Henk de Regt - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Henk de Regt
Synthese
Understanding natural phenomena is an important aim of science. Since the turn of the millennium ... more Understanding natural phenomena is an important aim of science. Since the turn of the millennium the notion of scientific understanding has been a hot topic of debate in the philosophy of science. A bone of contention in this debate is the role of truth and representational accuracy in scientific understanding. So-called factivists and non-factivists disagree about the extent to which the theories and models that are used to achieve understanding must be (at least approximately) true or accurate. In this paper we address this issue by examining a case from the practice of synthetic chemistry. We investigate how understanding is obtained in this field by means of an in-depth analysis of the famous synthesis of periplanone B by W. Clark Still. It turns out that highly idealized models—that are representationally inaccurate and sometimes even inconsistent—and qualitative concepts are essential for understanding the synthetic pathway and accordingly for achieving the synthesis. We compa...
Philosophica, 1996
This article argues that individual philosophical commitments of scientists can decisively influe... more This article argues that individual philosophical commitments of scientists can decisively influence scientific practice. To support this claim, two historical examples are presented, concerning controversies between physicists about central problems in their field. Confrontation of the theories of Kuhn, Lakatos, and Laudan with these examples reveals their inadequacy to explain the role-of individual commitments. It is concluded that an adequate model of scientific change should exhibit a three-level structure.
Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 2019
Publisher's Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in publishe... more Publisher's Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 2019
In recent years, scientific understanding has become a focus of attention in philosophy of scienc... more In recent years, scientific understanding has become a focus of attention in philosophy of science. Since understanding is typically associated with the pragmatic and psychological dimensions of explanation, shifting the focus from explanation to understanding may induce a shift from accounts that embody normative ideals to accounts that provide accurate descriptions of scientific practice. Not surprisingly, many ‘friends of understanding’ sympathize with a naturalistic approach to the philosophy of science. However, this raises the question of whether the proposed theories of understanding can still have normative power. In this paper I address this question by examining two theories of scientific understanding: Jan Faye’s pragmatic-rhetorical theory and my own contextual theory of scientific understanding. I argue that both theories leave room for normativity, despite their naturalistic tendencies. The normative power of my contextual theory is illustrated with a case study of the...
Synthese, 2018
While the relation between visualization and scientific understanding has been a topic of long-st... more While the relation between visualization and scientific understanding has been a topic of long-standing discussion, recent developments in physics have pushed the boundaries of this debate to new and still unexplored realms. For it is claimed that, in certain theories of quantum gravity, spacetime 'disappears': and this suggests that one may have sensible physical theories in which spacetime is completely absent. This makes the philosophical question whether such theories are intelligible, even more pressing. And if such theories are intelligible, the question then is how they manage to do so. In this paper, we adapt the contextual theory of scientific understanding, developed by one of us, to fit the novel challenges posed by physical theories without spacetime. We construe understanding as a matter of skill rather than just knowledge. The appeal is thus to understanding, rather than explanation, because we will be concerned with the tools that scientists have at their disposal for understanding these theories. Our central thesis is that such physical theories can provide scientific understanding, and that such understanding does not require spacetimes of any sort. Our argument consists of four consecutive steps: (a) We argue, from the general theory of scientific understanding, that although visualization is an oft-used tool for understanding, it is not a necessary condition for it; (b) we criticise certain metaphysical preconceptions which can stand in the way of recognising how intelligibility without spacetime can be had; (c) we catalogue tools for rendering theories without a spacetime intelligible; and (d) we give examples of cases in which understanding is attained without a spacetime, and explain what kind of understanding these examples provide.
