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Papers by Jeffrey Reid
Psychologie, 2019
Romantic psychology is first specified in counter-distinction to Enlightenment-informed facultyps... more Romantic psychology is first specified in counter-distinction to Enlightenment-informed facultypsychology, whose scientific paradigm is fundamentally materialistic and mechanistic. Romantic psychology is then presented through Fr. Schlegel's theory and practice of the literary fragment. In the fragment, we discover selfhood that is self-positing, powered by electro-chemical forces and enlivened by the stimulating Other. Romantic psychology determines the self as an ironic system, complete and yet organically open to other selves. It is phenomenological in nature and its contemporary legacy can be found in psychoanalysis and psychoanalytical hermeneutics. In this article, I will attempt to establish the specificity of Romantic psychology. I will do this, first of all, by distinguishing it from psychological science as it arises in the Enlightenment, in what might be broadly defined as faculty-psychology. To provide an idea of
Proceedings of the Hegel Society of America, 2006
The question of language goes right to the core of Hegel's notion of systematic science, of truth... more The question of language goes right to the core of Hegel's notion of systematic science, of truth that actually takes place in the embrace between thought and being. If a language of science is one meant to convey objective truth, then Hegel's singular take on science must imply a special grasp of both its language and objectivity. What sort of discourse can claim to express objective truth within an idea of science that sees itself as the systematic articulation of existing knowledge? To answer this question we must guard against importing epistemological and linguistic notions foreign to the Hegelian idea of objective truth, neither must we import notions of objectivity and discourse alien to his idea of science. Failure to comprehensively understand the nature of Hegelian scientific language has allowed to go unchallenged a widespread misunderstanding regarding the nature of Hegelian objectivity. This misunderstanding can be bluntly summarized as follows: the world itself operates dialectically, obeying an inherently dialectical logic. Many who know something of Hegel will probably find nothing objectionable in this statement. In fact, it appears readily verifiable with regard to that part of worldly objectivity Hegel deals with on the Spirit side of his philosophy, for example the rise of consciousness and inter-subjective relations. Indeed, spirit, as human activity, can easily be said to reflect thought or "mind", which, as the Logics tell us, is inherently dialectical. And it is this objectivity or "second nature" i that most commentators are interested in. When the natural world itself is brought into consideration, however, there is some embarrassment. It is indeed hard to verify, for example, that cosmological phenomena and chemical reactions operate along strictly dialectical lines. Hegel's Philosophy of Nature therefore tends to be taken less seriously, or ignored ii .
Horizons philosophiques, 1995
TÉtat se faisait de lui-même. Bref, nous avons affaire à un malentendu de fond qui renvoie, nous ... more TÉtat se faisait de lui-même. Bref, nous avons affaire à un malentendu de fond qui renvoie, nous le verrons, à deux conceptions différentes, voire opposées, de la liberté, de TÉtat et de la philosophie. Essayons de dégager ces tendances conceptuelles, les courants philosophiques qui donnèrent lieu à l'université moderne, à l'université d'État et à ses contradictions. C'est à partir de la notion de la Bildung (généralement traduit par «culture», parfois par «formation») que nous abordons la première tendance conceptuelle à l'oeuvre lors de la création de l'Université de Berlin. Dans l'acception philosophique du 18ième siècle le terme allemand renvoie, par le biais de Bild («image» ou «tableau»), à une étymologie gnostique ou néoplatonicienne, une référence à Yenergeia, la lumière de la vérité radieuse du Bien, du Beau, du Vrai, qui illumine les éclairés, bien qu'ils se trouvent loin de la source de cette lumière. Or c'est justement cette tension, le fait d'être à la fois dans le vrai et loin du vrai qui va animer la notion de BildungteWe qu'elle se trouve saisie par les premiers théoriciens de l'université D'État: Fichte, Humboldt et Schleiermacher 2 .
