Joelle Proust - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

Papers by Joelle Proust

Experimental studies in metacognition indicate that a variety of norms are used by humans and som... more Experimental studies in metacognition indicate that a variety of norms are used by humans and some non-human agents to control and monitor their cognitive performances, such as accuracy, comprehensiveness, intelligibility, coherence, relevance, or consensus. This diversity of epistemic norms motivates a revision of the concept of acceptance. First, there are different forms of acceptance, corresponding to the specific epistemic norm(s) that constitute(s) them. Furthermore, acceptances need to include a strategic component, from which the epistemic component is insulated, whose function is to adjust the epistemic output to expected utility. Experimental evidence suggests that this twotiered analysis of acceptance is empirically adequate. Relevance to AI is briefly discussed. Acceptance and its Norms Intelligent agency requires an ability to control and monitor one's cognitive states, e.g. retrieve memories, check one's perceptions or one's utterances. The aim of cognitive...

Against the prior view that primate communication is based only on signal decoding, comparative e... more Against the prior view that primate communication is based only on signal decoding, comparative evidence suggests that primates are able, no less than humans, to intentionally perform or understand impulsive or habitual communicational actions with a structured evaluative nonconceptual content. These signals convey an affordance-sensing that immediately motivates conspecifics to act. Although humans have access to a strategic form of propositional communication adapted to teaching and persuasion, they share with nonhuman primates the capacity to communicate in impulsive or habitual ways. They are also similarly able to monitor fluency, informativeness and relevance of messages or signals through nonconceptual cues.

Disorders of Volition, 2006

Philosophical Issues, 2014

How should one attribute epistemic credit to an agent, and hence, knowledge, when cognitive proce... more How should one attribute epistemic credit to an agent, and hence, knowledge, when cognitive processes include an extensive use of human or mechanical enhancers, informational tools, and devices which allow one to complement or modify one's own cognitive system? The concept of integration of a cognitive system has been used to address this question. For true belief to be creditable to a person's ability, it is claimed, the relevant informational processes must be or become part of the cognitive character of the agent, as a result of a process of enculturation. We argue that this view does not capture the role of sensitivity to epistemic norms in forming true beliefs. An analysis of epistemic actions, basic and extended, is proposed as offering an appropriate framework for crediting an agent with knowledge.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2014

This book deals with metacognition, that is: with the epistemic self-evaluation that allows menta... more This book deals with metacognition, that is: with the epistemic self-evaluation that allows mental agents to predict whether they will be able to remember a proper name, to discriminate an object, to solve a given problem etc., and to retrospectively evaluate whether their cognitive outputs (what they seem to remember, to discriminate, to demonstrate) are likely to be valid. There has been for several years an important controversy among psychologists and philosophers about the best definition of the concept of metacognition, based on a number of assumptions concerning mental architecture, consciousness, the continuity or discontinuity between humans and nonhumans, and the respective roles, in self-evaluation, of beliefs and feelings. On a classical view, dating back to pioneering articles by James Flavell and by Nelson and Narens, "metacognition" refers to knowledge about one's own knowledge, or thinking about one's own thinking, which involves metarepresentation of one's own epistemic states. This is the "attributivist" conception of metacognition. More recently, the term "metacognition" has been extended from recursive (metarepresentational) to experiencebased evaluations: on this latter approach, self-directed mindreading is no longer constitutively involved in a phenomenon which is still called "metacognition". Self-directed mindreading is rather seen as contributing to a more restricted area called "analytic" metacognition. Metacognition "at large", then, is defined as epistemic self-evaluation, whether based on affects or on concepts (and metarepresentations). 1 This is the "evaluativist" conception of metacognition. Some theorists, nevertheless, have stuck to the initial attributivist definition of metacognition as knowledge about one's knowledge, where metarepresentations are constitutively involved. However, their views about the relation between metarepresentations and self-evaluations vary to a considerable extent. Some deny that feelings can play any role in epistemic self-evaluation and are skeptical about nonhuman metacognition (attribution does it all). 2 Others recognize that feelings can guide uncertainty-based decision-making, and that evidence for this ability in animals is impressive, while also denying that this function is metacognitive. 3 Still others claim that nonhumans use metarepresentations, rather than mere feelings, when evaluating what they perceive or remember, even though they are unable to read others' minds. 4 The first chapters of the book aim at clarifying both the meaning and the scope of metacognition. To do so, a neutral definition is proposed in chapter 1, that does not preempt the respective roles of evaluation and of representation. Chapters 2 and 3 aim to spell out four opposing theoretical claims constituting respectively an "evaluativist" and an "attributivist" view of metacognition. These claims are responses to four questions: 1) does appraisal originate uniquely for the self, or can it also be applied to others? 2) what kind of information does epistemic appraisal rely on? 3) Does appraisal require an ability to represent the attitudes being appraised? 4) Does appraisal need to be part of an agentive context? The attributivist view takes appraisal to apply similarly to self and others. It responds positively to 1 This wider use of the term is instantiated in work by Koriat, Bjork, Strack, Reber, and by most experimental and social psychologists studying metacognition. See for example Koriat & Levy-Sadot, (1999). 2 Cf. Perner (2012).

Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2014

Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by Springer Science +B... more Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by Springer Science +Business Media Dordrecht. This e-offprint is for personal use only and shall not be selfarchived in electronic repositories. If you wish to self-archive your article, please use the accepted manuscript version for posting on your own website. You may further deposit the accepted manuscript version in any repository, provided it is only made publicly available 12 months after official publication or later and provided acknowledgement is given to the original source of publication and a link is inserted to the published article on Springer's website. The link must be accompanied by the following text: "The final publication is available at link.springer.com".

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 2008

Controlling one's mental agency encompasses two forms of metacognitive operations, self-probing a... more Controlling one's mental agency encompasses two forms of metacognitive operations, self-probing and post-evaluating. Metacognition so defined might seem to fuel an internalist view of epistemic norms, where rational feelings are available to instruct a thinker of what she can do, and allow her to be responsible for her mental agency. Such a view, however, ignores the dynamics of the mind-world interactions that calibrate the epistemic sentiments as reliable indicators of epistemic norms. A 'brain in the lab' thought experiment suggests that an internalist view of epistemic feelings is unable to account for the contrast between norm-tracking, educated sentiments, and illusory feelings.

Consciousness and Cognition, 2011

Perceivers generally show a poor ability to detect changes, a condition referred to as ''Change B... more Perceivers generally show a poor ability to detect changes, a condition referred to as ''Change Blindness'' (CB). They are, in addition, ''blind to their own blindness''. A common explanation of this ''Change Blindness Blindness'' (CBB) is that it derives from an inadequate, ''photographical'' folk-theory about perception. This explanation, however, does not account for intra-individual variations of CBB across trials. Our study aims to explore an alternative theory, according to which participants base their self-evaluations on two activity-dependent cues, namely search time and perceived success in prior trials. These cues were found to influence self-evaluation in two orthogonal ways: success-feedback influenced self-evaluation in a global, contextual way, presumably by recalibrating the norm of adequacy for the task. Search time influenced it in a local way, predicting the success of a given trial from its duration.

Animal Behavior and Cognition, 2019

The goal of this article is to critically examine the notion of metacognition, based on comparati... more The goal of this article is to critically examine the notion of metacognition, based on comparative, developmental and neuroscientific publications. A number of researchers define "metacognition" as "knowing what one knows." Others define it more broadly as a set of abilities allowing an individual to control and monitor his/her own cognitive activity"-where "cognitive activity" is taken to mean "activity with an informational goal." Developmental, neuroscientific and comparative studies, however, show that cognitive agents can pursue informational goals and reliably monitor them without representing their own mental states as mental states: they enjoy "procedural" metacognition. Various objections raised in the literature against this hypothesis are discussed, such as the kind of reinforcement at work in metacognition, and the role of metacognitive awareness in human and nonhuman decision-making. Finally, Peter Carruthers' first-order account of the comparative and developmental evidence of metacognition in terms of "basic questioning" is compared with the account in terms of procedural metacognition.