What Is Scientific Knowledge?, 2019
Science has not only produced a vast amount of knowledge about a wide range of phenomena, it has ... more Science has not only produced a vast amount of knowledge about a wide range of phenomena, it has also enhanced our understanding of these phenomena. Indeed, understanding can be regarded as one of the central aims of science. But what exactly is it to understand phenomena scientifically, and how can scientific understanding be achieved? What is the difference between scientific knowledge and scientific understanding? These questions are hotly debated in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science. While philosophers have long regarded understanding as a merely subjective and psychological notion that is irrelevant from an epistemological perspective, nowadays many of them acknowledge that a philosophical account of science and its aims should include an analysis of the nature of understanding. This chapter reviews the current debate on scientific understanding. It presents the main philosophical accounts of scientific understanding and discusses topical issues such as the relation between understanding, truth and knowledge, the phenomenology of understanding, and the role of understanding in scientific progress.
Frontiers in Cellular Neuroscience, 2019
Holland et al. Models and Nerve Impulse Propagation nerve impulse propagation with a single gener... more Holland et al. Models and Nerve Impulse Propagation nerve impulse propagation with a single general unifying model, it appears advisable to explain this complex phenomenon using a 'mosaic' framework of models in which each model provides a partial explanation of nerve impulse propagation.
European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2018
In this paper we have two aims: first, to draw attention to the close connexion between interpret... more In this paper we have two aims: first, to draw attention to the close connexion between interpretation and scientific understanding; second, to give a detailed account of how theories without a spacetime can be interpreted, and so of how they can be understood. In order to do so, we of course need an account of what is meant by a theory 'without a spacetime': which we also provide in this paper. We describe three tools, used by physicists, aimed at constructing interpretations which are adequate for the goal of understanding. We analyse examples from high-energy physics illustrating how physicists use these tools to construct interpretations and thereby attain understanding. The examples are: the 't Hooft approximation of gauge theories, random matrix models, causal sets, loop quantum gravity, and group field theory.
Progress in neurobiology, Jan 4, 2018
Nerve impulse generation and propagation are often thought of as solely electrical events. The pr... more Nerve impulse generation and propagation are often thought of as solely electrical events. The prevalence of this view is the result of long and intense study of nerve impulses in electrophysiology culminating in the introduction of the Hodgkin-Huxley model of the action potential in the 1950s. To this day, this model forms the physiological foundation for a broad area of neuroscientific research. However, the Hodgkin-Huxley model cannot account for non-electrical phenomena that accompany nerve impulse propagation, for which there is nevertheless ample evidence. This raises the question whether the Hodgkin-Huxley model is a complete model of the nerve impulse. Several alternative models have been proposed that do take into account non-electrical aspects of the nerve impulse and emphasize their importance in gaining a more complete understanding of the nature of the nerve impulse. In our opinion, these models deserve more attention in neuroscientific research, since, together with th...
EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009, 2011
In the literature on scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between explanation... more In the literature on scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between explanations of facts and explanations of laws. This paper is about explanations of facts. Our aim is to analyse the role of unification in explanations of this kind. We discuss five positions with respect to this role, argue for two of them and refute the three others.
European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2021
What makes teaching philosophy of science to non-philosophy students different from teaching it t... more What makes teaching philosophy of science to non-philosophy students different from teaching it to philosophy students, and how should lecturers in philosophy adapt to an audience of practitioners of a field of study that they are reflecting on? In this paper we address this question by analyzing the differences between these student groups, and based on this analysis we make suggestions as to how philosophy of science can be taught to non-philosophy students in an effective and attractive way. Starting-point is the observation that not only the background knowledge and interests of these students but also the aims of the respective courses will differ. We present a comparative analysis of the demands and conditions for teaching philosophy of science to the different types of students, focusing on learning objectives and didactic approaches. Next, we apply our analysis to a concrete example, the role of values in science, and discuss how this may be taught to either philosophy stude...
Foundations of Science, 2020
The starting point for this special issue is that explanations as they occur in scientific practi... more The starting point for this special issue is that explanations as they occur in scientific practice exhibit a plurality of structures. The explananda are at different levels (e.g. events, regularities, laws) and of different types (e.g. plain facts, contrasts, similarities). Likewise, the explanantia can have different ingredients (e.g. causes, constraints, laws, mechanisms) and different types of organisation (e.g. deductive and/or inductive arguments, causal models). We give a brief illustration of this plurality. We start with an example that Paul Humphreys uses in his book The Chances of Explanation (1989). Suppose that Albert has died and we want an explanation for this event. An explanation could be: Albert's death occurred because of his infection with the plague bacillus, despite the administration of tetracycline to him. (p. 100).