Horizons philosophiques, 1992
Prenons le texte d'Aquin au sérieux, philosophiquement. J'entends par là outrepasser son contenu ... more Prenons le texte d'Aquin au sérieux, philosophiquement. J'entends par là outrepasser son contenu polémique afin d'examiner l'édifice lui-même dans ses fondements et extensions théoriques, un procédé qui, ne soyons pas naïfs, nous ramènera en pleine polémique. J'avoue d'emblée que cet examen révélera une contradiction de fond qui semble priver «La fatigue culturelle du Canada français» de toute conséquence. J'avoue également qu'à mes yeux l'intérêt philosophique du texte relève, en grande partie, de cette contradiction.
Proceedings of the Hegel Society of America, 2013
Why does Hegel change "Dreaming Soul" to "Feeling Soul" in the 1830 edition of the Philosophy of ... more Why does Hegel change "Dreaming Soul" to "Feeling Soul" in the 1830 edition of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit? By tracing the content of the Dreaming Soul section, through Hegel's 1794 manuscript on psychology, to sources such as C.P. Moritz's Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde, the paper shows how the section embraces a late Enlightenment mission: combating supposedly supernatural expressions of spiritual enthrallment by explaining them as pathological conditions of the soul. Responding to perceived attacks on the 1827 edition of the Encyclopedia by Schleiermacher, Hegel alters the section and its heading, thereby including the pastor's religion of feeling in the pathology of Schwärmerei. Between the second, 1827 edition of his Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences and the ultimate 1830 edition, Hegel made a number of what might be considered minor changes, particularly in comparison with the extensive revisions undertaken between the first, 1817 edition and the second, "mature, if penultimate formulation", as Robert Williams writes. 1 One change that does occur between 1827 and 1830 takes place in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit (PSS) 2 , where Hegel changes the section heading at §403 from "The Dreaming Soul (Die traümende Seele)" to "The Feeling Soul (Die fühlende Seele)." This paper explores the significance of this revision, which, although apparently minor, is hardly superficial. In fact, by calling attention to the original title, the change from "dreaming" to "feeling" invites us to investigate the origins of Hegel's thought on this crucial section, whose insights into the particularities of the human soul remain largely unchanged, in spite of the heading change. The first object of investigation will
Symposium, 2017
Contemporary reluctance to consider any complicity between philosophy and religion has led to an ... more Contemporary reluctance to consider any complicity between philosophy and religion has led to an inability to consider, in Hegel studies, how the revelatory agency of the Absolute necessarily complements the narrative of human reason. According to Hegel, reason alone can do no more than end in the endless limitations of actuality, in the inϔinite approximations of a moral summum bonum and in the ad inϔinitum strivings for concrete political freedom. Recognizing where revelatory agency occurs in Hegel's Science allows us to recognize the Idea's freedom in the worldly, human expressions of art, religion and philosophy, in their philosophical study within the state University. Without such recognition, both Left and Right ϔields of Hegel interpretation tend to evaluate the success (or failure) of his philosophy based on inϔlated, unrealistic expectations of what is meant by "actuality.
Philosophiques, 2001
L'objectivité dont s'occupe la science hégélienne n'est pas celle d'une réalité d... more L'objectivité dont s'occupe la science hégélienne n'est pas celle d'une réalité détachée, mue selon les lois dialectiques, et le discours scientifique n'est pas vrai et objectif parce qu'il serait la réflexion adéquate d'une telle réalité. L'objectivité scientifique chez Hegel doit être saisie comme le logos , c'est-à-dire le discours de la science elle-même dans son actualité existante. Il s'agit d'un discours qui est son objet et qui est l'objectivité véritable. Ce type de langage est seulement possible s'il est compris comme le moyen terme entre l'être et le penser, c'est-à-dire en termes du syllogisme hégélien et non pas de la prédication. Concrètement, les objets de la science, ou les contenus de l' Encyclopédie , sont eux-mêmes des discours objectifs, c'est-à-dire existants et vrais. Ainsi, par exemple, c'est seulement comme discours (à savoir le contrat, le droit écrit, la constitution et l'histoire) ...
