Sean Greenberg - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Sean Greenberg
Oxford University Press eBooks, Oct 1, 2013
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jan 4, 2005
Cambridge University Press eBooks, Jan 5, 2016
Philosophy in review, Dec 1, 2007
... Donald Rutherford, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy Reviewed by. Sean G... more ... Donald Rutherford, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy Reviewed by. Sean Greenberg. Philosophy in Review ISSN (online) 1920-8936 © University of Victoria. This journal is published under the terms ...
Notre Dame philosophical reviews, 2006
Philosophy in review, 2012
In one of his final published papers, Donald Davidson remarks: 'Since it is clear that the concep... more In one of his final published papers, Donald Davidson remarks: 'Since it is clear that the concept of action is central to many of the perennial concerns of philosophy, what is surprising is not Aristotle's interest, or ours, but rather the relative neglect of the subject during the intervening millennia… But whatever the reason, the consequence is that the subject has progressed, or changed, relatively little since Aristotle… Our topic has flourished, then, mainly in two periods: Aristotle's and our own' ("Aristotle's Action," Truth, Language and History [Clarendon Press, 2005], 277-8). The first three parts of A Companion to the Philosophy of Action-Part I, "Acts and Actions"; Part II, "Agency and Causation," and Part III, "Action in Special Contexts"testify to the efflorescence of work in the philosophy of action since the second half of the twentieth century. Part IV, "Prominent Figures," which, apart from an opening chapter on classical Indian philosophy, focuses on Western philosophers from Plato to Paul Ricoeur (no living philosophers are treated), might seem to challenge Davidson's historical claim. After limning the main topics treated in the first three parts of the volume, I treat Part IV, which constitutes nearly a third of the volume, at greatest length, and assess whether the historical chapters included there challenge Davidson's claim about the history of the philosophy of action.
Without question, the problem of evil vexed Leibniz as much as any philosophical problem during h... more Without question, the problem of evil vexed Leibniz as much as any philosophical problem during his career. This is obvious from the fact that the first and the last book length works that he authored, the Philosopher's Confession (written at age 26 in 1672) and the Theodicy (written in 1709, seven years before his death) were both devoted to this problem. It is, as well, equally striking that this latter work was the only book length treatise Leibniz saw fit to publish during his life. In this entry we will examine to two main species of the problem of evil which Leibniz addresses. The first, "the underachiver problem," is the one raised by the critic who argues that the evil in our world indicates that God cannot be as knowledgeable, powerful, or good, as traditional monotheists have claimed. The second, "the holiness problem," is one raised by a critic who argues that God's intimate causal entanglements with the world make God the cause of evil. God is thereby implicated in the evil at the expense of his holiness.
Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, Volume VII, 2015
HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 2015
The Cambridge Descartes Lexicon
HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 2013
Oxford Handbooks Online, 2013
Philosophy Compass, 2008
Hume begins the Treatise of Human Nature by announcing the goal of developing a science of man; b... more Hume begins the Treatise of Human Nature by announcing the goal of developing a science of man; by the end of Book 1 of the Treatise, the science of man seems to founder in doubt. Underlying the tension between Hume's constructive ambition -his 'naturalism' -and his doubts about that ambition -his 'skepticism' -is the question of whether Hume is justified in continuing his philosophical project. In this paper, I explain how this question emerges in the final section of Book 1 of the Treatise, the 'Conclusion of this Book', then examine Janet Broughton's and Don Garrett's answers to it, and conclude by sketching a different approach to this question. There seems to be a tension in David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature. In the Introduction, Hume proposes to develop a 'science of man' (T Intro.4; SBN xv), that will illuminate 'the extent and force of the understanding . . . the nature of the ideas we employ . . . and . . . the operations we perform in our reasonings' (T Intro.4; SBN xv), and serve as the 'solid foundation for the other sciences' (T Intro.7; SBN xvi). 