Science & Education, 2019
While a conception of science as value free has been dominant since Max Weber defended it in the ... more While a conception of science as value free has been dominant since Max Weber defended it in the nineteenth century, recent years have witnessed an emerging consensus that science is not – and cannot be – completely free of values. Which values may legitimately influence science, and in which ways, is currently a topic of heated debate in philosophy of science. These discussions have immediate relevance for science teaching: if the value-free ideal of science is misguided, science students should abandon it too and learn to reflect on the relation between science and values – only then can they become responsible academics and citizens. Since science students will plausibly become scientists, scientific practitioners, or academic professionals, and their values will influence their future professional activities, it is essential that they are aware of these values and are able to critically reflect upon their role. In this paper, we investigate ways in which reflection on science an...
Synthese, 2005
Achieving understanding of nature is one of the aims of science. In this paper we offer an analys... more Achieving understanding of nature is one of the aims of science. In this paper we offer an analysis of the nature of scientific understanding that accords with actual scientific practice and accommodates the historical diversity of conceptions of understanding. Its core idea is a general criterion for the intelligibility of scientific theories that is essentially contextual: which theories conform to this criterion depends on contextual factors, and can change in the course of time. Our analysis provides a general account of how understanding is provided by scientific explanations of diverse types. In this way, it reconciles conflicting views of explanatory understanding, such as the causal-mechanical and the unificationist conceptions.
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 2006
Page 1. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. 20, No. 2, July 2006, pp. 129147... more Page 1. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. 20, No. 2, July 2006, pp. 129147 ISSN 02698595 (print)/ISSN 14699281 (online) © 2006 Inter-University Foundation DOI: 10.1080/02698590600814308 Wesley Salmon's Complementarity ...
Synthese
Understanding natural phenomena is an important aim of science. Since the turn of the millennium ... more Understanding natural phenomena is an important aim of science. Since the turn of the millennium the notion of scientific understanding has been a hot topic of debate in the philosophy of science. A bone of contention in this debate is the role of truth and representational accuracy in scientific understanding. So-called factivists and non-factivists disagree about the extent to which the theories and models that are used to achieve understanding must be (at least approximately) true or accurate. In this paper we address this issue by examining a case from the practice of synthetic chemistry. We investigate how understanding is obtained in this field by means of an in-depth analysis of the famous synthesis of periplanone B by W. Clark Still. It turns out that highly idealized models—that are representationally inaccurate and sometimes even inconsistent—and qualitative concepts are essential for understanding the synthetic pathway and accordingly for achieving the synthesis. We compa...
Philosophica, 1996
This article argues that individual philosophical commitments of scientists can decisively influe... more This article argues that individual philosophical commitments of scientists can decisively influence scientific practice. To support this claim, two historical examples are presented, concerning controversies between physicists about central problems in their field. Confrontation of the theories of Kuhn, Lakatos, and Laudan with these examples reveals their inadequacy to explain the role-of individual commitments. It is concluded that an adequate model of scientific change should exhibit a three-level structure.
Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 2019
Publisher's Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in publishe... more Publisher's Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 2019
In recent years, scientific understanding has become a focus of attention in philosophy of scienc... more In recent years, scientific understanding has become a focus of attention in philosophy of science. Since understanding is typically associated with the pragmatic and psychological dimensions of explanation, shifting the focus from explanation to understanding may induce a shift from accounts that embody normative ideals to accounts that provide accurate descriptions of scientific practice. Not surprisingly, many ‘friends of understanding’ sympathize with a naturalistic approach to the philosophy of science. However, this raises the question of whether the proposed theories of understanding can still have normative power. In this paper I address this question by examining two theories of scientific understanding: Jan Faye’s pragmatic-rhetorical theory and my own contextual theory of scientific understanding. I argue that both theories leave room for normativity, despite their naturalistic tendencies. The normative power of my contextual theory is illustrated with a case study of the...
