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Papers by Harrison Pretat

CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2021

Since completing the construction of its artificial island outposts in the Spratly Islands in 201... more Since completing the construction of its artificial island outposts in the Spratly Islands in 2016, China has shifted its focus toward asserting control over peacetime activity across the South China Sea. A key component of this shift has been the expansion of China's maritime militia-a force of vessels ostensibly engaged in commercial fishing but which in fact operate alongside Chinese law enforcement and military to achieve Chinese political objectives in disputed waters. The tactics employed by the militia pose a significant challenge to those interested in maintaining a maritime order rooted in international law. But open-source Chinese language research, remote sensing data, and maritime patrols conducted by actors operating in disputed waters have the power to expose the militia and diminish its effectiveness as a gray zone force. This report presents the most comprehensive profile yet available of China's maritime militia in the South China Sea. Additionally, this report presents a methodology for identifying Chinese maritime militia vessels and a list of 122 militia vessels thus identified, as well as a list of 52 more ships highly likely to be militia. Key Findings HISTORY OF THE MILITIA ▪ China's modern use of fishing militias dates back to at least 1974, when they were employed in seizing the Paracel Islands from the Republic of Vietnam. Several developments in the 1980s, including the 1985 establishment of a militia force in Tanmen Township on Hainan and the establishment of China's first bases in the Spratlys in 1988, would lay the groundwork for a more active militia in the following decades. ▪ The militia's involvement in aggressive operations increased in the 2000s, when militia vessels physically interfered with the navigation of multiple U.S. Navy ships. This continued into the early 2010s, where the militia would play a key role in China's seizure of Scarborough Shoal in 2012, as well as the deployment of a Chinese oil rig into Vietnamese waters in 2014. ▪ Since the completion of China's artificial island outposts in 2016, militia boats have been deployed to the Spratlys in greater numbers and on a more constant basis than ever before. Militia have accompanied Chinese law enforcement at several oil and gas standoffs with Malaysia and Vietnam and have participated in mass deployments at targeted features; nearly 100 militia boats deployed near Philippine-occupied Thitu Island in 2018, and approximately 200 gathered at unoccupied Whitsun Reef in the spring of 2021. THE MODERN MILITIA ▪ The militia as currently constituted in the South China Sea operates from a string of 10 ports in China's Guangdong and Hainan provinces. Remote sensing data indicates that roughly 300 militia vessels are operating in the Spratly Islands on any given day. ▪ Militia ships fall into two major categories: professional militia vessels and commercial fishing In the interest of dissuading assertive behavior and lowering the risk of conflict in disputed waters, this report seeks to lift the shroud of uncertainty and deniability surrounding China's maritime militia. By providing a comprehensive overview of the militia, including extensive new findings on the government subsidies and ownership networks behind it, as well as a methodology for identifying militia vessels and a list of active militia vessels and owners, the findings presented here dispel any

CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2021

Since completing the construction of its artificial island outposts in the Spratly Islands in 201... more Since completing the construction of its artificial island outposts in the Spratly Islands in 2016, China has shifted its focus toward asserting control over peacetime activity across the South China Sea. A key component of this shift has been the expansion of China's maritime militia-a force of vessels ostensibly engaged in commercial fishing but which in fact operate alongside Chinese law enforcement and military to achieve Chinese political objectives in disputed waters. The tactics employed by the militia pose a significant challenge to those interested in maintaining a maritime order rooted in international law. But open-source Chinese language research, remote sensing data, and maritime patrols conducted by actors operating in disputed waters have the power to expose the militia and diminish its effectiveness as a gray zone force. This report presents the most comprehensive profile yet available of China's maritime militia in the South China Sea. Additionally, this report presents a methodology for identifying Chinese maritime militia vessels and a list of 122 militia vessels thus identified, as well as a list of 52 more ships highly likely to be militia. Key Findings HISTORY OF THE MILITIA ▪ China's modern use of fishing militias dates back to at least 1974, when they were employed in seizing the Paracel Islands from the Republic of Vietnam. Several developments in the 1980s, including the 1985 establishment of a militia force in Tanmen Township on Hainan and the establishment of China's first bases in the Spratlys in 1988, would lay the groundwork for a more active militia in the following decades. ▪ The militia's involvement in aggressive operations increased in the 2000s, when militia vessels physically interfered with the navigation of multiple U.S. Navy ships. This continued into the early 2010s, where the militia would play a key role in China's seizure of Scarborough Shoal in 2012, as well as the deployment of a Chinese oil rig into Vietnamese waters in 2014. ▪ Since the completion of China's artificial island outposts in 2016, militia boats have been deployed to the Spratlys in greater numbers and on a more constant basis than ever before. Militia have accompanied Chinese law enforcement at several oil and gas standoffs with Malaysia and Vietnam and have participated in mass deployments at targeted features; nearly 100 militia boats deployed near Philippine-occupied Thitu Island in 2018, and approximately 200 gathered at unoccupied Whitsun Reef in the spring of 2021. THE MODERN MILITIA ▪ The militia as currently constituted in the South China Sea operates from a string of 10 ports in China's Guangdong and Hainan provinces. Remote sensing data indicates that roughly 300 militia vessels are operating in the Spratly Islands on any given day. ▪ Militia ships fall into two major categories: professional militia vessels and commercial fishing In the interest of dissuading assertive behavior and lowering the risk of conflict in disputed waters, this report seeks to lift the shroud of uncertainty and deniability surrounding China's maritime militia. By providing a comprehensive overview of the militia, including extensive new findings on the government subsidies and ownership networks behind it, as well as a methodology for identifying militia vessels and a list of active militia vessels and owners, the findings presented here dispel any