Articles spéciaux, 2005
Mettre en rapport des textes de Hegel sur l’amour érotique avec quelques passages du penseur roma... more Mettre en rapport des textes de Hegel sur l’amour érotique avec quelques passages du penseur romantique Friedrich Schlegel permet de mettre en relief la méfiance hégélienne à l’égard du désir sexuel. Selon l’échelle hiérarchique de désirs chez Hegel, le désir érotique fait preuve d’un déséquilibre entre le sujet désirant et l’objet désiré, ce qui est typique d’un rapport purement naturel et non spirituel. C’est dire que la connaissance charnelle, avec son objet dénué de Soi propre, représente pour Hegel une forme inférieure de savoir. L’inégalité sujet-objet propre à l’amour érotique n’est dépassée que par la participation à la substance éthique, ce qui exige la reconnaissance réciproque de consciences de soi égales. Dans ce contexte, il s’agit du mariage.
Dialogue, 2006
The question is this: what happens to the imagination in Hegel? Given its promotion in his main p... more The question is this: what happens to the imagination in Hegel? Given its promotion in his main predecessors, in Kant and particularly in Fichte and Schelling, how does it come to disappear in the Phenomenology of Spirit and only resurface as a discreet feature of theoretical, subjective mind in the Philosophy of Spirit of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences ? Jennifer Ann Bates's answer to this question forms the startlingly original thesis of her book. In spite of the fact that the term Einbildungskraft (imagination) only occurs there once, and then in the polemical context of Hegel's famous Preface, the imagination is actually what the whole Phenomenology is about. Hegel's Theory of Imagination is essentially an argument supporting this novel conclusion. Although I have some reservations about the methodology Bates employs and am reluctant to fully embrace her conclusion, her book teaches a great deal about its subject, the imagination in Hegel, and encourages us to see the oft-examined Phenomenology in a new and revealing light. Bates presents her thesis at the outset, in a frank Preface that summarizes her approach, argues for the relevance of her project, and confronts two fundamental objections that may be raised. Unfortunately, the Preface includes short sections on "The Book's Contribution to Scholarship" and "The Audience for Which the Book Was Written," which feel misplaced and cursory. For example, the brief "contribution" section undervalues itself, failing to mention Klaus Düsing's important 1991 article, which shares, in German, the same title as Bates's present work. Düsing's article is cited in the Bibliography, although its content is not discussed. The Introduction is, in fact, the first move in the author's argument. In order to show that the imagination's absence in the Phenomenology is noteworthy, the author sketches out its central role in the thought of Hegel's predecessors. The ten pages or so devoted to the imagination in Hume, Kant, Fichte, and Schelling can, of course, only scratch the surface, as Bates admits. However, this sketch may be sufficient for her purposes, since the goal is simply to show the centrality of the concept in Kant's first and third Critiques , in Fichte's Science of Knowledge , and in Schelling's System of Transcendental Idealism. Nonetheless, the high quality of the author's analysis makes one wish for a more in-depth treatment of these extremely complex issues. Central questions concerning Kant's hypothesis of an
Archives de Philosophie, 2003
... GÖRLAND, Ingtraud, Die Kantkritik des jungen Hegels, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1966. HARRIS, HS... more ... GÖRLAND, Ingtraud, Die Kantkritik des jungen Hegels, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1966. HARRIS, HS, Hegel's Development, vol. ... PRIEST, Stephen, dir., Hegel's Critique of Kant, Oxford, University Press, 1987, Gregg Revivals, 1992. ...
Dialogue, 2006
ABSTRACTWithin Hegel's system of science, judgement(Urteil)is thought's original dividing... more ABSTRACTWithin Hegel's system of science, judgement(Urteil)is thought's original dividing from identity into difference. In the same context, judgement is also an act of predication where “subject” must be understood in both a grammatical and psychical sense. Thus, judgement expresses a language act that is a self-positing into the difference of being. This article looks at two examples where Hegel's ontological notion of judgement obtains, then finds, the roots of this notion in Hölderlin and Fichte.
