Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres - Academia.edu (original) (raw)

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Papers by Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres

Managerial and Decision Economics

We examine the motivational effects of setting both assigned and personal nonbinding goals on a r... more We examine the motivational effects of setting both assigned and personal nonbinding goals on a real effort laboratory experiment. In order to derive conjectures for our experiment, we develop a model with goal-dependent preferences. In line with previous studies, we find that goal setting leads to a higher performance. We also find that goal-setting is most effective if subjects were able to achieve previous goals. Therefore, in goal setting, "success breeds success". In particular, we observe that when subjects are initially allowed to attain assigned goals, they are better at self-motivating in the future when performing under personal goals.

Manufacturing & Service Operations Management

Problem definition: We investigate the impact of nonbinding (wage-irrelevant) goals, set by a man... more Problem definition: We investigate the impact of nonbinding (wage-irrelevant) goals, set by a manager, on a team of workers with “weak-link” production technology. Can nonbinding goals improve team production when team members face production complementarity? Academic/practical relevance: Nonbinding goals are easy to implement and ubiquitous in practice. These goals have been shown to improve individual performance, but it remains to be seen if such goals are effective in team production when there is production complementarity among workers. Methodology: We first develop a theoretical model where goals act as reference points for workers’ intrinsic motivation to complete the task. We then test our hypotheses in a controlled, human-subjects experiment. In our experiment, participants act as managers or workers, and we examine the impact of nonbinding goals on team outcomes. Results: Consistent with our model, we find evidence that team production does increase when managers are able...

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 2017

We study a dynamic model of self-control where previous decisions have influence on subsequent de... more We study a dynamic model of self-control where previous decisions have influence on subsequent decision making. In our model effort and guilt are negative emotions produced by previous decisions to either resist or yield to temptation, respectively. These emotions calibrate an individual's self-control, in turn affecting future decisions. Our model explains non-stationary consumption paths characterized by compensatory indulgence and restraint, why under some circumstances the amplitude of this switching pattern increases with foresight, and how unavoidable options that might show up on one's menu influence choices, consequent emotions, consumption paths, and preferences for commitment. We discuss the implications of self-control insights provided by our model for both consumers and marketers.

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000

We study a principal-agent framework in which principals can assign wage-irrelevant goals to agen... more We study a principal-agent framework in which principals can assign wage-irrelevant goals to agents. We find evidence that, when given the possibility to set wage-irrelevant goals, principals select incentive contracts for which pay is less responsive to agents' performance. Agents' performance is higher in the presence of goal setting despite weaker incentives. We develop a principal-agent model with reference-dependent utility that illustrates how labor contracts combining weak monetary incentives and wage-irrelevant goals can be optimal. The pervasive use of non-monetary incentives in the workplace may help account for previous empirical findings suggesting that firms rely on unexpectedly weak monetary incentives.

We study a principal agent model where agents derive a sense of pride when accomplishing producti... more We study a principal agent model where agents derive a sense of pride when accomplishing production goals. As in classical models, the principal offers a pay-per-performance wage to the agent, determining the agent’s extrinsic incentives. However, in our setting, the principal does also want to set goals that affect the agents’ intrinsic motivation to work. Agents differ in their personal

In this paper, we analyze the implications of consumers'temptation on pric- ing and product o... more In this paper, we analyze the implications of consumers'temptation on pric- ing and product oerings when the dierentiation of the product is horizontal. We formalize temptation as a change in the consumers' ideal point on the Hotelling line. Given these consumer preferences, we study the monopolist's optimal pricing and product oerings strategy. We …nd that product diversity decreases with the

Resources, Conservation and Recycling

Managerial and Decision Economics

We examine the motivational effects of setting both assigned and personal nonbinding goals on a r... more We examine the motivational effects of setting both assigned and personal nonbinding goals on a real effort laboratory experiment. In order to derive conjectures for our experiment, we develop a model with goal-dependent preferences. In line with previous studies, we find that goal setting leads to a higher performance. We also find that goal-setting is most effective if subjects were able to achieve previous goals. Therefore, in goal setting, "success breeds success". In particular, we observe that when subjects are initially allowed to attain assigned goals, they are better at self-motivating in the future when performing under personal goals.

Manufacturing & Service Operations Management

Problem definition: We investigate the impact of nonbinding (wage-irrelevant) goals, set by a man... more Problem definition: We investigate the impact of nonbinding (wage-irrelevant) goals, set by a manager, on a team of workers with “weak-link” production technology. Can nonbinding goals improve team production when team members face production complementarity? Academic/practical relevance: Nonbinding goals are easy to implement and ubiquitous in practice. These goals have been shown to improve individual performance, but it remains to be seen if such goals are effective in team production when there is production complementarity among workers. Methodology: We first develop a theoretical model where goals act as reference points for workers’ intrinsic motivation to complete the task. We then test our hypotheses in a controlled, human-subjects experiment. In our experiment, participants act as managers or workers, and we examine the impact of nonbinding goals on team outcomes. Results: Consistent with our model, we find evidence that team production does increase when managers are able...

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 2017

We study a dynamic model of self-control where previous decisions have influence on subsequent de... more We study a dynamic model of self-control where previous decisions have influence on subsequent decision making. In our model effort and guilt are negative emotions produced by previous decisions to either resist or yield to temptation, respectively. These emotions calibrate an individual's self-control, in turn affecting future decisions. Our model explains non-stationary consumption paths characterized by compensatory indulgence and restraint, why under some circumstances the amplitude of this switching pattern increases with foresight, and how unavoidable options that might show up on one's menu influence choices, consequent emotions, consumption paths, and preferences for commitment. We discuss the implications of self-control insights provided by our model for both consumers and marketers.

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000

We study a principal-agent framework in which principals can assign wage-irrelevant goals to agen... more We study a principal-agent framework in which principals can assign wage-irrelevant goals to agents. We find evidence that, when given the possibility to set wage-irrelevant goals, principals select incentive contracts for which pay is less responsive to agents' performance. Agents' performance is higher in the presence of goal setting despite weaker incentives. We develop a principal-agent model with reference-dependent utility that illustrates how labor contracts combining weak monetary incentives and wage-irrelevant goals can be optimal. The pervasive use of non-monetary incentives in the workplace may help account for previous empirical findings suggesting that firms rely on unexpectedly weak monetary incentives.

We study a principal agent model where agents derive a sense of pride when accomplishing producti... more We study a principal agent model where agents derive a sense of pride when accomplishing production goals. As in classical models, the principal offers a pay-per-performance wage to the agent, determining the agent’s extrinsic incentives. However, in our setting, the principal does also want to set goals that affect the agents’ intrinsic motivation to work. Agents differ in their personal

In this paper, we analyze the implications of consumers'temptation on pric- ing and product o... more In this paper, we analyze the implications of consumers'temptation on pric- ing and product oerings when the dierentiation of the product is horizontal. We formalize temptation as a change in the consumers' ideal point on the Hotelling line. Given these consumer preferences, we study the monopolist's optimal pricing and product oerings strategy. We …nd that product diversity decreases with the

Resources, Conservation and Recycling