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Papers by Jean-Luc Lemahieu

Third World Quarterly, 1997

Talks by Jean-Luc Lemahieu

This dissatisfaction with the implementation of drug control policies resulted in an ‘UNGASS 2016... more This dissatisfaction with the implementation of drug control policies resulted in an ‘UNGASS 2016 momentum’ for a wider and very divergent group of lobby groups most demanding changes in ‘international drug policy’, some also asking for a change in the Conventions themselves, ranging from libertarians advocating legalization, to those wanting space for added policy and operational experiments, and again others seeking a rescheduling of cannabis. All in all the April event is an excellent opportunity to take stock and assess the effectiveness of the current drug policies at the national, regional and international levels.
However, two caveats. First, UNGASS 2016 is and remains foremost an inter-governmental discussion and the three Conventions themselves are not under discussion within the UNGASS 2016 process. It is to be noted that the 2014 Joint Ministerial Declaration welcomes ‘the important role played by civil society, in particular non-governmental organizations, in, addressing the world drug problem, and note(s) with appreciation their important contribution to the review process’. To this end, the active participation of civil society within the CND led processes towards UNGASS 2016, as demonstrated during the interactive discussions, has been ground-breaking. Secondly, UNGASS 2016 is a significant ‘bus-stop’ but not the culmination of the decade starting with the 2009 Political Declaration and having its final review set for 2019. It should result in a ‘short, substantive, concise and action-oriented document comprising a set of operational recommendations’ (Resolution 58/8 CND, June 2015).
In conclusion, while UNGASS 2016 certainly will not result in a policy revolution that some had aspired for, it has been instrumental in mobilizing a wide range of voices and opinions in a 3 pronged debate: (1) the formal inter-governmental debate as led by the CND in Vienna; (2) the ‘substantive debate’ as led by academia and practitioners, including civil society; and (3) the ‘public and media debate’ which has witnessed quite some intensive lobbying in ‘the battle for the public opinion’. This paper aims to place UNGASS 2016 in its contextual and historical setting.

From the outset allow me to express my professional fascination of this vast topic of the link be... more From the outset allow me to express my professional fascination of this vast topic of the link between development and organized crime (OC), having witnessed this phenomenon playing out in real terms as a practitioner in the field working for UNIDO, briefly UNDP and later on UNDCP/UNODC, serving in the Caribbean, South East Europe, Central Asia and South East Asia. And also to have the opportunity to express my frustration for the difficulty we face in translating theoretical concepts in operational or real terms largely due to the ‘tunnel visions’ in which we so comfortably function. (...)

Allow me thus to start with seven premises before I finalize by submitting a few conclusions. And evidently ‘If you want to have a happy ending, that depends on when you stop your story’ (Orson Welles).
1- Un-intended consequences of well-intended aid.
2- Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde rewritten by René Descartes.
3- The interplay between ‘vulnerability’ and ‘opportunity’.
4- Pragmatism and puritanism – embedded in the past but embracing the future.
5- The twilight zone: fluidity of ‘functionality of crime’.
6- Influence of the 2030 Agenda: Smart crime approaches fitting an aspirational agenda.
7- Principle of universalism – moving between legal and legitimate.

Transnational Organized Crime engages in as many different facets and types of economic activitie... more Transnational Organized Crime engages in as many different facets and types of economic activities, both legal and illegal, as commensurate to the influence they can exert within a specific geographic or economic area. No country is immune to organized crime, yet the typologies of crime tend to differ pending the swerving opportunities offered in different stages of economic and institutional development. Money laundering plagues the international financial capitals – as proven by the HSBC scandals, involving narco-profits, then tax evasion and finally rigging currencies. Guatemala in turn is challenged by gang violence resulting in high homicide rates among especially young male, whereas in the Netherlands homicide rates are generally low and largely crimes committed within family relationships, with females most likely ending up as the victim.
Opportunities thus abound for crime but its implications are the real source of concern. Corruption and crime festers happily in a low immunity system of governance with far more devastating results. Indeed, pending equal overall conditions, middle- and high economic countries do score better against destabilizing TOC and conflict. A one billion dollars bank fraud in the London financial market might result in an uncomfortable sneeze – think HSBC – while the same amount has the potential to wreck the emerging financial sector in a less economically advanced country as was recently the case in Afghanistan. Resilience is thus partially to be explained due to the proportionality, scale and scope, between licit and illicit economies.
Part is also caused by the mere fact that mid -and high level income countries simply are able to rely on a wider resource pool to build up law and order and reduce opportunities for destabilizing crime manifestations. Simply stated, societal viruses are better manageable once the immunity system is generally healthy. In this good governance and state building – building up the state’s immunity system – are not any longer to be considered mere civil-society concerns, but, to paraphrase Sarah Chayes, the instrument to limit transnational organized crime opportunities and avoid a force multiplier of dysfunctional states, ineffective and wasted aid, corruption and abuse, conflict and instability.

From the outset allow me to thank you for the kind invite to address you today, as well as pointi... more From the outset allow me to thank you for the kind invite to address you today, as well as pointing out that UNODC provides policy advise and technical support to member states on issues pertaining to crime and drugs. Hence, the political analysis as I will lay out to you, goes beyond this mandate and therefore cannot be attributed to the organization. Evidently the view I will provide on international security, will be strongly biased by the perspective of transnational organized crime – an area I most familiar and at ease with. Yet strangely, this is not an abstract exercise since international crime proves one of the big winners of globalization and has become part of the new global governance systems – or the absence of such governance. I would like to submit to you 12 points of interests, starting with the more generic and ending with 3 concrete mandate areas which eventually could be of interest to both organizations.

Third World Quarterly, 1997