Isabelle CAPEK - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Papers by Isabelle CAPEK
International audienceAfter West Nile virus (WNV) reappeared in Camargue in September 2000, a mul... more International audienceAfter West Nile virus (WNV) reappeared in Camargue in September 2000, a multi species surveillance system was first set up in three districts in 2001. It was then extended to the entire French Mediterranean costal areas at the end of 2003. The integrated surveillance system was jointly coordinated by the ministry of health and the ministry of agriculture. It combined a multidisciplinary approach, involving; human, equine, avian and entomological surveillance. Between 2003 and 2006, WNV was detected in three occurrences; in the district of Var in summer 2003 with 7 human cases and 4 equine cases; in Camargue in September 2004 with 32 equine cases and 13 birds’ seroconversions, and finally in the district of Pyrénées-Orientales at the end of September 2006 with 5 equine cases. The virus circulation was limited in time and space. Control measures were implemented in the West Nile outbreak districts, integrating local antivectorial activities, prevention individual...
Ce numéro est le fruit d’une collaboration entre le Bulletin Épidémiologique, santé animale et al... more Ce numéro est le fruit d’une collaboration entre le Bulletin Épidémiologique, santé animale et alimentation (http://www.afssa.fr/PN7501.htm), édité par l’Agence nationale de sécurité sanitaire de l’alimentation, de l’environnement et du travail (Anses) et la Direction générale de l’alimentation (DGAl) – Ministère de l’alimentation, de l’agriculture et de la pêche, et le BEH. Il paraît simultanément dans les deux supports. Éditorial / Editorial
Bulletin de l'Académie Nationale de Médecine, 2009
The French public health institute is responsible for promoting and coordinating threats the dete... more The French public health institute is responsible for promoting and coordinating threats the detection and assessment of health risks, and for suggesting possible responses. Transmissible diseases affecting both human and animal health are the focus of surveillance networks. Early detection of potential infectious threats is based on the screening of '' alert signals '' identified through routine surveillance networks and other systems. The quality and accuracy of these signals is first verified, before assessing, through a multidisciplinary approach, the risk of introduction and dissemination. This article examines specific cases illustrating the process of detection, risk analysis and response, with respect to infectious threats that are endemic in tropical regions and have the potential to be imported into metropolitan France. For both novel pathogens and exotic diseases-which, not being endemic in France, are less well known-the analysis and response process must regularly be adapted to the latest epidemiological, clinical and biological findings, taking interactions between the pathogen, host, and environment into consideration. The need to improve reaction times and risk assessment is also discussed.
![Research paper thumbnail of Nationwide outbreak of Salmonella enterica serotype 4,[5],12:i:- infection associated with consumption of dried pork sausage, France, November to December 2011](https://attachments.academia-assets.com/91533377/thumbnails/1.jpg)
](Eurosurveillance, 2012
An outbreak of the monophasic variant of Salmonella enterica serotype 4,[5],12:i:- occurred in No... more An outbreak of the monophasic variant of Salmonella enterica serotype 4,[5],12:i:- occurred in November and December 2011 in France. Epidemiological investigation and food investigation with the help of supermarket loyalty cards suggested dried pork sausage from one producer as the most likely source of the outbreak. Despite the absence of positive food samples, control measures including withdrawal and recall were implemented.
