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Papers by Jay Elliott

Poliética

Modern readers of Aristotle’s Politics are understandably embarrassed by his defense of slavery. ... more Modern readers of Aristotle’s Politics are understandably embarrassed by his defense of slavery. We often attempt to minimize the embarrassment by presenting his endorsement of slavery as a mere reflection of his time and place. I argue that this approach misrepresents Aristotle’s project and fails to grasp what we most have to learn from it. Careful attention to the text shows that Aristotle’s treatment of slavery is an innovative piece of philosophical work and a substantial revision of slavery as it existed in the ancient Greek world. I show how Aristotle develops his defense in close dialogue with certain radical critiques of slavery. Aristotle’s position turns out to have surprising points of affinity with these critiques, in particular in regarding as wholly insufficient standard defenses of slavery that ground slavery in legal conventions arising from warfare. Once we open ourselves up to engaging with Aristotle’s argument as serious philosophical work, the essential problem ...

Arete in Plato and Aristotle

Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy, 2021

In Nicomachean Ethics III.5, Aristotle argues that virtue and vice are “up to us and voluntary.” ... more In Nicomachean Ethics III.5, Aristotle argues that virtue and vice are “up to us and voluntary.” Readers have long struggled to make sense of Aristotle’s arguments in this chapter and to explain how they cohere with the rest of his ethical project. Among the most influential lines of complaint is that the argument of III.5 appears to contradict his emphasis elsewhere on the power of upbringing to shape character, beginning in childhood. Scholars have developed two main interpretive approaches to III.5, which I label “libertarian” and “compatibilist.” I argue that neither approach succeeds in removing the appearance of contradiction. I develop an alternative interpretation that reveals the coherence of Aristotle’s commitments, showing that for him the voluntariness of character and the power of upbringing are in reality two sides of the same philosophical coin. Both are grounded in his fundamental idea that virtue and vice are acquired by practice.

Augustinian Studies, 2018

Philosophy and Literature, 2018

by Jay R. Elliott D id Plato see something that Aristotle missed? According to a familiar narrati... more by Jay R. Elliott D id Plato see something that Aristotle missed? According to a familiar narrative, Plato regarded literature as dangerous to the aims of philosophy, and he accordingly exiled the poets from his ideal republic (in fact, he proposed to censor them, allowing only those who would "imitate the speech of a decent person," 1 which from a modern point of view is perhaps even worse). By contrast, Aristotle is supposed to have reconciled literature and philosophy, not only through his appreciative account of epic and tragedy in the Poetics but also through his invocations of literary examples at crucial junctures elsewhere in his corpus, for example his use of the Trojan legend of Priam in the Nicomachean Ethics. In this contest between two of the founding figures of virtue ethics, recent virtue theorists have been emphatically on the side of Aristotle: sympathetic accounts of literary works have now become part of the standard equipment of arguments in virtue ethics, and virtue ethicists widely assume that attention to literature yields important forms of support for their philosophical agenda. Yet in all their enthusiasm for literature, recent virtue theorists may have missed something that Plato saw clearly: for philosophers, literature often spells trouble. Unlike Plato, I don't necessarily think that's a bad thing. But contemporary virtue ethicists

Film and Philosophy, 2013

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2016

For the labels 'principled' and 'conflicted', see Müller, 'Aristotle on Vice'. 2 All quotations a... more For the labels 'principled' and 'conflicted', see Müller, 'Aristotle on Vice'. 2 All quotations are from Nicomachean Ethics unless otherwise noted. Translations are my own. I have consulted and benefitted from Broadie and Rowe, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics; Crisp, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics; Irwin, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics; and Reeve, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics. 3 Some scholars argue that Aristotle is talking in these two places about two different kinds of vicious people: in Book VII, the 'fully' or 'truly' vicious, and in Book IX those who are merely phaulos or 'base' (see Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory and Reeve, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics). Others have argued that Aristotle's inconsistency in fact reflects an inconsistency in the vicious person himself:

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2018

Scholars have long debated how exactly Aristotle thinks that agents acquire the distinctive archa... more Scholars have long debated how exactly Aristotle thinks that agents acquire the distinctive archai ("principles" or "starting-points") that govern their practical reasoning. The debate has traditionally been dominated by anti-intellectualists, who hold that for Aristotle all agents acquire their archai solely through a process of habituation in the nonrational soul. Their traditional opponents, the intellectualists, focus their argument on the case of the virtuous person, arguing that in Aristotle's view virtuous agents acquire their archai through a process of reasoning. I intervene in this debate in two main ways: first, I press a heretofore underappreciated objection against anti-intellectualism, that it is inconsistent with Aristotle's account of akrasia; and second, I urge that all sides in the debate would benefit from more sustained attention to Aristotle's nonvirtuous character types. In the final section, I suggest that proper consideration of the full breadth of Aristotle's account of character points in the direction of a new approach that I call "character pluralism," according to which Aristotle's moral psychology does not involve a single conception of psychic structure or moral development that is equally applicable to all character types.

Augustinian Studies, 2014

Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 2006

article argumente en faveur de l'idée que la réflexion sur la nature peut nous aider à clarifier ... more article argumente en faveur de l'idée que la réflexion sur la nature peut nous aider à clarifier ce en quoi consiste le sophisme naturaliste. Il montre à quel point le naturalisme éthique, pour Moore, n'inclut pas seulement le naturalisme scientifique de Mill et Spencer, mais aussi le naturalisme métaphysique des Stoïciens, de Spinoza, Kant et Hegel. Moore considère toute tentative de définir le « bien » comme une occurrence du sophisme naturaliste. Il est tentant de suggérer que Moore aurait alors dû renvoyer à l'indéfinissabilité de « bien » au lieu du sophisme naturaliste : mais l'article montre que la non-naturalité du bien ne se réduit pas à son indéfinissabilité. J'en conclus que le bien est non naturel non seulement parce qu'il est indéfinissable, mais parce qu'il nous mène au-

Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2011

Contemporary philosophers and psychologists seek the roots of ethically sound forms of behavior, ... more Contemporary philosophers and psychologists seek the roots of ethically sound forms of behavior, including altruism and a sense of fairness, in the basic structure of cooperative action. I argue that recent work on cooperation in both philosophy and psychology has been hampered by what I call “the mutualistic paradigm.” The mutualistic paradigm treats one kind of cooperative situation—what I call