Indridi Indridason - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Uploads

Papers by Indridi Indridason

The Journal of Politics, 2020

We examine how voters form expectations about the policy positions of coalition governments. The ... more We examine how voters form expectations about the policy positions of coalition governments. The literature generally assumes that voters believe the influence of coalition parties on government policy is proportional to the coalition parties' sizes. Yet little is known about whether, or how, voters form such expectations. In this article we leverage data from Austria, Germany, and Sweden and find that voters do not see coalition party influence as proportional. Voters take account of the coalition parties' bargaining strength, perceiving smaller coalition parties to have disproportional influence on coalition policy. In other words, voters who live under and vote for coalition governments have a somewhat different sense of policy outcomes than the literature currently suggests.

American Journal of Political Science, 2011

Voters in elections under plurality rule face relatively straightforward incentives when it comes... more Voters in elections under plurality rule face relatively straightforward incentives when it comes to voting. Voters in PR systems face more complex incentives as electoral outcomes don't translate as directly into policy outcomes as in plurality rule elections. A common approach is to assume electoral outcomes translate into policy as a vote-weighted average of all party platforms. Most of the world's legislatures are majoritarian institutions and elections in PR systems are generally followed by a process of coalition formation. I demonstrate that existing results are not robust to the introduction of minimal forms of majoritarianism. Voters' incentive to engage in strategic voting are shown to depend on considerations about the coalitions that may form after the election. In line with the empirical findings in the literature, the voters' equilibrium strategies are shaped by policy balancing and the post-electoral coalition bargaining situation, including considerations about who will be appointed the formateur.

Abstract* Department of Political Science, 900 University Avenue, University of California–Rivers... more Abstract* Department of Political Science, 900 University Avenue, University of California–Riverside Riverside, CA 92521, USA. e-mail: indridi. indridason@ ucr. edu. Presented at the 2010 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. We would like to acknowledge the generous support of Jafnréttissjóður (The Equality Fund, Iceland). We are extremely grateful to Samfylkingin (The United Front–The Social Democratic Party) and Vinstrihreyfingin-grænt framboð (The Left-Green Movement) for providing us with access ...

Political Science Research and Methods

The legislative agenda in most parliamentary systems is controlled tightly by the government and ... more The legislative agenda in most parliamentary systems is controlled tightly by the government and bills offered by individual members of parliament have low rates of success. Yet, members of parliament (MPs) do seek to present (private) members’ bills even where the rate of adoption is very low. We argue that members’ bills serve as an electoral connection but also as an opportunity for MPs to signal competence to their co-partisans. To demonstrate the presence of an electoral connection we take advantage of the random selection of private members’ bills in the New Zealand House of Representatives and show that survey respondents approve more of electorate MPs whose bills were drawn on the ballot. In addition, we show that MPs respond to the incentives created by the voters and parties’ willingness to reward legislative effort and, consequently, that electorally vulnerable legislators are more likely to place members’ bills on the ballot.

Economics & Politics, 2007

Elections represent a coordination problem for voters and candidates for office. Electoral coordi... more Elections represent a coordination problem for voters and candidates for office. Electoral coordination is also the causal mechanism behind any explanation of the relationship between electoral systems and the number of parties. I present a dynamic model of electoral coordination with candidate exit. The model extends two important results from the literature to a dynamic setting. The extension of Duverger's Law and the median-voter theorem also offers a simultaneous prediction of the number of parties and their ideological positions. Coordination failure is shown to be possible in a mixed-strategy equilibrium.

The Journal of Politics, 2020

We examine how voters form expectations about the policy positions of coalition governments. The ... more We examine how voters form expectations about the policy positions of coalition governments. The literature generally assumes that voters believe the influence of coalition parties on government policy is proportional to the coalition parties' sizes. Yet little is known about whether, or how, voters form such expectations. In this article we leverage data from Austria, Germany, and Sweden and find that voters do not see coalition party influence as proportional. Voters take account of the coalition parties' bargaining strength, perceiving smaller coalition parties to have disproportional influence on coalition policy. In other words, voters who live under and vote for coalition governments have a somewhat different sense of policy outcomes than the literature currently suggests.

American Journal of Political Science, 2011

Voters in elections under plurality rule face relatively straightforward incentives when it comes... more Voters in elections under plurality rule face relatively straightforward incentives when it comes to voting. Voters in PR systems face more complex incentives as electoral outcomes don't translate as directly into policy outcomes as in plurality rule elections. A common approach is to assume electoral outcomes translate into policy as a vote-weighted average of all party platforms. Most of the world's legislatures are majoritarian institutions and elections in PR systems are generally followed by a process of coalition formation. I demonstrate that existing results are not robust to the introduction of minimal forms of majoritarianism. Voters' incentive to engage in strategic voting are shown to depend on considerations about the coalitions that may form after the election. In line with the empirical findings in the literature, the voters' equilibrium strategies are shaped by policy balancing and the post-electoral coalition bargaining situation, including considerations about who will be appointed the formateur.

Abstract* Department of Political Science, 900 University Avenue, University of California–Rivers... more Abstract* Department of Political Science, 900 University Avenue, University of California–Riverside Riverside, CA 92521, USA. e-mail: indridi. indridason@ ucr. edu. Presented at the 2010 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. We would like to acknowledge the generous support of Jafnréttissjóður (The Equality Fund, Iceland). We are extremely grateful to Samfylkingin (The United Front–The Social Democratic Party) and Vinstrihreyfingin-grænt framboð (The Left-Green Movement) for providing us with access ...

Political Science Research and Methods

The legislative agenda in most parliamentary systems is controlled tightly by the government and ... more The legislative agenda in most parliamentary systems is controlled tightly by the government and bills offered by individual members of parliament have low rates of success. Yet, members of parliament (MPs) do seek to present (private) members’ bills even where the rate of adoption is very low. We argue that members’ bills serve as an electoral connection but also as an opportunity for MPs to signal competence to their co-partisans. To demonstrate the presence of an electoral connection we take advantage of the random selection of private members’ bills in the New Zealand House of Representatives and show that survey respondents approve more of electorate MPs whose bills were drawn on the ballot. In addition, we show that MPs respond to the incentives created by the voters and parties’ willingness to reward legislative effort and, consequently, that electorally vulnerable legislators are more likely to place members’ bills on the ballot.

Economics & Politics, 2007

Elections represent a coordination problem for voters and candidates for office. Electoral coordi... more Elections represent a coordination problem for voters and candidates for office. Electoral coordination is also the causal mechanism behind any explanation of the relationship between electoral systems and the number of parties. I present a dynamic model of electoral coordination with candidate exit. The model extends two important results from the literature to a dynamic setting. The extension of Duverger's Law and the median-voter theorem also offers a simultaneous prediction of the number of parties and their ideological positions. Coordination failure is shown to be possible in a mixed-strategy equilibrium.