Transfusion, 2012
BACKGROUND: A recent case-control study showed that transfusion recipients were at an increased r... more BACKGROUND: A recent case-control study showed that transfusion recipients were at an increased risk of developing sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (sCJD), suggesting that blood donors with silent preclinical sCJD could transmit the sCJD agent. We therefore estimated the annual number of French blood donors expected to have preclinical sCJD at the time of donation. STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS: We developed a mathematical model to estimate the number of blood donors who would subsequently develop sCJD, under various assumptions about how long their blood might be infective before clinical onset. The model used distributions by age group and sex for sCJD cases, blood donor population, French general population, and mortality in the general population. RESULTS: Using 1999 to 2008 data, modeling showed that, each year, a mean of 1.1 (standard deviation [SD], 0.3) donors were within 1 year of sCJD onset at the time of blood donation, 6.9 (SD, 0.5) donors were within 5 years, 18.0 (SD, 0.6) were within 10 years, and 33.4 (SD, 1.1) were within 15 years. CONCLUSION: Few donors are expected to be in the late preclinical stage of sCJD at the time of blood donation. This result and that of the worldwide absence of any epidemic increase in sCJD over the years indicate that this risk of transfusion-transmitted sCJD, if any, is likely to be very low. ABBREVIATIONS: BSE = bovine spongiform encephalopathy; EuroCJD = European Union collaborative group on CJD; PrP = prion protein; sCJD = sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease; TSE = transmissible spongiform encephalopathy; vCJD = variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.
Neuroepidemiology, 2011
Background: Surveillance of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) is still an important issue because o... more Background: Surveillance of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) is still an important issue because of the variant CJD epidemic, which is in decline and also because of the emergence of novel forms of animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathy with zoonotic potential and the risk of nosocomial and blood transfusion-related transmission. Active surveillance has been implemented in most European countries and requires important human resources and funding. Here, we studied whether national mortality and morbidity statistics can be used as reliable indicators. Methods: CJD data collected by the French national CJD surveillance centre were compared with data registered in the national mortality statistics. Results: From 2000 to 2008, the two sources reported fairly similar numbers of CJD deaths. However, analysis of individual data showed important between-sources disagreement. Nearly 24% of CJD reported by the mortality register were false-positive diagnoses and 21.6% of the CJD cases ...
Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2004
We describe severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in France. Patients meeting the World Health... more We describe severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in France. Patients meeting the World Health Organization definition of a suspected case underwent a clinical, radiologic, and biologic assessment at the closest university-affiliated infectious disease ward. Suspected cases were immediately reported to the Institut de Veille Sanitaire. Probable case-patients were isolated, their contacts quarantined at home, and were followed for 10 days after exposure. Five probable cases occurred from March through April 2003; four were confirmed as SARS coronavirus by reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction, serologic testing, or both. The index case-patient (patient A), who had worked in the French hospital of Hanoi, Vietnam, was the most probable source of transmission for the three other confirmed cases; two had been exposed to patient A while on the Hanoi-Paris flight of March 22-23. Timely detection, isolation of probable case-patients, and quarantine of their contacts appear to have been effective in preventing the secondary spread of SARS in France. S evere acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was recently identified as a new clinical entity (1). SARS likely originated in the Guangdong Province of People's Republic of China (2) and subsequently spread worldwide as infected persons traveled. During the 2003 outbreak, SARS was primarily transmitted by person-to-person contact between healthcare workers or household members and ill patients (2). Community transmission also occurred in several of the most affected areas, and an explosive outbreak from a common source occurred in Amoy Garden in Hong-Kong (3). As of June 2003, a total of 8,477 probable cases and 811 deaths had been reported from 32 countries (4). A novel coronavirus has been identified as the cause of SARS (5-7). Based on current knowledge, SARS is transmitted from symptomatic patients by close direct or indirect contacts through respiratory droplet secretions (2). In specific situations, other modes of transmission, such as airborne spread, may be possible (8). The incubation period ranges from 2 to 10 days, allowing SARS to spread over long distances by infected persons who travel (8,9). We describe how SARS was introduced in France through a single patient who returned from Vietnam on March 23 and present data that suggest transmission from this patient to other passengers may have occurred during his flight back from Hanoi to Paris. Materials and Methods After the World Health Organization (WHO) alert on March 12, 2003, a centralized surveillance system was set up for SARS in France (10). All persons who returned from an area affected by recent transmission, had been in contact with a probable case during the previous 10 days, and in whom fever was >38°C, with cough or difficult breathing, were advised to call the emergency service. These persons were transported to the closest universityaffiliated infectious disease ward or one of the nine infectious disease wards designated as a regional reference center in the French plan of action against bioterrorism, using masks for droplet protection. After performing clinical and
Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2009
We identifi ed 2 cases of European bat lyssavirus subtype 1 transmission to domestic carnivores (... more We identifi ed 2 cases of European bat lyssavirus subtype 1 transmission to domestic carnivores (cats) in France. Bat-to-cat transmission is suspected. Low amounts of virus antigen in cat brain made diagnosis diffi cult. M ost countries in western Europe are currently free of rabies in terrestrial mammals, as was the case in France during 2001-2008 (1). However, rabies still remains a public health problem in these countries because of natural circulation of bat-specifi c viruses (order Mononegavirales, family Rhabdoviridae, genus Lyssavirus) such as European bat lyssaviruses (EBLVs). These viruses are divided into genotypes 5 (EBLV-1) and 6 (EBLV-2); the fi rst genotype is subdivided into subtypes a and b (2). Knowledge of the prevalence and epidemiology of EBLV is limited (2-5). To date, natural transmission of EBLV-1 has been reported in a limited number of terrestrial mammals, including 5 sheep in Denmark (6) and 1 stone marten in Germany (7) (Table 1). Since 1985, only 3 human deaths from EBLVs have been confi rmed (3) (Table 1). We describe 2 documented cases of spillover transmission of EBLV in domestic carnivores (cats, Felis domesticus) in Europe. The Study In November 2003, a 6-month-old female stray cat (cat no. 1) was found ill in a public garden in Vannes (Morbihan District) in western France and taken to a veterinary clinic. This animal had convulsions and moderate dehydration and was emaciated. It was infected by feline immunodefi ciency virus, which was compatible with the clinical symptoms. The veterinarian was bitten while providing veterinary care to the cat. After a few days, the cat recovered and was impounded for veterinary surveillance. It died suddenly the following night. No information about potential contact with bats was available. On November 8, 2007, an 18-month-old female cat (cat no. 2) was taken by its owner to a veterinarian in Fontenayle-Comte (Vendée District) in western France because of abnormal behavior. The owner reported having been bitten by the cat. The next day, the cat showed severe central neurologic disorders and aggressive behavior. It died during the next night. Its outdoor access appeared to have been restricted. Two months later, the carcass of a bat (Eptesicus serotinus) was recovered in the same area of Fontenay-le-Comte and submitted for rabies testing. Recommended techniques for rabies diagnosis were used for all animals (8). For cat no. 1, results of a repeated direct immunofl uorescence antibody test (FAT) with a polyclonal antirabies conjugate (Bio-Rad, Marnes-la-Coquette, France) performed on different cortex and spinal bulb smears were negative. Viral isolation by using a rabies tissue culture infection test (RTCIT) was also unsuccessful, as was attempted isolation of virus by using a mouse inoculation test (MIT) (Table 1). The only test routinely used that gave a positive result was an antigen-capture ELISA (WELYSSA) for lyssavirus antigen (9). The presence of EBLV RNA (03011FRA) was determined by reverse transcription-PCR (RT-PCR) targeting short viral gene regions (5). Lyssavirus antigens were repeatedly detected by FAT in different areas of the brain of cat no. 2. Viral isolation by using RTCIT was positive only after the second cell culture passage. Results for isolation of EBLV (07240FRA) by MIT were positive. Lyssavirus antigen detection by WEL-YSSA was variable, depending on the part of the brain tested. Viral RNA was detected by RT-PCR (Table 1). The bat was positive for EBLV by FAT, RTCIT (08120FRA), MIT, and RT-PCR. Nucleotide sequencing and phylogenetic analysis identifi ed isolate 03011FRA as EBLV-1b and isolates 08120FRA and 07240FRA as EBLV-1a (Figure 1). Sequencing of the complete genome (10) of the 2 EBLV-1a isolates showed a high percentage of homology (Table 2). After identifi cation of these 2 cases of spillover transmission of EBLV-1 to domestic cats, postexposure prophylaxis measures were implemented. The veterinarian who DISPATCHES 280
Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2009
Clinical Infectious Diseases, 2004
International audienceAfter West Nile virus (WNV) reappeared in Camargue in September 2000, a mul... more International audienceAfter West Nile virus (WNV) reappeared in Camargue in September 2000, a multi species surveillance system was first set up in three districts in 2001. It was then extended to the entire French Mediterranean costal areas at the end of 2003. The integrated surveillance system was jointly coordinated by the ministry of health and the ministry of agriculture. It combined a multidisciplinary approach, involving; human, equine, avian and entomological surveillance. Between 2003 and 2006, WNV was detected in three occurrences; in the district of Var in summer 2003 with 7 human cases and 4 equine cases; in Camargue in September 2004 with 32 equine cases and 13 birds’ seroconversions, and finally in the district of Pyrénées-Orientales at the end of September 2006 with 5 equine cases. The virus circulation was limited in time and space. Control measures were implemented in the West Nile outbreak districts, integrating local antivectorial activities, prevention individual...
