Jan Potters - Academia.edu (original) (raw)
Uploads
Papers by Jan Potters
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
ABSTRACT We implement a trust game in which the trustee can write a free-form pre-play message fo... more ABSTRACT We implement a trust game in which the trustee can write a free-form pre-play message for the trustor. The main twist in our design is that there is a 50% probability that the message is delivered to the trustor and a 50% probability that the message is replaced by an empty sheet. We find that even when messages are not delivered trustees who make a promise are significantly more likely to act trustworthy than those who do not make a promise. This suggests that a promise has a commitment value which is independent of its impact on the trustor. Interestingly, we also find that both trustees who make a promise and those who do not make a promise are more likely to be trustworthy if their message is delivered to the trustor. This means that communication increases trustworthiness irrespective of the content of messages.
Public Choice, 2000
This paper presents the results of a political stock market in the Netherlands: PAM94. The exchan... more This paper presents the results of a political stock market in the Netherlands: PAM94. The exchange covered three consecutive elections, allowing trade on five different markets. The predictions at PAM94 appear to be less accurate than those of previous markets of comparable size. Of the possible explanations that we examine, one in particular survives closer scrutiny. It concerns a type
We examine communication in a 2-player sequential public good game in which the leader has privat... more We examine communication in a 2-player sequential public good game in which the leader has private information about the return from contributing to it. The leader decides …rst and the follower observes the leader's contribution, before de- ciding whether or not to contribute. Without communication, the unique equilib- rium is fully e¢ cient. We study whether the introduction of communication
We use experiments to examine whether the auctioning of entry rights affects thebehavior,of marke... more We use experiments to examine whether the auctioning of entry rights affects thebehavior,of market entrants. Standard economic,arguments,suggest that the license fee paid at the auction will not affect pricing since it constitutes a sunk cost. This argument,is not uncontested though and this paper puts it to an experimental test. Ourresults indicate that an auction of entry licenses has a
Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy, 1996
ABSTRACT This paper calculates indices of central bank autonomy (CBA) for 163 central banks as of... more ABSTRACT This paper calculates indices of central bank autonomy (CBA) for 163 central banks as of end-2003, and comparable indices for a subgroup of 68 central banks as of the end of the 1980s. The results confirm strong improvements in both economic and political CBA over the past couple of decades, although more progress is needed to boost political autonomy of the central banks in emerging market and developing countries. Our analysis confirms that greater CBA has on average helped to maintain low inflation levels. The paper identifies four broad principles of CBA that have been shared by the majority of countries. Significant differences exist in the area of banking supervision where many central banks have retained a key role. Finally, we discuss the sequencing of reforms to separate the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies. IMF Staff Papers (2009) 56, 263–296. doi:10.1057/imfsp.2008.25; published online 23 September 2008
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
Experimental Economics, 2015
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
This paper reports on a series of signaling game experiments in which an informe d sender can sen... more This paper reports on a series of signaling game experiments in which an informe d sender can send a costly message in order to persuade an uninformed responder.We compare t he behavior of two subjects pools: 143 undergraduate students and 30 public affairs official s that are professionally familiar with strategic information transmission.The experiments comprised two parameter treatments: one with low costs for sending messages, and one with high costs.Our main conclusion is that there are neither significant nor systematic differences in the behavior of the two subject-pools.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
ABSTRACT We implement a trust game in which the trustee can write a free-form pre-play message fo... more ABSTRACT We implement a trust game in which the trustee can write a free-form pre-play message for the trustor. The main twist in our design is that there is a 50% probability that the message is delivered to the trustor and a 50% probability that the message is replaced by an empty sheet. We find that even when messages are not delivered trustees who make a promise are significantly more likely to act trustworthy than those who do not make a promise. This suggests that a promise has a commitment value which is independent of its impact on the trustor. Interestingly, we also find that both trustees who make a promise and those who do not make a promise are more likely to be trustworthy if their message is delivered to the trustor. This means that communication increases trustworthiness irrespective of the content of messages.
Public Choice, 2000
This paper presents the results of a political stock market in the Netherlands: PAM94. The exchan... more This paper presents the results of a political stock market in the Netherlands: PAM94. The exchange covered three consecutive elections, allowing trade on five different markets. The predictions at PAM94 appear to be less accurate than those of previous markets of comparable size. Of the possible explanations that we examine, one in particular survives closer scrutiny. It concerns a type
We examine communication in a 2-player sequential public good game in which the leader has privat... more We examine communication in a 2-player sequential public good game in which the leader has private information about the return from contributing to it. The leader decides …rst and the follower observes the leader's contribution, before de- ciding whether or not to contribute. Without communication, the unique equilib- rium is fully e¢ cient. We study whether the introduction of communication
We use experiments to examine whether the auctioning of entry rights affects thebehavior,of marke... more We use experiments to examine whether the auctioning of entry rights affects thebehavior,of market entrants. Standard economic,arguments,suggest that the license fee paid at the auction will not affect pricing since it constitutes a sunk cost. This argument,is not uncontested though and this paper puts it to an experimental test. Ourresults indicate that an auction of entry licenses has a
Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy, 1996
ABSTRACT This paper calculates indices of central bank autonomy (CBA) for 163 central banks as of... more ABSTRACT This paper calculates indices of central bank autonomy (CBA) for 163 central banks as of end-2003, and comparable indices for a subgroup of 68 central banks as of the end of the 1980s. The results confirm strong improvements in both economic and political CBA over the past couple of decades, although more progress is needed to boost political autonomy of the central banks in emerging market and developing countries. Our analysis confirms that greater CBA has on average helped to maintain low inflation levels. The paper identifies four broad principles of CBA that have been shared by the majority of countries. Significant differences exist in the area of banking supervision where many central banks have retained a key role. Finally, we discuss the sequencing of reforms to separate the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies. IMF Staff Papers (2009) 56, 263–296. doi:10.1057/imfsp.2008.25; published online 23 September 2008
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
Experimental Economics, 2015
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
This paper reports on a series of signaling game experiments in which an informe d sender can sen... more This paper reports on a series of signaling game experiments in which an informe d sender can send a costly message in order to persuade an uninformed responder.We compare t he behavior of two subjects pools: 143 undergraduate students and 30 public affairs official s that are professionally familiar with strategic information transmission.The experiments comprised two parameter treatments: one with low costs for sending messages, and one with high costs.Our main conclusion is that there are neither significant nor systematic differences in the behavior of the two subject-pools.