1 Hume seems to prosecute the science of man successfully in parts 1 to 3 of Book 1 of the Treatise, but each successive section of part 4 seems further to narrow the extent of the understanding, thereby threatening to sap the very foundations of the science of man itself, as Hume seems to recognize in the 'Conclusion of this Book'. Methinks I am like a man, who, having struck on many shoals, and having narrowly escap'd ship-wreck in passing a small frith, has yet the temerity to put out to sea in the same leaky weather-beaten vessel, and even carries his ambition so far as to think of compassing the globe under these disadvantageous circumstances. My memory of past errors and perplexities, makes me diffident for the future. The wretched condition, weakness, and disorder of the faculties, I must employ in my enquiries, encrease my apprehensions. And the impossibility of amending or correcting these faculties, reduces me almost to despair, and makes me resolve to perish on the barren rock, on which I am at present, rather than venture myself upon that boundless ocean, which runs out into immensity. This sudden view of my danger strikes me with melancholy. (T 1.4.7.1; SBN 264)
Noûs, 2007
What is the place of the passions in the cognitive economy of the Cartesian mind? How do passions... more What is the place of the passions in the cognitive economy of the Cartesian mind? How do passions promote the survival of the embodied mind? In recent years, Descartes' little treatise (AT IV 407) on the passions, The Passions of the Soul, has received considerable attention from ...
Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2007
Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2013
Overall, this is a thorough account of Aquinas on punishment. It is well developed, and for the m... more Overall, this is a thorough account of Aquinas on punishment. It is well developed, and for the most part rigorously argued. While the last three decades have witnessed much writing on Aquinas's moral theory, especially its association with virtue ethics, less is found on political and jurisprudence concepts. This small treatise is a welcome addition to the burgeoning field of contemporary Aquinas studies.
Inquiry, 2005
In a recent paper, Eckart Förster challenges interpreters to explain why in the first Critique pr... more In a recent paper, Eckart Förster challenges interpreters to explain why in the first Critique practical reason has a canon but no dialectic, whereas in the second Critique, there is not only a dialectic, but an antinomy of practical reason. In the Groundwork, Kant claims that there is ...
Oxford University Press eBooks, Oct 1, 2013
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jan 4, 2005
Cambridge University Press eBooks, Jan 5, 2016
Philosophy in review, Dec 1, 2007
... Donald Rutherford, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy Reviewed by. Sean G... more ... Donald Rutherford, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy Reviewed by. Sean Greenberg. Philosophy in Review ISSN (online) 1920-8936 © University of Victoria. This journal is published under the terms ...
Notre Dame philosophical reviews, 2006
Philosophy in review, 2012
In one of his final published papers, Donald Davidson remarks: 'Since it is clear that the concep... more In one of his final published papers, Donald Davidson remarks: 'Since it is clear that the concept of action is central to many of the perennial concerns of philosophy, what is surprising is not Aristotle's interest, or ours, but rather the relative neglect of the subject during the intervening millennia… But whatever the reason, the consequence is that the subject has progressed, or changed, relatively little since Aristotle… Our topic has flourished, then, mainly in two periods: Aristotle's and our own' ("Aristotle's Action," Truth, Language and History [Clarendon Press, 2005], 277-8). The first three parts of A Companion to the Philosophy of Action-Part I, "Acts and Actions"; Part II, "Agency and Causation," and Part III, "Action in Special Contexts"testify to the efflorescence of work in the philosophy of action since the second half of the twentieth century. Part IV, "Prominent Figures," which, apart from an opening chapter on classical Indian philosophy, focuses on Western philosophers from Plato to Paul Ricoeur (no living philosophers are treated), might seem to challenge Davidson's historical claim. After limning the main topics treated in the first three parts of the volume, I treat Part IV, which constitutes nearly a third of the volume, at greatest length, and assess whether the historical chapters included there challenge Davidson's claim about the history of the philosophy of action.