Ce numéro est le fruit d’une collaboration entre le Bulletin Épidémiologique, santé animale et al... more Ce numéro est le fruit d’une collaboration entre le Bulletin Épidémiologique, santé animale et alimentation (http://www.afssa.fr/PN7501.htm), édité par l’Agence nationale de sécurité sanitaire de l’alimentation, de l’environnement et du travail (Anses) et la Direction générale de l’alimentation (DGAl) – Ministère de l’alimentation, de l’agriculture et de la pêche, et le BEH. Il paraît simultanément dans les deux supports. Éditorial / Editorial
Bulletin de l'Académie Nationale de Médecine, 2009
The French public health institute is responsible for promoting and coordinating threats the dete... more The French public health institute is responsible for promoting and coordinating threats the detection and assessment of health risks, and for suggesting possible responses. Transmissible diseases affecting both human and animal health are the focus of surveillance networks. Early detection of potential infectious threats is based on the screening of '' alert signals '' identified through routine surveillance networks and other systems. The quality and accuracy of these signals is first verified, before assessing, through a multidisciplinary approach, the risk of introduction and dissemination. This article examines specific cases illustrating the process of detection, risk analysis and response, with respect to infectious threats that are endemic in tropical regions and have the potential to be imported into metropolitan France. For both novel pathogens and exotic diseases-which, not being endemic in France, are less well known-the analysis and response process must regularly be adapted to the latest epidemiological, clinical and biological findings, taking interactions between the pathogen, host, and environment into consideration. The need to improve reaction times and risk assessment is also discussed.
Eurosurveillance, 2012
An outbreak of the monophasic variant of Salmonella enterica serotype 4,[5],12:i:- occurred in No... more An outbreak of the monophasic variant of Salmonella enterica serotype 4,[5],12:i:- occurred in November and December 2011 in France. Epidemiological investigation and food investigation with the help of supermarket loyalty cards suggested dried pork sausage from one producer as the most likely source of the outbreak. Despite the absence of positive food samples, control measures including withdrawal and recall were implemented.
Transfusion, 2012
BACKGROUND: A recent case-control study showed that transfusion recipients were at an increased r... more BACKGROUND: A recent case-control study showed that transfusion recipients were at an increased risk of developing sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (sCJD), suggesting that blood donors with silent preclinical sCJD could transmit the sCJD agent. We therefore estimated the annual number of French blood donors expected to have preclinical sCJD at the time of donation. STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS: We developed a mathematical model to estimate the number of blood donors who would subsequently develop sCJD, under various assumptions about how long their blood might be infective before clinical onset. The model used distributions by age group and sex for sCJD cases, blood donor population, French general population, and mortality in the general population. RESULTS: Using 1999 to 2008 data, modeling showed that, each year, a mean of 1.1 (standard deviation [SD], 0.3) donors were within 1 year of sCJD onset at the time of blood donation, 6.9 (SD, 0.5) donors were within 5 years, 18.0 (SD, 0.6) were within 10 years, and 33.4 (SD, 1.1) were within 15 years. CONCLUSION: Few donors are expected to be in the late preclinical stage of sCJD at the time of blood donation. This result and that of the worldwide absence of any epidemic increase in sCJD over the years indicate that this risk of transfusion-transmitted sCJD, if any, is likely to be very low. ABBREVIATIONS: BSE = bovine spongiform encephalopathy; EuroCJD = European Union collaborative group on CJD; PrP = prion protein; sCJD = sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease; TSE = transmissible spongiform encephalopathy; vCJD = variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.