Synthese, 2018
While the relation between visualization and scientific understanding has been a topic of long-st... more While the relation between visualization and scientific understanding has been a topic of long-standing discussion, recent developments in physics have pushed the boundaries of this debate to new and still unexplored realms. For it is claimed that, in certain theories of quantum gravity, spacetime 'disappears': and this suggests that one may have sensible physical theories in which spacetime is completely absent. This makes the philosophical question whether such theories are intelligible, even more pressing. And if such theories are intelligible, the question then is how they manage to do so. In this paper, we adapt the contextual theory of scientific understanding, developed by one of us, to fit the novel challenges posed by physical theories without spacetime. We construe understanding as a matter of skill rather than just knowledge. The appeal is thus to understanding, rather than explanation, because we will be concerned with the tools that scientists have at their disposal for understanding these theories. Our central thesis is that such physical theories can provide scientific understanding, and that such understanding does not require spacetimes of any sort. Our argument consists of four consecutive steps: (a) We argue, from the general theory of scientific understanding, that although visualization is an oft-used tool for understanding, it is not a necessary condition for it; (b) we criticise certain metaphysical preconceptions which can stand in the way of recognising how intelligibility without spacetime can be had; (c) we catalogue tools for rendering theories without a spacetime intelligible; and (d) we give examples of cases in which understanding is attained without a spacetime, and explain what kind of understanding these examples provide.
What Is Scientific Knowledge?, 2019
Science has not only produced a vast amount of knowledge about a wide range of phenomena, it has ... more Science has not only produced a vast amount of knowledge about a wide range of phenomena, it has also enhanced our understanding of these phenomena. Indeed, understanding can be regarded as one of the central aims of science. But what exactly is it to understand phenomena scientifically, and how can scientific understanding be achieved? What is the difference between scientific knowledge and scientific understanding? These questions are hotly debated in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science. While philosophers have long regarded understanding as a merely subjective and psychological notion that is irrelevant from an epistemological perspective, nowadays many of them acknowledge that a philosophical account of science and its aims should include an analysis of the nature of understanding. This chapter reviews the current debate on scientific understanding. It presents the main philosophical accounts of scientific understanding and discusses topical issues such as the relation between understanding, truth and knowledge, the phenomenology of understanding, and the role of understanding in scientific progress.
Frontiers in Cellular Neuroscience, 2019
Holland et al. Models and Nerve Impulse Propagation nerve impulse propagation with a single gener... more Holland et al. Models and Nerve Impulse Propagation nerve impulse propagation with a single general unifying model, it appears advisable to explain this complex phenomenon using a 'mosaic' framework of models in which each model provides a partial explanation of nerve impulse propagation.
European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2018
In this paper we have two aims: first, to draw attention to the close connexion between interpret... more In this paper we have two aims: first, to draw attention to the close connexion between interpretation and scientific understanding; second, to give a detailed account of how theories without a spacetime can be interpreted, and so of how they can be understood. In order to do so, we of course need an account of what is meant by a theory 'without a spacetime': which we also provide in this paper. We describe three tools, used by physicists, aimed at constructing interpretations which are adequate for the goal of understanding. We analyse examples from high-energy physics illustrating how physicists use these tools to construct interpretations and thereby attain understanding. The examples are: the 't Hooft approximation of gauge theories, random matrix models, causal sets, loop quantum gravity, and group field theory.
Progress in neurobiology, Jan 4, 2018
Nerve impulse generation and propagation are often thought of as solely electrical events. The pr... more Nerve impulse generation and propagation are often thought of as solely electrical events. The prevalence of this view is the result of long and intense study of nerve impulses in electrophysiology culminating in the introduction of the Hodgkin-Huxley model of the action potential in the 1950s. To this day, this model forms the physiological foundation for a broad area of neuroscientific research. However, the Hodgkin-Huxley model cannot account for non-electrical phenomena that accompany nerve impulse propagation, for which there is nevertheless ample evidence. This raises the question whether the Hodgkin-Huxley model is a complete model of the nerve impulse. Several alternative models have been proposed that do take into account non-electrical aspects of the nerve impulse and emphasize their importance in gaining a more complete understanding of the nature of the nerve impulse. In our opinion, these models deserve more attention in neuroscientific research, since, together with th...
EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009, 2011
In the literature on scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between explanation... more In the literature on scientific explanation, there is a classical distinction between explanations of facts and explanations of laws. This paper is about explanations of facts. Our aim is to analyse the role of unification in explanations of this kind. We discuss five positions with respect to this role, argue for two of them and refute the three others.
European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2021
What makes teaching philosophy of science to non-philosophy students different from teaching it t... more What makes teaching philosophy of science to non-philosophy students different from teaching it to philosophy students, and how should lecturers in philosophy adapt to an audience of practitioners of a field of study that they are reflecting on? In this paper we address this question by analyzing the differences between these student groups, and based on this analysis we make suggestions as to how philosophy of science can be taught to non-philosophy students in an effective and attractive way. Starting-point is the observation that not only the background knowledge and interests of these students but also the aims of the respective courses will differ. We present a comparative analysis of the demands and conditions for teaching philosophy of science to the different types of students, focusing on learning objectives and didactic approaches. Next, we apply our analysis to a concrete example, the role of values in science, and discuss how this may be taught to either philosophy stude...
Foundations of Science, 2020
The starting point for this special issue is that explanations as they occur in scientific practi... more The starting point for this special issue is that explanations as they occur in scientific practice exhibit a plurality of structures. The explananda are at different levels (e.g. events, regularities, laws) and of different types (e.g. plain facts, contrasts, similarities). Likewise, the explanantia can have different ingredients (e.g. causes, constraints, laws, mechanisms) and different types of organisation (e.g. deductive and/or inductive arguments, causal models). We give a brief illustration of this plurality. We start with an example that Paul Humphreys uses in his book The Chances of Explanation (1989). Suppose that Albert has died and we want an explanation for this event. An explanation could be: Albert's death occurred because of his infection with the plague bacillus, despite the administration of tetracycline to him. (p. 100).
Science & Education, 2019
While a conception of science as value free has been dominant since Max Weber defended it in the ... more While a conception of science as value free has been dominant since Max Weber defended it in the nineteenth century, recent years have witnessed an emerging consensus that science is not – and cannot be – completely free of values. Which values may legitimately influence science, and in which ways, is currently a topic of heated debate in philosophy of science. These discussions have immediate relevance for science teaching: if the value-free ideal of science is misguided, science students should abandon it too and learn to reflect on the relation between science and values – only then can they become responsible academics and citizens. Since science students will plausibly become scientists, scientific practitioners, or academic professionals, and their values will influence their future professional activities, it is essential that they are aware of these values and are able to critically reflect upon their role. In this paper, we investigate ways in which reflection on science an...
Synthese, 2005
Achieving understanding of nature is one of the aims of science. In this paper we offer an analys... more Achieving understanding of nature is one of the aims of science. In this paper we offer an analysis of the nature of scientific understanding that accords with actual scientific practice and accommodates the historical diversity of conceptions of understanding. Its core idea is a general criterion for the intelligibility of scientific theories that is essentially contextual: which theories conform to this criterion depends on contextual factors, and can change in the course of time. Our analysis provides a general account of how understanding is provided by scientific explanations of diverse types. In this way, it reconciles conflicting views of explanatory understanding, such as the causal-mechanical and the unificationist conceptions.
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 2006
Page 1. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. 20, No. 2, July 2006, pp. 129147... more Page 1. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. 20, No. 2, July 2006, pp. 129147 ISSN 02698595 (print)/ISSN 14699281 (online) © 2006 Inter-University Foundation DOI: 10.1080/02698590600814308 Wesley Salmon's Complementarity ...