Iordanis Marcoulatos - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

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Papers by Iordanis Marcoulatos

Research paper thumbnail of Rethinking Intentionality: A Bourdieuian Perspective

Research paper thumbnail of Intentionality and social ontology : non-representational intentionality as a constitutive aspect of social reality : the background, the habitus, and the phenomenological roots of the issue

Research paper thumbnail of Rethinking Intentionality

Research paper thumbnail of Rethinking Intentionality

The Dynamics of the Human Ecological Condition, 2006

Research paper thumbnail of The Secret Life of Things: Rethinking Social Ontology

Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 2003

... the (variously) epistemic character of all practices, and, on the other, the practical charac... more ... the (variously) epistemic character of all practices, and, on the other, the practical character ofepistemic practices. ... One may object to my brief commentary on social ontology that I am not directly addressing the most vital component of social reality, namely, social agents ...

Research paper thumbnail of Merleau-Ponty and Bourdieu on Embodied Significance

Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 2001

Research paper thumbnail of John Searle and Pierre Bourdieu: Divergent Perspectives on Intentionality and Social Ontology

Human Studies, 2003

Despite Searle's claim of theoretical proximity between his concept of the Background and Bourdie... more Despite Searle's claim of theoretical proximity between his concept of the Background and Bourdieu's concept of the habitus, there is at least one substantial difference in the respective ways in which these concepts have been elaborated: the Background is conceived as a nonintentional neurophysiological reality whereas the habitus is fully intentional, or rather constitutes a nonrepresentational level of intentionality completely overlooked from Searle's standpoint. Moreover, each concept implicates a distinct perspective on social reality: the former suggests that significance is superimposed yet essentially external to this reality; the latter indicates that significance is immanent. I elaborate on the comparison between the two concepts/perspectives from different angles in order to highlight the existing differences as well as explore possible underlying affinities, which depend upon reconsidering the conventional understanding of intentionality as an exclusive attribute of mental phenomena. I show that Searle's analysis of the Background is inundated with indications of the undeniably intentional character of something he attempts to define as a nonintentional reality. Finally, I discuss the connection between the immanence of significance in Bourdieu's account of social reality and the conflict-centered orientation of this account. This dimension is noticeably absent from Searle's theorizing of the social.

Research paper thumbnail of Rethinking Intentionality: A Bourdieuian Perspective

Research paper thumbnail of Intentionality and social ontology : non-representational intentionality as a constitutive aspect of social reality : the background, the habitus, and the phenomenological roots of the issue

Research paper thumbnail of Rethinking Intentionality

Research paper thumbnail of Rethinking Intentionality

The Dynamics of the Human Ecological Condition, 2006

Research paper thumbnail of The Secret Life of Things: Rethinking Social Ontology

Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 2003

... the (variously) epistemic character of all practices, and, on the other, the practical charac... more ... the (variously) epistemic character of all practices, and, on the other, the practical character ofepistemic practices. ... One may object to my brief commentary on social ontology that I am not directly addressing the most vital component of social reality, namely, social agents ...

Research paper thumbnail of Merleau-Ponty and Bourdieu on Embodied Significance

Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 2001

Research paper thumbnail of John Searle and Pierre Bourdieu: Divergent Perspectives on Intentionality and Social Ontology

Human Studies, 2003

Despite Searle's claim of theoretical proximity between his concept of the Background and Bourdie... more Despite Searle's claim of theoretical proximity between his concept of the Background and Bourdieu's concept of the habitus, there is at least one substantial difference in the respective ways in which these concepts have been elaborated: the Background is conceived as a nonintentional neurophysiological reality whereas the habitus is fully intentional, or rather constitutes a nonrepresentational level of intentionality completely overlooked from Searle's standpoint. Moreover, each concept implicates a distinct perspective on social reality: the former suggests that significance is superimposed yet essentially external to this reality; the latter indicates that significance is immanent. I elaborate on the comparison between the two concepts/perspectives from different angles in order to highlight the existing differences as well as explore possible underlying affinities, which depend upon reconsidering the conventional understanding of intentionality as an exclusive attribute of mental phenomena. I show that Searle's analysis of the Background is inundated with indications of the undeniably intentional character of something he attempts to define as a nonintentional reality. Finally, I discuss the connection between the immanence of significance in Bourdieu's account of social reality and the conflict-centered orientation of this account. This dimension is noticeably absent from Searle's theorizing of the social.

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