Neuroepidemiology, 2011
Background: Surveillance of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) is still an important issue because o... more Background: Surveillance of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) is still an important issue because of the variant CJD epidemic, which is in decline and also because of the emergence of novel forms of animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathy with zoonotic potential and the risk of nosocomial and blood transfusion-related transmission. Active surveillance has been implemented in most European countries and requires important human resources and funding. Here, we studied whether national mortality and morbidity statistics can be used as reliable indicators. Methods: CJD data collected by the French national CJD surveillance centre were compared with data registered in the national mortality statistics. Results: From 2000 to 2008, the two sources reported fairly similar numbers of CJD deaths. However, analysis of individual data showed important between-sources disagreement. Nearly 24% of CJD reported by the mortality register were false-positive diagnoses and 21.6% of the CJD cases ...
Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2004
We describe severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in France. Patients meeting the World Health... more We describe severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in France. Patients meeting the World Health Organization definition of a suspected case underwent a clinical, radiologic, and biologic assessment at the closest university-affiliated infectious disease ward. Suspected cases were immediately reported to the Institut de Veille Sanitaire. Probable case-patients were isolated, their contacts quarantined at home, and were followed for 10 days after exposure. Five probable cases occurred from March through April 2003; four were confirmed as SARS coronavirus by reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction, serologic testing, or both. The index case-patient (patient A), who had worked in the French hospital of Hanoi, Vietnam, was the most probable source of transmission for the three other confirmed cases; two had been exposed to patient A while on the Hanoi-Paris flight of March 22-23. Timely detection, isolation of probable case-patients, and quarantine of their contacts appear to have been effective in preventing the secondary spread of SARS in France. S evere acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was recently identified as a new clinical entity (1). SARS likely originated in the Guangdong Province of People's Republic of China (2) and subsequently spread worldwide as infected persons traveled. During the 2003 outbreak, SARS was primarily transmitted by person-to-person contact between healthcare workers or household members and ill patients (2). Community transmission also occurred in several of the most affected areas, and an explosive outbreak from a common source occurred in Amoy Garden in Hong-Kong (3). As of June 2003, a total of 8,477 probable cases and 811 deaths had been reported from 32 countries (4). A novel coronavirus has been identified as the cause of SARS (5-7). Based on current knowledge, SARS is transmitted from symptomatic patients by close direct or indirect contacts through respiratory droplet secretions (2). In specific situations, other modes of transmission, such as airborne spread, may be possible (8). The incubation period ranges from 2 to 10 days, allowing SARS to spread over long distances by infected persons who travel (8,9). We describe how SARS was introduced in France through a single patient who returned from Vietnam on March 23 and present data that suggest transmission from this patient to other passengers may have occurred during his flight back from Hanoi to Paris. Materials and Methods After the World Health Organization (WHO) alert on March 12, 2003, a centralized surveillance system was set up for SARS in France (10). All persons who returned from an area affected by recent transmission, had been in contact with a probable case during the previous 10 days, and in whom fever was >38°C, with cough or difficult breathing, were advised to call the emergency service. These persons were transported to the closest universityaffiliated infectious disease ward or one of the nine infectious disease wards designated as a regional reference center in the French plan of action against bioterrorism, using masks for droplet protection. After performing clinical and
Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2009
We identifi ed 2 cases of European bat lyssavirus subtype 1 transmission to domestic carnivores (... more We identifi ed 2 cases of European bat lyssavirus subtype 1 transmission to domestic carnivores (cats) in France. Bat-to-cat transmission is suspected. Low amounts of virus antigen in cat brain made diagnosis diffi cult. M ost countries in western Europe are currently free of rabies in terrestrial mammals, as was the case in France during 2001-2008 (1). However, rabies still remains a public health problem in these countries because of natural circulation of bat-specifi c viruses (order Mononegavirales, family Rhabdoviridae, genus Lyssavirus) such as European bat lyssaviruses (EBLVs). These viruses are divided into genotypes 5 (EBLV-1) and 6 (EBLV-2); the fi rst genotype is subdivided into subtypes a and b (2). Knowledge of the prevalence and epidemiology of EBLV is limited (2-5). To date, natural transmission of EBLV-1 has been reported in a limited number of terrestrial mammals, including 5 sheep in Denmark (6) and 1 stone marten in Germany (7) (Table 1). Since 1985, only 3 human deaths from EBLVs have been confi rmed (3) (Table 1). We describe 2 documented cases of spillover transmission of EBLV in domestic carnivores (cats, Felis domesticus) in Europe. The Study In November 2003, a 6-month-old female stray cat (cat no. 1) was found ill in a public garden in Vannes (Morbihan District) in western France and taken to a veterinary clinic. This animal had convulsions and moderate dehydration and was emaciated. It was infected by feline immunodefi ciency virus, which was compatible with the clinical symptoms. The veterinarian was bitten while providing veterinary care to the cat. After a few days, the cat recovered and was impounded for veterinary surveillance. It died suddenly the following night. No information about potential contact with bats was available. On November 8, 2007, an 18-month-old female cat (cat no. 2) was taken by its owner to a veterinarian in Fontenayle-Comte (Vendée District) in western France because of abnormal behavior. The owner reported having been bitten by the cat. The next day, the cat showed severe central neurologic disorders and aggressive behavior. It died during the next night. Its outdoor access appeared to have been restricted. Two months later, the carcass of a bat (Eptesicus serotinus) was recovered in the same area of Fontenay-le-Comte and submitted for rabies testing. Recommended techniques for rabies diagnosis were used for all animals (8). For cat no. 1, results of a repeated direct immunofl uorescence antibody test (FAT) with a polyclonal antirabies conjugate (Bio-Rad, Marnes-la-Coquette, France) performed on different cortex and spinal bulb smears were negative. Viral isolation by using a rabies tissue culture infection test (RTCIT) was also unsuccessful, as was attempted isolation of virus by using a mouse inoculation test (MIT) (Table 1). The only test routinely used that gave a positive result was an antigen-capture ELISA (WELYSSA) for lyssavirus antigen (9). The presence of EBLV RNA (03011FRA) was determined by reverse transcription-PCR (RT-PCR) targeting short viral gene regions (5). Lyssavirus antigens were repeatedly detected by FAT in different areas of the brain of cat no. 2. Viral isolation by using RTCIT was positive only after the second cell culture passage. Results for isolation of EBLV (07240FRA) by MIT were positive. Lyssavirus antigen detection by WEL-YSSA was variable, depending on the part of the brain tested. Viral RNA was detected by RT-PCR (Table 1). The bat was positive for EBLV by FAT, RTCIT (08120FRA), MIT, and RT-PCR. Nucleotide sequencing and phylogenetic analysis identifi ed isolate 03011FRA as EBLV-1b and isolates 08120FRA and 07240FRA as EBLV-1a (Figure 1). Sequencing of the complete genome (10) of the 2 EBLV-1a isolates showed a high percentage of homology (Table 2). After identifi cation of these 2 cases of spillover transmission of EBLV-1 to domestic cats, postexposure prophylaxis measures were implemented. The veterinarian who DISPATCHES 280
Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2009
Clinical Infectious Diseases, 2004