Psychologie, 2019
Romantic psychology is first specified in counter-distinction to Enlightenment-informed facultyps... more Romantic psychology is first specified in counter-distinction to Enlightenment-informed facultypsychology, whose scientific paradigm is fundamentally materialistic and mechanistic. Romantic psychology is then presented through Fr. Schlegel's theory and practice of the literary fragment. In the fragment, we discover selfhood that is self-positing, powered by electro-chemical forces and enlivened by the stimulating Other. Romantic psychology determines the self as an ironic system, complete and yet organically open to other selves. It is phenomenological in nature and its contemporary legacy can be found in psychoanalysis and psychoanalytical hermeneutics. In this article, I will attempt to establish the specificity of Romantic psychology. I will do this, first of all, by distinguishing it from psychological science as it arises in the Enlightenment, in what might be broadly defined as faculty-psychology. To provide an idea of
Proceedings of the Hegel Society of America, 2006
The question of language goes right to the core of Hegel's notion of systematic science, of truth... more The question of language goes right to the core of Hegel's notion of systematic science, of truth that actually takes place in the embrace between thought and being. If a language of science is one meant to convey objective truth, then Hegel's singular take on science must imply a special grasp of both its language and objectivity. What sort of discourse can claim to express objective truth within an idea of science that sees itself as the systematic articulation of existing knowledge? To answer this question we must guard against importing epistemological and linguistic notions foreign to the Hegelian idea of objective truth, neither must we import notions of objectivity and discourse alien to his idea of science. Failure to comprehensively understand the nature of Hegelian scientific language has allowed to go unchallenged a widespread misunderstanding regarding the nature of Hegelian objectivity. This misunderstanding can be bluntly summarized as follows: the world itself operates dialectically, obeying an inherently dialectical logic. Many who know something of Hegel will probably find nothing objectionable in this statement. In fact, it appears readily verifiable with regard to that part of worldly objectivity Hegel deals with on the Spirit side of his philosophy, for example the rise of consciousness and inter-subjective relations. Indeed, spirit, as human activity, can easily be said to reflect thought or "mind", which, as the Logics tell us, is inherently dialectical. And it is this objectivity or "second nature" i that most commentators are interested in. When the natural world itself is brought into consideration, however, there is some embarrassment. It is indeed hard to verify, for example, that cosmological phenomena and chemical reactions operate along strictly dialectical lines. Hegel's Philosophy of Nature therefore tends to be taken less seriously, or ignored ii .
Horizons philosophiques, 1995
TÉtat se faisait de lui-même. Bref, nous avons affaire à un malentendu de fond qui renvoie, nous ... more TÉtat se faisait de lui-même. Bref, nous avons affaire à un malentendu de fond qui renvoie, nous le verrons, à deux conceptions différentes, voire opposées, de la liberté, de TÉtat et de la philosophie. Essayons de dégager ces tendances conceptuelles, les courants philosophiques qui donnèrent lieu à l'université moderne, à l'université d'État et à ses contradictions. C'est à partir de la notion de la Bildung (généralement traduit par «culture», parfois par «formation») que nous abordons la première tendance conceptuelle à l'oeuvre lors de la création de l'Université de Berlin. Dans l'acception philosophique du 18ième siècle le terme allemand renvoie, par le biais de Bild («image» ou «tableau»), à une étymologie gnostique ou néoplatonicienne, une référence à Yenergeia, la lumière de la vérité radieuse du Bien, du Beau, du Vrai, qui illumine les éclairés, bien qu'ils se trouvent loin de la source de cette lumière. Or c'est justement cette tension, le fait d'être à la fois dans le vrai et loin du vrai qui va animer la notion de BildungteWe qu'elle se trouve saisie par les premiers théoriciens de l'université D'État: Fichte, Humboldt et Schleiermacher 2 .