Memory & Cognition, 2021

Prior studies explored the early development of memory monitoring and control. However, little wo... more Prior studies explored the early development of memory monitoring and control. However, little work has examined crosscultural similarities and differences in metacognitive development in early childhood. In the present research, we investigated a total of 100 Japanese and German preschool-aged children's memory monitoring and control in a visual perception task. After seeing picture items, some of which were repeated, children were presented with picture pairs, one of which had been presented earlier and the other was a novel item. They then were asked to identify the previously presented picture. Children were also asked to evaluate their confidence about their selection, and to sort the responses to be used for being awarded with a prize at the end of the test. Both groups similarly expressed more confidence in the accurately remembered items than in the inaccurately remembered items, and their sorting decision was based on their subjective confidence. Japanese children's sorting more closely corresponded to memory accuracy than German children's sorting, however. These findings were further confirmed by a hierarchical Bayesian estimation of metacognitive efficiency. The present findings therefore suggest that early memory monitoring and control have both culturally similar and diverse aspects. The findings are discussed in light of broader sociocultural influences on metacognition.

Brain research, Jan 28, 2018

Little is known about what exactly differentiates metacognitive processes from ordinary cognitive... more Little is known about what exactly differentiates metacognitive processes from ordinary cognitive processes particularly early in development, and the underlying developmental aspects. To examine the time-course of metacognition, the present study investigated the neural underpinnings of judgments of learning (JoLs) and compared them with control judgments, using an event-related potentials (ERP) design. During ERP recording, children age seven to eight were presented with cue-target picture pairs and instructed to learn these pairs. After each pair, they either had to make a JoL (assess the likelihood of remembering the target when only presented with the cue) or a colour judgment (indicate whether the colour yellow had been present in one of the two pictures presented earlier). Results revealed a late slow wave divergence maximal pronounced from 550ms to 950ms post-stimulus that distinguished between JOLs and colour judgments. Over centro-parietal areas, JoLs showed a more negativ...

Developmental psychology, Mar 30, 2017

Despite an increasing number of studies demonstrating that young children selectively learn from ... more Despite an increasing number of studies demonstrating that young children selectively learn from others, and a few studies of children's selective teaching, the evidence almost exclusively comes from Western cultures, and cross-cultural comparison in this line of work is very rare. In the present research, we investigated Japanese and German children's selective learning and teaching abilities. We found clear cultural differences. Japanese children were better at selectively teaching an ignorant person over a knowledgeable person than at selectively learning from knowledgeable others. By contrast, German children were better at choosing to learn from a knowledgeable rather than from an ignorant person than at selectively teaching ignorant others. The present findings suggest that the development of human learning and teaching, especially the tendency to take into account others' knowledge status, is strongly affected by cultural background. (PsycINFO Database Record

PLOS ONE, 2015

Some studies, so far limited in number, suggest the existence of procedural metacognition in youn... more Some studies, so far limited in number, suggest the existence of procedural metacognition in young children, that is, the practical capacity to monitor and control one's own cognitive activity in a given task. The link between procedural metacognition and false belief understanding is currently under theoretical discussion. If data with primates seem to indicate that procedural metacognition and false belief understanding are not related, no study in developmental psychology has investigated this relation in young children. The present paper aims, first, to supplement the findings concerning young children's abilities to monitor and control their uncertainty (procedural metacognition) and, second, to explore the relation between procedural metacognition and false belief understanding. To examine this, 82 3-to 5-year-old children were presented with an opt-out task and with 3 false belief tasks. Results show that children can rely on procedural metacognition to evaluate their perceptual access to information, and that success in false belief tasks does not seem related to success in the task we used to evaluate procedural metacognition. These results are coherent with a procedural view of metacognition, and are discussed in the light of recent data from primatology and developmental psychology.

Child development, Jan 12, 2015

Recent studies have demonstrated that young children use past reliability and consensus to endors... more Recent studies have demonstrated that young children use past reliability and consensus to endorse object labels. Until now, no study has investigated how children weigh these two cues when they are in conflict. The two experiments reported here were designed to explore whether any initial preference for information provided by a consensual group would be influenced by the group's subsequent unreliability. The results show that 4- and 5-year-old children were more likely to endorse labels provided by an unreliable but consensual group than the labels provided by a reliable dissenter. Six-year-olds displayed the reverse pattern. The article concludes by discussing the methodological implications of the two experiments and the developmental trajectory regarding the way children weigh consensuality versus reliability.

Open MIND, 2-vol. set, 2015

The word “feeling” denotes a reactive, subjective experience with a distinctive embodied phenome... more The word “feeling” denotes a reactive, subjective experience with a distinctive embodied
phenomenal quality. Several types of feelings are usually distinguished,
such as bodily, agentive, affective, and metacognitive feelings. The hypothesis developed
in this article is that all feelings are represented in a specialized, nonconceptual
“expressive” mode, whose function is evaluative and action-guiding.
Feelings, it is claimed, are conceptually impenetrable. Against a two-factor theory
of feelings, it is argued, in the cases of affective and metacognitive feelings, that
background beliefs can circumvent feelings in gaining the control of action, but
cannot fully suppress them or their motivational potential.

