ethnic identity does not produce polarized preferences, it is relevant in shaping political attitudes. Also, analysis of an original database of statements made by Donbas residents indicate that they were motivated to support separatism by local concerns exacerbated by a sense of abandonment by Kyiv rather than by Russian language and pro-Russian foreign policy issues. We are sick and tired of our country, of our government's policies, so we're voting for what we've been offered so far. We want order; stability; salaries; jobs …-A woman in Donetsk explaining why she is voting for independence in the sovereignty referendum in Donetsk, May 11, 2014. (RFE/RL 2014) Demands for separatism in the eastern Donbas region of Ukraine in spring 2014 emerged rapidly. Residents of Donetsk and Luhansk, who had been politically quiescent throughout the Maidan demonstrations that started the previous fall, began to participate in a series of escalating demonstrations after the ouster of Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych in late February. As events in Crimea crescendoed in early March, local activists of formerly marginal pro-Russian organizations in Donbas gained in popularity. 1 Whereas only a year earlier these groups' events consisted primarily of distributing literature to passers-by from folding tables, they now took advantage of the opening provided by Russia's annexation of Crimea. Activists forcibly seized government buildings in April and declared themselves leaders of the self-styled Peoples' Republic of Donetsk (DNR) and Peoples' Republic of Luhansk (LNR). They quickly adopted declarations of sovereignty (e.g. Declaration 2014), and in May, held referenda on state sovereignty. Support for separatism was not the dominant political opinion among residents of Donbas. Only a minority of the population-slightly less than a third of people surveyed in Donetsk and Luhanskbacked separation from Ukraine (KIIS 2014). Nevertheless, the percentage of citizens with opinions that

Nationalities Papers, 2012

1. Ethnic Entrepreneurs, Ordinary People, and Group Grievance 2. Variation in Mass Nationalism ac... more 1. Ethnic Entrepreneurs, Ordinary People, and Group Grievance 2. Variation in Mass Nationalism across Russia's Republics 3. Does Structure Matter? Local Labor Markets and Social Mobility 4. Supporting National Sovereignty in Tatarstan 5. Nationalism in a Socialist Company Town: Tatars, Russians, and the Kamskii Automobile Works in Naberezhnye Chelny 6. Ethnic Entrepreneurs and the Construction of Group Grievance: Tuva, Mari El, and Komi Compared 7. Secessionism from the Bottom Up: Democratization, Nationalism, and Local Accountability in Russia 8. Lessons from Russia: A Critical View of the Relationship between Ethnic Elite Claims and Mass InterestsBibliography Index

Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 2005

Muslims in Russia are often alleged (most recently by President Putin) to be potential Islamists,... more Muslims in Russia are often alleged (most recently by President Putin) to be potential Islamists, ready to support the radical Chechen separatist project of establishing an Islamic state in the Caucasus. This article challenges this claim, which assumes that Muslims in Russia form a coherent group based on religious identity, and as such, share a set of common political preferences that oppose the central state. The article demonstrates instead that: (1) Russian Muslims practice various forms of Islam; (2) religious belief and practice is not always correlated with anti-Moscow political mobilization; (3) ethnicity, rather than always reinforcing Muslim identity, interacts with Islam in complex ways throughout Russia's ethnic republics, and (4) Muslims in Russia have largely opposed radical Islamic movements during the past 15 years and most likely will continue to do so. These points are supported by an analysis of Islam, identity and politics in Dagestan and Chechnya, the two republics in Russia that have witnessed the largest amount of Islamic mobilization.