Horizons philosophiques, 1992
Prenons le texte d'Aquin au sérieux, philosophiquement. J'entends par là outrepasser son contenu ... more Prenons le texte d'Aquin au sérieux, philosophiquement. J'entends par là outrepasser son contenu polémique afin d'examiner l'édifice lui-même dans ses fondements et extensions théoriques, un procédé qui, ne soyons pas naïfs, nous ramènera en pleine polémique. J'avoue d'emblée que cet examen révélera une contradiction de fond qui semble priver «La fatigue culturelle du Canada français» de toute conséquence. J'avoue également qu'à mes yeux l'intérêt philosophique du texte relève, en grande partie, de cette contradiction.
Proceedings of the Hegel Society of America, 2013
Why does Hegel change "Dreaming Soul" to "Feeling Soul" in the 1830 edition of the Philosophy of ... more Why does Hegel change "Dreaming Soul" to "Feeling Soul" in the 1830 edition of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit? By tracing the content of the Dreaming Soul section, through Hegel's 1794 manuscript on psychology, to sources such as C.P. Moritz's Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde, the paper shows how the section embraces a late Enlightenment mission: combating supposedly supernatural expressions of spiritual enthrallment by explaining them as pathological conditions of the soul. Responding to perceived attacks on the 1827 edition of the Encyclopedia by Schleiermacher, Hegel alters the section and its heading, thereby including the pastor's religion of feeling in the pathology of Schwärmerei. Between the second, 1827 edition of his Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences and the ultimate 1830 edition, Hegel made a number of what might be considered minor changes, particularly in comparison with the extensive revisions undertaken between the first, 1817 edition and the second, "mature, if penultimate formulation", as Robert Williams writes. 1 One change that does occur between 1827 and 1830 takes place in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit (PSS) 2 , where Hegel changes the section heading at §403 from "The Dreaming Soul (Die traümende Seele)" to "The Feeling Soul (Die fühlende Seele)." This paper explores the significance of this revision, which, although apparently minor, is hardly superficial. In fact, by calling attention to the original title, the change from "dreaming" to "feeling" invites us to investigate the origins of Hegel's thought on this crucial section, whose insights into the particularities of the human soul remain largely unchanged, in spite of the heading change. The first object of investigation will
Symposium, 2017
Contemporary reluctance to consider any complicity between philosophy and religion has led to an ... more Contemporary reluctance to consider any complicity between philosophy and religion has led to an inability to consider, in Hegel studies, how the revelatory agency of the Absolute necessarily complements the narrative of human reason. According to Hegel, reason alone can do no more than end in the endless limitations of actuality, in the inϔinite approximations of a moral summum bonum and in the ad inϔinitum strivings for concrete political freedom. Recognizing where revelatory agency occurs in Hegel's Science allows us to recognize the Idea's freedom in the worldly, human expressions of art, religion and philosophy, in their philosophical study within the state University. Without such recognition, both Left and Right ϔields of Hegel interpretation tend to evaluate the success (or failure) of his philosophy based on inϔlated, unrealistic expectations of what is meant by "actuality.
Philosophiques, 2001
L'objectivité dont s'occupe la science hégélienne n'est pas celle d'une réalité d... more L'objectivité dont s'occupe la science hégélienne n'est pas celle d'une réalité détachée, mue selon les lois dialectiques, et le discours scientifique n'est pas vrai et objectif parce qu'il serait la réflexion adéquate d'une telle réalité. L'objectivité scientifique chez Hegel doit être saisie comme le logos , c'est-à-dire le discours de la science elle-même dans son actualité existante. Il s'agit d'un discours qui est son objet et qui est l'objectivité véritable. Ce type de langage est seulement possible s'il est compris comme le moyen terme entre l'être et le penser, c'est-à-dire en termes du syllogisme hégélien et non pas de la prédication. Concrètement, les objets de la science, ou les contenus de l' Encyclopédie , sont eux-mêmes des discours objectifs, c'est-à-dire existants et vrais. Ainsi, par exemple, c'est seulement comme discours (à savoir le contrat, le droit écrit, la constitution et l'histoire) ...