Brain research, Dec 6, 2016

Metacognitive assessment of performance has been revealed to be one of the most powerful predicto... more Metacognitive assessment of performance has been revealed to be one of the most powerful predictors of human learning success and academic achievement. Yet, little is known about the functional nature of cognitive processes supporting judgments of learning (JOLs). The present study investigated the neural underpinnings of JOLs, using event-related brain potentials. Participants were presented with picture pairs and instructed to learn these pairs. After each pair, participants received a task cue, which instructed them to make a JOL (the likelihood of remembering the target when only presented with the cue) or to make a control judgment. Results revealed that JOLs were accompanied by a positive slow wave over medial frontal areas and a bilateral negative slow wave over occipital areas between 350ms and 700ms following the task cue. The results are discussed with respect to recent accounts on the neural correlates of judgments of learning.

SociologieS, 2012

Cet article examine les raisons avancees par Albert Ogien et Louis Quere pour rejeter le naturali... more Cet article examine les raisons avancees par Albert Ogien et Louis Quere pour rejeter le naturalisme social, c'est-a-dire le projet metatheorique consistant a integrer les savoirs sur le social issus de la biologie evolutionnaire et des sciences cognitives aux travaux menes en sciences sociales. Face aux arguments d'Albert Ogien portant sur l'irreductibilite de fait et de droit du social relativement au cognitif, il est objecte que les travaux pertinents provenant des sciences cognitives dans leur etat actuel devraient etre pris en compte et que l'irreductibilite de droit introduit un dualisme dans les sciences sociales qu'il est difficile de justifier. En outre, la distinction de l'epistemique et du cognitif est placee au fondement de l'irreductibilite, mais la necessite imperative de la coordination sociale pour la sensibilite normative epistemique n'est pas etablie de maniere concluante. Face aux objections de Louis Quere concernant l'emploi equivoque, en sciences cognitives, du concept de concept (dont l'acception riche determine la specificite de la sociologie), on peut repondre que les concepts maigres (non accompagnes par une analyse de ce qui fait concept) sont utilises non seulement par des organismes depourvus de pensee propositionnelle, mais figurent aussi dans le repertoire associatif et evaluatif des humains, qu'il s'agisse de l'evaluation de leur propres capacites, ou de celle de la confiance que meritent leurs partenaires.

Oxford Scholarship Online, 2018

This book focuses on the variability of metacognitive skills across cultures. Metacognition refer... more This book focuses on the variability of metacognitive skills across cultures. Metacognition refers to the processes that enable agents to contextually control their first-order cognitive activity (e.g. perceiving, remembering, learning, or problem-solving) by monitoring them, i.e. assessing their likely success. It is involved in our daily observations, such as “I don’t remember where my keys are,” or “I understand your point.” These assessments may rely either on specialized feelings (e.g. the felt fluency involved in distinguishing familiar from new environments, informative from repetitive messages, difficult from easy cognitive tasks) or on folk theories about one’s own mental abilities. Variable and universal features associated with these dimensions are documented, using anthropological, linguistic, neuroscientific, and psychological evidence. Among the universal cross-cultural aspects of metacognition, children are found to be more sensitive to their own ignorance than to tha...

PloS one, 2016

Prior research suggests that young children selectively inform others depending on others' kn... more Prior research suggests that young children selectively inform others depending on others' knowledge states. Yet, little is known whether children selectively inform others depending on their own knowledge states. To explore this issue, we manipulated 3- to 4-year-old children's knowledge about the content of a box and assessed the impact on their decisions to inform another person. Moreover, we assessed the presence of uncertainty gestures while they inform another person in light of the suggestions that children's gestures reflect early developing, perhaps transient, epistemic sensitivity. Finally, we compared children's performance in the informing context to their explicit verbal judgment of their knowledge states to further confirm the existence of a performance gap between the two tasks. In their decisions to inform, children tend to accurately assess their ignorance, whereas they tend to overestimate their own knowledge states when asked to explicitly report t...