Without question, the problem of evil vexed Leibniz as much as any philosophical problem during h... more Without question, the problem of evil vexed Leibniz as much as any philosophical problem during his career. This is obvious from the fact that the first and the last book length works that he authored, the Philosopher's Confession (written at age 26 in 1672) and the Theodicy (written in 1709, seven years before his death) were both devoted to this problem. It is, as well, equally striking that this latter work was the only book length treatise Leibniz saw fit to publish during his life. In this entry we will examine to two main species of the problem of evil which Leibniz addresses. The first, "the underachiver problem," is the one raised by the critic who argues that the evil in our world indicates that God cannot be as knowledgeable, powerful, or good, as traditional monotheists have claimed. The second, "the holiness problem," is one raised by a critic who argues that God's intimate causal entanglements with the world make God the cause of evil. God is thereby implicated in the evil at the expense of his holiness.
Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, Volume VII, 2015
HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 2015
The Cambridge Descartes Lexicon
HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 2013
Oxford Handbooks Online, 2013
Philosophy Compass, 2008
Hume begins the Treatise of Human Nature by announcing the goal of developing a science of man; b... more Hume begins the Treatise of Human Nature by announcing the goal of developing a science of man; by the end of Book 1 of the Treatise, the science of man seems to founder in doubt. Underlying the tension between Hume's constructive ambition -his 'naturalism' -and his doubts about that ambition -his 'skepticism' -is the question of whether Hume is justified in continuing his philosophical project. In this paper, I explain how this question emerges in the final section of Book 1 of the Treatise, the 'Conclusion of this Book', then examine Janet Broughton's and Don Garrett's answers to it, and conclude by sketching a different approach to this question. There seems to be a tension in David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature. In the Introduction, Hume proposes to develop a 'science of man' (T Intro.4; SBN xv), that will illuminate 'the extent and force of the understanding . . . the nature of the ideas we employ . . . and . . . the operations we perform in our reasonings' (T Intro.4; SBN xv), and serve as the 'solid foundation for the other sciences' (T Intro.7; SBN xvi). 1 Hume seems to prosecute the science of man successfully in parts 1 to 3 of Book 1 of the Treatise, but each successive section of part 4 seems further to narrow the extent of the understanding, thereby threatening to sap the very foundations of the science of man itself, as Hume seems to recognize in the 'Conclusion of this Book'. Methinks I am like a man, who, having struck on many shoals, and having narrowly escap'd ship-wreck in passing a small frith, has yet the temerity to put out to sea in the same leaky weather-beaten vessel, and even carries his ambition so far as to think of compassing the globe under these disadvantageous circumstances. My memory of past errors and perplexities, makes me diffident for the future. The wretched condition, weakness, and disorder of the faculties, I must employ in my enquiries, encrease my apprehensions. And the impossibility of amending or correcting these faculties, reduces me almost to despair, and makes me resolve to perish on the barren rock, on which I am at present, rather than venture myself upon that boundless ocean, which runs out into immensity. This sudden view of my danger strikes me with melancholy. (T 1.4.7.1; SBN 264)
Noûs, 2007
What is the place of the passions in the cognitive economy of the Cartesian mind? How do passions... more What is the place of the passions in the cognitive economy of the Cartesian mind? How do passions promote the survival of the embodied mind? In recent years, Descartes' little treatise (AT IV 407) on the passions, The Passions of the Soul, has received considerable attention from ...
Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2007
Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2013
Overall, this is a thorough account of Aquinas on punishment. It is well developed, and for the m... more Overall, this is a thorough account of Aquinas on punishment. It is well developed, and for the most part rigorously argued. While the last three decades have witnessed much writing on Aquinas's moral theory, especially its association with virtue ethics, less is found on political and jurisprudence concepts. This small treatise is a welcome addition to the burgeoning field of contemporary Aquinas studies.
Inquiry, 2005
In a recent paper, Eckart Förster challenges interpreters to explain why in the first Critique pr... more In a recent paper, Eckart Förster challenges interpreters to explain why in the first Critique practical reason has a canon but no dialectic, whereas in the second Critique, there is not only a dialectic, but an antinomy of practical reason. In the Groundwork, Kant claims that there is ...