Articles spéciaux, 2005
Mettre en rapport des textes de Hegel sur l’amour érotique avec quelques passages du penseur roma... more Mettre en rapport des textes de Hegel sur l’amour érotique avec quelques passages du penseur romantique Friedrich Schlegel permet de mettre en relief la méfiance hégélienne à l’égard du désir sexuel. Selon l’échelle hiérarchique de désirs chez Hegel, le désir érotique fait preuve d’un déséquilibre entre le sujet désirant et l’objet désiré, ce qui est typique d’un rapport purement naturel et non spirituel. C’est dire que la connaissance charnelle, avec son objet dénué de Soi propre, représente pour Hegel une forme inférieure de savoir. L’inégalité sujet-objet propre à l’amour érotique n’est dépassée que par la participation à la substance éthique, ce qui exige la reconnaissance réciproque de consciences de soi égales. Dans ce contexte, il s’agit du mariage.
Dialogue, 2006
The question is this: what happens to the imagination in Hegel? Given its promotion in his main p... more The question is this: what happens to the imagination in Hegel? Given its promotion in his main predecessors, in Kant and particularly in Fichte and Schelling, how does it come to disappear in the Phenomenology of Spirit and only resurface as a discreet feature of theoretical, subjective mind in the Philosophy of Spirit of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences ? Jennifer Ann Bates's answer to this question forms the startlingly original thesis of her book. In spite of the fact that the term Einbildungskraft (imagination) only occurs there once, and then in the polemical context of Hegel's famous Preface, the imagination is actually what the whole Phenomenology is about. Hegel's Theory of Imagination is essentially an argument supporting this novel conclusion. Although I have some reservations about the methodology Bates employs and am reluctant to fully embrace her conclusion, her book teaches a great deal about its subject, the imagination in Hegel, and encourages us to see the oft-examined Phenomenology in a new and revealing light. Bates presents her thesis at the outset, in a frank Preface that summarizes her approach, argues for the relevance of her project, and confronts two fundamental objections that may be raised. Unfortunately, the Preface includes short sections on "The Book's Contribution to Scholarship" and "The Audience for Which the Book Was Written," which feel misplaced and cursory. For example, the brief "contribution" section undervalues itself, failing to mention Klaus Düsing's important 1991 article, which shares, in German, the same title as Bates's present work. Düsing's article is cited in the Bibliography, although its content is not discussed. The Introduction is, in fact, the first move in the author's argument. In order to show that the imagination's absence in the Phenomenology is noteworthy, the author sketches out its central role in the thought of Hegel's predecessors. The ten pages or so devoted to the imagination in Hume, Kant, Fichte, and Schelling can, of course, only scratch the surface, as Bates admits. However, this sketch may be sufficient for her purposes, since the goal is simply to show the centrality of the concept in Kant's first and third Critiques , in Fichte's Science of Knowledge , and in Schelling's System of Transcendental Idealism. Nonetheless, the high quality of the author's analysis makes one wish for a more in-depth treatment of these extremely complex issues. Central questions concerning Kant's hypothesis of an
Archives de Philosophie, 2003
... GÖRLAND, Ingtraud, Die Kantkritik des jungen Hegels, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1966. HARRIS, HS... more ... GÖRLAND, Ingtraud, Die Kantkritik des jungen Hegels, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1966. HARRIS, HS, Hegel's Development, vol. ... PRIEST, Stephen, dir., Hegel's Critique of Kant, Oxford, University Press, 1987, Gregg Revivals, 1992. ...
Dialogue, 2006
ABSTRACTWithin Hegel's system of science, judgement(Urteil)is thought's original dividing... more ABSTRACTWithin Hegel's system of science, judgement(Urteil)is thought's original dividing from identity into difference. In the same context, judgement is also an act of predication where “subject” must be understood in both a grammatical and psychical sense. Thus, judgement expresses a language act that is a self-positing into the difference of being. This article looks at two examples where Hegel's ontological notion of judgement obtains, then finds, the roots of this notion in Hölderlin and Fichte.